How then can the distinction of the understanding as to the manner in which they operate be necessary to their producing their due and uniform effect upon the mind? If certain effects did not regularly arise out of certain causes in mind as well as matter, there could be no rule given for them: nature does not follow the rule, but suggests it. Reason is the interpreter and critic of nature and genius, not their law-giver and judge. He must be a poor creature indeed whose practical convictions do not in almost all cases outrun his deliberate understanding, or who does not feel and know much more than he can give a reason for. Hence the distinction between eloquence7 and wisdom, between ingenuity8 and common sense. A man may be dexterous9 and able in explaining the grounds of his opinions, and yet may be a mere10 sophist, because he only sees one-half of a subject. Another may feel the whole weight of a question, nothing relating to it may be lost upon him, and yet he may be able to give no account of the manner in which it affects him, or to drag his reasons from their silent lurking11-places. This last will be a wise man, though neither a logician12 nor rhetorician. Goldsmith was a fool to Dr. Johnson in argument; that is, in assigning the specific grounds of his opinions: Dr. Johnson was a fool to Goldsmith in the fine tact, the airy, intuitive faculty13 with which he skimmed the surfaces of things, and unconsciously formed his Opinions. Common sense is the just result of the sum total of such unconscious impressions in the ordinary occurrences of life, as they are treasured up in the memory, and called out by the occasion. Genius and taste depend much upon the same principle exercised on loftier ground and in more unusual combinations.
I am glad to shelter myself from the charge of affectation or singularity in this view of an often debated but ill-understood point, by quoting a passage from Sir Joshua Reynolds’s Discourses14, which is full, and, I think, conclusive16 to the purpose. He says:—
‘I observe, as a fundamental ground common to all the Arts with which we have any concern in this Discourse15, that they address themselves only to two faculties17 of the mind, its imagination and its sensibility.
‘All theories which attempt to direct or to control the Art, upon any principles falsely called rational, which we form to ourselves upon a supposition of what ought in reason to be the end or means of Art, independent of the known first effect produced by objects on the imagination, must be false and delusive18. For though it may appear bold to say it, the imagination is here the residence of truth. If the imagination be affected19, the conclusion is fairly drawn20; if it be not affected, the reasoning is erroneous, because the end is not obtained; the effect itself being the test, and the only test, of the truth and efficacy of the means.
‘There is in the commerce of life, as in Art, a sagacity which is far from being contradictory21 to right reason, and is superior to any occasional exercise of that faculty which supersedes22 it and does not wait for the slow progress of deduction23, but goes at once, by what appears a kind of intuition, to the conclusion. A man endowed with this faculty feels and acknowledges the truth, though it is not always in his power, perhaps, to give a reason for it; because he cannot recollect4 and bring before him all the materials that gave birth to his opinion; for very many and very intricate considerations may unite to form the principle, even of small and minute parts, involved in, or dependent on, a great many things:— though these in process of time are forgotten, the right impression still remains24 fixed25 in his mind.
‘This impression is the result of the accumulated experience of our whole life, and has been collected, we do not always know how or when. But this mass of collective observation, however acquired, ought to prevail over that reason, which, however powerfully exerted on any particular occasion, will probably comprehend but a partial view of the subject; and our conduct in life, as well as in the arts, is or ought to be generally governed by this habitual26 reason: it is our happiness that we are enabled to draw on such funds. If we were obliged to enter into a theoretical deliberation on every occasion before we act, life would be at a stand, and Art would be impracticable.
‘It appears to me therefore’ (continues Sir Joshua) ‘that our first thoughts, that is, the effect which any thing produces on our minds on its first appearance, is never to be forgotten; and it demands for that reason, because it is the first, to be laid up with care. If this be not done, the artist may happen to impose on himself by partial reasoning; by a cold consideration of those animated27 thoughts which proceed, not perhaps from caprice or rashness (as he may afterwards conceit), but from the fulness of his mind, enriched with the copious28 stores of all the various inventions which he had ever seen, or had ever passed in his mind. These ideas are infused into his design, without any conscious effort; but if he be not on his guard, he may reconsider and correct them, till the whole matter is reduced to a commonplace invention.
‘This is sometimes the effect of what I mean to caution you against; that is to say, an unfounded distrust of the imagination and feeling, in favour of narrow, partial, confined, argumentative theories, and of principles that seem to apply to the design in hand, without considering those general impressions on the fancy in which real principles of sound reason, and of much more weight and importance, are involved, and, as it were, lie hid under the appearance of a sort of vulgar sentiment. Reason, without doubt, must ultimately determine everything; at this minute it is required to inform us when that very reason is to give way to feeling.’16
Mr. Burke, by whom the foregoing train of thinking was probably suggested, has insisted on the same thing, and made rather a perverse29 use of it in several parts of his Reflections on the French Revolution; and Windham in one of his Speeches has clenched30 it into an aphorism31 —‘There is nothing so true as habit.’ Once more I would say, common sense is tacit reason. Conscience is the same tacit sense of right and wrong, or the impression of our moral experience and moral apprehensions32 on the mind, which, because it works unseen, yet certainly, we suppose to be an instinct, implanted in the mind; as we sometimes attribute the violent operations of our passions, of which we can neither trace the source nor assign the reason, to the instigation of the Devil!
I shall here try to go more at large into this subject, and to give such instances and illustrations of it as occur to me.
One of the persons who had rendered themselves obnoxious34 to Government and been included in a charge for high treason in the year 1794, had retired35 soon after into Wales to write an epic36 poem and enjoy the luxuries of a rural life. In his peregrinations through that beautiful scenery, he had arrived one fine morning at the inn at Llangollen, in the romantic valley of that name. He had ordered his breakfast, and was sitting at the window in all the dalliance of expectation when a face passed, of which he took no notice at the instant — but when his breakfast was brought in presently after, he found his appetite for it gone — the day had lost its freshness in his eye — he was uneasy and spiritless; and without any cause that he could discover, a total change had taken place in his feelings. While he was trying to account for this odd circumstance, the same face passed again — it was the face of Taylor the spy; and he was longer at a loss to explain the difficulty. He had before caught only a transient glimpse, a passing side-view of the face; but though this was not sufficient to awaken37 a distinct idea in his memory, his feelings, quicker and surer, had taken the alarm; a string had been touched that gave a jar to his whole frame, and would not let him rest, though he could not at all tell what was the matter with him. To the flitting, shadowy, half-distinguished profile that had glided38 by his window was linked unconsciously and mysteriously, but inseparably, the impression of the trains that had been laid for him by this person; — in this brief moment, in this dim, illegible39 short-hand of the mind he had just escaped the speeches of the Attorney and Solicitor–General over again; the gaunt figure of Mr. Pitt glared by him; the walls of a prison enclosed him; and he felt the hands of the executioner near him, without knowing it till the tremor40 and disorder41 of his nerves gave information to his reasoning faculties that all was not well within. That is, the same state of mind was recalled by one circumstance in the series of association that had been produced by the whole set of circumstances at the time, though the manner in which this was done was not immediately perceptible. In other words, the feeling of pleasure or pain, of good or evil, is revived, and acts instantaneously upon the mind, before we have time to recollect the precise objects which have originally given birth to it.17 The incident here mentioned was merely, then, one case of what the learned understand by the association of ideas: but all that is meant by feeling or common sense is nothing but the different cases of the association of ideas, more or less true to the impression of the original circumstances, as reason begins with the more formal development of those circumstances, or pretends to account for the different cases of the association of ideas. But it does not follow that the dumb and silent pleading of the former (though sometimes, nay42 often, mistaken) is less true than that of its babbling43 interpreter, or that we are never to trust its dictates45 without consulting the express authority of reason. Both are imperfect, both are useful in their way, and therefore both are best together, to correct or to confirm one another. It does not appear that in the singular instance above mentioned, the sudden impression on the mind was superstition46 or fancy, though it might have been thought so, had it not been proved by the event to have a real physical and moral cause. Had not the same face returned again, the doubt would never have been properly cleared up, but would have remained a puzzle ever after, or perhaps have been soon forgot. — By the law of association as laid down by physiologists47, any impression in a series can recall any other impression in that series without going through the whole in order; so that the mind drops the intermediate links, and passes on rapidly and by stealth to the more striking effects of pleasure or pain which have naturally taken the strongest hold of it. By doing this habitually48 and skillfully with respect to the various impressions and circumstances with which our experience makes us acquainted, it forms a series of unpremeditated conclusions on almost all subjects that can be brought before it, as just as they are of ready application to human life; and common sense is the name of this body of unassuming but practical wisdom. Common sense, however, is an impartial49, instinctive50 result of truth and nature, and will therefore bear the test and abide51 the scrutiny52 of the most severe and patient reasoning. It is indeed incomplete without it. By ingrafting reason on feeling, we ‘make assurance double sure.’
’Tis the last key-stone that makes up the arch . . .
Then stands it a triumphal mark! Then men
Observe the strength, the height, the why and when
It was erected53; and still walking under,
Meet some new matter to look up, and wonder.
But reason, not employed to interpret nature, and to improve and perfect common sense and experience, is, for the most part, a building without a foundation. The criticism exercised by reason, then, on common sense may be as severe as it pleases, but it must be as patient as it is severe. Hasty, dogmatical, self-satisfied reason is worse than idle fancy or bigoted54 prejudice. It is systematic55, ostentatious in error, closes up the avenues of knowledge, and ‘shuts the gates of wisdom on mankind.’ It is not enough to show that there is no reason for a thing that we do not see the reason of it: if the common feeling, if the involuntary prejudice sets in strong in favour of it, if, in spite of all we can do, there is a lurking suspicion on the side of our first impressions, we must try again, and believe that truth is mightier56 than we. So, in ordering a definition of any subject, if we feel a misgiving57 that there is any fact or circumstance emitted, but of which we have only a vague apprehension33, like a name we cannot recollect, we must ask for more time, and not cut the matter short by an arrogant58 assumption of the point in dispute. Common sense thus acts as a check-weight on sophistry59, and suspends our rash and superficial judgments61. On the other hand, if not only no reason can be given for a thing, but every reason is clear against it, and we can account from ignorance, from authority, from interest, from different causes, for the prevalence of an opinion or sentiment, then we have a right to conclude that we have mistaken a prejudice for an instinct, or have confounded a false and partial impression with the fair and unavoidable inference from general observation. Mr. Burke said that we ought not to reject every prejudice, but should separate the husk of prejudice from the truth it encloses, and so try to get at the kernel62 within; and thus far he was right. But he was wrong in insisting that we are to cherish our prejudices ‘because they are prejudices’: for if all are well founded, there is no occasion to inquire into their origin or use; and he who sets out to philosophise upon them, or make the separation Mr. Burke talks of in this spirit and with this previous determination, will be very likely to mistake a maggot or a rotten canker for the precious kernel of truth, as was indeed the case with our Political sophist.
There is nothing more distinct than common sense and vulgar opinion. Common sense is only a judge of things that fall under common observation, or immediately come home to the business and bosoms63 of men. This is of the very essence of its principle, the basis of its pretensions64. It rests upon the simple process of feeling — it anchors in experience. It is not, nor it cannot be, the test of abstract, speculative65 opinions. But half the opinions and prejudices of mankind, those which they hold in the most unqualified approbation66 and which have been instilled67 into them under the strongest sanctions, are of this latter kind, that is, opinions not which they have ever thought, known, or felt one tittle about, but which they have taken up on trust from others, which have been palmed on their understandings by fraud or force, and which they continue to hold at the peril68 of life, limb, property, and character, with as little warrant from common sense in the first instance as appeal to reason in the last. The ultima ratio regum proceeds upon a very different plea. Common sense is neither priestcraft nor state-policy. Yet ‘there’s the rub that makes absurdity69 of so long life,’ and, at the same time, gives the sceptical philosophers the advantage over us. Till nature has fair play allowed it, and is not adulterated by political and polemical quacks70 (as it so often has been), it is impossible to appeal to it as a defence against the errors and extravagances of mere reason. If we talk of common sense, we are twitted with vulgar prejudice, and asked how we distinguish the one from the other; but common and received opinion is indeed ‘a compost heap’ of crude notions, got together by the pride and passions of individuals, and reason is itself the thrall71 or manumitted slave of the same lordly and besotted masters, dragging its servile chain, or committing all sorts of Saturnalian licenses72, the moment it feels itself freed from it. — If ten millions of Englishmen are furious in thinking themselves right in making war upon thirty millions of Frenchmen, and if the last are equally bent73 upon thinking the others always in the wrong, though it is a common and national prejudice, both opinions cannot be the dictate44 of good sense; but it may be the infatuated policy of one or both governments to keep their subjects always at variance74. If a few centuries ago all Europe believed in the infallibility of the Pope, this was not an opinion derived75 from the proper exercise or erroneous direction of the common sense of the people; common sense had nothing to do with it — they believed whatever their priests told them. England at present is divided into Whigs and Tories, Churchmen and Dissenters76; both parties have numbers on their side; but common sense and party spirit are two different things. Sects77 and heresies78 are upheld partly by sympathy, and partly by the love of contradiction; if there was nobody of a different way of thinking, they would fall to pieces of themselves. If a whole court say the same thing, this is no proof that they think it, but that the individual at the head of the court has said it; if a mob agree for a while in shouting the same watchword, this is not to me an example of the sensus communis, they only repeat what they have heard repeated by others. If indeed a large proportion of the people are in want of food, of clothing, of shelter — if they are sick, miserable79, scorned, oppressed — an d if each feeling it in himself, they all say so with one voice and one heart, and lift up their hands to second their appeal, this I should say was but the dictate of common sense, the cry of nature. But to waive80 this part of the argument, which it is needless to push farther — l believe that the best way to instruct mankind is not by pointing out to them their mutual81 errors, but by teaching them to think rightly on indifferent matters, where they will listen with patience in order to be amused, and where they do not consider a definition or a syllogism82 as the greatest injury you can offer them.
There is no rule for expression. It is got at solely83 by feeling, that is, on the principle of the association of ideas, and by transferring what has been found to hold good in one case (with the necessary modifications) to others. A certain look has been remarked strongly indicative of a certain passion or trait of character, and we attach the same meaning to it or are affected in the same pleasurable or painful manner by it, where it exists in a less degree, though we can define neither the look itself nor the modification84 of it. Having got the general clue, the exact result may be left to the imagination to vary, to extenuate85 or aggravate86 it according to circumstances. In the admirable profile of Oliver Cromwell after —— the drooping87 eyelids88, as if drawing a veil over the fixed, penetrating89 glance, the nostrils90 somewhat distended91, and lips compressed so as hardly to let the breath escape him, denote the character of the man for high-reaching policy and deep designs as plainly as they can be written. How is it that we decipher this expression in the face? First, by feeling it. And how is it that we feel it? Not by reestablished rules, but by the instinct of analogy, by the principle of association, which is subtle and sure in proportion as it is variable and indefinite. A circumstance, apparently92 of no value, shall alter the whole interpretation93 to be put upon an expression or action and it shall alter it thus powerfully because in proportion to its very insignificance94 it shows a strong general principle at work that extends in its ramifications95 to the smallest things. This in fact will make all the difference between minuteness and subtlety96 or refinement97; for a small or trivial effect may in given circumstances imply the operation of a great power. Stillness may be the result of a blow too powerful to be resisted; silence may be imposed by feelings too agonising for utterance98. The minute, the trifling99 and insipid100 is that which is little in itself, in its causes and its consequences; the subtle and refined is that which is slight and evanescent at first sight, but which mounts up to a mighty101 sum in the end, which is an essential part of an important whole, which has consequences greater than itself, and where more is meant than meets the eye or ear. We complain sometimes of littleness in a Dutch picture, where there are a vast number of distinct parts and objects, each small in itself, and leading to nothing else. A sky of Claude’s cannot fall under this censure102, where one imperceptible gradation is as it were the scale to another, where the broad arch of heaven is piled up of endlessly intermediate gold and azure103 tints104, and where an infinite number of minute, scarce noticed particulars blend and melt into universal harmony. The subtlety in Shakespear, of which there is an immense deal scattered105 everywhere up and down, is always the instrument of passion, the vehicle of character. The action of a man pulling his hat over his forehead is indifferent enough in itself, and generally speaking, may mean anything or nothing; but in the circumstances in which Macduff is placed, it is neither insignificant106 nor equivocal.
What! man, ne’er pull your hat upon your brows, etc.
It admits but of one interpretation or inference, that which follows it:—
Give sorrow words: the grief that does not speak,
Whispers the o’er-fraught heart, and bids it break.
The passage in the same play, in which Duncan and his attendants are introduced, commenting on the beauty and situation of Macbeth’s castle, though familiar in itself, has been often praised for the striking contrast it presents to the scenes which follow. — The same look in different circumstances may convey a totally different expression. Thus the eye turned round to look at you without turning the head indicates generally slyness or suspicion; but if this is combined with large expanded eyelids or fixed eyebrows107, as we see it in Titian’s pictures, it will denote calm contemplation or piercing sagacity, without anything of meanness or fear of being observed. In other cases it may imply merely indolent, enticing108 voluptuousness109, as in Lely’s portraits of women. The languor110 and weakness of the eyelids give the amorous111 turn to the expression. How should there be a rule for all this beforehand, seeing it depends on circumstances ever varying, and scarce discernible but by their effect on the mind? Rules are applicable to abstractions, but expression is concrete and individual. We know the meaning of certain looks, and we feel how they modify one another in conjunction. But we cannot have a separate rule to judge of all their combinations in different degrees and circumstances, without foreseeing all those combinations, which is impossible; or if we did foresee them, we should only be where we are, that is, we could only make the rule as we now judge without it, from imagination and the feeling of the moment. The absurdity of reducing expression to a preconcerted system was perhaps never more evidently shown than in a picture of the Judgment60 of Solomon by so great a man as N. Poussin, which I once heard admired for the skill and discrimination of the artist in making all the women, who are ranged on one side, in the greatest alarm at the sentence of the judge, while all the men on the opposite side see through the design of it. Nature does not go to work or cast things in a regular mould in this sort of way. I once heard a person remark of another, ‘He has an eye like a vicious horse.’ This was a fair analogy. We all, I believe, have noticed the look of a horse’s eye just before he is going to bite or kick. But will any one, therefore, describe to me exactly what that look is? It was the same acute observer that said of a self-sufficient., prating112 music-master, ‘He talks on all subjects at sight’— which expressed the man at once by an allusion113 to his profession, the coincidence was indeed perfect. Nothing else could compare with the easy assurance with which this gentleman would volunteer an explanation of things of which he was most ignorant, but the nonchalance114 with which a musician sits down to a harpsichord115 to play a piece he has never seen before. My physiognomical friend would not have hit on this mode of illustration without knowing the profession of the subject of his criticism; but having this hint given him, it instantly suggested itself to his ‘sure trailing.’ The manner of the speaker was evident; and the association of the music-master sitting down to play at sight, lurking in his mind, was immediately called out by the strength of his impression of the character. The feeling of character and the felicity of invention in explaining it were nearly allied116 to each other. The first was so wrought117 up and running over that the transition to the last was very easy and unavoidable. When Mr. Kean was so much praised for the action of Richard in his last struggle with his triumphant118 antagonist119, where he stands, after his sword is wrested120 from him, with his hands stretched out, ‘as if his will could not be disarmed121, and the very phantoms122 of his despair had a withering123 power,’ he said that he borrowed it from seeing the last efforts of Painter in his fight with Oliver. This assuredly did not lessen124 the merit of it. Thus it ever is with the man of real genius. He has the feeling of truth already shrined in his own breast, and his eye is still bent on Nature to see how she expresses herself. When we thoroughly125 understand the subject it is easy to translate from one language into another. Raphael, in muffling126 up the figure of Elymas the Sorcerer in his garments, appears to have extended the idea of blindness even to his clothes. Was this design? Probably not; but merely the feeling of analogy thoughtlessly suggesting this device, which being so suggested was retained and carried on, because it flattered or fell in with the original feeling. The tide of passion, when strong, overflows127 and gradually insinuates128 itself into all nooks and corners of the mind. Invention (of the best kind) I therefore do not think so distinct a thing from feeling as some are apt to imagine. The springs of pure feeling will rise and fill the moulds of fancy that are fit to receive it. There are some striking coincidences of colour in well-composed pictures, as in a straggling weed in the foreground streaked129 with blue or red to answer to a blue or red drapery, to the tone of the flesh or an opening in the sky:— not that this was intended, or done by the rule (for then it would presently become affected and ridiculous), but the eye, being imbued130 with a certain colour, repeats and varies it from a natural sense of harmony, a secret craving131 and appetite for beauty, which in the same manner soothes132 and gratifies the eye of taste, though the cause is not understood. Tact, finesse133, is nothing but the being completely aware of the feeling belonging to certain situations, passions, etc., and the being consequently sensible to their slightest indications or movements in others. One of the most remarkable134 instances of this sort of faculty is the following story, told of Lord Shaftesbury, the grandfather of the author of the Characteristics. He had been to dine with Lady Clarendon and her daughter, who was at that time privately135 married to the Duke of York (afterwards James II.), and as he returned home with another nobleman who had accompanied him, he suddenly turned to him, and said, ‘Depend upon it, the Duke has married Hyde’s daughter.’ His companion could not comprehend what he meant; but on explaining himself, he said, ‘Her mother behaved to her with an attention and a marked respect that it is impossible to account for in any other way; and I am sure of it.’ His conjecture136 shortly afterwards proved to be the truth. This was carrying the prophetic spirit of common sense as far as it could go.
点击
收听单词发音
收听单词发音 |
1
strictly
|
|
| adv.严厉地，严格地；严密地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
2
tact
|
|
| n.机敏，圆滑，得体 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
3
propriety
|
|
| n.正当行为；正当；适当 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
4
recollect
|
|
| v.回忆，想起，记起，忆起，记得 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
5
recollected
|
|
| adj.冷静的；镇定的；被回忆起的；沉思默想的v.记起，想起( recollect的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
6
immediate
|
|
| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
7
eloquence
|
|
| n.雄辩；口才，修辞 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
8
ingenuity
|
|
| n.别出心裁；善于发明创造 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
9
dexterous
|
|
| adj.灵敏的；灵巧的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
10
mere
|
|
| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
11
lurking
|
|
| 潜在 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
12
logician
|
|
| n.逻辑学家 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
13
faculty
|
|
| n.才能；学院，系；(学院或系的)全体教学人员 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
14
discourses
|
|
| 论文( discourse的名词复数 )； 演说； 讲道； 话语 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
15
discourse
|
|
| n.论文，演说；谈话；话语；vi.讲述，著述 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
16
conclusive
|
|
| adj.最后的，结论的；确凿的，消除怀疑的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
17
faculties
|
|
| n.能力( faculty的名词复数 )；全体教职员；技巧；院 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
18
delusive
|
|
| adj.欺骗的，妄想的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
19
affected
|
|
| adj.不自然的，假装的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
20
drawn
|
|
| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
21
contradictory
|
|
| adj.反驳的，反对的，抗辩的；n.正反对，矛盾对立 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
22
supersedes
|
|
| 取代，接替( supersede的第三人称单数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
23
deduction
|
|
| n.减除，扣除，减除额；推论，推理，演绎 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
24
remains
|
|
| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
25
fixed
|
|
| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
26
habitual
|
|
| adj.习惯性的；通常的，惯常的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
27
animated
|
|
| adj.生气勃勃的，活跃的，愉快的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
28
copious
|
|
| adj.丰富的，大量的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
29
perverse
|
|
| adj.刚愎的；坚持错误的，行为反常的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
30
clenched
|
|
| v.紧握，抓紧，咬紧( clench的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
31
aphorism
|
|
| n.格言，警语 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
32
apprehensions
|
|
| 疑惧 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
33
apprehension
|
|
| n.理解，领悟；逮捕，拘捕；忧虑 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
34
obnoxious
|
|
| adj.极恼人的，讨人厌的，可憎的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
35
retired
|
|
| adj.隐退的，退休的，退役的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
36
epic
|
|
| n.史诗，叙事诗；adj.史诗般的，壮丽的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
37
awaken
|
|
| vi.醒，觉醒；vt.唤醒，使觉醒，唤起，激起 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
38
glided
|
|
| v.滑动( glide的过去式和过去分词 )；掠过；（鸟或飞机 ） 滑翔 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
39
illegible
|
|
| adj.难以辨认的，字迹模糊的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
40
tremor
|
|
| n.震动，颤动，战栗，兴奋，地震 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
41
disorder
|
|
| n.紊乱，混乱；骚动，骚乱；疾病，失调 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
42
nay
|
|
| adv.不；n.反对票，投反对票者 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
43
babbling
|
|
| n.胡说，婴儿发出的咿哑声adj.胡说的v.喋喋不休( babble的现在分词 )；作潺潺声（如流水）；含糊不清地说话；泄漏秘密 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
44
dictate
|
|
| v.口授；(使)听写；指令，指示，命令 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
45
dictates
|
|
| n.命令，规定，要求( dictate的名词复数 )v.大声讲或读( dictate的第三人称单数 )；口授；支配；摆布 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
46
superstition
|
|
| n.迷信，迷信行为 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
47
physiologists
|
|
| n.生理学者( physiologist的名词复数 )；生理学( physiology的名词复数 )；生理机能 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
48
habitually
|
|
| ad.习惯地，通常地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
49
impartial
|
|
| adj.(in,to)公正的，无偏见的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
50
instinctive
|
|
| adj.(出于)本能的；直觉的；(出于)天性的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
51
abide
|
|
| vi.遵守；坚持；vt.忍受 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
52
scrutiny
|
|
| n.详细检查，仔细观察 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
53
ERECTED
|
|
| adj. 直立的，竖立的，笔直的 vt. 使 ... 直立，建立 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
54
bigoted
|
|
| adj.固执己见的，心胸狭窄的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
55
systematic
|
|
| adj.有系统的，有计划的，有方法的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
56
mightier
|
|
| adj. 强有力的，强大的，巨大的 adv. 很，极其 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
57
misgiving
|
|
| n.疑虑，担忧，害怕 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
58
arrogant
|
|
| adj.傲慢的，自大的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
59
sophistry
|
|
| n.诡辩 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
60
judgment
|
|
| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
61
judgments
|
|
| 判断( judgment的名词复数 )； 鉴定； 评价； 审判 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
62
kernel
|
|
| n.(果实的)核，仁；(问题)的中心，核心 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
63
bosoms
|
|
| 胸部( bosom的名词复数 )； 胸怀； 女衣胸部（或胸襟）； 和爱护自己的人在一起的情形 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
64
pretensions
|
|
| 自称( pretension的名词复数 )； 自命不凡； 要求； 权力 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
65
speculative
|
|
| adj.思索性的，暝想性的，推理的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
66
approbation
|
|
| n.称赞；认可 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
67
instilled
|
|
| v.逐渐使某人获得（某种可取的品质），逐步灌输( instill的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
68
peril
|
|
| n.(严重的)危险；危险的事物 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
69
absurdity
|
|
| n.荒谬，愚蠢；谬论 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
70
quacks
|
|
| abbr.quacksalvers 庸医，骗子(16世纪习惯用水银或汞治疗梅毒的人)n.江湖医生( quack的名词复数 )；江湖郎中；（鸭子的）呱呱声v.（鸭子）发出嘎嘎声( quack的第三人称单数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
71
thrall
|
|
| n.奴隶；奴隶制 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
72
licenses
|
|
| n.执照( license的名词复数 )v.批准，许可，颁发执照( license的第三人称单数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
73
bent
|
|
| n.爱好，癖好；adj.弯的；决心的，一心的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
74
variance
|
|
| n.矛盾，不同 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
75
derived
|
|
| vi.起源；由来；衍生；导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
76
dissenters
|
|
| n.持异议者，持不同意见者( dissenter的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
77
sects
|
|
| n.宗派，教派( sect的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
78
heresies
|
|
| n.异端邪说，异教( heresy的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
79
miserable
|
|
| adj.悲惨的，痛苦的；可怜的，糟糕的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
80
waive
|
|
| vt.放弃，不坚持(规定、要求、权力等) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
81
mutual
|
|
| adj.相互的，彼此的；共同的，共有的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
82
syllogism
|
|
| n.演绎法，三段论法 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
83
solely
|
|
| adv.仅仅，唯一地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
84
modification
|
|
| n.修改，改进，缓和，减轻 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
85
extenuate
|
|
| v.减轻，使人原谅 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
86
aggravate
|
|
| vt.加重(剧)，使恶化；激怒，使恼火 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
87
drooping
|
|
| adj. 下垂的，无力的 动词droop的现在分词 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
88
eyelids
|
|
| n.眼睑( eyelid的名词复数 )；眼睛也不眨一下；不露声色；面不改色 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
89
penetrating
|
|
| adj.（声音）响亮的，尖锐的adj.（气味）刺激的adj.（思想）敏锐的，有洞察力的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
90
nostrils
|
|
| 鼻孔( nostril的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
91
distended
|
|
| v.（使）膨胀，肿胀( distend的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
92
apparently
|
|
| adv.显然地；表面上，似乎 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
93
interpretation
|
|
| n.解释，说明，描述；艺术处理 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
94
insignificance
|
|
| n.不重要；无价值；无意义 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
95
ramifications
|
|
| n.结果，后果( ramification的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
96
subtlety
|
|
| n.微妙，敏锐，精巧；微妙之处，细微的区别 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
97
refinement
|
|
| n.文雅；高尚；精美；精制；精炼 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
98
utterance
|
|
| n.用言语表达，话语，言语 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
99
trifling
|
|
| adj.微不足道的；没什么价值的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
100
insipid
|
|
| adj.无味的，枯燥乏味的，单调的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
101
mighty
|
|
| adj.强有力的；巨大的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
102
censure
|
|
| v./n.责备；非难；责难 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
103
azure
|
|
| adj.天蓝色的，蔚蓝色的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
104
tints
|
|
| 色彩( tint的名词复数 )； 带白的颜色； （淡色）染发剂； 痕迹 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
105
scattered
|
|
| adj.分散的，稀疏的；散步的；疏疏落落的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
106
insignificant
|
|
| adj.无关紧要的，可忽略的，无意义的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
107
eyebrows
|
|
| 眉毛( eyebrow的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
108
enticing
|
|
| adj.迷人的；诱人的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
109
voluptuousness
|
|
| n.风骚，体态丰满 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
110
languor
|
|
| n.无精力，倦怠 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
111
amorous
|
|
| adj.多情的；有关爱情的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
112
prating
|
|
| v.（古时用语）唠叨，啰唆( prate的现在分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
113
allusion
|
|
| n.暗示，间接提示 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
114
nonchalance
|
|
| n.冷淡，漠不关心 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
115
harpsichord
|
|
| n.键琴（钢琴前身） | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
116
allied
|
|
| adj.协约国的；同盟国的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
117
wrought
|
|
| v.引起；以…原料制作；运转；adj.制造的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
118
triumphant
|
|
| adj.胜利的，成功的；狂欢的，喜悦的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
119
antagonist
|
|
| n.敌人，对抗者，对手 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
120
wrested
|
|
| （用力）拧( wrest的过去式和过去分词 )； 费力取得； （从…）攫取； （ 从… ） 强行取去… | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
121
disarmed
|
|
| v.裁军( disarm的过去式和过去分词 )；使息怒 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
122
phantoms
|
|
| n.鬼怪，幽灵( phantom的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
123
withering
|
|
| 使人畏缩的，使人害羞的，使人难堪的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
124
lessen
|
|
| vt.减少，减轻；缩小 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
125
thoroughly
|
|
| adv.完全地，彻底地，十足地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
126
muffling
|
|
| v.压抑，捂住( muffle的现在分词 )；用厚厚的衣帽包着（自己） | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
127
overflows
|
|
| v.溢出，淹没( overflow的第三人称单数 )；充满；挤满了人；扩展出界，过度延伸 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
128
insinuates
|
|
| n.暗示( insinuate的名词复数 )；巧妙或迂回地潜入；（使）缓慢进入；慢慢伸入v.暗示( insinuate的第三人称单数 )；巧妙或迂回地潜入；（使）缓慢进入；慢慢伸入 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
129
streaked
|
|
| adj.有条斑纹的，不安的v.快速移动( streak的过去式和过去分词 )；使布满条纹 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
130
imbued
|
|
| v.使（某人/某事）充满或激起（感情等）( imbue的过去式和过去分词 )；使充满；灌输；激发（强烈感情或品质等） | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
131
craving
|
|
| n.渴望,热望 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
132
soothes
|
|
| v.安慰( soothe的第三人称单数 )；抚慰；使舒服；减轻痛苦 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
133
finesse
|
|
| n.精密技巧，灵巧，手腕 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
134
remarkable
|
|
| adj.显著的，异常的，非凡的，值得注意的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
135
privately
|
|
| adv.以私人的身份，悄悄地，私下地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
136
conjecture
|
|
| n./v.推测，猜测 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
| 欢迎访问英文小说网 |