THE QUESTION of greatest moment in regard to modes of voting is that of secrecy1 or publicity2; and to this we will at once address ourselves.
It would be a great mistake to make the discussion turn on sentimentalities about skulking3 or cowardice4. Secrecy is justifiable5 in many cases, imperative6 in some, and it is not cowardice to seek protection against evils which are honestly avoidable. Nor can it be reasonably maintained that no cases are conceivable in which secret voting is preferable to public. But I must contend that these cases, in affairs of a political character, are the exception, not the rule.
The present is one of the many instances in which, as I have already had occasion to remark, the spirit of an institution, the impression it makes on the mind of the citizen, is one of the most important parts of its operation. The spirit of vote by ballot7 — the interpretation8 likely to be put on it in the mind of an elector — is that the suffrage9 is given to him for himself; for his particular use and benefit, and not as a trust for the public. For if it is indeed a trust, if the public are entitled to his vote, are not they entitled to know his vote? This false and pernicious impression may well be made on the generality, since it has been made on most of those who of late years have been conspicuous10 advocates of the ballot. The doctrine11 was not so understood by its earlier promoters; but the effect of a doctrine on the mind is best shown, not in those who form it, but in those who are formed by it. Mr. Bright and his school of democrats12 think themselves greatly concerned in maintaining that the franchise13 is what they term a right, not a trust. Now this one idea, taking root in the general mind, does a moral mischief14 outweighing15 all the good that the ballot could do, at the highest possible estimate of it. In whatever way we define or understand the idea of a right, no person can have a right (except in the purely16 legal sense) to power over others: every such power, which he is allowed to possess, is morally, in the fullest force of the term, a trust. But the exercise of any political function, either as an elector or as a representative, is power over others.
Those who say that the suffrage is not a trust but a right will scarcely accept the conclusions to which their doctrine leads. If it is a right, if it belongs to the voter for his own sake, on what ground can we blame him for selling it, or using it to recommend himself to any one whom it is his interest to please? A person is not expected to consult exclusively the public benefit in the use he makes of his house, or his three per cent stock, or anything else to which he really has a right. The suffrage is indeed due to him, among other reasons, as a means to his own protection, but only against treatment from which he is equally bound, so far as depends on his vote, to protect every one of his fellow-citizens. His vote is not a thing in which he has an option; it has no more to do with his personal wishes than the verdict of a juryman. It is strictly17 a matter of duty; he is bound to give it according to his best and most conscientious18 opinion of the public good. Whoever has any other idea of it is unfit to have the suffrage; its effect on him is to pervert19, not to elevate his mind. Instead of opening his heart to an exalted20 patriotism21 and the obligation of public duty, it awakens22 and nourishes in him the disposition23 to use a public function for his own interest, pleasure, or caprice; the same feelings and purposes, on a humbler scale, which actuate a despot and oppressor. Now an ordinary citizen in any public position, or on whom there devolves any social function, is certain to think and feel, respecting the obligations it imposes on him, exactly what society appears to think and feel in conferring it. What seems to be expected from him by society forms a standard which he may fall below, but which he will seldom rise above. And the interpretation which he is almost sure to put upon secret voting is that he is not bound to give his vote with any reference to those who are not allowed to know how he gives it; but may bestow24 it simply as he feels inclined.
This is the decisive reason why the argument does not hold, from the use of the ballot in clubs and private societies, to its adoption25 in parliamentary elections. A member of a club is really, what the elector falsely believes himself to be, under no obligation to consider the wishes or interests of any one else. He declares nothing by his vote but that he is or is not willing to associate, in a manner more or less close, with a particular person. This is a matter on which, by universal admission, his own pleasure or inclination26 is entitled to decide: and that he should be able so to decide it without risking a quarrel is best for everybody, the rejected person included. An additional reason rendering27 the ballot unobjectionable in these cases is that it does not necessarily or naturally lead to lying. The persons concerned are of the same class or rank, and it would be considered improper28 in one of them to press another with questions as to how he had voted. It is far otherwise in parliamentary elections, and is likely to remain so, as long as the social relations exist which produce the demand for the ballot; as long as one person is sufficiently29 the superior of another to think himself entitled to dictate30 his vote. And while this is the case, silence or an evasive answer is certain to be construed31 as proof that the vote given has not been that which was desired.
In any political election, even by universal suffrage (and still more obviously in the case of a restricted suffrage), the voter is under an absolute moral obligation to consider the interest of the public, not his private advantage, and give his vote, to the best of his judgment32, exactly as he would be bound to do if he were the sole voter, and the election depended upon him alone. This being admitted, it is at least a prima facie consequence that the duty of voting, like any other public duty, should be performed under the eye and criticism of the public; every one of whom has not only an interest in its performance, but a good title to consider himself wronged if it is performed otherwise than honestly and carefully. Undoubtedly33 neither this nor any other maxim34 of political morality is absolutely inviolable; it may be overruled by still more cogent35 considerations. But its weight is such that the cases which admit of a departure from it must be of a strikingly exceptional character.
It may, unquestionably, be the fact that if we attempt, by publicity, to make the voter responsible to the public for his vote, he will practically be made responsible for it to some powerful individual, whose interest is more opposed to the general interest of the community than that of the voter himself would be if, by the shield of secrecy, he were released from responsibility altogether. When this is the condition, in a high degree, of a large proportion of the voters, the ballot may be the smaller evil. When the voters are slaves, anything may be tolerated which enables them to throw off the yoke36. The strongest case for the ballot is when the mischievous37 power of the Few over the Many is increasing. In the decline of the Roman republic the reasons for the ballot were irresistible38. The oligarchy39 was yearly becoming richer and more tyrannical, the people poorer and more dependent, and it was necessary to erect40 stronger and stronger barriers against such abuse of the franchise as rendered it but an instrument the more in the hands of unprincipled persons of consequence. As little can it be doubted that the ballot, so far as it existed, had a beneficial operation in the Athenian constitution. Even in the least unstable41 of the Grecian commonwealths42 freedom might be for the time destroyed by a single unfairly obtained popular vote; and though the Athenian voter was not sufficiently dependent to be habitually43 coerced44, he might have been bribed45, or intimidated46 by the lawless outrages47 of some knot of individuals, such as were not uncommon48 even at Athens among the youth of rank and fortune. The ballot was in these cases a valuable instrument of order, and conduced to the Eunomia by which Athens was distinguished49 among the ancient commonwealths.
But in the more advanced states of modern Europe, and especially in this country, the power of coercing51 voters has declined and is declining; and bad voting is now less to be apprehended52 from the influences to which the voter is subject at the hands of others than from the sinister53 interests and discreditable feelings which belong to himself, either individually or as a member of a class. To secure him against the first, at the cost of removing all restraint from the last, would be to exchange a smaller and a diminishing evil for a greater and increasing one. On this topic, and on the question generally, as applicable to England at the present date, I have, in a pamphlet on Parliamentary Reform, expressed myself in terms which, as I do not feel that I can improve upon, I will venture here to transcribe54.
"Thirty years ago it was still true that in the election of members of Parliament the main evil to be guarded against was that which the ballot would exclude — coercion55 by landlords, employers, and customers. At present, I conceive, a much greater source of evil is the selfishness, or the selfish partialities, of the voter himself. A base and mischievous vote is now, I am convinced, much oftener given from the voter's personal interest, or class interest, or some mean feeling in his own mind, than from any fear of consequences at the hands of others: and to these influences the ballot would enable him to yield himself up, free from all sense of shame or responsibility.
"In times not long gone by, the higher and richer classes were in complete possession of the government. Their power was the master grievance56 of the country. The habit of voting at the bidding of an employer, or of a landlord, was so firmly established, that hardly anything was capable of shaking it but a strong popular enthusiasm, seldom known to exist but in a good cause. A vote given in opposition57 to those influences was therefore, in general, an honest, a public-spirited vote; but in any case, and by whatever motive58 dictated59, it was almost sure to be a good vote, for it was a vote against the monster evil, the over-ruling influence of oligarchy. Could the voter at that time have been enabled, with safety to himself, to exercise his privilege freely, even though neither honestly nor intelligently, it would have been a great gain to reform; for it would have broken the yoke of the then ruling power in the country — the power which had created and which maintained all that was bad in the institutions and the administration of the State — the power of landlords and boroughmongers.
"The ballot was not adopted; but the progress of circumstances has done and is doing more and more, in this respect, the work of the ballot. Both the political and the social state of the country, as they affect this question, have greatly changed, and are changing every day. The higher classes are not now masters of the country. A person must be blind to all the signs of the times who could think that the middle classes are as subservient60 to the higher, or the working classes as dependent on the higher and middle, as they were a quarter of a century ago. The events of that quarter of a century have not only taught each class to know its own collective strength, but have put the individuals of a lower class in a condition to show a much bolder front to those of a higher. In a majority of cases, the vote of the electors, whether in opposition to or in accordance with the wishes of their superiors, is not now the effect of coercion, which there are no longer the same means of applying, but the expression of their own personal or political partialities. The very vices61 of the present electoral system are a proof of this. The growth of bribery62, so loudly complained of, and the spread of the contagion64 to places formerly65 free from it, are evidence that the local influences are no longer paramount66; that the electors now vote to please themselves, and not other people. There is, no doubt, in counties, and in the smaller boroughs67, a large amount of servile dependence68 still remaining; but the temper of the times is adverse69 to it, and the force of events is constantly tending to diminish it. A good tenant70 can now feel that he is as valuable to his landlord as his landlord is to him; a prosperous tradesman can afford to feel independent of any particular customer. At every election the votes are more and more the voter's own. It is their minds, far more than their personal circumstances, that now require to be emancipated71. They are no longer passive instruments of other men's will — mere72 organs for putting power into the hands of a controlling oligarchy. The electors themselves are becoming the oligarchy.
"Exactly in proportion as the vote of the elector is determined73 by his own will, and not by that of somebody who is his master, his position is similar to that of a member of Parliament, and publicity is indispensable. So long as any portion of the community are unrepresented, the argument of the Chartists against ballot in conjunction with a restricted suffrage is unassailable. The present electors, and the bulk of those whom any probable Reform Bill would add to the number, are the middle class; and have as much a class interest, distinct from the working classes, as landlords or great manufacturers. Were the suffrage extended to all skilled labourers, even these would, or might, still have a class interest distinct from the unskilled. Suppose it extended to all men — suppose that what was formerly called by the misapplied name of universal suffrage, and now by the silly title of manhood suffrage, became the law; the voters would still have a class interest, as distinguished from women. Suppose that there were a question before the Legislature specially50 affecting women; as whether women should be allowed to graduate at Universities; whether the mild penalties inflicted75 on ruffians who beat their wives daily almost to death's door should be exchanged for something more effectual; or suppose that any one should propose in the British Parliament, what one State after another in America is enacting76, not by a mere law, but by a provision of their revised Constitutions — that married women should have a right to their own property. Are not a man's wife and daughters entitled to know whether he votes for or against a candidate who will support these propositions?
"It will of course be objected that these arguments' derive78 all their weight from the supposition of an unjust state of the suffrage: That if the opinion of the non-electors is likely to make the elector vote more honestly, or more beneficially, than he would vote if left to himself, they are more fit to be electors than he is, and ought to have the franchise: That whoever is fit to influence electors is fit to be an elector: That those to whom voters ought to be responsible should be themselves voters; and being such, should have the safeguard of the ballot to shield them from the undue79 influence of powerful individuals or classes to whom they ought not to be responsible.
"This argument is specious80, and I once thought it conclusive81. It now appears to me fallacious. All who are fit to influence electors are not, for that reason, fit to be themselves electors. This last is a much greater power than the former, and those may be ripe for the minor82 political function who could not as yet be safely trusted with the superior. The opinions and wishes of the poorest and rudest class of labourers may be very useful as one influence among others on the minds of the voters, as well as on those of the Legislature; and yet it might be highly mischievous to give them the preponderant influence by admitting them, in their present state of morals and intelligence, to the full exercise of the suffrage. It is precisely83 this indirect influence of those who have not the suffrage over those who have which, by its progressive growth, softens84 the transition to every fresh extension of the franchise, and is the means by which, when the time is ripe, the extension is peacefully brought about. But there is another and a still deeper consideration, which should never be left out of the account in political speculations85. The notion is itself unfounded, that publicity, and the sense of being answerable to the public, are of no use unless the public are qualified86 to form a sound judgment. It is a very superficial view of the utility of public opinion to suppose that it does good only when it succeeds in enforcing a servile conformity87 to itself. To be under the eyes of others — to have to defend oneself to others — is never more important than to those who act in opposition to the opinion of others, for it obliges them to have sure ground of their own. Nothing has so steadying an influence as working against pressure. Unless when under the temporary sway of passionate88 excitement, no one will do that which he expects to be greatly blamed for, unless from a preconceived and fixed89 purpose of his own; which is always evidence of a thoughtful and deliberate character, and, except in radically90 bad men, generally proceeds from sincere and strong personal convictions. Even the bare fact of having to give an account of their conduct is a powerful inducement to adhere to conduct of which at least some decent account can be given. If any one thinks that the mere obligation of preserving decency91 is not a very considerable check on the abuse of power, he has never had his attention called to the conduct of those who do not feel under the necessity of observing that restraint. Publicity is inappreciable, even when it does no more than prevent that which can by no possibility be plausibly92 defended — than compel deliberation, and force every one to determine, before he acts, what he shall say if called to account for his actions.
"But, if not now (it may be said), at least hereafter, when all are fit to have votes, and when all men and women are admitted to vote in virtue93 of their fitness; then there can no longer be danger of class legislation; then the electors, being the nation, can have no interest apart from the general interest: even if individuals still vote according to private or class inducements, the majority will have no such inducement; and as there will then be no non-electors to whom they ought to be responsible, the effect of the ballot, excluding none but the sinister influences, will be wholly beneficial.
"Even in this I do not agree. I cannot think that even if the people were fit for, and had obtained, universal suffrage, the ballot would be desirable. First, because it could not, in such circumstances be supposed to be needful. Let us only conceive the state of things which the hypothesis implies; a people universally educated, and every grown-up human being possessed94 of a vote. If, even when only a small proportion are electors, and the majority of the population almost uneducated, public opinion is already, as every one now sees that it is, the ruling power in the last resort; it is a chimera95 to suppose that over a community who all read, and who all have votes, any power could be exercised by landlords and rich people against their own inclination which it would be at all difficult for them to throw off. But though the protection of secrecy would then be needless, the control of publicity would be as needful as ever. The universal observation of mankind has been very fallacious if the mere fact of being one of the community, and not being in a position of pronounced contrariety of interest to the public at large, is enough to ensure the performance of a public duty, without either the stimulus96 or the restraint derived97 from the opinion of our fellow creatures. A man's own particular share of the public interest, even though he may have no private interest drawing him in the opposite direction, is not, as a general rule, found sufficient to make him do his duty to the public without other external inducements. Neither can it be admitted that even if all had votes they would give their votes as honestly in secret as in public.
"The proposition that the electors when they compose the whole of the community cannot have an interest in voting against the interest of the community will be found on examination to have more sound than meaning in it. Though the community as a whole can have (as the terms imply) no other interest than its collective interest, any or every individual in it may. A man's interest consists of whatever he takes an interest in. Everybody has as many different interests as he has feelings; likings or dislikings, either of a selfish or of a better kind. It cannot be said that any of these, taken by itself, constitutes 'his interest'; he is a good man or a bad according as he prefers one class of his interests or another. A man who is a tyrant98 at home will be apt to sympathise with tyranny (when not exercised over himself): he will be almost certain not to sympathise with resistance to tyranny. An envious99 man will vote against Aristides because he is called the just. A selfish man will prefer even a trifling100 individual benefit to his share of the advantage which his country would derive from a good law; because interests peculiar101 to himself are those which the habits of his mind both dispose him to dwell on, and make him best able to estimate. A great number of the electors will have two sets of preferences — those on private and those on public grounds. The last are the only ones which the elector would like to avow102. The best side of their character is that which people are anxious to show, even to those who are no better than themselves. People will give dishonest or mean votes from lucre103, from malice104, from pique105, from personal rivalry106, even from the interests or prejudices of class or sect107, more readily in secret than in public. And cases exist — they may come to be more frequent — in which almost the only restraint upon a majority of knaves108 consists in their involuntary respect for the opinion of an honest minority. In such a case as that of the repudiating109 States of North America, is there not some check to the unprincipled voter in the shame of looking an honest man in the face? Since all this good would be sacrificed by the ballot, even in the circumstances most favourable110 to it, a much stronger case is requisite111 than can now be made out for its necessity (and the case is continually becoming still weaker) to make its adoption desirable."8
8 Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform, 2nd ed. pp 32-36.
On the other debateable points connected with the mode of voting it is not necessary to expend112 so many words. The system of personal representation, as organised by Mr. Hare, renders necessary the employment of voting papers. But it appears to me indispensable that the signature of the elector should be affixed113 to the paper at a public polling place, or if there be no such place conveniently accessible, at some office open to all the world, and in the presence of a responsible public officer. The proposal which has been thrown out of allowing the voting papers to be filled up at the voter's own residence, and sent by the post, or called for by a public officer, I should regard as fatal. The act would be done in the absence of the salutary and the presence of all the pernicious influences. The briber63 might, in the shelter of privacy, behold114 with his own eyes his bargain fulfilled, and the intimidator115 could see the extorted116 obedience117 rendered irrevocably on the spot; while the beneficent counter-influence of the presence of those who knew the voter's real sentiments, and the inspiring effect of the sympathy of those of his own party or opinion, would be shut out.9
9 "This expedient118 has been recommended, both on the score of saving expense, and on that of obtaining the votes of many electors who otherwise would not vote, and who are regarded by the advocates of the plan as a particularly desirable class of voters. The scheme has been carried into practice in the election of poor-law guardians119, and its success in that instance is appealed to in favour of adopting it in the more important case of voting for a member of the Legislature. But the two cases appear to me to differ in the point on which the benefits of the expedient depend. In a local election for a special kind of administrative120 business, which consists mainly in the dispensation of a public fund, it is an object to prevent the choice from being exclusively in the hands of those who actively121 concern themselves about it; for the public interest which attaches to the election being of a limited kind, and in most cases not very great in degree, the disposition to make themselves busy in the matter is apt to be in a great measure confined to persons who hope to turn their activity to their own private advantage; and it may be very desirable to render the intervention122 of other people as little onerous123 to them as possible, if only for the purpose of swamping these private interests. But when the matter in hand is the great business of national government, in which every one must take an interest who cares for anything out of himself, or who cares even for himself intelligently, it is much rather an object to prevent those from voting who are indifferent to the subject, than to induce them to vote by any other means than that of awakening124 their dormant125 minds. The voter who does not care enough about the election to go to the poll, is the very man who, if he can vote without that small trouble, will give his vote to the first person who asks for it, or on the most trifling or frivolous126 inducement. A man who does not care whether he votes, is not likely to care much which way he votes; and he who is in that state of mind has no moral right to vote at all; since, if he does so, a vote which is not the expression of a conviction, counts for as much, and goes as far in determining the result, as one which represents the thoughts and purposes of a life." — Thoughts, etc., p. 39.
The polling places should be so numerous as to be within easy reach of every voter; and no expenses of conveyance127, at the cost of the candidate, should be tolerated under any pretext128. The infirm, and they only on medical certificate, should have the right of claiming suitable carriage conveyance, at the cost of the State, or of the locality. Hustings129, poll clerks, and all the necessary machinery130 of elections, should be at the public charge. Not only the candidate should not be required, he should not be permitted, to incur131 any but a limited and trifling expense for his election. Mr. Hare thinks it desirable that a sum of L50 should be required from every one who places his name on the list of candidates, to prevent persons who have no chance of success, and no real intention of attempting it, from becoming candidates in wantonness or from mere love of notoriety, and perhaps carrying off a few votes which are needed for the return of more serious aspirants132. There is one expense which a candidate or his supporters cannot help incurring133, and which it can hardly be expected that the public should defray for every one who may choose to demand it; that of making his claims known to the electors, by advertisements, placards, and circulars. For all necessary expenses of this kind the L50 proposed by Mr. Hare, if allowed to be drawn134 upon for these purposes (it might be made L100 if requisite), ought to be sufficient. If the friends of the candidate choose to go to expense for committees and canvassing135 there are no means of preventing them; but such expenses out of the candidates's own pocket, or any expenses whatever beyond the deposit of L50 (or L100), should be illegal and punishable. If there appeared any likelihood that opinion would refuse to connive136 at falsehood, a declaration on oath or honour should be required from every member on taking his seat that he had not expended137, nor would expend, money or money's worth beyond the L50, directly or indirectly138, for the purposes of his election; and if the assertion were proved to be false or the pledge to have been broken, he should be liable to the penalties of perjury139.
It is probable that those penalties, by showing that the Legislature was in earnest, would turn the course of opinion in the same direction, and would hinder it from regarding, as has hitherto done, this most serious crime against society as a venial140 peccadillo141. When once this effect has been produced, there need be no doubt that the declaration on oath or honour would be considered binding142.10 "Opinion tolerates a false disclaimer, only when it already tolerates the thing disclaimed143." This is notoriously the case with regard to electoral corruption144. There has never yet been, among political men, any real and serious attempt to prevent bribery, because there has been no real desire that elections should not be costly146. Their costliness147 is an advantage to those who can afford the expense, by excluding a multitude of competitors; and anything, however noxious148, is cherished as having a conservative tendency if it limits the access to Parliament to rich men. This is a rooted feeling among our legislators of both political parties, and is almost the only point on which I believe them to be really ill-intentioned. They care comparatively little who votes, as long as they feel assured that none but persons of their own class can be voted for. They know that they can rely on the fellow-feeling of one of their class with another, while the subservience149 of nouveaux enrichis, who are knocking at the door of the class, is a still surer reliance; and that nothing very hostile to the class interests or feelings of the rich need be apprehended under the most democratic suffrage as long as democratic persons can be prevented from being elected to Parliament. But, even from their own point of view, this balancing of evil by evil, instead of combining good with good, is a wretched policy. The object should be to bring together the best members of both classes, under such a tenure150 as shall induce them to lay aside their class preferences, and pursue jointly151 the path traced by the common interest; instead of allowing the class feelings of the Many to have full swing in the constituencies, subject to the impediment of having to act through persons imbued152 with the class feelings of the Few.
10 Several of the witnesses before the Committee of the House of Commons in 1860, on the operation of the Corrupt145 Practices Prevention Act, some of them of great practical experience in election matters, were favourable (either absolutely or as a last resort) to the principle of requiring a declaration from members of Parliament; and were of opinion that, if supported by penalties, it would be, to a great degree, effectual. (Evidence, pp. 46, 54-57, 67, 123, 198-202, 208.) The Chief Commissioner153 of the Wakefield Inquiry154 said (in reference certainly to a different proposal), "If they see that the Legislature is earnest upon the subject, the machinery will work. . . . I am quite sure that if some personal stigma155 were applied74 upon conviction of bribery, it would change the current of public opinion" (pp. 26 and 32). A distinguished member of the Committee (and of the present Cabinet) seemed to think it very objectionable to attach the penalties of perjury to a merely promissory as distinguished from an assertory oath; but he was reminded, that the oath taken by a witness in a court of justice is a promissory oath: and the rejoinder (that the witness's promise relates to an act to be done at once, while the member's would be a promise for all future time) would only be to the purpose, if it could be supposed that the swearer might forget the obligation he had entered into, or could possibly violate it unawares: contingencies156 which, in a case like the present, are out of the question.
A more substantial difficulty is that one of the forms most frequently assumed by election expenditure157 is that of subscriptions159 to local charities, or other local objects; and it would be a strong measure to enact77 that money should not be given in charity, within a place, by the member for it. When such subscriptions are bona fide, the popularity which may be derived from them is an advantage which it seems hardly possible to deny to superior riches. But the greatest part of the mischief consists in the fact that money so contributed is employed in bribery, under the euphemistic name of keeping up the member's interest. To guard against this, it should be part of the member's promissory declaration, that all sums expended by him in the place, or for any purpose connected with it or with any of its inhabitants (with the exception perhaps of his own hotel expenses), should pass through the hands of the election auditor160, and be by him (and not by the member himself or his friends) applied to its declared purpose.
The principle of making all lawful161 expenses of a charge not upon the candidate, but upon the locality, was upheld by two of the best witnesses (pp. 20, 65-70, 277).
There is scarcely any mode in which political institutions are more morally mischievous-work greater evil through their spirit-than by representing political functions as a favour to be conferred, a thing which the depositary is to ask for as desiring it for himself, and even pay for as if it were designed for his pecuniary162 benefit. Men are not fond of paying large sums for leave to perform a laborious163 duty. Plato had a much juster view of the conditions of good government when he asserted that the persons who should be sought out to be invested with political power are those who are personally most averse164 to it, and that the only motive which can be relied on for inducing the fittest men to take upon themselves the toils165 of government is the fear of being governed by worse men. What must an elector think, when he sees three or four gentlemen, none of them previously166 observed to be lavish167 of their money on projects of disinterested168 beneficence, vying169 with one another in the sums they expend to be enabled to write M.P. after their names? Is it likely he will suppose that it is for his interest they incur all this cost? And if he form an uncomplimentary opinion of their part in the affair, what moral obligation is he likely to feel as to his own? Politicians are fond of treating it as the dream of enthusiasts170 that the electoral body will ever be uncorrupt: truly enough, until they are willing to become so themselves: for the electors, assuredly, will take their moral tone from the candidates. So long as the elected member, in any shape or manner, pay for his seat, all endeavours, will fail to make the business of election anything but a selfish bargain on all sides. "So long as the candidate himself, and the customs of the world, seem to regard the function of a member of Parliament less as a duty to be discharged than a personal favour to be solicited171, no effort will avail to implant172 in an ordinary voter the feeling that the election of a member of Parliament is also a matter of duty, and that he is not at liberty to bestow his vote on any other consideration than that of personal fitness."
The same principle which demands that no payment of money for election purposes should be either required or tolerated on the part of the person elected dictates173 another conclusion, apparently174 of contrary tendency, but really directed to the same object. It negatives what has often been proposed as a means of rendering Parliament accessible to persons of all ranks and circumstances; the payment of members of Parliament. If, as in some of our colonies, there are scarcely any fit persons who can afford to attend to an unpaid175 occupation, the payment should be an indemnity176 for loss of time or money, not a salary. The greater latitude177 of choice which a salary would give is an illusory advantage. No remuneration which any one would think of attaching to the post would attract to it those who were seriously engaged in other lucrative178 professions with a prospect179 of succeeding in them. The business of a member of Parliament would therefore become an occupation in itself; carried on, like other professions, with a view chiefly to its pecuniary returns, and under the demoralising influences of an occupation essentially180 precarious181. It would become an object of desire to adventurers of a low class; and 658 persons in possession, with ten or twenty times as many in expectancy182, would be incessantly183 bidding to attract or retain the suffrages184 of the electors, by promising185 all things, honest or dishonest, possible or impossible, and rivalling each other in pandering186 to the meanest feelings and most ignorant prejudices of the vulgarest part of the crowd. The auction187 between Cleon and the sausage-seller in Aristophanes is a fair caricature of what would be always going on. Such an institution would be a perpetual blister188 applied to the most peccant parts of human nature. It amounts to offering 658 prizes for the most successful flatterer, the most adroit189 misleader, of a body of his fellow-countrymen. Under no despotism has there been such an organised system of tillage for raising a rich crop of vicious courtiership.11 When, by reason of pre-eminent qualifications (as may at any time happen to be the case), it is desirable that a person entirely190 without independent means, either derived from property or from a trade or profession, should be brought into Parliament to render services which no other person accessible can render as well, there is the resource of a public subscription158; he may be supported while in Parliament, like Andrew Marvell, by the contributions of his constituents191. This mode is unobjectionable for such an honour will never be paid to mere subserviency192: bodies of men do not care so much for the difference between one sycophant193 and another as to go to the expense of his maintenance in order to be flattered by that particular individual. Such a support will only be given in consideration of striking and impressive personal qualities, which, though no absolute proof of fitness to be a national representative, are some presumption194 of it, and, at all events, some guarantee for the possession of an independent opinion and will.
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1
secrecy
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| n.秘密，保密，隐蔽 | |
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2
publicity
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| n.众所周知，闻名；宣传，广告 | |
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3
skulking
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| v.潜伏，偷偷摸摸地走动，鬼鬼祟祟地活动( skulk的现在分词 ) | |
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4
cowardice
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| n.胆小，怯懦 | |
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5
justifiable
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| adj.有理由的，无可非议的 | |
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imperative
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| n.命令，需要；规则；祈使语气；adj.强制的；紧急的 | |
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7
ballot
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| n.（不记名）投票，投票总数，投票权；vi.投票 | |
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interpretation
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| n.解释，说明，描述；艺术处理 | |
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suffrage
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| n.投票，选举权，参政权 | |
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conspicuous
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| adj.明眼的，惹人注目的；炫耀的，摆阔气的 | |
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doctrine
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| n.教义；主义；学说 | |
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democrats
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| n.民主主义者，民主人士( democrat的名词复数 ) | |
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franchise
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| n.特许，特权，专营权，特许权 | |
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14
mischief
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| n.损害，伤害，危害；恶作剧，捣蛋，胡闹 | |
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15
outweighing
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| v.在重量上超过( outweigh的现在分词 )；在重要性或价值方面超过 | |
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purely
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| adv.纯粹地，完全地 | |
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strictly
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| adv.严厉地，严格地；严密地 | |
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18
conscientious
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| adj.审慎正直的，认真的，本着良心的 | |
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19
pervert
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| n.堕落者，反常者；vt.误用，滥用；使人堕落，使入邪路 | |
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exalted
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| adj.(地位等)高的，崇高的；尊贵的，高尚的 | |
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patriotism
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| n.爱国精神，爱国心，爱国主义 | |
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22
awakens
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| v.（使）醒( awaken的第三人称单数 )；（使）觉醒；弄醒；（使）意识到 | |
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23
disposition
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| n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署 | |
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24
bestow
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| v.把…赠与，把…授予；花费 | |
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25
adoption
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| n.采用，采纳，通过；收养 | |
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26
inclination
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| n.倾斜；点头；弯腰；斜坡；倾度；倾向；爱好 | |
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27
rendering
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| n.表现，描写 | |
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improper
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| adj.不适当的，不合适的，不正确的，不合礼仪的 | |
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sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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dictate
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| v.口授；(使)听写；指令，指示，命令 | |
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31
construed
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| v.解释（陈述、行为等）( construe的过去式和过去分词 )；翻译，作句法分析 | |
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32
judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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33
undoubtedly
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| adv.确实地，无疑地 | |
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34
maxim
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| n.格言，箴言 | |
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cogent
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| adj.强有力的，有说服力的 | |
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36
yoke
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| n.轭；支配；v.给...上轭，连接，使成配偶 | |
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mischievous
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| adj.调皮的，恶作剧的，有害的，伤人的 | |
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38
irresistible
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| adj.非常诱人的，无法拒绝的，无法抗拒的 | |
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oligarchy
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| n.寡头政治 | |
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40
erect
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| n./v.树立，建立，使竖立；adj.直立的，垂直的 | |
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unstable
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| adj.不稳定的，易变的 | |
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42
commonwealths
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| n.共和国( commonwealth的名词复数 )；联邦；团体；协会 | |
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43
habitually
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| ad.习惯地，通常地 | |
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44
coerced
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| v.迫使做( coerce的过去式和过去分词 )；强迫；（以武力、惩罚、威胁等手段）控制；支配 | |
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45
bribed
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| v.贿赂( bribe的过去式和过去分词 )；向（某人）行贿，贿赂 | |
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46
intimidated
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| v.恐吓；威胁adj.害怕的；受到威胁的 | |
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47
outrages
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| 引起…的义愤，激怒( outrage的第三人称单数 ) | |
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uncommon
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| adj.罕见的，非凡的，不平常的 | |
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49
distinguished
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| adj.卓越的，杰出的，著名的 | |
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50
specially
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| adv.特定地；特殊地；明确地 | |
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51
coercing
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| v.迫使做( coerce的现在分词 )；强迫；（以武力、惩罚、威胁等手段）控制；支配 | |
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52
apprehended
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| 逮捕，拘押( apprehend的过去式和过去分词 )； 理解 | |
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53
sinister
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| adj.不吉利的，凶恶的，左边的 | |
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54
transcribe
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| v.抄写，誉写；改编(乐曲)；复制，转录 | |
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55
coercion
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| n.强制，高压统治 | |
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56
grievance
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| n.怨愤，气恼，委屈 | |
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57
opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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motive
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| n.动机，目的；adv.发动的，运动的 | |
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59
dictated
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| v.大声讲或读( dictate的过去式和过去分词 )；口授；支配；摆布 | |
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subservient
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| adj.卑屈的，阿谀的 | |
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61
vices
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| 缺陷( vice的名词复数 )； 恶习； 不道德行为； 台钳 | |
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62
bribery
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| n.贿络行为，行贿，受贿 | |
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63
briber
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| n.行贿者 | |
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64
contagion
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| n.(通过接触的疾病)传染；蔓延 | |
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65
formerly
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| adv.从前，以前 | |
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paramount
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| a.最重要的，最高权力的 | |
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boroughs
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| （尤指大伦敦的）行政区( borough的名词复数 )； 议会中有代表的市镇 | |
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68
dependence
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| n.依靠，依赖；信任，信赖；隶属 | |
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69
adverse
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| adj.不利的；有害的；敌对的，不友好的 | |
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70
tenant
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| n.承租人；房客；佃户；v.租借，租用 | |
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71
emancipated
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| adj.被解放的，不受约束的v.解放某人（尤指摆脱政治、法律或社会的束缚）( emancipate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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72
mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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applied
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| adj.应用的；v.应用，适用 | |
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75
inflicted
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| 把…强加给，使承受，遭受( inflict的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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76
enacting
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| 制定（法律），通过（法案）( enact的现在分词 ) | |
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enact
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| vt.制定(法律)；上演，扮演 | |
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78
derive
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| v.取得；导出；引申；来自；源自；出自 | |
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undue
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| adj.过分的；不适当的；未到期的 | |
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80
specious
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| adj.似是而非的；adv.似是而非地 | |
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81
conclusive
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| adj.最后的，结论的；确凿的，消除怀疑的 | |
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82
minor
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| adj.较小(少)的，较次要的；n.辅修学科；vi.辅修 | |
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83
precisely
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| adv.恰好，正好，精确地，细致地 | |
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84
softens
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| （使）变软( soften的第三人称单数 )； 缓解打击； 缓和； 安慰 | |
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85
speculations
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| n.投机买卖( speculation的名词复数 )；思考；投机活动；推断 | |
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86
qualified
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| adj.合格的，有资格的，胜任的，有限制的 | |
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87
conformity
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| n.一致，遵从，顺从 | |
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88
passionate
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| adj.热情的，热烈的，激昂的，易动情的，易怒的，性情暴躁的 | |
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fixed
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| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
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radically
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| ad.根本地，本质地 | |
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91
decency
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| n.体面，得体，合宜，正派，庄重 | |
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plausibly
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| 似真地 | |
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93
virtue
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| n.德行，美德；贞操；优点；功效，效力 | |
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possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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chimera
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| n.神话怪物；梦幻 | |
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stimulus
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| n.刺激，刺激物，促进因素，引起兴奋的事物 | |
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97
derived
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| vi.起源；由来；衍生；导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取 | |
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tyrant
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| n.暴君，专制的君主，残暴的人 | |
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envious
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| adj.嫉妒的，羡慕的 | |
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trifling
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| adj.微不足道的；没什么价值的 | |
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101
peculiar
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| adj.古怪的，异常的；特殊的，特有的 | |
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avow
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| v.承认，公开宣称 | |
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lucre
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| n.金钱，财富 | |
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malice
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| n.恶意，怨恨，蓄意；[律]预谋 | |
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105
pique
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| v.伤害…的自尊心，使生气 n.不满，生气 | |
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rivalry
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| n.竞争，竞赛，对抗 | |
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sect
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| n.派别，宗教，学派，派系 | |
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knaves
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| n.恶棍，无赖( knave的名词复数 )；（纸牌中的）杰克 | |
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109
repudiating
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| v.（正式地）否认( repudiate的现在分词 )；拒绝接受；拒绝与…往来；拒不履行（法律义务） | |
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favourable
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| adj.赞成的，称赞的，有利的，良好的，顺利的 | |
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111
requisite
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| adj.需要的，必不可少的；n.必需品 | |
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112
expend
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| vt.花费，消费，消耗 | |
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113
affixed
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| adj.[医]附着的，附着的v.附加( affix的过去式和过去分词 )；粘贴；加以；盖（印章） | |
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114
behold
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| v.看，注视，看到 | |
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115
intimidator
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| n.威吓者，胁迫者 | |
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116
extorted
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| v.敲诈( extort的过去式和过去分词 )；曲解 | |
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117
obedience
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| n.服从，顺从 | |
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118
expedient
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| adj.有用的，有利的；n.紧急的办法，权宜之计 | |
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119
guardians
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| 监护人( guardian的名词复数 )； 保护者，维护者 | |
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120
administrative
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| adj.行政的，管理的 | |
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121
actively
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| adv.积极地，勤奋地 | |
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122
intervention
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| n.介入，干涉，干预 | |
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123
onerous
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| adj.繁重的 | |
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124
awakening
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| n.觉醒，醒悟 adj.觉醒中的；唤醒的 | |
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125
dormant
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| adj.暂停活动的；休眠的；潜伏的 | |
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126
frivolous
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| adj.轻薄的；轻率的 | |
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127
conveyance
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| n.(不动产等的)转让，让与；转让证书；传送；运送；表达；（正）运输工具 | |
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128
pretext
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| n.借口，托词 | |
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129
hustings
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| n.竞选活动 | |
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130
machinery
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| n.(总称)机械，机器；机构 | |
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131
incur
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| vt.招致，蒙受，遭遇 | |
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132
aspirants
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| n.有志向或渴望获得…的人( aspirant的名词复数 )v.渴望的，有抱负的，追求名誉或地位的( aspirant的第三人称单数 )；有志向或渴望获得…的人 | |
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133
incurring
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| 遭受，招致，引起( incur的现在分词 ) | |
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134
drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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canvassing
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| v.（在政治方面）游说( canvass的现在分词 )；调查（如选举前选民的）意见；为讨论而提出（意见等）；详细检查 | |
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136
connive
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| v.纵容；密谋 | |
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137
expended
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| v.花费( expend的过去式和过去分词 )；使用（钱等）做某事；用光；耗尽 | |
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138
indirectly
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| adv.间接地，不直接了当地 | |
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139
perjury
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| n.伪证；伪证罪 | |
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140
venial
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| adj.可宽恕的；轻微的 | |
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141
peccadillo
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| n.轻罪，小过失 | |
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142
binding
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| 有约束力的，有效的，应遵守的 | |
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143
disclaimed
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| v.否认( disclaim的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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144
corruption
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| n.腐败，堕落，贪污 | |
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corrupt
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| v.贿赂，收买；adj.腐败的，贪污的 | |
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costly
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| adj.昂贵的，价值高的，豪华的 | |
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147
costliness
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| 昂贵的 | |
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148
noxious
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| adj.有害的，有毒的；使道德败坏的，讨厌的 | |
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subservience
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| n.有利，有益；从属（地位），附属性；屈从，恭顺；媚态 | |
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tenure
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| n.终身职位；任期；(土地)保有权，保有期 | |
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151
jointly
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| ad.联合地，共同地 | |
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imbued
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| v.使（某人/某事）充满或激起（感情等）( imbue的过去式和过去分词 )；使充满；灌输；激发（强烈感情或品质等） | |
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153
commissioner
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| n.（政府厅、局、处等部门）专员，长官，委员 | |
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inquiry
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| n.打听，询问，调查，查问 | |
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155
stigma
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| n.耻辱，污名；(花的)柱头 | |
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156
contingencies
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| n.偶然发生的事故，意外事故( contingency的名词复数 )；以备万一 | |
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157
expenditure
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| n.(时间、劳力、金钱等)支出；使用，消耗 | |
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158
subscription
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| n.预订，预订费，亲笔签名，调配法，下标（处方） | |
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159
subscriptions
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| n.（报刊等的）订阅费( subscription的名词复数 )；捐款；（俱乐部的）会员费；捐助 | |
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160
auditor
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| n.审计员，旁听着 | |
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161
lawful
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| adj.法律许可的，守法的，合法的 | |
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162
pecuniary
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| adj.金钱的；金钱上的 | |
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163
laborious
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| adj.吃力的，努力的，不流畅 | |
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164
averse
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| adj.厌恶的；反对的，不乐意的 | |
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165
toils
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| 网 | |
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166
previously
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| adv.以前，先前（地） | |
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167
lavish
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| adj.无节制的；浪费的；vt.慷慨地给予，挥霍 | |
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168
disinterested
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| adj.不关心的，不感兴趣的 | |
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169
vying
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| adj.竞争的；比赛的 | |
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170
enthusiasts
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| n.热心人，热衷者( enthusiast的名词复数 ) | |
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171
solicited
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| v.恳求( solicit的过去式和过去分词 )；（指娼妇）拉客；索求；征求 | |
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172
implant
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| vt.注入，植入，灌输 | |
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173
dictates
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| n.命令，规定，要求( dictate的名词复数 )v.大声讲或读( dictate的第三人称单数 )；口授；支配；摆布 | |
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174
apparently
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| adv.显然地；表面上，似乎 | |
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175
unpaid
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| adj.未付款的，无报酬的 | |
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176
indemnity
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| n.赔偿，赔款，补偿金 | |
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177
latitude
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| n.纬度，行动或言论的自由(范围)，(pl.)地区 | |
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178
lucrative
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| adj.赚钱的，可获利的 | |
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179
prospect
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| n.前景，前途；景色，视野 | |
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180
essentially
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| adv.本质上，实质上，基本上 | |
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181
precarious
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| adj.不安定的，靠不住的；根据不足的 | |
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182
expectancy
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| n.期望，预期，（根据概率统计求得）预期数额 | |
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183
incessantly
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| ad.不停地 | |
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184
suffrages
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| （政治性选举的）选举权，投票权( suffrage的名词复数 ) | |
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185
promising
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| adj.有希望的，有前途的 | |
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186
pandering
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| v.迎合（他人的低级趣味或淫欲）( pander的现在分词 )；纵容某人；迁就某事物 | |
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187
auction
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| n.拍卖；拍卖会；vt.拍卖 | |
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188
blister
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| n.水疱；(油漆等的)气泡；v.(使)起泡 | |
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189
adroit
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| adj.熟练的，灵巧的 | |
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190
entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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191
constituents
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| n.选民( constituent的名词复数 )；成分；构成部分；要素 | |
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192
subserviency
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| n.有用，裨益 | |
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193
sycophant
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| n.马屁精 | |
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194
presumption
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| n.推测，可能性，冒昧，放肆，[法律]推定 | |
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