1802: Sirhowey Tramroad, built by the Monmouthshire Canal Company in conjunction with the Tredegar Iron-works; length, eleven miles; cost ￡45,000.
1809: Forest of Dean Railway, for conveying coals, timber, ore, etc., to the Severn for shipment; length, seven and a half miles; cost ￡125,000.
1809: Severn and Wye Railway, connecting those rivers; length, 26 miles; cost ￡110,000.
1812: Penrhynmaur Railway, Anglesey; a colliery line, seven miles long, consisting of a series of inclined planes.
1815: Gloucester and Cheltenham Railway, connecting with the Berkeley Canal at Gloucester.
1817: Mansfield and Pinxton Railway, connecting the town of Mansfield, Nottinghamshire, with the Cromford Canal at Pinxton basin, near Alfreton, Derbyshire; cost ￡32,800.
1819: Plymouth and Dartmoor Railway; length 30 miles; cost ￡35,000.
1825: Cromford and High Peak Railway, connecting the Cromford and Peak Forest Canals, and rising, by a series of elevations3, 990 feet; length 34 miles; cost ￡164,000.
The first Act for a really public railway, in the sense in which that term is understood to-day, and as distinct from {223}railways serving mainly or exclusively the interests of collieries, iron-works and canal navigations, was granted by Parliament in 1801 for the Surrey Iron Rail-way, which established a rail connection between the Thames at Wandsworth and the town of Croydon, with a branch to some mills on the river Wandle whose owners were the leaders in the enterprise. The total length was about nine and a half miles. According to the Act, the line was designed for "the advantage of carrying coals, corn and all goods and merchandise to and from the Metropolis4." Constructed with flanged5 rails, or "plates," fixed6 on stone blocks, the line was available for any ordinary cart or waggon7 of the requisite8 gauge9. The conveyances10 mostly used on it were four-wheeled trucks, about the size of railway contractors12' waggons13. They belonged either to local traders or to carriers who let them out on hire, it being doubtful whether the company had any rolling stock of their own. The motive14 power was supplied by horses, mules15 or donkeys. Chalk, flint, fire-stone, fuller's earth and agricultural produce were sent from Croydon—then a town of 5700 inhabitants—to the Thames for conveyance11 to London. The return loading from the Thames was mainly coal and manure16. Two sets of rails were provided, and there was a path on each side for the men in charge of the horses.
Referring to the Surrey Iron Rail-way in his "History of Private Bill Legislation," Clifford says:—
"The Act of 1801, upon which the rest of this early railway legislation was framed, follows the canal precedents17 in their provision for managing the company's affairs, for raising share and loan capital, and for compensating19 landowners. Only the use of horse power was contemplated20. The tracks, when laid down, were meant, like canals, for general use by carriers and freighters. The companies did not provide rolling stock; any person might construct carriages adapted to run upon the rails, and if these carriages were approved certain maximum tolls21 applied22 to the freight they might carry.... Passenger traffic was not expected or provided for.... Such was the first Railway Act, passed at the beginning of the century with little notice by Parliament or people, but now a social landmark23, prominent in that stormy period of history."
{224}
This was, however, in point of fact, only a further development of the still earlier railway legislation (see page 210), which required the proprietors24 of lines laid down for general traffic to allow anyone who pleased to run his own vehicles thereon, subject to certain regulations and to the payment of specified25 tolls.
The Surrey Iron Rail-way was also a landmark in railway history because, although in itself of very small extent, it was originally designed to serve as the first section of a railway which, made by different companies, as capital could be raised, would eventually have extended from the Thames to Portsmouth.[37] The second section was the Croydon, Merstham and Godstone Iron Railway, which Parliament sanctioned in 1803. From Croydon this further railway was to carry the lines on to Reigate, with a branch from Merstham to Godstone Green, a total distance of sixteen miles in addition, that is, to the nine and a half miles of the Surrey Iron Rail-way. Both companies, however, drifted into financial difficulties, and had to apply to Parliament again, in 1806, for fresh powers, while the lines of the second company never got beyond the chalk quarries27 at Merstham.
In the absence of the through traffic it had been hoped eventually to secure, the local business alone available was evidently inadequate28 to meet the charges on a capital outlay29 which, at that time, may have been regarded as not inconsiderable, inasmuch as the Surrey Iron Rail-way attained30 to a good elevation2 at its southern end, while the Croydon, Merstham and Godstone line went through a cutting thirty feet deep, and crossed a valley by an embankment twenty feet high. After a chequered career, the Merstham line was acquired by the Brighton Railway Company in 1838 and closed, being then no longer required. The Surrey line lingered on till 1846, when, with the sanction of Parliament, its operation was discontinued, the rails being taken up and sold by auction32.
{225}
It was unfortunate that these two pioneer public railways were a failure because, had they succeeded, and had they really formed the first sections of a through line of communication between the Thames and Portsmouth, there would have been established a further precedent18—and one of much greater value than that of a common user—the precedent, namely, of a trunk line made by companies co-operating with one another to give continuous communication on a well-organised system, in place of collections of disconnected lines designed, at the outset, to serve the interests only of particular localities, with little or no attempt at co-ordination.
Yet the principle of a general public railway had, at least, been established by the Surrey and Merstham lines, and this principle underwent further important development by the Stockton and Darlington Railway, the first Act for which was obtained in 1821.
The only purpose originally intended to be served by the Stockton and Darlington Railway was the finding of a better outlet34 for coal from the South Durham coalfield. A company, with Edward Pease as the moving spirit, was formed in 1816, but two years later the projectors35 were still undecided whether to make a canal or "a rail or tramway." George Overton, who preceded George Stephenson as a distinguished37 railway engineer, wrote to them, however, advising the latter course. "Railways," he said, "are now generally adopted, and the cutting of canals nearly discontinued"; and he told them, further, that within the last fifteen years the great improvements made in the construction of tram-roads had led to the application of the principle to a number of new roads. His advice was adopted, and the first Act, obtained after several unsuccessful efforts, authorised the making and maintaining of "a railway or tramroad" from the river Tees, at Stockton, to Witton Park Colliery, with various branches therefrom. The line would, the Act said, be "of great public utility by facilitating the conveyance of coal, iron, lime, corn and other commodities from the interior of the county of Durham to the town of Darlington and the town and port of Stockton," etc.
It was first intended to use wooden rails, and to rely on horse-power, no authority for the employment of locomotives being obtained under the Act of 1821; but George {226}Stephenson, on being appointed engineer to the line, persuaded the company to adopt iron rails in preference to wooden ones, and to provide a locomotive such as he had already constructed and successfully employed at Killingworth Colliery. Two-thirds of the rails laid were of malleable38 iron and one-third of cast iron. It was not, however, until September, 1824, that the order was actually given for a locomotive, some of the promoters having still shown a strong preference for the use of stationary39 engines and ropes.
The line was opened for traffic on September 27, 1825, and the locomotive which had been ordered—the "Locomotion40" as it was called—was ready for the occasion. It weighed seven tons, and had perpendicular41 cylinders42 and a boiler43 provided with only a single flue, or tube, 10 inches in diameter and 10 feet in length, the heat being abstracted therefrom so imperfectly that when the locomotive was working the chimney soon became red-hot.[38] The usual speed was from four to six miles an hour, with a highest possible of eight miles an hour on the level.
The company made provision for the anticipated goods traffic by having 150 waggons built; but they started with no idea of themselves undertaking44 passenger traffic. Their first Act had laid down that "Any person is at liberty to use and run a carriage on the railway, provided he complies with the bye-laws of the company"; and J. S. Jeans, in his history of the Stockton and Darlington Railway published (1875) under the title of "Jubilee45 Memorial of the Railway System," says: "It was originally intended to allow the proprietors of stage-coaches or other conveyances plying46 on the route of the proposed new railway to make use of the line on certain specified conditions." This, too, is what actually happened; for although, a fortnight after the opening of the line, the railway company themselves put on the line a springless "coach," known as the "Experiment," and drawn47 by a horse, several coach proprietors in the district availed themselves of their statutory right to run their own coaches on the railway, first, of course, providing them with wheels adapted to the rails. They paid the railway company {227}the stipulated48 tolls, and had the advantage of requiring to use no more than a single horse for each coach. These horse coaches for passengers seem to have run in the intervals49 when the lines were not occupied by the locomotive engaged in drawing the coal waggons.
In a letter published in the "Railway Herald50" of April 27, 1889, John Wesley Hackworth, whose father, Timothy Hackworth, was for some time engineer on the Stockton and Darlington Railway, says that twenty miles of the line were at first worked by horses and locomotive in competition, and at the end of eighteen months it was found that horse traction51 was costing only a little over one-third of the traction by locomotive. Meanwhile, also, the value of the ￡100 shares had fallen to ￡50. In view of these results the directors had decided36 to abandon locomotive power, and depend entirely52 on horses; but Timothy Hackworth said to them, "If you will allow me to construct an engine in my own way I will engage it shall work cheaper than animal power." He received the desired authority, and the "Royal George," built by him, was put into operation in September, 1827. It confirmed the assurance which had been given, and, says Timothy Hackworth's son, "finally and for ever" settled the question of the respective merits of horse and steam traction on railways.
Horse coaches still continued to run on the lines, however, in addition to the mineral and goods trains, and in January, 1830, the company had to draw up a time-table fixing the hours of departure for the coaches, thus ensuring a better service for the public, and, also, protecting travellers against any possible encounter with the locomotive as the horse ambled53 along with them on the railway.
By October, 1832, seven coaches, belonging to various proprietors, were doing fifty journeys a week between different places on the line; so that thus far the original idea of Parliament, in enforcing against railways the principle of a common user of their lines by the public, had appeared to be warranted. A year later, however, the railway company, finding, as Jeans tells us, that it would be more convenient and more advantageous54 for them to take the whole carrying trade in their own hands and supersede55 the horses by steam locomotives, bought out, on what were considered generous terms, {228}the interests of the four coach proprietors then carrying passengers on their own account on the lines.
Actual experience had thus nullified the expectation that a railway would be simply a rail-road upon which anyone would be able to run his own conveyances as on an ordinary turnpike road.
From October, 1833, the whole of the passenger traffic (then undergoing rapid expansion) was conducted by the company. In April, 1834, the directors, who had by this time acquired some other and better engines, announced that they had commenced to run, six times a day, both "coaches" (for passengers) and "carriages" (for goods) by locomotives; and this date, probably, marks the final disappearance56 of the horse as a means of traction for passenger traffic on public railways in England, though the word "coaches," introduced into the railway vocabulary under the circumstances here narrated57, has remained in use ever since among railway men as applied to rolling stock for passenger traffic.
Unlike its predecessors58 in Surrey, and though facing various difficulties at the outset, the Stockton and Darlington line attained to a considerable degree of prosperity. After undergoing various extensions from time to time, and playing a leading part in the industrial expansion of the district it served, it was incorporated into what is now the North-Eastern Railway system.
Summing up the respects in which the Stockton and Darlington line had carried forward the story of railway development, we find that it (1) established the practicability of substituting locomotive for horse traction on railways; (2) introduced the provision of waggons by the railway company, instead of leaving these to be found by carriers and traders; (3) proved that railways were as well adapted to the transport of passengers as they were to the carriage of goods; (4) showed by actual experience that the idea of a common user of railways was impracticable; and (5) prepared the way for the eventual26 recognition, even by Parliament itself, of the principle that transport on a line of railway operated by locomotives must, in the nature of things, be the monopoly of the owning and responsible railway company.
While the Surrey Iron Rail-way and the Stockton and {229}Darlington Railway had been thus seeking to establish themselves as public railways, there was no lack of advocates of what were then called "general rail-ways," to be laid either on the ordinary roads or on roads made for the purpose; and such general railways were especially advocated for districts where canals could not be made available.
Dr James Anderson, writing on "Cast Iron Rail-ways" in the issue of his "Recreations in Agriculture, Natural History," etc., for November, 1800, had already strongly recommended them as "an eligible60 mode of conveyance where canals cannot be conveniently adopted"; and he especially advised the construction of one railway in London, from the new docks on the Isle61 of Dogs to Bishopsgate Street, and another between London and Bath, "for the purpose of conveying unsightly loads, leaving the roads, as at present, open for coaches and light carriages." Such railways, he argued, would render great service in relieving the ordinary road of heavy traffic, and help to solve the road problem of that day—all the more acute because McAdam had not yet shown the country how roads could and should be made or repaired.
On February 11, 1800, Mr Thomas, of Denton, read a paper before the Newcastle Literary Society recommending the introduction of railways, on the colliery principle, for the general carriage of goods; and R. L. Edgeworth urged, in "Nicholson's Journal," in 1802, that for a distance of ten miles or more one of the great roads out of London should be provided with four tracks of railway operated by stationary engines and circulating chains for fast and slow traffic in each direction.
But the most strenuous62 advocate of all was Thomas Gray. Both before and subsequent to the publication, in 1820, of the first edition of his "Observations on a General Rail-way," he had been pressing his views, in the form of petitions, letters or articles, on members of the Government, peers of the realm, M.P.'s, corporations, capitalists, reviews and newspapers. His idea was that there should be six trunk lines of railway radiating from London, with branch lines linking up towns and villages off these main routes; but he was looked upon as a visionary, if not as a crank and a bore whose impracticable proposals were not deserving of serious {230}consideration. It was evidently Thomas Gray whom the "Quarterly Review" had in mind when it said, in March, 1825: "As to those persons who speculate on making railways general throughout the Kingdom, and superseding63 all the canals, all the waggons, mail and stage-coaches, post-chaises, and, in short, every other mode of conveyance by land and water, we deem them and their visionary schemes unworthy of notice."
In the result Gray was left to spend the last years of his life in obscurity and poverty, and the further development of the railway system of the country was proceeded with on lines altogether different from, and far less efficient, than those he had recommended.
The greatest impetus64 to the movement was now to come, not from any individual pioneer, but from the Liverpool and Manchester Railway; and this line, in turn, was due far more to purely65 local conditions and circumstances than to any idea of encouraging the creation of a network of railways on some approach, however remote, to a national or "general" system. The original cause of the Liverpool and Manchester line being undertaken was, in fact, nothing less than extreme dissatisfaction among the traders both of Liverpool and of Manchester with the then existing transport arrangements between these two places.
Just as the Duke of Bridgewater had drawn his strongest arguments in favour of a canal from the shortcomings of the Irwell and Mersey navigation, so now did the traders base their case for a railway mainly on the deficiencies and shortcomings alike of the river navigation and of the canal by which the rivers had been supplemented.
There were, in the first place, physical difficulties. By whichever of the two water routes goods were sent from Liverpool to Manchester, the barges66 had first to go about eighteen miles along the Mersey to Runcorn, being thus exposed for that distance to the possibly adverse67 winds and strong tides of an open estuary68. The boats often got aground, and many wrecks69 occurred during stormy weather. On the canal itself the boats could often go with only half loads in the summer, and they were liable to be stopped by frost in winter, while the canal was closed altogether for ten days every year for repairs.
{231}
Supplementing these physical disadvantages of the navigation was the attitude of the waterway interests towards the traders whom they held at their mercy. Theoretically there was competition between the rivers and the canal; but the agents of both extorted70 from the traders the highest possible charges for a most inefficient71 service.
Joseph Sandars, who was to take a leading part in the movement for a railway between Liverpool and Manchester, has some strong things to say about the "exorbitant72 and unjust charges of the water carriers" in a "Letter" on the subject of the proposed railway which he published in 1824. He alleged73 that, whereas the Duke of Bridgewater had been authorised by his Acts to charge not more than two shillings and sixpence per ton for canal dues, his agents had, by various devices, which Sandars details, exacted five shillings and twopence per ton. The trustees had, also, obtained possession of all the warehouses75 alongside the canal at Manchester, and they were thus able to exact whatever terms they pleased from the bye-carriers and traders. If the canal trustees carried the goods in their own vessels76 they were entitled to charge six shillings per ton; and their aim seems to have been to render it impossible for the independent carriers to do their business at a lower rate than this. When the carriers, using boats of their own, would not pay the same rate as if the trustees had themselves done the carrying, they were not allowed to land the goods.
Then, by acquiring all the warehouses and all the available land at Preston Brook77 and Runcorn, the trustees had likewise got control over navigation on the Trent and Mersey Canal, which joins the Bridgewater Canal at Preston Brook. Sandars speaks of Mr Bradshaw, to whom the Duke of Bridgewater had, by his will, given absolute control of his undertakings78, as a dictator of canal transport. "No man," he says, in giving examples of the wide extent of the interests that Bradshaw controlled or sought to influence, "can bring a Bill forward for a canal in any part of the Kingdom but Mr Bradshaw interferes79 as a sort of canal Neptune80, directing where, how, and at what price it shall run. He has tortured the trade of the country to become tributory to him in all directions. Every man, every corporate59 body, seems spellbound the moment Mr Bradshaw interposes his authority." {232}As for the profits of the undertaking, Sandars says: "There is good reason to believe that the nett income of the Duke's canal has, for the last twenty years, averaged nearly ￡100,000 per annum."
The Old Quay81 Company had refrained from exceeding the amounts they were authorised to charge for tolls on the Irwell and the Mersey; but there was no restriction82 on them in regard to traffic they themselves carried, and Sandars alleges83 that they, also, had secured all the warehouse74 accommodation on their own line of route, and had almost monopolised the carrying trade, since a bye-carrier's business could hardly be conducted without warehouses. They were thus making far more money than they could have got from the statutory tolls alone. So profitable had the undertaking become that the thirty-nine original proprietors had, Sandars continues, "been paid every other year, for nearly half a century, the total amount of their investment." An immense revenue was being raised at the expense of the merchants and manufacturers, "and for no other purpose than to enrich a few individuals who were daily violating Acts of Parliament, Acts which, by a long course of cunning policy," they had contrived84 to convert into "the most oppressive and unjust monopoly known to the trade of this Kingdom—a monopoly which," Sandars goes on to declare, "there is every reason to believe compels the public to pay, in one shape or another, ￡100,000 more per annum than they ought to pay."
The agents of the two companies not only agreed between themselves what charges they would impose but, autocrats85 as they were, they established a despotic sway over the traders. They set up, says Francis, "a rotation86 by which they sent as much or as little as suited them, and shipped it how or when they pleased. They held levees, attended by crowds who, admitted one by one, almost implored87 them to forward their goods. One firm was thus limited by the supreme88 wisdom of the canal managers to sixty or seventy bags a day. The effects were really disastrous89; mills stood still for want of material; machines were stopped for lack of food. Of 5000 feet of pine timber required in Manchester by one house, 2000 remained unshipped from November, 1824, to March, 1825."
{233}
Merchants whose timber was thus delayed in transit90 were fined for allowing it to obstruct91 the quays92; and Sandars tells of one who paid ￡69 in fines on this account during the course of two months. It was less costly93 and more convenient to leave the delayed timber where it was, and pay the fines, than to keep moving it to and fro between quay and timber yard; though the effect—especially as the imports of timber increased—was to block up, not only the quays, but the neighbouring streets, which thus became almost impassable for carts and carriages.
Corn and other commodities had often to be kept back eight or ten days on account of a lack of vessels. It sometimes happened that commodities brought across the Atlantic in three weeks were detained in Liverpool for six weeks before they could be sent on to Manchester. The agents would not carry certain kinds of merchandise or particular descriptions of cotton at all. Alternatively they would tell a trader: "We took so much for you yesterday, and we can take only so much for you to-day." "They limited the quantity," says Francis, "they appointed the time, until the difficulties of transit became a public talk and the abuse of power a public trouble. The Exchange of Liverpool resounded94 with merchants' complaints; the counting-houses of Manchester re-echoed the murmurs95 of manufacturers."
To avoid serious delays either to raw materials or to manufactured articles the traders were often forced to resort to road transport "because," says Sandars, "speed and certainty as to delivery are of the first importance"; and he adds on this point, "Packages of goods sent from Manchester, for immediate96 shipment at Liverpool, often pay two or three pounds per ton; and yet there are those who assert that the difference of a few hours in speed can be no object. The merchants know better."
The example already set in so many different parts of the country in the provision of rail-ways, or railways, as they were now being generally called, may well have suggested that in a resort to this expedient97 would be found the most practical solution of the problem which had caused so much trouble to the traders. Sandars himself says that inasmuch as the two companies were "deaf to all remonstrances98, to all entreaties," and were "actuated solely99 by a spirit of {234}monopoly and extortion," the only remedy the public had left was to go to Parliament and ask for permission to establish a new line of conveyance—and one, also, that possessed100 decided advantages over canal or river transport.
But here there arose a consideration which had a material bearing on the problem immediately concerned, and was to affect the further development of the railway system in general.
Numerous as were the lines already existing at this time, none of them directly competed with the waterways. They were feeders rather than rivals of the canals. Even the Surrey Iron Rail-way and the Stockton and Darlington line, though operating independently of the canal companies, had not come into conflict with them. In the one instance—that of the Merthyr and Cardiff dram-road—in which a railway had hitherto been projected in direct competition with a canal the scheme had been either killed or bought off by the canal interests. But the proposed Liverpool and Manchester Railway was avowedly101 and expressly designed to compete with the existing water services. It was not simply to supplement the waterways. It threatened to supplant102 them.
So the waterway companies, representing very powerful interests—inasmuch as by 1824 the amount invested in canal and navigation schemes was about ￡14,000,000—might well think it necessary to take action in defence of their own position. Down to this time they had regarded the railway as either a friend or a non-competitor, and they had either extended to it a sympathetic support or had, at least, regarded it with a feeling of equanimity103. Henceforward they had to look upon it as an opponent.
The project for a Liverpool and Manchester Railway would seem to have first begun to assume definite shape in or about 1822, when William James, a London engineer, who had already proposed a "Central Junction1 Rail-way or Tram-road" from Stratford-on-Avon to London, made surveys between Liverpool and Manchester, and prepared a set of plans. The certain prospect104, however, of vigorous opposition105 from the waterway interests led some of the traders to think they had better make terms with the men in possession, if they could; and in that same year the corn merchants of Liverpool memorialised the Bridgewater trustees, asking both {235}for a reduction in the rate of freight and for better accommodation. Bradshaw replied with an unqualified refusal, and he treated as idle talk the then much-discussed project of a line of railway.
There is no doubt that if, at this period, reasonable concessions106 had been made to the traders the building of the Liverpool and Manchester Railway, although, of course, inevitable107, would have been delayed to a later period. The traders shrank, at first, from an open fight, and the project of 1822 was allowed to drop for a time. The situation was found to be so hopeless, however, that in 1824 they decided that mere108 concessions from the waterway interests would no longer suffice, and that the provision of an alternative means of transport had become imperative109. A Liverpool and Manchester Railway Company was now formed, and on October 29, 1824, there was issued a prospectus110 which was, in effect, a declaration of war against the waterway parties who had so mercilessly abused the situation they thought they controlled. This document, after mentioning that the total quantity of merchandise then passing between Liverpool and Manchester was estimated at 1000 tons a day, proceeded:—
"The committee are aware that it will not immediately be understood by the public how the proprietors of a railroad, requiring an invested capital of ￡400,000 can afford to carry goods at so great a reduction upon the charge of the present water companies. But the problem is easily solved. It is not that the water companies have not been able to carry goods on reasonable terms, but that, strong in the enjoyment111 of their monopoly, they have not thought proper to do so. Against the most arbitrary exactions the public have hitherto had no protection, and against the indefinite continuance or recurrence112 of the evil they have but one security. It is competition that is wanted, and the proof of this assertion may be adduced from the fact that shares in the Old Quay Navigation, of which the original cost was ￡70, have been sold as high as ￡1250 each!"
The canal interests in general had, however, anticipated the definite challenge thus given, and there had already been a call to arms in defence of common interests. In a postscript113 to the prospectus just referred to it was mentioned that {236}the Leeds and Liverpool, the Birmingham, the Grand Trunk and other canal companies had issued circulars calling upon "every canal and navigation company in the Kingdom to oppose in limine, and by a united effort, the establishment of railroads wherever contemplated."[39]
By this time, therefore, the projectors of the Liverpool and Manchester Railway were threatened with the opposition, not alone of the Bridgewater trustees and of the Old Quay Navigation trustees, but of the canal and river navigation interests throughout the country. As Thomas Baines well describes the position in his "History of Liverpool," "The canal proprietors, with an instinctive114 sense of danger, justly appreciated what they affected115 to despise, and, with one accord, and with one heart and mind, resolved to crush the rival project which threatened to interrupt, if not to destroy the hopes of prescription116 and the dreams of a sanguine117 avarice118."
The real strength of the opposition thus being worked up against not only the Liverpool and Manchester Railway but public railways in general will be better understood if I supplement the references I have already made to the shares of canal and navigation companies by a few further figures, showing the financial position to which the waterways had attained, and the extent of the vested interests they represented at the particular period now in question.
In a pamphlet published in 1824, under the title of "A Statement of the Claim of the Subscribers to the Birmingham and Liverpool Rail-road to an Act of Parliament; in reply to the Opposition of the Canal Companies" (quoted in the fifth, or 1825, edition of Thomas Gray's "Observations on a General Iron Rail-way"), it is stated that the amount of capital originally subscribed119 for the old Birmingham Canal Company was about ￡55,000, in shares of ￡100, subject to a stipulation120 that no one person should hold more than ten shares. The pamphlet proceeds:—
{237}
"By various subsequent Acts and collateral121 cuts, this canal, which has now changed its name to the style of the 'Birmingham Canal Navigation Company,' is extended to a distance of about 60 miles of water, containing 99 locks or thereabouts, 10 fire engines to raise water, number of bridges not known to the present writer.
"The original shares are computed122 to have cost the proprietors ￡140 each. In 1782 they were marketably worth ￡370, and in 1792, ￡1110. In 1811 an Act increased the shares 500 to 1000, or, in other words, for marketable convenience divided them. In 1813 the half share was sold as high as ￡585. In 1818 power was given to the company of proprietors further to subdivide123 the shares as they should deem advisable, on due public notice, etc. The shares are now in eighths. Thus at the present time, and at the last quoted prices in Wetenhall's list, there are 4000 shares of eighths, marketably worth ￡360 per eighth, each receiving an annual dividend124 of ￡12-10-0. Thus the original cost, compared with the present value of the 500 shares, is as ￡70,000 to ￡1,444,000, the original share having risen from ￡140 sterling125 (or thereabouts) to the sum of ￡2840."
Shares in the Loughborough Navigation cost the first holders126 ￡142-17-0 each. In the "European Magazine" for June, 1821, they are quoted at ￡2600 a share, and the dividend then being paid is given as 170 per cent. In the issue of the same magazine for November, 1824, the price per share is ￡4700, and the dividend is shown to have risen to 200 per cent.
Among other canal shares quoted in the "European Magazine" for the dates mentioned are the following:—
1821 1824
COMPANY. SHARE. PRICE. DIVIDEND. PRICE. DIVIDEND.
￡ ￡ ￡ ￡ ￡
Coventry 100 970 44 1350 44 and 61
Erewash 100 1000 56 — 58
Leeds and Liverpool 100 280 10 570 15
Oxford127 100 630 32 900 32*
Staffordshire and
Worcestershire 100 700 40 950 40
Trent and Mersey 200 1750 75 2250 75*
* And bonus.
{238}
The following further quotations128 are from "Wetenhall's Commercial List" for December 10, 1824:—
COMPANY. SHARE. PRICE. DIVIDEND.
￡s.d. ￡s.d. ￡s.d.
Ashton and Oldham 97180 31000 500
Barnsley 16000 34000 1200
Grand Junction 10000 29600 1000
Glamorganshire 172134 28000 13128
Grantham 15000 19000 1000
Leicester 14000 39000 1400
Monmouthshire 10000 24500 1000
Melton Mowbray 10000 25500 1100
Mersey and Irwell — 100000 3500
Neath 10000 40000 1500
Shrewsbury 12500 20600 1000
Stourbridge 14500 22000 10100
Stroudwater 15000 45000 31100
Trent and Mersey (half share) 10000 230000 7500*
Warwick and Birmingham 10000 32000 1100
Warwick and Knapton 10000 28000 1100
* And bonus.
These figures, it will be seen, are given for years when the "canal mania"—at its height between 1791 and 1794—had long been over, and they suggest, therefore, bona fide market values based on business done and dividends129 paid. High as they are, it is doubtful if they tell the whole story. I have mentioned on page 218 that in their petition to the House of Commons against the proposed railway, or tramway, between Merthyr and Cardiff, the Glamorganshire Canal Company represented that they were restrained by their Act from paying more than a "moderate" dividend. The dividend they were authorised to pay was one of eight per cent; but there is a tradition in South Wales that the company, after checking effectively the threatened railway competition, attained to phenomenal prosperity, and resorted to an ingenious expedient as a means of deriving130 further pecuniary131 advantage from the waterway without exceeding the statutory limitation in regard to the dividend to be paid. This expedient took the form of a suspension of all tolls for a large part of every year, the use of the canal being free to the public for {239}the period so arranged. In some years, it is said, no tolls were paid for six months at a time. This practice was found preferable, for certain members of the managing committee—ironmasters or large traders in the district—to a reduction of tolls to be in force throughout the year, their practice being to keep back their own consignments132, whenever possible, till the free period, which they could fix to suit their convenience. When the principal shareholders133 were traders using the canal, it did not matter to them whether their profits came wholly in dividends or partly in dividends and partly in free carriage. Traders, however, who could not wait for their supplies or store their manufactured goods until the free period came round had to pay the full rates of tolls for, at least, the period during which these were enforced.
I shall refer later to the effect on railway legislation of the power and influence to which the waterways had attained. The consideration for the moment is that, even allowing for a certain number of minor134 or of purely speculative135 canals which were admittedly failures, the waterway interests, consolidating136 their forces, were able, by virtue137 of their position at the time in question, to organise33 a powerful and widespread opposition to a rival form of transport then still in its infancy138, though obviously capable of eventually becoming a formidable competitor.
The canal interests also made every effort to work up an opposition on the part of representatives of the landed interests, who, however, developed such strong hostility139 of their own towards the iron road that the arguments of the canal proprietors were hardly needed to arouse them to violent antagonism140 to the scheme. Popular prejudices, too, were well exploited, and the most direful predictions were indulged in as to what would result from the running of locomotives, so that, for a time, the promoters even abandoned the idea of using locomotives at all.
The combined canal and land interests scored the first victory on the Liverpool and Manchester Bill, which was thrown out in 1825; but it was reintroduced and passed in 1826, the opposition of the Bridgewater trustees having, in the meantime, been overcome by a judicious141 presentation to them of a thousand shares in the railway.
The promoters thus established the new principle of direct {240}competition between railways and waterways; but otherwise the Liverpool and Manchester differed from the Stockton and Darlington, at the outset, and as a line of railway, only in the fact that the former was to be provided throughout with malleable iron rails, whereas the latter had two-thirds malleable iron and one-third cast iron. On the one line as on the other, the use of locomotives had not been decided upon from the start; and, unless the Liverpool and Manchester had not only adopted locomotives but, as was, of course, the case, improved on those of the Stockton and Darlington, it would have shown little real advance in actual railway operation.
The motive power to be used on the Liverpool and Manchester remained uncertain when George Stephenson and his "navvies" were attacking the engineering proposition of Chat Moss142. It was still uncertain in October, 1828—or two years after the passing of the Act—when three of the directors went to Killingworth colliery, to see the early locomotive which Stephenson had made there, and to Darlington to see the locomotives then operating on the Stockton and Darlington line. They decided that "horses were out of the question"; but even then the point remained doubtful whether the Liverpool and Manchester should be provided with locomotives or have stationary engines at intervals of a mile or two along the line to draw the trains from station to station by means of ropes. How the directors sought to solve the problem by offering a premium143 of ￡500 for a locomotive which would fulfil certain conditions; how George Stephenson won the prize with his "Rocket"; and how the "Rocket," with a gross load of seventeen tons, attained a speed of twenty-nine miles an hour, with an average of fourteen—whereas counsel for the promoters had only promised a speed of six or seven miles an hour—are facts known to all the world.
If the Stockton and Darlington Railway had had the honour of introducing the locomotive, it was the Rainhill trials, organised by the Liverpool and Manchester Company, which gave the world its first idea of the great possibilities to which alike the locomotive and the railway might attain31. In this respect the Liverpool and Manchester line carried railway development far beyond the point already attained by the Stockton and Darlington, although no fundamentally {241}new principle in railway working was set up. The Liverpool and Manchester line did, however, establish a new departure in proclaiming direct rivalry144 with the then powerful canal interests, and the warfare145 thus entered on, and persevered146 in until the railway system had gained the ascendancy147, was to affect the whole further history of railway expansion and control.
点击
收听单词发音
收听单词发音 |
1
junction
|
|
| n.连接，接合；交叉点，接合处，枢纽站 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
2
elevation
|
|
| n.高度；海拔；高地；上升；提高 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
3
elevations
|
|
| （水平或数量）提高( elevation的名词复数 )； 高地； 海拔； 提升 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
4
metropolis
|
|
| n.首府；大城市 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
5
flanged
|
|
| 带凸缘的，用法兰连接的，折边的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
6
fixed
|
|
| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
7
waggon
|
|
| n.运货马车，运货车；敞篷车箱 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
8
requisite
|
|
| adj.需要的，必不可少的；n.必需品 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
9
gauge
|
|
| v.精确计量；估计；n.标准度量；计量器 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
10
conveyances
|
|
| n.传送( conveyance的名词复数 )；运送；表达；运输工具 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
11
conveyance
|
|
| n.(不动产等的)转让，让与；转让证书；传送；运送；表达；（正）运输工具 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
12
contractors
|
|
| n.（建筑、监造中的）承包人( contractor的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
13
waggons
|
|
| 四轮的运货马车( waggon的名词复数 )； 铁路货车； 小手推车 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
14
motive
|
|
| n.动机，目的；adv.发动的，运动的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
15
mules
|
|
| 骡( mule的名词复数 )； 拖鞋； 顽固的人； 越境运毒者 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
16
manure
|
|
| n.粪，肥，肥粒；vt.施肥 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
17
precedents
|
|
| 引用单元； 范例( precedent的名词复数 )； 先前出现的事例； 前例； 先例 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
18
precedent
|
|
| n.先例，前例；惯例；adj.在前的，在先的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
19
compensating
|
|
| 补偿，补助，修正 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
20
contemplated
|
|
| adj. 预期的 动词contemplate的过去分词形式 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
21
tolls
|
|
| （缓慢而有规律的）钟声( toll的名词复数 )； 通行费； 损耗； （战争、灾难等造成的）毁坏 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
22
applied
|
|
| adj.应用的；v.应用，适用 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
23
landmark
|
|
| n.陆标，划时代的事，地界标 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
24
proprietors
|
|
| n.所有人，业主( proprietor的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
25
specified
|
|
| adj.特定的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
26
eventual
|
|
| adj.最后的，结局的，最终的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
27
quarries
|
|
| n.（采）石场( quarry的名词复数 )；猎物（指鸟，兽等）；方形石；（格窗等的）方形玻璃v.从采石场采得( quarry的第三人称单数 )；从（书本等中）努力发掘（资料等）；在采石场采石 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
28
inadequate
|
|
| adj.(for,to)不充足的，不适当的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
29
outlay
|
|
| n.费用，经费，支出；v.花费 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
30
attained
|
|
| （通常经过努力）实现( attain的过去式和过去分词 )； 达到； 获得； 达到（某年龄、水平、状况） | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
31
attain
|
|
| vt.达到，获得，完成 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
32
auction
|
|
| n.拍卖；拍卖会；vt.拍卖 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
33
organise
|
|
| vt.组织，安排，筹办 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
34
outlet
|
|
| n.出口/路；销路；批发商店；通风口；发泄 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
35
projectors
|
|
| 电影放映机，幻灯机( projector的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
36
decided
|
|
| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
37
distinguished
|
|
| adj.卓越的，杰出的，著名的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
38
malleable
|
|
| adj.(金属)可锻的;有延展性的；(性格)可训练的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
39
stationary
|
|
| adj.固定的，静止不动的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
40
locomotion
|
|
| n.运动，移动 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
41
perpendicular
|
|
| adj.垂直的，直立的；n.垂直线，垂直的位置 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
42
cylinders
|
|
| n.圆筒( cylinder的名词复数 )；圆柱；汽缸；（尤指用作容器的）圆筒状物 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
43
boiler
|
|
| n.锅炉；煮器(壶，锅等) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
44
undertaking
|
|
| n.保证，许诺，事业 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
45
jubilee
|
|
| n.周年纪念；欢乐 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
46
plying
|
|
| v.使用（工具）( ply的现在分词 )；经常供应（食物、饮料）；固定往来；经营生意 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
47
drawn
|
|
| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
48
stipulated
|
|
| vt.& vi.规定；约定adj.[法]合同规定的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
49
intervals
|
|
| n.[军事]间隔( interval的名词复数 )；间隔时间；[数学]区间；（戏剧、电影或音乐会的）幕间休息 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
50
herald
|
|
| vt.预示...的来临，预告，宣布，欢迎 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
51
traction
|
|
| n.牵引；附着摩擦力 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
52
entirely
|
|
| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
53
ambled
|
|
| v.（马）缓行( amble的过去式和过去分词 )；从容地走，漫步 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
54
advantageous
|
|
| adj.有利的；有帮助的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
55
supersede
|
|
| v.替代；充任 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
56
disappearance
|
|
| n.消失，消散，失踪 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
57
narrated
|
|
| v.故事( narrate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
58
predecessors
|
|
| n.前任( predecessor的名词复数 )；前辈；（被取代的）原有事物；前身 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
59
corporate
|
|
| adj.共同的，全体的；公司的，企业的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
60
eligible
|
|
| adj.有条件被选中的；(尤指婚姻等)合适(意)的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
61
isle
|
|
| n.小岛，岛 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
62
strenuous
|
|
| adj.奋发的，使劲的；紧张的；热烈的，狂热的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
63
superseding
|
|
| 取代，接替( supersede的现在分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
64
impetus
|
|
| n.推动，促进，刺激；推动力 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
65
purely
|
|
| adv.纯粹地，完全地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
66
barges
|
|
| 驳船( barge的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
67
adverse
|
|
| adj.不利的；有害的；敌对的，不友好的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
68
estuary
|
|
| n.河口，江口 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
69
wrecks
|
|
| n.沉船( wreck的名词复数 )；（事故中）遭严重毁坏的汽车（或飞机等）；（身体或精神上）受到严重损伤的人；状况非常糟糕的车辆（或建筑物等）v.毁坏[毁灭]某物( wreck的第三人称单数 )；使（船舶）失事，使遇难，使下沉 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
70
extorted
|
|
| v.敲诈( extort的过去式和过去分词 )；曲解 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
71
inefficient
|
|
| adj.效率低的，无效的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
72
exorbitant
|
|
| adj.过分的；过度的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
73
alleged
|
|
| a.被指控的，嫌疑的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
74
warehouse
|
|
| n.仓库；vt.存入仓库 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
75
warehouses
|
|
| 仓库，货栈( warehouse的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
76
vessels
|
|
| n.血管( vessel的名词复数 )；船；容器；（具有特殊品质或接受特殊品质的）人 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
77
brook
|
|
| n.小河，溪；v.忍受，容让 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
78
undertakings
|
|
| 企业( undertaking的名词复数 )； 保证； 殡仪业； 任务 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
79
interferes
|
|
| vi. 妨碍，冲突，干涉 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
80
Neptune
|
|
| n.海王星 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
81
quay
|
|
| n.码头，靠岸处 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
82
restriction
|
|
| n.限制，约束 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
83
alleges
|
|
| 断言，宣称，辩解( allege的第三人称单数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
84
contrived
|
|
| adj.不自然的，做作的；虚构的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
85
autocrats
|
|
| n.独裁统治者( autocrat的名词复数 )；独断专行的人 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
86
rotation
|
|
| n.旋转；循环，轮流 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
87
implored
|
|
| 恳求或乞求（某人）( implore的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
88
supreme
|
|
| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
89
disastrous
|
|
| adj.灾难性的，造成灾害的；极坏的，很糟的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
90
transit
|
|
| n.经过，运输；vt.穿越，旋转；vi.越过 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
91
obstruct
|
|
| v.阻隔，阻塞(道路、通道等)；n.阻碍物，障碍物 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
92
quays
|
|
| 码头( quay的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
93
costly
|
|
| adj.昂贵的，价值高的，豪华的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
94
resounded
|
|
| v.（指声音等）回荡于某处( resound的过去式和过去分词 )；产生回响；（指某处）回荡着声音 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
95
murmurs
|
|
| n.低沉、连续而不清的声音( murmur的名词复数 )；低语声；怨言；嘀咕 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
96
immediate
|
|
| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
97
expedient
|
|
| adj.有用的，有利的；n.紧急的办法，权宜之计 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
98
remonstrances
|
|
| n.抱怨，抗议( remonstrance的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
99
solely
|
|
| adv.仅仅，唯一地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
100
possessed
|
|
| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
101
avowedly
|
|
| adv.公然地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
102
supplant
|
|
| vt.排挤；取代 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
103
equanimity
|
|
| n.沉着，镇定 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
104
prospect
|
|
| n.前景，前途；景色，视野 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
105
opposition
|
|
| n.反对，敌对 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
106
concessions
|
|
| n.（尤指由政府或雇主给予的）特许权( concession的名词复数 )；承认；减价；（在某地的）特许经营权 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
107
inevitable
|
|
| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
108
mere
|
|
| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
109
imperative
|
|
| n.命令，需要；规则；祈使语气；adj.强制的；紧急的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
110
prospectus
|
|
| n.计划书；说明书；慕股书 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
111
enjoyment
|
|
| n.乐趣；享有；享用 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
112
recurrence
|
|
| n.复发，反复，重现 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
113
postscript
|
|
| n.附言，又及；(正文后的)补充说明 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
114
instinctive
|
|
| adj.(出于)本能的；直觉的；(出于)天性的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
115
affected
|
|
| adj.不自然的，假装的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
116
prescription
|
|
| n.处方，开药；指示，规定 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
117
sanguine
|
|
| adj.充满希望的，乐观的，血红色的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
118
avarice
|
|
| n.贪婪；贪心 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
119
subscribed
|
|
| v.捐助( subscribe的过去式和过去分词 )；签署，题词；订阅；同意 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
120
stipulation
|
|
| n.契约，规定，条文；条款说明 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
121
collateral
|
|
| adj.平行的；旁系的；n.担保品 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
122
computed
|
|
| adj.[医]计算的，使用计算机的v.计算，估算( compute的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
123
subdivide
|
|
| vt.细分（细区分，再划分，重分，叠分，分小类） | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
124
dividend
|
|
| n.红利，股息；回报，效益 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
125
sterling
|
|
| adj.英币的(纯粹的，货真价实的)；n.英国货币(英镑) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
126
holders
|
|
| 支持物( holder的名词复数 )； 持有者； （支票等）持有人； 支托（或握持）…之物 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
127
Oxford
|
|
| n.牛津（英国城市） | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
128
quotations
|
|
| n.引用( quotation的名词复数 )；[商业]行情（报告）；（货物或股票的）市价；时价 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
129
dividends
|
|
| 红利( dividend的名词复数 )； 股息； 被除数； （足球彩票的）彩金 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
130
deriving
|
|
| v.得到( derive的现在分词 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
131
pecuniary
|
|
| adj.金钱的；金钱上的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
132
consignments
|
|
| n.托付货物( consignment的名词复数 )；托卖货物；寄售；托运 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
133
shareholders
|
|
| n.股东( shareholder的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
134
minor
|
|
| adj.较小(少)的，较次要的；n.辅修学科；vi.辅修 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
135
speculative
|
|
| adj.思索性的，暝想性的，推理的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
136
consolidating
|
|
| v.（使）巩固， （使）加强( consolidate的现在分词 )；（使）合并 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
137
virtue
|
|
| n.德行，美德；贞操；优点；功效，效力 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
138
infancy
|
|
| n.婴儿期；幼年期；初期 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
139
hostility
|
|
| n.敌对，敌意；抵制［pl.］交战，战争 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
140
antagonism
|
|
| n.对抗，敌对，对立 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
141
judicious
|
|
| adj.明智的，明断的，能作出明智决定的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
142
moss
|
|
| n.苔，藓，地衣 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
143
premium
|
|
| n.加付款；赠品；adj.高级的；售价高的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
144
rivalry
|
|
| n.竞争，竞赛，对抗 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
145
warfare
|
|
| n.战争(状态)；斗争；冲突 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
146
persevered
|
|
| v.坚忍，坚持( persevere的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
147
ascendancy
|
|
| n.统治权，支配力量 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
| 欢迎访问英文小说网 |