The cavalry, supported by the 60th Division, were ordered to continue their advance to the north-west, and to push on with the utmost vigour7, so as to intercept8 the retirement9 of the Gaza garrison10. The Anzac Division was directed on Bureir, some twelve miles north-east of Gaza, with the Australian Mounted and 60th Divisions on the left, in échelon to the rear. The country was open, rolling down-land, devoid11 of trees or scrub, and dotted with prominent hills or 'tels.' The ground surface was hard, and the whole terrain12 was admirably suited for cavalry work.
The Anzac Division moved off at dawn, with the 1st and 2nd Brigades in line covering a front of some six miles, with centre about Abu Dilakh, and in touch[Pg 51] with the Australian Mounted Division on the left. The 7th Mounted Brigade, which had joined the division from Corps13 Reserve early in the morning, marched in support.
From the commencement of the advance, the Turks resisted strongly. Having been retiring during the two previous nights, and pressed by our cavalry on the intervening day, they had not had any opportunity of organising a definite line of resistance, but bodies of them, varying from a company to several regiments15, occupied every tel or other commanding ground along the line of our advance, and held on tenaciously16.
About nine o'clock, in order to expedite the advance, General Chaytor pushed up the 7th Brigade between the other two, which were encountering strong resistance. At eleven o'clock the enemy counter-attacked strongly against the 2nd Brigade, which was on the right of our line, near Tel el Nejile, and held up its advance. The 7th Brigade, in the centre, continued to push on, and had nearly reached Bir el Jemameh, about one o'clock, when it was heavily attacked by a large force of the enemy covering the water supply there. The brigade was forced back, and its left flank was endangered, when the 1st Brigade came up on the west, and drove back the Turks. Following up their advantage, the leading troops of this brigade fought their way into Bir el Jemameh shortly after three o'clock, capturing the steam pumping plant intact and complete, even to the engineer in charge. This individual had been left behind to blow up the plant, but instead remained to work it for us with great docility17.
A regiment14 of the 1st Brigade pushed out to the north, and secured the high ground overlooking Bir el Jemameh, and, under cover of this regiment, the[Pg 52] 7th Brigade and the rest of the 1st were able to water all their horses. The enemy fell back after dark, and the 2nd Brigade occupied Tel el Nejile. Some water was found here in the Wadi el Hesi, but it was not possible to water the horses of the outpost troops. The division established a night outpost line, protecting Nejile and Jemameh.
Meanwhile the Australian Mounted Division, on the left of the Anzacs, and with the 60th Division in its rear and a little farther west, pushed slowly after the retreating enemy, engaged in continuous, isolated18 troop actions throughout the day, in the course of which a number of enemy guns, particularly heavy howitzers, were captured. The 3rd A.L.H. Brigade especially distinguished19 itself in this form of warfare20. Troops of the brigade repeatedly stalked enemy guns during the day, and then charged them suddenly from the rear, killing21 the gun crews and capturing the guns. It became a commonplace to find an enemy 5·9-inch howitzer in a hollow in the ground, with the detachment dead around it, and the words 'captured by the 3rd A.L.H. Brigade' scrawled22 in chalk on the chase of the gun.
Early in the afternoon, a regiment of the 4th A.L.H. Brigade was ordered to try and gain touch with the right of the 21st Corps, which was out of communication with our troops in the centre. All the afternoon, the regiment rode hard over the plain to the north-west, avoiding the enemy troops where possible, brushing them aside when encountered, and succeeded in linking up with the Imperial Service Cavalry Brigade about Beit Hanun before nightfall. It rejoined the division at Huj next day.
About 3 P.M., as the right flank of the 60th Division was approaching Huj, it came suddenly under a devastating23 fire at close range from several con[Pg 53]cealed batteries of enemy artillery24, which, with two battalions25 of infantry, were covering the withdrawal26 of the VIIIth Army headquarters. The country was rather like Salisbury Plain, rolling down-land without any cover, and our troops suffered severely27 from the murderous fire. Major-General Shea, commanding the division, finding Colonel Gray-Cheape of the Warwick Yeomanry close by him, requested him to charge the enemy guns at once. Colonel Cheape collected a few troops of his own regiment that he had with him, and some of the Worcester Yeomanry, and led them away to the right front. Taking advantage of a slight rise in the ground to the east of the enemy position, he succeeded in leading his troops to within 800 yards of the Turkish guns unseen. He then gave the order to charge, and the ten troops galloped28 over the rise, and raced down upon the flank of the enemy guns. The Turks had in position a battery of field and one of mountain guns, with four machine guns on a low hill between the two batteries, and three heavy howitzers behind.
As our cavalry appeared, thundering over the rise, the Turks sprang to their guns and swung them round, firing point-blank into the charging horsemen. The infantry, leaping on the limbers, blazed away with their rifles till they were cut down. There was no thought of surrender; every man stuck to his gun or rifle to the last. The leading troops of the cavalry dashed into the first enemy battery. The following troops, swinging to the right, took the three heavy howitzers almost in their stride, leaving the guns silent, the gun crews dead or dying, and galloped round the hill, to fall upon the mountain battery from the rear, and cut the Turkish gunners to pieces in a few minutes. The third wave, passing the first battery, where a fierce[Pg 54] sabre v. bayonet fight was going on between our cavalry and the enemy, raced up the slope at the machine guns. Many saddles were emptied in that few yards, but the charge was irresistible29. In a few minutes the enemy guns were silenced, their crews killed, and the whole position was in our hands.
Most of the Turkish infantry escaped, as our small force of cavalry was too scattered30 and cut up by the charge to be able to pursue them, but few of the enemy gunners lived to fight again. About seventy of them were killed outright31, and a very large number were wounded.
This was the first time that our troops had 'got home' properly with the modern, cavalry thrusting sword, and an examination of the enemy dead afterwards proved what a fine weapon it is. Our losses were heavy. Of the 170 odd who took part in the charge, seventy-five were killed and wounded, and all within a space of ten minutes. In this charge, as in all others during the campaign, it was noticeable how many more horses were killed than men. Apart from the fact that a horse presents a much bigger target than a man, it is probably that infantry, and especially machine gunners, when suddenly charged by cavalry, have a tendency to fire 'into the brown,' where the target looks thickest, which is about the middle of the horses' bodies, thus dropping many horses but failing to kill their riders. A man whose horse is brought down is, however, by no means done with, as the Turks learnt to their cost. In this, as in subsequent charges, many a man whose horse had been shot under him, extricated32 himself from his fallen mount, and, seizing rifle and bayonet, rushed on into the fight.
It is sad to have to relate that the gallant33 officer who led this great charge, met his death subsequently,[Pg 55] not on the field of battle as he would have wished, but in the Mediterranean34, when the transport that was taking him and his regiment to France for the final act of the war, was torpedoed35 and sunk by an enemy submarine.[11]
The action was of interest as an indication of what may be accomplished36, under suitable conditions, by even a very small force of cavalry when resolutely37 led. The charge was made on the spur of the moment, with little preliminary reconnaissance of the ground, without fire support, and with the equivalent of little more than one squadron of cavalry. It resulted in the capture of eleven guns and four machine guns, and the complete destruction of a strong point of enemy resistance, at a cost of seventy-five casualties.
There was considerable divergence38 of opinion in the cavalry as to the best method to be employed in a mounted attack. As there were no reliable precedents39 in modern warfare, with its machine guns and quick-firing artillery, brigadiers had been given a free hand to develop the tactics they favoured, subject to the principle that fire support should always be provided if available, and that the line of fire and the direction of the mounted attack should be as nearly as possible at right angles to one another.
Prior to the operations the 5th Mounted Brigade had been practising the following method for the attack of lightly entrenched40 troops. A regiment charged in column of squadrons in line, with a distance of 150 to 200 yards between squadrons. The leading squadron charged with the sword, and, having passed over the enemy position, galloped straight on to attack any supports that might be coming up. The remainder of the regiment charged[Pg 56] without swords. The second squadron galloped over the trench2 while the enemy troops were still in a state of confusion, dismounted on the farther side, and attacked from the rear with the bayonet. The third squadron dismounted before reaching the trench, and went in with the bayonet from the front. Two machine guns accompanied this last squadron, and came into action on one or both flanks, as the situation demanded, to deal with any counter-attack that might develop. If more than one regiment took part in the attack, the machine guns, of course, moved on the outer flanks of the regiments.
Unfortunately this brigade never had an opportunity of putting this method to the test, but the 4th A.L.H. Brigade used it in a modified form at Beersheba, with excellent results.
The wisdom of accompanying a mounted attack by one or two machine guns was generally recognised, and in most cases where a charge was made deliberately41 and after due preparation, and the guns were available, this method of support was employed.
Where a mounted attack had to cover a considerable distance of open ground before reaching charging distance, the most usual formation was in column of squadrons in line of troop columns. Our own gunners were of opinion that this formation offered the most difficult target to artillery, provided the interval42 between troops was not less than 25 yards, and the distance between squadrons not less than 100 yards. The experience of the campaign seemed to point to the fact that cavalry also suffered less from machine-gun fire in this formation than in any other, at any rate at ranges beyond 1000 yards.
The Turks had their main ammunition43 depot44 at Huj. A squadron of the Worcester Yeomanry came upon this depot just after the charge, and found a[Pg 57] party of enemy cavalry engaged in setting fire to it. The squadron commander of the Worcesters at once decided45 to charge the fire instead of the enemy, and his prompt action was the means of putting out the fire and saving the ammunition. Later on in the campaign we made considerable use of captured enemy guns, especially those of heavy calibre, and this vast store of shells was of the greatest value to us.
General Kress von Kressenstein and his staff, who were still at Huj when our cavalry made this charge, narrowly escaped capture, and had to leave everything behind them in their hurried flight, even to their wireless46 code book. The Turks had, of course, abandoned all their telephone and telegraph wires, when they were driven off their positions from Gaza to Beersheba. During the retreat over the plain of Philistia their units were so scattered and disorganised that they had to rely almost entirely47 on gallopers for all orders and messages. Once in the Jud?an hills, however, they re-established their wireless service, and thereafter all orders were sent by wireless, until the arrival of fresh telephone and telegraph equipment in January 1918. Armed with their code book, we were able to decode48 all their messages, and were thus always in possession of enemy orders as soon as they were issued. This piece of luck stood us in good stead later on, more particularly at the time when the Turks made their big effort to recover Jerusalem at the end of December.
As soon as it had arrived at Huj the Australian Mounted Division set about watering horses from the two wells there. These wells were each about 150 feet deep, and, as the Turks had destroyed the winding49 apparatus50, water could only be obtained by the laborious51 process of letting down and hauling up by hand a few small canvas buckets attached to a[Pg 58] length of field telephone wire. Most of the horses had been without any water since the afternoon of the 6th, and the poor brutes52 were raging with thirst, and drank inordinately53. In some cases a single troop took over an hour to water. All night long and all the next day the weary work went on, but, on the evening of the 9th, when the advance was resumed, the horses of the divisional ammunition column had not yet been watered.
The task of the Yeomanry Division on the 8th of November was to attack the eastern group of the enemy forces on its right flank, so as to drive it across the front of the 53rd Division and the Camel Corps Brigade about Tel Khuweilfeh. The Turkish flank was located in a strong position on the high and broken ground at Khurbet el Mujeidilat. The 8th Mounted Brigade attacked this position, but was unable to dislodge the enemy, and, before a further attack could be organised, orders were received to break off the action and march to Sharia to water, preparatory to taking part in the more important task of pursuing the enemy forces over the coastal54 plain. The 53rd Division and the Camel Corps remained in observation of the enemy. The Yeomanry watered at Sharia that evening, and marched to Huj on the following day.
It was now clear that the attempt to cut off the whole of the enemy forces had failed. Most of the rearguards left by the troops who had been driven out of the Sharia-Hareira positions had been disposed of by the Anzac and Australian Mounted Divisions during the past two days, but the sturdy resistance offered by these rearguards, coupled with the delay caused to our cavalry by the scarcity55 of water, had afforded time for the Gaza garrison and some of the enemy troops east of Gaza to make good their escape.
[Pg 59]
The r?le of the cavalry thus changed to a direct pursuit of the enemy. Accordingly the Anzac Division, which had got some water on the evening of the 8th, and was ready to move, was ordered to push across the plain towards the coast, with Bureir as the first objective and El Mejdel as the second. The Australian Mounted Division, on completing the watering of horses at Huj, was to move to the north on Arak el Menshiye and El Faluje, thus coming up on the right of the Anzac Division. The Yeomanry, when they had reached Huj, were to push on and come into line on the right of the Australian Division. The Corps would then be in line across the plain, from the foothills to the sea, and ready for the further pursuit of the enemy.
The Anzac Division started soon after daylight on the 9th, with the 1st and 2nd Brigades in line, each being responsible for the protection of its own front and outer flank, and the 7th Brigade in support. The 1st Brigade, on the left, entered Bureir about half-past eight, after encountering some opposition56. About an hour later, the 2nd Brigade, nearing El Huleikat, located a body of the enemy occupying some high ground north-west of the village. The brigade attacked dismounted, and drove off the Turks, capturing about 600 prisoners. There was no water available at either place.
About mid-day the 1st Brigade reached El Mejdel, which was seized with little difficulty, the small force of Turks there making but a feeble stand. One hundred and seventy prisoners were taken. There was a good well with a steam pump here, and the brigade was able to get water for all the horses.
A message now arrived from the Corps to the effect that the 21st Corps was marching on El Mejdel and Julis, and that the Anzac Division was to push[Pg 60] on to the neighbourhood of Beit Duras. The division accordingly wheeled to the right, and the line of advance became north-east. The troops pressed on as fast as their jaded57 horses could carry them, and, towards evening, the 1st Brigade reached Esdud, and the 2nd entered the villages of Suafir el Sharkiye and Arak Suweidan. On the way the latter brigade had captured a Turkish convoy58, with its escort of about 350 men. While these prisoners were being sent to the rear, some enemy guns farther north opened fire and shelled captors and captives with a fine impartiality59. This shelling of their own men when taken prisoner was of such frequent occurrence that it is impossible not to suspect German inspiration.
Just before dark the 2nd Brigade rounded up another 200 Turks. The division occupied a battle outpost line along the high ground south of the Wadi Mejma, from near Esdud to Arak Suweidan. Just at dusk a small body of Turks advanced with fixed60 bayonets to attack the outposts of the 2nd Brigade. When they were close up to our line, an officer in the brigade, who had evidently been studying the Handbook of Turkish Military Terms, shouted in Turkish a peremptory61 command to surrender. The weary Turks, thinking that the order had been given by one of their own officers, and being only too glad to comply with it, obediently laid down their arms, and were added to the bag!
The enemy troops encountered during the day, and especially towards evening, were utterly62 disorganised, and offered little resistance to our advance. They were quite worn out by their exertions63 of the past three days. Many of them had dysentery, and all were suffering severely from thirst.
The advanced troops of the 52nd Division, 21st Corps, reached El Mejdel in the evening.
FOOTNOTES:
[11] The charge formed the subject of a brilliant picture by Lady Butler painted from notes made by an eye-witness of the action.
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1
entrench
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| v.使根深蒂固；n.壕沟；防御设施 | |
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trench
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| n./v.(挖)沟，(挖)战壕 | |
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cavalry
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| n.骑兵；轻装甲部队 | |
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withdrawn
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| vt.收回；使退出；vi.撤退，退出 | |
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harassing
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| v.侵扰，骚扰( harass的现在分词 )；不断攻击（敌人） | |
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infantry
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| n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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vigour
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| （=vigor）n.智力，体力，精力 | |
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intercept
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| vt.拦截，截住，截击 | |
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retirement
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| n.退休，退职 | |
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garrison
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| n.卫戍部队；驻地，卫戍区；vt.派(兵)驻防 | |
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11
devoid
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| adj.全无的，缺乏的 | |
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12
terrain
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| n.地面，地形，地图 | |
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corps
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| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
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regiment
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| n.团，多数，管理；v.组织，编成团，统制 | |
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regiments
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| （军队的）团( regiment的名词复数 )； 大量的人或物 | |
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16
tenaciously
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| 坚持地 | |
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docility
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| n.容易教，易驾驶，驯服 | |
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18
isolated
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| adj.与世隔绝的 | |
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distinguished
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| adj.卓越的，杰出的，著名的 | |
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20
warfare
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| n.战争(状态)；斗争；冲突 | |
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killing
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| n.巨额利润；突然赚大钱，发大财 | |
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scrawled
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| 乱涂，潦草地写( scrawl的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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devastating
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| adj.毁灭性的，令人震惊的，强有力的 | |
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artillery
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| n.(军)火炮，大炮；炮兵(部队) | |
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battalions
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| n.（陆军的）一营（大约有一千兵士）( battalion的名词复数 )；协同作战的部队；军队；（组织在一起工作的）队伍 | |
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withdrawal
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| n.取回，提款；撤退，撤军；收回，撤销 | |
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severely
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| adv.严格地；严厉地；非常恶劣地 | |
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28
galloped
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| （使马）飞奔，奔驰( gallop的过去式和过去分词 )； 快速做[说]某事 | |
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irresistible
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| adj.非常诱人的，无法拒绝的，无法抗拒的 | |
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scattered
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| adj.分散的，稀疏的；散步的；疏疏落落的 | |
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outright
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| adv.坦率地；彻底地；立即；adj.无疑的；彻底的 | |
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extricated
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| v.使摆脱困难，脱身( extricate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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gallant
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| adj.英勇的，豪侠的；(向女人)献殷勤的 | |
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Mediterranean
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| adj.地中海的；地中海沿岸的 | |
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torpedoed
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| 用鱼雷袭击（torpedo的过去式与过去分词形式） | |
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accomplished
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| adj.有才艺的；有造诣的；达到了的 | |
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resolutely
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| adj.坚决地，果断地 | |
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38
divergence
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| n.分歧，岔开 | |
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39
precedents
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| 引用单元； 范例( precedent的名词复数 )； 先前出现的事例； 前例； 先例 | |
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40
entrenched
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| adj.确立的，不容易改的(风俗习惯) | |
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41
deliberately
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| adv.审慎地；蓄意地；故意地 | |
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42
interval
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| n.间隔，间距；幕间休息，中场休息 | |
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43
ammunition
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| n.军火，弹药 | |
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44
depot
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| n.仓库，储藏处；公共汽车站；火车站 | |
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45
decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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46
wireless
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| adj.无线的；n.无线电 | |
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47
entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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48
decode
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| vt.译（码），解（码） | |
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49
winding
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| n.绕，缠，绕组，线圈 | |
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50
apparatus
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| n.装置，器械；器具，设备 | |
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51
laborious
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| adj.吃力的，努力的，不流畅 | |
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52
brutes
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| 兽( brute的名词复数 )； 畜生； 残酷无情的人； 兽性 | |
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53
inordinately
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| adv.无度地，非常地 | |
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54
coastal
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| adj.海岸的，沿海的，沿岸的 | |
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55
scarcity
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| n.缺乏，不足，萧条 | |
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56
opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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57
jaded
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| adj.精疲力竭的；厌倦的；（因过饱或过多而）腻烦的；迟钝的 | |
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58
convoy
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| vt.护送，护卫，护航；n.护送；护送队 | |
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59
impartiality
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| n. 公平, 无私, 不偏 | |
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60
fixed
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| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
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61
peremptory
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| adj.紧急的，专横的，断然的 | |
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62
utterly
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| adv.完全地，绝对地 | |
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exertions
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| n.努力( exertion的名词复数 )；费力；（能力、权力等的）运用；行使 | |
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