Of course so long as the super-men substitutes have only to walk to their places, to bow, smile, frown, overawe, and be admired, everything goes safely enough. The audience is satisfied and the {54} 'management' rubs its hands. But if anything has to be done beyond this parade business, if the unexpected happens, if, for instance, there is an alarm of fire—in which case the example set by the super-creatures might be of inestimable assistance—the 'paper' element is certain to crumple7 up, according to the laws of its nature, being after all but dried pulp8. Something of this kind appears to have happened in various great countries during the weeks which immediately preceded and followed the outbreak of war, and in none was the crumpling10 up of the supermen substitutes more noticeable than in Germany.
The thoroughness of the German race is no empty boast. All the world knows as much by experience in peace as well as war. Consequently, people had said to themselves: "However it may be with other nations, in Germany at all events the strings11 of foreign policy are firmly held in giant fingers." But as day succeeded day, unmasking one miscalculation after another, it became clear that there must have been at least as much 'paper' in the political high places of Germany as elsewhere.
Clearly, although this war was made in Germany, it did not at all follow the course which had been charted for it in the official forecasts. For the German bureaucracy and general staff had laid their plans to crush France at the first onset—to crush her till the bones stuck out through her skin. And they had reckoned to out-general Russia and roll back her multitudes, as yet unorganised—so at least it was conceived—in wave upon wave of encroaching defeat.
Having achieved these aims before the fall of the leaf, Germany would have gained thereby12 another {55} decade for the undisturbed development of wealth and world-power. Under Prussian direction the power of Austria would then be consolidated13 within her own dominions14 and throughout the Balkan Peninsula. At the end of this interval15 of vigorous recuperation, or possibly earlier, Germany would attack England, and England would fall an easy prey16. For having stood aside from the former struggle she would be without allies. Her name would stink17 in the nostrils18 of Russia and France; and indeed to the whole world she would be recognised for what she was—a decadent19 and coward nation. Even her own children would blush for her dishonour20.
That these were the main lines of the German forecast no man can doubt, who has watched and studied the development of events; and although it is as yet too early days to make sure that nothing of all this vast conception will ever be realised, much of it—the time-table at all events—has certainly miscarried for good and all.
THE TIME-TABLE MISCARRIES
According to German calculations England would stand aside; but England took part. Italy would help her allies; but Italy refused. Servia was a thing of naught21; but Servia destroyed several army corps22. Belgium would not count; and yet Belgium by her exertions23 counted, if for nothing more, for the loss of eight precious days, while by her sufferings she mobilised against the aggressor the condemnation24 of the whole world.
The Germans reckoned that the army of France was terrible only upon paper. Forty-five years of corrupt25 government and political peculation26 must, according to their calculations, have paralysed the {56} general staff and betrayed the national spirit. The sums voted for equipment, arms, and ammunition27 must assuredly have been spirited away, as under The Third Empire, into the pockets of ministers, senators, deputies, and contractors28. The results of this régime would become apparent, as they had done in 1870, only in the present case sooner.
War was declared by the Third Napoleon at mid-July, by William the Second not until August 1; but Sedan or its equivalent would occur, nevertheless, in the first days of September, in 1914 as in 1870. In the former contest Paris fell at the end of six months; in this one, with the aid of howitzers, it would fall at the end of six weeks.
Unfortunately for this confident prediction, whatever may have been the deficiency in the French supplies, however dangerous the consequent hitches29 in mobilisation, things fell out quite differently. The spirit of the people of France, and the devotion of her soldiers, survived the misfeasances of the politicians, supposing indeed that such crimes had actually been committed.
It was a feature of Bismarck's diplomacy30 that he put a high value upon the good opinion of the world, and took the greatest pains to avoid its condemnation. In 1870, as we now know, he schemed successfully, to lure32 the government of Napoleon the Third into a declaration of war, thereby saddling the French government with the odium which attaches to peace-breakers.[1] But in the case of the present war, {57} which, as it out-Bismarcked Bismarck in deliberate aggressiveness, stood all the more in need of a tactful introduction to the outside world, the precautions of that astute33 statesman were neglected or despised. From the beginning all neutral nations were resentful of German procedure, and after the devastation34 of Belgium and the destruction of Louvain, the spacious35 morality of the Young Turks alone was equal to the profession of friendship and admiration36.
CRUELTIES IN BELGIUM
The objects which Germany sought to gain by the cruelties perpetrated, under orders, by her soldiers in Belgium and Northern France are clear enough. These objects were certainly of considerable value in a military as well as in a political sense. One wonders, however, if even Germany herself now considers them to have been worth the abhorrence37 and disgust which they have earned for her throughout the civilised world.
In nothing is the sham38 super-man more easily detected than in the confidence and self-complacency with which he pounces39 upon the immediate9 small advantage, regardless of the penalty he will have to pay in the future. By spreading death and devastation broadcast in Belgium the Germans hoped to attain40 three things, and it is not impossible that they have succeeded in attaining41 them all. They sought to secure their communications by putting the fear of death, and worse than death, into the hearts of the civil population. They sought to send the countryside fleeing terror-stricken before their advance, choking and cumbering the highways; than which nothing is ever more hampering42 to the operations of an army in retreat, or more depressing to its spirits. But chiefly they desired to set a ruthless object-lesson before the {58} eyes of Holland, in order to show her the consequences of resistance; so that when it came to her turn to answer a summons to surrender she might have the good sense not to make a fuss. They desired in their dully-calculating, official minds that Holland might never forget the clouds of smoke, from burning villages and homesteads, which the August breezes carried far across her frontiers; the sights of horror, the tales of suffering and ruin which tens of thousands of starved, forlorn, and hurrying fugitives43 brought with them when they came seeking sanctuary44 in her territories. But if the Germans gained all this, and even if they gained in addition the loving admiration of the Young Turks, was it worth while to purchase these advantages at such a price? It seems a poor bargain to save your communications, if thereby you lose the good opinion of the whole world.
What is of most interest to ourselves, however, in the long list of miscalculations, is the confidence of Germany that Britain would remain neutral. For a variety of reasons which satisfied the able bureaucrats45 at Berlin, it was apparently46 taken for granted by them that we were determined47 to stand out; and indeed that we were in no position to come in even if we would. We conjecture48 that the reports of German ambassadors, councillors, consuls49, and secret service agents must have been very certain and unanimous in this prediction.
According to the German theory, the British race, at home and abroad, was wholly immersed in gain, and in a kind of pseudo-philanthropy—in making money, and in paying blackmail50 to the working-classes in order to be allowed to go on making money. {59} Our social legislation and our 'People's Budgets' were regarded in Germany with contempt, as sops51 and shams52, wanting in thoroughness and tainted53 with hypocrisy54.
English politicians, acting55 upon the advice of obliging financiers, had been engaged during recent years (so grossly was the situation misjudged by our neighbours) in imposing57 taxation58 which hit the trader, manufacturer, and country-gentleman as hard as possible; which also hit the working-class hard, though indirectly59; but which left holes through which the financiers themselves—by virtue60 of their international connections and affiliations—could glide61 easily into comparative immunity62.
From these faulty premisses, Germans concluded that Britain was held in leading-strings by certain sentimentalists who wanted vaguely64 to do good; and that these sentimentalists, again, were helped and guided by certain money-lenders and exploiters, who were all very much in favour of paying ransom65 out of other people's pockets. A nation which had come to this pass would be ready enough to sacrifice future interests—being blind to them—for the comforts of a present peace.
The Governments of the United Kingdom and the Dominions were largely influenced—so it was believed at Berlin—by crooks66 and cranks of various sorts, by speculators and 'speculatists,'[2] many of them of foreign origin or descent—who preached day in and day out the doctrine67 that war was an anachronism, vieux jeu, even an impossibility in the present situation of the world.
[2] 'Speculatists' was a term used by contemporary American writers to describe the eloquent68 theorists who played so large a part in the French Revolution.
{60}
The British Government appeared to treat these materially-minded visionaries with the highest favour. Their advice was constantly sought; they were recipients69 of the confidences of Ministers; they played the part of Lords Bountiful to the party organisations; they were loaded with titles, if not with honour. Their abhorrence of militarism knew no bounds, and to a large extent it seemed to German, and even to English eyes, as if they carried the Cabinet, the party-machine, and the press along with them.
'Militarism,' as used by these enthusiasts70, was a comprehensive term. It covered with ridicule71 and disrepute even such things as preparation for the defence of the national existence. International law was solemnly recommended as a safer defence than battleships.
Better certainly, they allowed, if militarism could be rooted out in all countries; but at any rate England, the land of their birth or adoption72, must be saved from the contamination of this brutalising idea. In their anxiety to discredit73 Continental74 exemplars they even went so far as to evolve an ingenious theory, that foreign nations which followed in the paths of militarism, did so at serious loss to themselves, but with wholly innocent intentions. More especially, they insisted, was this true in the case of Germany.
The Liberal party appeared to listen to these opinions with respect; Radicals75 hailed them with enthusiasm; while the Labour party was at one time so much impressed, as to propose through some of its more progressive spirits that, in the exceedingly unlikely event of a German landing, working-men {61} should continue steadily76 at their usual labours and pay no heed77 to the military operations of the invaders78.
In Berlin, apparently, all this respect and enthusiasm for pacifism, together with the concrete proposals for putting its principles into practice, were taken at their face value. There at any rate it was confidently believed that the speculators and the 'speculatists' had succeeded in changing or erasing79 the spots of the English leopard80.
ERRORS OF INFERENCE
But in order to arrive at such a conclusion as this the able German bureaucrats must have understood very little, one would think, of human nature in general, and of British human nature in particular. Clearly they built more hopes on our supposed conversion81 to pacifism than the foundations would stand. They were right, of course, in counting it a benefit to themselves that we were unprepared and unsuspicious of attack; that we had pared down our exiguous82 army and stinted83 our navy somewhat beyond the limits of prudence84. They were foolish, however, not to perceive that if the British people found themselves confronted with the choice, between a war which they believed to be righteous, and a peace which they saw clearly would not only be wounding to their own honour but ruinous to their security, all their fine abstract convictions would go by the board; that party distinctions would then for the time being disappear, and the speculators and the 'speculatists' would be interned85 in the nethermost86 pit of national distrust.... In so far, therefore, as the Germans reckoned on our unpreparedness they were wise; but in counting upon British neutrality they were singularly wide of the mark.
{62}
One imagines that among the idealists of Berlin there must surely have been a few sceptics who did not altogether credit this wholesale87 conversion and quakerisation of the British race. But for these doubters, if indeed they existed, there were other considerations of a more practical kind which seemed to indicate that Britain must certainly stand aside.
The first and most important of these was the imminence88 of civil war in Ireland. If Prince Lichnowsky and Baron89 von Kuhlmann reported that this had become inevitable90, small blame to their perspicacity91! For in this their judgment92 only tallied93 with that of most people in the United Kingdom who had any knowledge of the true facts.
In March an incident occurred among the troops stationed in Ireland which must have given comfort at Berlin, even in greater measure than it caused disquiet94 at home. For it showed in a vivid flash the intrinsic dangers of the Irish situation, and the tension, almost to breaking-point, which existed between the civil authorities and the fighting services.
It also showed, what in the circumstances must have been peculiarly reassuring95 to the German Government, that our Navy and Army were under the charge of Ministers whose judgments96 were apt to be led captive by their tempers. Although the Secretary of State for War did not remain in office for many days to encourage the hearts of the general staff at Berlin, his important post was never filled. It was only occupied and kept warm by the Prime Minister, whose labours and responsibilities—according to the notions of the Germans, who are a painstaking97 and thorough people—were already enough for one man to undertake. Moreover, the First {63} Lord of the Admiralty had not resigned; and it was perhaps natural, looking at what had just happened, to conclude that he would be wholly incapable98 of the sound and swift decision by which a few months later he was destined99 to atone100 for his recent blunder.
THE DUBLIN RIOT
Moreover, although the Curragh incident, as it was called, had been patched over in a sort of way, the danger of civil war in Ireland had not diminished in the least by Midsummer. Indeed it had sensibly increased. During the interval large quantities of arms and ammunition had been imported by Ulstermen in defiance101 of the Government, and Nationalists were eagerly engaged in emulating102 their example. The emergency conference of the leaders of parties which the King, acting upon the desperate advice of his Ministers, had called together at Buckingham Palace ended in complete failure.
On Monday the 27th of July readers of the morning newspapers, looking anxiously for news of the Servian reply to the Austrian ultimatum103, found their eyes distracted by even blacker headlines, which announced that a Scots regiment104 had fired on a Dublin mob.
How the bureaucrats of Berlin must have rubbed their hands and admired their own prescience! Civil war in Ireland had actually begun, and in the very nick of time! And this occurrence, no less dramatic than opportune105, was a triumph not merely for German foresight106 but for German contrivance—like a good many other things, indeed, which have taken place of late. When the voyage of the good ship Fanny, which in April carried arms to the coast of Antrim, comes to be written, and that of the anonymous107 yacht which sailed from German waters, transhipped its {64} cargo108 in the channel, whence it was safely conveyed by another craft to Dublin Bay to kindle109 this blaze in July—when these narratives110 are set out by some future historian, as they deserve to be, but not until then, it will be known how zealously111, benevolently112, and impartially114 our loyal and kindly115 Teuton cousins forwarded and fomented116 the quarrel between Covenanter and Nationalist. What the German bureaucrats, however, with all their foresight, apparently did not in the least foresee, was that the wound which they had intentionally118 done so much to keep open, they would speedily be helping119 unintentionally to heal.
With regard to South Africa, German miscalculation and intrigue120 pursued a somewhat similar course, though with little better results. It was assumed that South Africa, having been fully31 incorporated in the Empire as a self-governing unit only twelve years earlier, and as the result of a prolonged and sanguinary war, must necessarily be bent121 on severing122 the British connection at the earliest opportunity. The Dutch, like the frogs in the fable123, were imagined to be only awaiting a favourable124 moment to exchange the tyranny of King Log for the benevolent113 rule of King Stork125.
In these forecasts, however, various considerations were overlooked. In the first place, the methods of incorporation126 pursued by the British in South Africa were as nearly as possible the opposite of those adopted by Prussia in Poland, in Schleswig-Holstein, and in Alsace-Lorraine. In many quarters there were doubtless bitter memories among the Dutch, and in some others disappointed ambition still ached; {65} but these forces were not enough to plunge127 into serious civil war two races which, after nearly a century of strife128 and division, had but a few years before entered into a solemn and voluntary covenant117 to make a firm union, and dwell henceforth in peace one with another. What object could there be for Dutchmen to rise in rebellion against a government, which consisted almost exclusively of Dutch statesmen, and which had been put in office and was kept there by the popular vote?
MISTAKES AS TO DUTCH
What German intrigue and bribery129 could do it did. But Dutchmen whose recollections went back so far as twenty years were little likely to place excessive confidence in the incitements and professions of Berlin. They remembered with what busy intrigues130 Germany had in former times encouraged their ambitions, with what a rich bribery of promises she had urged them on to war, with what cold indifference131, when war arose, she had left them to their fate. They also remembered how, when their aged56 President, an exiled and broken-hearted man, sought an interview with the great sovereign whose consideration for him in his more prosperous days had never lacked for warmth, he received for an answer, that Berlin was no place for people who had been beaten to come whining132, and was turned from the door.
In India, as in South Africa, Germany entertained confident hopes of a successful rising. Had not the Crown Prince, a shrewd judge, visited there a few years earlier and formed his own estimate of the situation? Was there not a widely spread network of sedition133 covering the whole of our Eastern Empire, an incendiary press, and orators134 who openly counselled {66} violence and preached rebellion? Had not riots been increasing rapidly in gravity and number? Had not assassins been actively135 pursuing their trade? Had not a ship-load of Indians just been refused admission to Canada, thereby causing a not unnatural136 outburst of indignation?
How far German statesmen had merely foreseen these things, how far they had actually contrived137 them, we are as yet in ignorance; but judging by what has happened in other places—in Ireland, South Africa, Belgium, and France—it would surprise no one to learn that the bombs which were thrown at the Viceroy and his wife with tragic138 consequences owed something to German teaching. It is unlikely that German emissaries had been less active in fomenting139 unrest in India than elsewhere among the subjects of nations with which they were ostensibly at peace; while the fact that the Crown Prince had but recently enjoyed the hospitality of the Viceregal Court was only a sentimental63 consideration unworthy of the attention of super-men.
Moreover, it had for long been abundantly clear, on a priori grounds, to thinkers like Treitschke and Bernhardi that India was already ripe for rebellion on a grand scale. There are but two things which affect the Indian mind with awe6 and submission—a sublime140 philosophy and a genius for war. The English had never been philosophers, and they had ceased to be warriors141. How, then, could a race which worshipped only soldiers and sages142 be expected to reverence143 and obey a garrison144 of clerks and shopkeepers? A war between England and Germany would provide an opportunity for making an end for ever of the British Raj.
{67}
MISTAKES AS TO DOMINIONS
The self-governing Dominions were believed to be affected145 with the same decadent spirit and fantastic illusions as their Mother Country; only with them these cankers had spread more widely, were more logically followed out in practice, and less tempered and restrained by aristocratic tradition. Their eloquent outpourings of devotion and cohesion147 were in reality quite valueless; merely what in their own slang is known as 'hot air.' They hated militarism in theory and practice, and they loved making money with at least an equal fervour. Consequently, it was absurd to suppose that their professions of loyalty148 would stand the strain of a war, by which not only their national exchequers149, but the whole mass of the people must inevitably150 be impoverished151, in which the manhood of the Dominions would be called on for military service, and their defenceless territories placed in danger of invasion.
It was incredible to the wise men at Berlin that the timid but clear minds of English Statesmen had not appreciated these obvious facts. War, therefore, would be avoided as long as possible. And when at a later date, war was forced by Germany upon the pusillanimous152 islanders, the Dominions would immediately discern various highly moral pleas for standing153 aloof154. Germany, honouring these pleas for the time being with a mock respect, would defer155 devouring156 the Dominions until she had digested the more serious meal.
It will be seen from all this how good the grounds were on which the best-informed and most efficient bureaucracy in the world decided157 that the British Empire would remain neutral in the present war. {68} Looked at from the strictly158 intellectual standpoint, the reasons which satisfied German Statesmen with regard to Britain's neutrality were overwhelming, and might well have convinced others, of a similar outlook and training, who had no personal interest whatsoever159 in coming to one conclusion rather than another.
None the less the judgment of the Kaiser and his Ministers was not only bad, but inexcusably bad. We expect more from statesmen than that they should arrive at logical conclusions. Logic146 in such cases is nothing; all that matters is to be right; but unless instinct rules and reason serves, right judgment will rarely be arrived at in such matters as these. If a man cannot feel as well as reason, if he cannot gauge160 the forces which are at work among the nations by some kind of second-sight, he has no title to set up his bills as a statesman. It is incredible that Lincoln, Cavour, or Bismarck would ever have blundered into such a war as this, under the delusion161 that Britain could remain neutral even if she would. Nor would any of these three have been so far out in his reckoning as to believe, that the immediate effect of such a war, if Britain joined in it, would be the disruption of her empire. They might have calculated that in the event of the war being prolonged and disastrous162 to England, disintegration163 would in the end come about; but without stopping to reason the matter out, they would have known by instinct, that the first effect produced by such a war would be a consolidation164 and knitting together of the loose Imperial fabric165, and a suspension, or at least a diminution166, of internal differences.
[1] British public opinion in regard to that war was divided roughly according to party lines, the Conservatives favouring France on sentimental grounds, the Liberals favouring Germany as a highly-educated, peace-loving people who had been wantonly attacked.
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1 veneration | |
n.尊敬,崇拜 | |
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2 burnish | |
v.磨光;使光滑 | |
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3 fig | |
n.无花果(树) | |
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4 comport | |
vi.相称,适合 | |
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5 propriety | |
n.正当行为;正当;适当 | |
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6 awe | |
n.敬畏,惊惧;vt.使敬畏,使惊惧 | |
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7 crumple | |
v.把...弄皱,满是皱痕,压碎,崩溃 | |
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8 pulp | |
n.果肉,纸浆;v.化成纸浆,除去...果肉,制成纸浆 | |
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9 immediate | |
adj.立即的;直接的,最接近的;紧靠的 | |
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10 crumpling | |
压皱,弄皱( crumple的现在分词 ); 变皱 | |
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11 strings | |
n.弦 | |
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12 thereby | |
adv.因此,从而 | |
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13 consolidated | |
a.联合的 | |
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14 dominions | |
统治权( dominion的名词复数 ); 领土; 疆土; 版图 | |
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15 interval | |
n.间隔,间距;幕间休息,中场休息 | |
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16 prey | |
n.被掠食者,牺牲者,掠食;v.捕食,掠夺,折磨 | |
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17 stink | |
vi.发出恶臭;糟透,招人厌恶;n.恶臭 | |
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鼻孔( nostril的名词复数 ) | |
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19 decadent | |
adj.颓废的,衰落的,堕落的 | |
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20 dishonour | |
n./vt.拒付(支票、汇票、票据等);vt.凌辱,使丢脸;n.不名誉,耻辱,不光彩 | |
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21 naught | |
n.无,零 [=nought] | |
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22 corps | |
n.(通信等兵种的)部队;(同类作的)一组 | |
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23 exertions | |
n.努力( exertion的名词复数 );费力;(能力、权力等的)运用;行使 | |
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24 condemnation | |
n.谴责; 定罪 | |
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25 corrupt | |
v.贿赂,收买;adj.腐败的,贪污的 | |
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26 peculation | |
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27 ammunition | |
n.军火,弹药 | |
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28 contractors | |
n.(建筑、监造中的)承包人( contractor的名词复数 ) | |
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暂时的困难或问题( hitch的名词复数 ); 意外障碍; 急拉; 绳套 | |
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30 diplomacy | |
n.外交;外交手腕,交际手腕 | |
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31 fully | |
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38 sham | |
n./adj.假冒(的),虚伪(的) | |
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39 pounces | |
v.突然袭击( pounce的第三人称单数 );猛扑;一眼看出;抓住机会(进行抨击) | |
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40 attain | |
vt.达到,获得,完成 | |
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41 attaining | |
(通常经过努力)实现( attain的现在分词 ); 达到; 获得; 达到(某年龄、水平、状况) | |
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42 hampering | |
妨碍,束缚,限制( hamper的现在分词 ) | |
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43 fugitives | |
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44 sanctuary | |
n.圣所,圣堂,寺庙;禁猎区,保护区 | |
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45 bureaucrats | |
n.官僚( bureaucrat的名词复数 );官僚主义;官僚主义者;官僚语言 | |
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46 apparently | |
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领事( consul的名词复数 ); (古罗马共和国时期)执政官 (古罗马共和国及其军队的最高首长,同时共有两位,每年选举一次) | |
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50 blackmail | |
n.讹诈,敲诈,勒索,胁迫,恫吓 | |
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51 sops | |
n.用以慰藉或讨好某人的事物( sop的名词复数 );泡湿的面包片等v.将(面包等)在液体中蘸或浸泡( sop的第三人称单数 );用海绵、布等吸起(液体等) | |
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52 shams | |
假象( sham的名词复数 ); 假货; 虚假的行为(或感情、言语等); 假装…的人 | |
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53 tainted | |
adj.腐坏的;污染的;沾污的;感染的v.使变质( taint的过去式和过去分词 );使污染;败坏;被污染,腐坏,败坏 | |
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54 hypocrisy | |
n.伪善,虚伪 | |
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55 acting | |
n.演戏,行为,假装;adj.代理的,临时的,演出用的 | |
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56 aged | |
adj.年老的,陈年的 | |
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57 imposing | |
adj.使人难忘的,壮丽的,堂皇的,雄伟的 | |
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58 taxation | |
n.征税,税收,税金 | |
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59 indirectly | |
adv.间接地,不直接了当地 | |
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60 virtue | |
n.德行,美德;贞操;优点;功效,效力 | |
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61 glide | |
n./v.溜,滑行;(时间)消逝 | |
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62 immunity | |
n.优惠;免除;豁免,豁免权 | |
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63 sentimental | |
adj.多愁善感的,感伤的 | |
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64 vaguely | |
adv.含糊地,暖昧地 | |
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65 ransom | |
n.赎金,赎身;v.赎回,解救 | |
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66 crooks | |
n.骗子( crook的名词复数 );罪犯;弯曲部分;(牧羊人或主教用的)弯拐杖v.弯成钩形( crook的第三人称单数 ) | |
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67 doctrine | |
n.教义;主义;学说 | |
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68 eloquent | |
adj.雄辩的,口才流利的;明白显示出的 | |
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69 recipients | |
adj.接受的;受领的;容纳的;愿意接受的n.收件人;接受者;受领者;接受器 | |
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70 enthusiasts | |
n.热心人,热衷者( enthusiast的名词复数 ) | |
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71 ridicule | |
v.讥讽,挖苦;n.嘲弄 | |
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72 adoption | |
n.采用,采纳,通过;收养 | |
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73 discredit | |
vt.使不可置信;n.丧失信义;不信,怀疑 | |
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74 continental | |
adj.大陆的,大陆性的,欧洲大陆的 | |
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75 radicals | |
n.激进分子( radical的名词复数 );根基;基本原理;[数学]根数 | |
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76 steadily | |
adv.稳定地;不变地;持续地 | |
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77 heed | |
v.注意,留意;n.注意,留心 | |
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78 invaders | |
入侵者,侵略者,侵入物( invader的名词复数 ) | |
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79 erasing | |
v.擦掉( erase的现在分词 );抹去;清除 | |
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80 leopard | |
n.豹 | |
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81 conversion | |
n.转化,转换,转变 | |
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82 exiguous | |
adj.不足的,太少的 | |
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83 stinted | |
v.限制,节省(stint的过去式与过去分词形式) | |
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84 prudence | |
n.谨慎,精明,节俭 | |
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85 interned | |
v.拘留,关押( intern的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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86 nethermost | |
adj.最下面的 | |
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87 wholesale | |
n.批发;adv.以批发方式;vt.批发,成批出售 | |
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88 imminence | |
n.急迫,危急 | |
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89 baron | |
n.男爵;(商业界等)巨头,大王 | |
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90 inevitable | |
adj.不可避免的,必然发生的 | |
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91 perspicacity | |
n. 敏锐, 聪明, 洞察力 | |
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92 judgment | |
n.审判;判断力,识别力,看法,意见 | |
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93 tallied | |
v.计算,清点( tally的过去式和过去分词 );加标签(或标记)于;(使)符合;(使)吻合 | |
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94 disquiet | |
n.担心,焦虑 | |
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95 reassuring | |
a.使人消除恐惧和疑虑的,使人放心的 | |
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96 judgments | |
判断( judgment的名词复数 ); 鉴定; 评价; 审判 | |
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97 painstaking | |
adj.苦干的;艰苦的,费力的,刻苦的 | |
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98 incapable | |
adj.无能力的,不能做某事的 | |
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99 destined | |
adj.命中注定的;(for)以…为目的地的 | |
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100 atone | |
v.赎罪,补偿 | |
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101 defiance | |
n.挑战,挑衅,蔑视,违抗 | |
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102 emulating | |
v.与…竞争( emulate的现在分词 );努力赶上;计算机程序等仿真;模仿 | |
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103 ultimatum | |
n.最后通牒 | |
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104 regiment | |
n.团,多数,管理;v.组织,编成团,统制 | |
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105 opportune | |
adj.合适的,适当的 | |
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106 foresight | |
n.先见之明,深谋远虑 | |
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107 anonymous | |
adj.无名的;匿名的;无特色的 | |
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108 cargo | |
n.(一只船或一架飞机运载的)货物 | |
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109 kindle | |
v.点燃,着火 | |
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110 narratives | |
记叙文( narrative的名词复数 ); 故事; 叙述; 叙述部分 | |
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111 zealously | |
adv.热心地;热情地;积极地;狂热地 | |
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112 benevolently | |
adv.仁慈地,行善地 | |
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113 benevolent | |
adj.仁慈的,乐善好施的 | |
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114 impartially | |
adv.公平地,无私地 | |
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115 kindly | |
adj.和蔼的,温和的,爽快的;adv.温和地,亲切地 | |
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116 fomented | |
v.激起,煽动(麻烦等)( foment的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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117 covenant | |
n.盟约,契约;v.订盟约 | |
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118 intentionally | |
ad.故意地,有意地 | |
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119 helping | |
n.食物的一份&adj.帮助人的,辅助的 | |
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120 intrigue | |
vt.激起兴趣,迷住;vi.耍阴谋;n.阴谋,密谋 | |
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121 bent | |
n.爱好,癖好;adj.弯的;决心的,一心的 | |
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122 severing | |
v.切断,断绝( sever的现在分词 );断,裂 | |
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123 fable | |
n.寓言;童话;神话 | |
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124 favourable | |
adj.赞成的,称赞的,有利的,良好的,顺利的 | |
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125 stork | |
n.鹳 | |
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126 incorporation | |
n.设立,合并,法人组织 | |
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127 plunge | |
v.跳入,(使)投入,(使)陷入;猛冲 | |
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128 strife | |
n.争吵,冲突,倾轧,竞争 | |
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129 bribery | |
n.贿络行为,行贿,受贿 | |
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130 intrigues | |
n.密谋策划( intrigue的名词复数 );神秘气氛;引人入胜的复杂情节v.搞阴谋诡计( intrigue的第三人称单数 );激起…的好奇心 | |
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131 indifference | |
n.不感兴趣,不关心,冷淡,不在乎 | |
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132 whining | |
n. 抱怨,牢骚 v. 哭诉,发牢骚 | |
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133 sedition | |
n.煽动叛乱 | |
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134 orators | |
n.演说者,演讲家( orator的名词复数 ) | |
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135 actively | |
adv.积极地,勤奋地 | |
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136 unnatural | |
adj.不自然的;反常的 | |
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137 contrived | |
adj.不自然的,做作的;虚构的 | |
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138 tragic | |
adj.悲剧的,悲剧性的,悲惨的 | |
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139 fomenting | |
v.激起,煽动(麻烦等)( foment的现在分词 ) | |
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140 sublime | |
adj.崇高的,伟大的;极度的,不顾后果的 | |
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141 warriors | |
武士,勇士,战士( warrior的名词复数 ) | |
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142 sages | |
n.圣人( sage的名词复数 );智者;哲人;鼠尾草(可用作调料) | |
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143 reverence | |
n.敬畏,尊敬,尊严;Reverence:对某些基督教神职人员的尊称;v.尊敬,敬畏,崇敬 | |
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144 garrison | |
n.卫戍部队;驻地,卫戍区;vt.派(兵)驻防 | |
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145 affected | |
adj.不自然的,假装的 | |
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146 logic | |
n.逻辑(学);逻辑性 | |
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147 cohesion | |
n.团结,凝结力 | |
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148 loyalty | |
n.忠诚,忠心 | |
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149 exchequers | |
n.(英国)财政部( exchequer的名词复数 );国库,金库 | |
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150 inevitably | |
adv.不可避免地;必然发生地 | |
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151 impoverished | |
adj.穷困的,无力的,用尽了的v.使(某人)贫穷( impoverish的过去式和过去分词 );使(某物)贫瘠或恶化 | |
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152 pusillanimous | |
adj.懦弱的,胆怯的 | |
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153 standing | |
n.持续,地位;adj.永久的,不动的,直立的,不流动的 | |
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154 aloof | |
adj.远离的;冷淡的,漠不关心的 | |
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155 defer | |
vt.推迟,拖延;vi.(to)遵从,听从,服从 | |
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156 devouring | |
吞没( devour的现在分词 ); 耗尽; 津津有味地看; 狼吞虎咽地吃光 | |
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157 decided | |
adj.决定了的,坚决的;明显的,明确的 | |
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158 strictly | |
adv.严厉地,严格地;严密地 | |
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159 whatsoever | |
adv.(用于否定句中以加强语气)任何;pron.无论什么 | |
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160 gauge | |
v.精确计量;估计;n.标准度量;计量器 | |
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161 delusion | |
n.谬见,欺骗,幻觉,迷惑 | |
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162 disastrous | |
adj.灾难性的,造成灾害的;极坏的,很糟的 | |
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163 disintegration | |
n.分散,解体 | |
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164 consolidation | |
n.合并,巩固 | |
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165 fabric | |
n.织物,织品,布;构造,结构,组织 | |
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166 diminution | |
n.减少;变小 | |
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