B. ACTION WITH THE ARMOURED CRUISERS
“The fire of the battle-cruisers was directed on the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. The effect of this was quickly seen, when at 1:25 P.M., with the Scharnhorst leading, they turned about seven points to port in succession into line ahead and opened fire at 1:30 P.M. Shortly afterwards speed was eased to twenty-four knots, and the battle-cruisers were ordered to turn together, bringing them into line ahead, with the Invincible1 leading.
“The range was about 13,500 yards at the final turn, and increased until at 2 P.M. it had reached 16,450 yards.”
The moment Von Spee found himself under the effective fire of the battle-cruisers, he took the only course open to him. To delay the finish by sheer flight would do no good. It was his duty to inflict2 some reciprocal injury on his opponent. He was under the fire of at least eight if not twelve 12-inch guns, and he only had six 8-inch guns bearing on Admiral Sturdee. To do anything at all effective he had to turn broadside on. He therefore turned seven-eighths of a right angle to port, that is, to the left—his course now being almost at right angles to Admiral Sturdee’s—and six minutes afterwards, when both his ships were on a steady course, he opened fire. Three minutes after he began his turn, and therefore three minutes before he opened fire, Admiral Sturdee turned his ships to port also, but his turn was not quite so big as the enemy’s, and192 for about twelve minutes the range was steadily4 closing. The effect of these changes of course was to bring the battle-cruisers to within 11,000 or 12,000 yards of Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. The Germans took full advantage of this opportunity, and before they had been firing five minutes they had salvo after salvo straddling the battle-cruisers.
As we have seen, both in the stories of the Koenigsberg and of the Emden, there has been no feature of any gunnery action more regularly reproduced than the rapidity with which the Germans find the range at the beginning of an action, or the regularity5 with which the projectiles6 of every broadside fall together. It was strikingly exemplified in the present instance, so much so indeed that Admiral Sturdee thought it wise to make a further turn to port, thus increasing the range, and as he says in this despatch7, by the time his total turn was completed, he brought the range out again to about 13,500 yards. At this distance the 12-inch guns would have a marked advantage over the 8.2’s. But for all that the German fire continued surprisingly accurate, and many hits were made on our ships. The British Admiral held to his new course and the German ships theirs. This involved the lengthening8 of the range. But Von Spee doubtless preferred this to the confusion of a changing rate. He held on then till he could reach the British ships no longer. The consequence was that in twenty minutes the range had increased by a further 2,500 yards, which was far beyond the capacity of 8.2’s, and a range at which the shooting of even the 12-inch guns might be irregular. Accordingly at about 2 o’clock the British squadron began a gradual turn towards the enemy, which in about seven minutes’ time brought them on a course at right angles193 to their previous course, and therefore a little less than right angles to the course which the Germans were steering9.
“The enemy then (2:10 P.M.) turned away about ten points to starboard and a second chase ensued, until, at 2:45 P.M., the battle-cruisers again opened fire; this caused the enemy, at 2:53 P.M., to turn into line ahead to port and open fire at 2:55 P.M.
“The Scharnhorst caught fire forward, but not seriously, and her fire slackened perceptibly; the Gneisenau was badly hit by the Inflexible10.”
In the seven minutes of the beginning of Admiral Sturdee’s turn he reduced the range by considerably11 over 1,000 yards, and Von Spee perceiving the change of course of the British ships, turned about half a right angle to starboard, that is to the right, as if undecided whether to go right across the bows, and then a few minutes afterwards turned much more than a right angle to the right again. This brought the British squadron dead astern of him and showed that his only anxiety at this moment was to escape our fire as long as possible. It appears from various accounts that firing had ceased on both sides for some little time before Admiral Sturdee began his turn at 2 o’clock, and Von Spee wished to make the lull12 in the fighting as long as possible. There were doubtless many wounded to carry off, damages to be made good, and so forth13. The whole of the first phase of the gunnery engagement, then, beginning just after half-past one on the German side, may be supposed to have ended round about ten minutes to two.
At ten minutes past two the enemy began his new flight, necessitating14 a reproduction by the British squadron of their tactics of two hours before. It was a chase, not on the direct track of the Germans, but on a course parallel194 to them and coming round on their port or left-hand side. Von Spee’s retreat had naturally increased the range, carried it out indeed considerably beyond 16,000 yards, but by a quarter to three it had been reduced once more to 15,000 yards, and when the British ships reopened fire, after less than ten minutes of it the enemy turned to bring his broadside into action, just as he had done at 1:25.
“At 3:30 P.M. the Scharnhorst led round about ten points to starboard; just previously15 her fire had slackened perceptibly, and one shell had shot away her third funnel16; some guns were not firing, and it would appear that the turn was dictated17 by a desire to bring her starboard guns into action. The effect of the fire on the Scharnhorst became more and more apparent in consequence of smoke from fires, and also escaping steam; at times a shell would cause a large hole to appear in her side, through which could be seen a dull red glow of flame. At 4:4 P.M. the Scharnhorst, whose flag remained flying to the last, suddenly listed heavily to port, and within a minute it became clear that she was a doomed18 ship; for the list increased very rapidly until she lay on her beam ends, and at 4:17 P.M. she disappeared.”
There was this difference between the enemy’s man?uvres on this occasion and that of an hour and a half before. At 1:25 he simply turned sufficiently19 to bring his broadside to bear. This time he turned not less but much more than a right angle, and Admiral Sturdee was considerably behind him when he opened fire at a quarter to three. Had the British squadron not turned shortly afterwards, the Germans could have closed the range to collision point. As a matter of fact, immediately after the Germans turned, Admiral Sturdee turned too, but not so large an angle, and the consequence was that at 3 o’clock195 the range had been reduced to 12,000 yards, and at one time it had shortened down to about 9,000. It was apparently21 Von Spee’s intention at this stage to shorten the range to an extent that would give his guns the opportunity of doing some real damage to our ships. This is of course the proper policy to adopt if a squadron has inferior gun-power and is unable to escape by flight.
But it will be observed that Von Spee did not persist in this man?uvre, and it is obvious that he adopted it too late. He missed his first opportunity of inflicting22 serious and possibly decisive injury, when he failed to engage the British ships as they were coming out of harbour. He missed the second when, on Admiral Sturdee turning away from him at 1:45, he held on his course and allowed the range to be increased. He missed it again when at 2:10, instead of holding on his course and going across Admiral Sturdee’s bows, he began his second and necessarily futile23 flight. When the fourth chance came it was probably too late. Both ships had been hit and Scharnhorst seriously. But for about twenty minutes the German Admiral did now close the range and come in almost direct pursuit of the British. So much so that shortly after a quarter past three Admiral Sturdee turned away from him, and describing a kind of circle with his ships from left to right, brought his squadron round so as to be directly behind the German ships. He had two reasons for making this turn. His course was straight up wind, so that gunnery conditions were bad, and the turn brought him to the most favourable24 possible position for concentrating fire upon the enemy, while they had only a minimum number of guns bearing. This position Von Spee found intolerable. Both his ships were suffering, and one of the Scharnhorst’s funnels25 was carried away. It must196 have been evident to him that the end was not far off when he turned at half past three. Never since the first twenty minutes had the enemy’s fire been really good, and now the thing was assuming the dimensions of a military execution. The second phase of gunfire between a quarter to three and half past had been decisive as far as the Scharnhorst was concerned.
A curious incident in this interval26 should be noted27. Just as the firing began in this second phase, a full-rigged sailing ship was observed about four miles off to the southeast from the leading British ship. She is not identified in any of the reports of the action that I have seen, nor has any account appeared that I know of, of what those on board saw. But it must have been an astonishing experience for a peaceful trading sailing vessel28, beating down quietly towards the Horn, to find herself suddenly in the middle of so grim a business as this. Those on board saw a thing at that time unprecedented29 in the history of the world. A sea battle in which ships as fast as the swiftest Atlantic liners were using an armament twice as powerful as that carried by any battleship that had ever been used in war before.
The last moments of Scharnhorst were curiously30 dramatic. Till now she had led Gneisenau throughout the fight. Just before she sank she turned a half circle past Gneisenau in the reverse direction, and before anybody in the British ships could guess whether this was an intentional31 man?uvre or purely32 involuntary, she turned over on her side, her bows plunged33 downwards34, and after standing35 upright for a second or two with her screws whirring high in the air, vanished from sight. It is probable that coincident with one shot inflicting such injuries that she was flooded, another had smashed up her steering gear, and jammed her helm hard a-port.
197 “The Gneisenau passed on the far side of her late flagship, and continued a determined36 but ineffectual effort to fight the two battle cruisers.
“At 5:8 P.M. the forward funnel was knocked over and remained resting against the second funnel. She was evidently in serious straits, and her fire slackened very much.
“At 5:15 P.M. one of the Gneisenau’s shells struck the Invincible; this was her last effective effort.
“At 5:30 P.M. she turned towards the flagship with a heavy list to starboard, and appeared stopped, with steam pouring from her escape pipes, and smoke from shell and fires rising everywhere. About this time I ordered the signal ‘Cease fire,’ but before it was hoisted37 the Gneisenau opened fire again, and continued to fire from time to time with a single gun.
“At 5:40 P.M. the three ships closed in on the Gneisenau, and, at this time, the flag flying at her fore3 truck was apparently hauled down, but the flag at the peak continued flying.
“At 5:50 P.M. ‘Cease fire’ was made.
“At 6 P.M. the Gneisenau heeled over very suddenly, showing the men gathered on her decks and then walking on her side as she lay for a minute on her beam ends before sinking.”
The Gneisenau, at 4:17, still had all her guns in action, and seemed indeed to have suffered very little. Had the fire of both battle-cruisers hitherto been concentrated chiefly on the flagship? If so, the effect was really rather unfortunate, for with one ship going strong, it was impossible for the Vice-Admiral to attempt the rescue of the people in Scharnhorst. Rain had set in. There were signs of mist and thick weather. At any moment the198 light might fail. The conditions of the morning had been ideal for the control of guns at long range. These conditions had long since vanished. No doubt it went greatly against the grain to leave the brave fellows of the Scharnhorst in their hopeless struggle, but the necessities of the situation gave no choice. For that matter, when the loss of life that took place in the Gneisenau is considered, it is highly probable that had the British ships stopped to look for people of the Scharnhorst they would have found none. For she turned over and sank, not as Gneisenau subsequently did, so slowly that the people on board were able to muster38 on deck and then clamber on to the ship’s sides as she heeled over, but with such fearful rapidity that it is said that a salvo which Carnarvon had fired at her when she was still afloat and showed no signs of immediate20 collapse39, actually pitched in the water where she had sunk! If this story is true she must have turned over and vanished from sight in from ten to fifteen seconds. In this instance there can have been few if any survivors40 left swimming in the water, and those must have perished before help could reach them.
With the disappearance41 of Scharnhorst Admiral Sturdee made a double turn with his ships to bring them more or less into the wake of Gneisenau and adopted a new disposition42. He followed Gneisenau on the starboard side himself, in Invincible, and sent Inflexible to take up a corresponding position on the port quarter. This brought both ships within a range of about 12,000 yards of the Gneisenau, who for the next forty minutes was subjected to a double attack, one on each side. At 5:15 she made her last effort. She hit Invincible amidships.
(LARGER)
Plan of the action between the British battle-cruisers and the German armoured cruisers
It is curious that after 5:30, when every gun but one was out of action and the ship had a heavy list, that she should199 still have been able to fire her last surviving piece. But such incidents are common to all naval43 actions. It is said that, at the battle of Tuschima, when Savaroff had not only been shot to pieces, but seemed to be red hot from stem to stern, one of the 6-inch casemates kept at work quite steadily throughout, the last shot being fired when the ship was on her beam ends, in the act of sinking, so that the shell must have been shot straight up into the air.
“The prisoners of war from the Gneisenau report that by the time the ammunition44 was expended45, some 600 men had been killed and wounded. The surviving officers and men were all ordered on deck and told to provide themselves with hammocks and any articles that could support them in the water.
“When the ship capsized and sank there were probably some two hundred unwounded survivors in the water, but owing to the shock of the cold water, many were drowned within sight of the boats and ship.
“Every effort was made to save life as quickly as possible, both by boats and from the ships; life-buoys were thrown and ropes lowered, but only a proportion could be rescued. The Invincible alone rescued 108 men, fourteen of whom were found to be dead after being brought on board; these men were buried at sea the following day with full military honours.”
Some of the German prisoners believed that Gneisenau was not sunk by gun-fire at all, and said that the commander had had the Kingston valves opened as soon as the ammunition was exhausted46 and there was no possibility of carrying on the fight.
点击收听单词发音
1 invincible | |
adj.不可征服的,难以制服的 | |
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2 inflict | |
vt.(on)把…强加给,使遭受,使承担 | |
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3 fore | |
adv.在前面;adj.先前的;在前部的;n.前部 | |
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4 steadily | |
adv.稳定地;不变地;持续地 | |
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5 regularity | |
n.规律性,规则性;匀称,整齐 | |
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6 projectiles | |
n.抛射体( projectile的名词复数 );(炮弹、子弹等)射弹,(火箭等)自动推进的武器 | |
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7 despatch | |
n./v.(dispatch)派遣;发送;n.急件;新闻报道 | |
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8 lengthening | |
(时间或空间)延长,伸长( lengthen的现在分词 ); 加长 | |
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9 steering | |
n.操舵装置 | |
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10 inflexible | |
adj.不可改变的,不受影响的,不屈服的 | |
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11 considerably | |
adv.极大地;相当大地;在很大程度上 | |
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12 lull | |
v.使安静,使入睡,缓和,哄骗;n.暂停,间歇 | |
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13 forth | |
adv.向前;向外,往外 | |
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14 necessitating | |
使…成为必要,需要( necessitate的现在分词 ) | |
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15 previously | |
adv.以前,先前(地) | |
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16 funnel | |
n.漏斗;烟囱;v.汇集 | |
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17 dictated | |
v.大声讲或读( dictate的过去式和过去分词 );口授;支配;摆布 | |
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18 doomed | |
命定的 | |
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19 sufficiently | |
adv.足够地,充分地 | |
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20 immediate | |
adj.立即的;直接的,最接近的;紧靠的 | |
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21 apparently | |
adv.显然地;表面上,似乎 | |
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22 inflicting | |
把…强加给,使承受,遭受( inflict的现在分词 ) | |
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23 futile | |
adj.无效的,无用的,无希望的 | |
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24 favourable | |
adj.赞成的,称赞的,有利的,良好的,顺利的 | |
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25 funnels | |
漏斗( funnel的名词复数 ); (轮船,火车等的)烟囱 | |
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26 interval | |
n.间隔,间距;幕间休息,中场休息 | |
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27 noted | |
adj.著名的,知名的 | |
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28 vessel | |
n.船舶;容器,器皿;管,导管,血管 | |
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29 unprecedented | |
adj.无前例的,新奇的 | |
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30 curiously | |
adv.有求知欲地;好问地;奇特地 | |
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31 intentional | |
adj.故意的,有意(识)的 | |
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32 purely | |
adv.纯粹地,完全地 | |
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33 plunged | |
v.颠簸( plunge的过去式和过去分词 );暴跌;骤降;突降 | |
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34 downwards | |
adj./adv.向下的(地),下行的(地) | |
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35 standing | |
n.持续,地位;adj.永久的,不动的,直立的,不流动的 | |
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36 determined | |
adj.坚定的;有决心的 | |
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37 hoisted | |
把…吊起,升起( hoist的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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38 muster | |
v.集合,收集,鼓起,激起;n.集合,检阅,集合人员,点名册 | |
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39 collapse | |
vi.累倒;昏倒;倒塌;塌陷 | |
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40 survivors | |
幸存者,残存者,生还者( survivor的名词复数 ) | |
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41 disappearance | |
n.消失,消散,失踪 | |
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42 disposition | |
n.性情,性格;意向,倾向;排列,部署 | |
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43 naval | |
adj.海军的,军舰的,船的 | |
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44 ammunition | |
n.军火,弹药 | |
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45 expended | |
v.花费( expend的过去式和过去分词 );使用(钱等)做某事;用光;耗尽 | |
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46 exhausted | |
adj.极其疲惫的,精疲力尽的 | |
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