As there were only ten batteries of Horse Artillery5 available, one battery ('B' H.A.C.) was withdrawn6 from the Australian Mounted Division in August, and joined the 5th Cavalry Division. These two divisions had thus only two batteries each.
During the first half of September preparations for the Great Drive were pushed forward energetically. Our broad-gauge8 railway had now been[Pg 191] carried forward as far north as Ludd, and the old Turkish line from Ludd to Jerusalem had been relaid for broad gauge. Light railways had been built along the coastal9 plain, from Ludd up to our front line; tracks had been improved, and roads made behind the line in the mountain sector10, and, from Jiljulie to the sea, the gunners were working ceaselessly, like a legion of ants, preparing positions for the considerable force of artillery that was to assist in forcing the enemy defences here.
The Turkish line west of the Jordan ran east from the coast, at a point just north of the old Crusader fortress11 of Arsuf, over the coastal plain to Jiljulie, near the railhead at Kalkili. Here it entered the mountains, and ran a little south of east, passing roughly through Mesha, Furkha and El Lubban, to the Jordan at Umm el Shert.
Forty miles north of this line lie the Plain of Esdraelon, or Armageddon, and the Valley of Jezreel, which cut a gap right through the mountain range from the sea to the river Jordan. Esdraelon is shaped roughly like a broad-bladed arrow head, having its point at Haifa on the sea coast, and the extremities12 of its blades at Mount Tabor on the north, and at the little town of Jenin on the south. Mid-way between these two lies the village of Afule, whence the Valley of Jezreel, forming the shaft13 of the arrow, runs down to the Jordan at Beisan, which is about fifteen miles south of the Sea of Galilee, and four miles west of the Jordan.
From Deraa Junction14 on the Hedjaz Railway, about thirty-five miles east of the Sea of Galilee, a branch line runs westwards to Semakh, at the southern end of the lake, and thence southwards down the Jordan Valley to Beisan. From here two roads lead south down the valley, one on each side of the river,[Pg 192] and a third goes south-west through the mountains to Nablus. Leaving Beisan, the railway continues in a north-westerly direction up the Valley of Jezreel, through Afule, to Haifa. From Afule a branch line runs south to Jenin, and thence to Samaria and Nablus; and from Messudieh, near Samaria, another branch winds through the mountains to Tul Keram on the coastal plain, and thence south to Kalkili.
Thus, to quote the Commander-in-Chiefs despatch15:[22] 'Afule, Beisan, and Deraa were the vital points on the enemy's communications. If they could be seized, his retreat would be cut off. Deraa was beyond my reach, but not beyond that of mobile detachments of the Arab Army. It was not to be expected that these detachments could hold this junction, but it was within their power to dislocate all traffic.'
The coastal plain, consisting of rolling down-land, is about ten miles wide at Arsuf. From this point northwards it gradually narrows, till it is shut off altogether at Haifa, where the Mount of Carmel, an offshoot from the main Jud?an range, falls in steep cliffs to the sea. The only track over the Carmel Range into the Plain of Esdraelon that is possible for wheeled traffic is by the famous Musmus Pass, from Kerkur to Lejjun on the river Kishon, over which Thothmes III. led his army, 'horse behind horse and man behind man,' to the great victory of Megiddo, in 1479 B.C.
The pass, which carries the age-old caravan16 road from Egypt to Mesopotamia, leads through a narrow, rocky defile17, in steep and difficult mountain country, and, near the top of the range, is enclosed in places between sheer cliffs. Skilfully18 handled, a small body of troops could hold it for a long time against a greatly superior force.
[Pg 193]
The enemy VIIth and VIIIth Armies held the line from the sea to the Jordan Valley. His IVth Army was disposed in the valley and east of the Jordan. A fairly good, metalled road runs from Jiljulie, through Tul Keram, to Nablus. From here two bad mountain tracks lead down to the Jordan, one through Beit Dejan, and the other by Ain Shibleh and down the Wadi Farah. These two tracks join one another at El Makhruk, four miles west of the river, and then continue over the Jordan at Jisr el Damieh, and on to El Salt. This was the enemy's only lateral19 communication, and the portion between Nablus and El Salt was so difficult that the IVth Army was practically isolated20 from the rest of the force.
The Turkish armies opposed to us, including reserves and lines of communication troops, numbered some 90,000 men, of whom perhaps 5000 were cavalry, with about 400 guns. Their Commander-in-Chief was the German Marshal Liman von Sanders, who had his headquarters at Nazareth. Our own troops numbered about 120,000, including 25,000 cavalry, with 540 guns.
The morale21 of the enemy troops, both Turkish and German, was lower than it had been at any time since the beginning of the campaign. Many of the Turkish soldiers were ill-trained and of poor character. Disheartened by a long series of successful small raids, carried out by our infantry22 during the past two months, utterly23 weary of a war the objects of which they little understood, racked with disease, and imbued24 with a bitter hatred25 of their German masters, who despised and bullied26 them, they were in no state to withstand the onslaught that was preparing. The ill-feeling between Turks and Germans, which had existed from the very beginning of the[Pg 194] war, had now reached an acute stage. The Germans, with characteristic stupidity, failed to do anything to allay27 the irritation28 caused by their overbearing manner, and openly expressed contempt for their allies.
Numerous documents, subsequently captured by us at the enemy G.H.Q., testified to the deplorable state of internal strife29 and suspicion to which the enemy army was now reduced. Indeed, with the exception of a few senior officers, the Germans seemed to take a delight in ill-treating and insulting the unhappy Turks.
These factors must be borne in mind in estimating the tactics adopted by the British Commander-in-Chief. His plan was one of the boldest and simplest ever conceived by a great captain, and will live in the text-books of the soldiers of all nations, as a model of the use of cavalry, as long as war is waged. Such risks as he took in the carrying out of that plan, and they were numerous, were justified30 by the state of the enemy armies opposed to us, and were, in every instance, triumphantly31 vindicated32 by the success of the operations.
In broad outline, the plan was to concentrate an overwhelming force of infantry and guns in the coastal sector, together with three divisions of cavalry: for the infantry to attack the enemy positions from Jiljulie to the sea, and, having captured them, to wheel to the right, pivoting33 on Jiljulie, and bend back the enemy's right wing into the hills, exactly like opening a door. Through this open door the cavalry were to dash, and ride up the coast and over the Musmus Pass into the Plain of Esdraelon. Once in the plain, their task was to seize Afule, and then ride down the Valley of Jezreel to Beisan and the Jordan, and cut the railways at these two places,[Pg 195] while an Arab force cut it farther east at Deraa. Later on Haifa was to be occupied, and thus a net of cavalry would be drawn7 from the sea to the Jordan. As soon as the cavalry were well through the gap on the coastal plain, our infantry were to attack all along the line in the mountain sector, while the troops that had opened the door endeavoured to roll up the enemy line from his right flank. Our force in the Jordan Valley was to advance simultaneously34, and seize the bridge over the Jordan at El Damieh. The two Turkish armies west of the Jordan would thus be caught in a trap, with the sea on their right and the Jordan on their left, and, with all their communications cut, would be forced back into the cavalry net behind them.
Once the crossing over the Jordan at Jisr el Damieh was in our hands, the Turkish IVth Army east of the river would find itself isolated, with its communications cut (at Deraa), and exposed to the converging36 attacks of our force in the valley, which would hold the river crossings, and of the Arab forces on the east. At the beginning of September a mobile column of the Arab Army, accompanied by armoured cars and a mountain battery, was assembling at Kasr el Azrak, in the desert fifty miles east of Amman, under the energetic direction of Lawrence.
The first essential for the success of the plan was to conceal37 from the enemy the considerable concentration of troops on the coastal plain, especially that of the three cavalry divisions.
It is doubtful if there has ever been a greater master of the art of deception38 in war than the British Commander-in-Chief. No detail was too small, no dodge39 too insignificant40 to engage his full attention. The two trans-Jordan raids had given the enemy the impression that we intended to attack either up the[Pg 196] Jordan Valley, or east of it, at Amman and along the Hedjaz Railway, and General Allenby now set himself to foster this belief by every possible means.
To this end he ordered Major-General Chaytor, who was in the Jordan Valley, in command of a mixed force consisting of the Anzac Mounted Division and eight battalions41 of infantry, to make a series of demonstrations43, with the object of inducing the enemy to believe that an attack east of Jordan was intended. The camps in the valley vacated by the cavalry were left standing44, and other camps were pitched there, and occupied by a few men, to show signs of movement, and to make tracks about, and leading to, the camps, in order to deceive enemy airmen. New bridges were thrown across the Jordan, miles of Décauville railway were laid, and thousands of dummy45 horses were erected46 on dummy horse lines in the dummy camps. Every day, for some considerable time, a battalion42 or two of infantry marched down the Jerusalem-Jericho road from Talaat el Dumm, and occupied one or other of these camps. During the night they were brought back to Talaat el Dumm, in returning empty motor lorries, ready to march back again next day. These troops could be plainly seen, marching down into the valley, by the enemy at Shunet Nimrin, who was thus induced to believe that a considerable concentration was taking place in the valley. This unpleasant daily promenade47 fell to the lot of the British West Indies regiments.
For the benefit of the native population, elaborate bogus preparations were made for the removal of G.H.Q. to Jerusalem. One of the hotels there was cleared of its occupants, much to their disgust, and staff officers busied themselves installing office furniture and telephone equipment, and painting the[Pg 197] names of a multitude of departments on the doors of the rooms.
Lastly, lest a chance word should reach a native enemy spy within our lines, everything was done to further the belief among our own troops that we were likely to attack on the east flank. The writer remembers receiving a visit one day from his Divisional General, and being told to do nothing to discourage the idea that the cavalry would once again find themselves in the Valley of Desolation. He also remembers vividly48 the lurid49 language that arose on all sides when this report spread about the camps!
No orders were committed to paper other than those issued by G.H.Q. and the three Corps50. Secret conferences were called in turn at the various Divisional Headquarters, when the scheme was explained to staffs and commanders of brigades, each of whom then prepared his scheme, and submitted it verbally to his immediate51 superior.
The three cavalry divisions on the left of our line were hidden securely from the eyes of enemy aeroplane observers; the Australian Mounted Division in the immense, old olive woods round Ramleh, the 4th Cavalry Division in the orange groves52 near Selmeh, and the 5th Division, which had left the Jordan Valley on September 11, in those north-west of Sarona.
Shortly before the operations commenced, the 60th and 75th Infantry Divisions were brought across to the coastal sector, where they remained, unseen by the enemy, till the attack was launched.
During all the period of concentration, the magnificent work of the Royal Air Force played a dominant53 part in keeping the enemy in ignorance of our movements. The Commander-in-Chief paid the force a well-deserved compliment in his despatch when he[Pg 198] said: 'The chief factor in the secrecy54 maintained must be attributed, however, to the supremacy55 in the air which had been obtained by the Royal Air Force. The process of wearing down the enemy's aircraft had been going on all through the summer. During one week in June 100 hostile aeroplanes had crossed our lines. During the last week in August this number had decreased to eighteen. In the next few days a number were shot down, with the result that only four ventured to cross our lines during the period of concentration.'[23]
On the 18th of September, the day before the attack, a large force of bombing aeroplanes was directed over Nablus, where it was known the enemy had his main telephone and telegraph exchange. This was completely destroyed, a fact which played an important part in enabling our cavalry to reach the Plain of Esdraelon next day, before the enemy G.H.Q. knew they had broken through.
The striking success of these measures was afterwards proved by captured enemy documents. Among these was the German Intelligence Service map, issued on the very day before our attack commenced. This map shows three cavalry divisions still in the Jordan Valley, and only one in the coastal sector. Only two infantry divisions are shown in the coastal sector instead of five, and the whole map points to an attack in, or east of, the Jordan Valley. A German air reconnaissance report, dated 17th of September, and found among Liman von Sanders' papers at Nazareth, stated that 'far from there being any diminution56 in the cavalry in the Jordan Valley, there are evidences of twenty-three more squadrons there.'
The Turkish line on the plain consisted of two defensive57 positions, well constructed and heavily[Pg 199] wired. The first, 14,000 yards in length and 3000 in depth, ran along a sandy ridge35 in a north-westerly direction from Bir Adas to the sea. It consisted of a series of works connected by a continuous network of fire trenches58. The second, or El Tire system, 3000 yards in the rear, ran from the village of that name to the mouth of the Nahr el Falik. On the enemy's extreme right the ground, except for a narrow strip along the coast, was marshy59, and could only be crossed in few places. The defence of the second system did not, therefore, require a large force.
The attack of these positions was entrusted60 to the 21st Corps (3rd, 7th, 54th, and 75th Divisions), to which were also attached the 60th Division, the French Infantry Detachment, and the 5th A.L.H. Brigade (Australian Mounted Division), together with a large number of heavy guns and two brigades of mountain artillery. This force was to break through the enemy's defences between the railway and the sea, in order to open the door for the cavalry, and, at the same time, to seize the foothills south-east of Jiljulie. The Corps was then to swing to the right, pivoting on Jiljulie, as already explained, on to the line Hableh-Tul Keram, and advance in a north-easterly direction, converging on Samaria and Attara (on the Jenin-Samaria Railway about five miles north-west of the latter place), so as to drive the enemy up the two roads from Messudieh Junction and Samaria to Jenin, into the arms of the cavalry on the Plain of Esdraelon. The 5th A.L.H. Brigade was to cover the outer (left) flank of the Corps during this turning movement, capture Tul Keram station, and then raid and cut the Messudieh-Jenin Railway, near Ajje.
As soon as the infantry had broken through, the three cavalry divisions were to advance rapidly up[Pg 200] the plain, the 5th Division along the coast road, through Mukhalid, the 4th via Tabsor and Mughair, and the Australian Mounted Division following the 4th.
The enemy had partially61 prepared an entrenched62 position across the plain from about Jelameh, through El Mejdel and Liktera, to the sea near the mouth of the Nahr Mefjir, and this was known to be held by a few troops. The 4th Division had orders to seize the portion of this line between Jelameh and Liktera, while the 5th dealt with the western half from Liktera to the coast.
Having made good the line of the Nahr Mefjir, they were to turn north-east and cross the Carmel Range, the 4th and Australian Divisions by the Musmus Pass, and the 5th by a little-known track from Sindiane to Abu Shusheh, and enter the Plain of Esdraelon. Arrived on the plain, the 4th Cavalry Division was to seize Afule and then push rapidly down the Valley of Jezreel to Beisan, occupy the Jordan bridges there, and send a force to hold and, if necessary, destroy the bridge at Jisr Mejamieh, twelve miles farther north. This programme entailed63 a ride of ninety-seven miles on end, and included the crossing of a mountain range by a difficult pass.
The 5th Division was directed on Nazareth (seventy miles) to capture the enemy General Headquarters, which was located there, and, if possible, Liman von Sanders himself, and then clear the plain as far east as Afule. The Australian Division was to remain on the Plain of Esdraelon at El Lejjun, sending a force to Jenin (sixty-eight miles), to intercept64 the Turks retiring from Samaria, when that place had been captured by our infantry.
As these immense distances had to be covered in[Pg 201] one 'bound,' speed was essential. The 4th and 5th Divisions, were, therefore, ordered to move up the coast on a wide front, and sweep over the Jelameh-Liktera positions with the sword and lance. If unexpectedly strong opposition65 was encountered there, the Australian Division was available, immediately in rear, to reinforce. The crossing of the Carmel Range was to be carried out as rapidly as possible, as it was recognised that our troops could only move in very narrow columns over the mountains, especially through the Musmus Pass, and flank guards would be out of the question. The 5th Division was, however, directed to drop a small force on the Sindiane-Abu Shusheh track, at the top of the range, to protect the left flank of the other two divisions, while they were passing through the defile.
The 20th Corps, in the hills north of Jerusalem, was ordered to attack all along its front on the day after the attack in the coastal plain, and drive the enemy northwards into the arms of the cavalry, while, in the Jordan Valley, Chaytor's Force had first to seize the bridge over the river at El Damieh, and then to cross the Jordan for the third and last time, and advance on Amman.
FOOTNOTES:
[22] Dated October 31, 1918.
[23] Despatch dated October 31, 1918.
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1
cavalry
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| n.骑兵；轻装甲部队 | |
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regiments
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| （军队的）团( regiment的名词复数 )； 大量的人或物 | |
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picturesque
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| adj.美丽如画的，（语言）生动的，绘声绘色的 | |
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barbs
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| n.（箭头、鱼钩等的）倒钩( barb的名词复数 )；带刺的话；毕露的锋芒；钩状毛 | |
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artillery
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| n.(军)火炮，大炮；炮兵(部队) | |
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withdrawn
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| vt.收回；使退出；vi.撤退，退出 | |
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drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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gauge
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| v.精确计量；估计；n.标准度量；计量器 | |
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coastal
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| adj.海岸的，沿海的，沿岸的 | |
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sector
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| n.部门，部分；防御地段，防区；扇形 | |
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fortress
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| n.堡垒，防御工事 | |
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extremities
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| n.端点( extremity的名词复数 )；尽头；手和足；极窘迫的境地 | |
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shaft
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| n.(工具的)柄，杆状物 | |
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junction
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| n.连接，接合；交叉点，接合处，枢纽站 | |
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despatch
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| n./v.(dispatch)派遣；发送；n.急件；新闻报道 | |
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caravan
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| n.大蓬车；活动房屋 | |
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defile
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| v.弄污，弄脏；n.(山间)小道 | |
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skilfully
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| adv. (美skillfully)熟练地 | |
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lateral
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| adj.侧面的，旁边的 | |
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isolated
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| adj.与世隔绝的 | |
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morale
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| n.道德准则，士气，斗志 | |
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infantry
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| n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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utterly
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| adv.完全地，绝对地 | |
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imbued
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| v.使（某人/某事）充满或激起（感情等）( imbue的过去式和过去分词 )；使充满；灌输；激发（强烈感情或品质等） | |
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hatred
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bullied
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| adj.被欺负了v.恐吓，威逼( bully的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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allay
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| v.消除，减轻(恐惧、怀疑等) | |
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irritation
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strife
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| n.争吵，冲突，倾轧，竞争 | |
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justified
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| a.正当的，有理的 | |
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triumphantly
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| ad.得意洋洋地；得胜地；成功地 | |
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vindicated
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| v.澄清（某人/某事物）受到的责难或嫌疑( vindicate的过去式和过去分词 )；表明或证明（所争辩的事物）属实、正当、有效等；维护 | |
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pivoting
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| n.绕轴旋转，绕公共法线旋转v.（似）在枢轴上转动( pivot的现在分词 )；把…放在枢轴上；以…为核心，围绕（主旨）展开 | |
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simultaneously
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ridge
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converging
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| adj.收敛[缩]的，会聚的，趋同的v.（线条、运动的物体等）会于一点( converge的现在分词 )；（趋于）相似或相同；人或车辆汇集；聚集 | |
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conceal
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| v.隐藏，隐瞒，隐蔽 | |
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deception
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| n.欺骗，欺诈；骗局，诡计 | |
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dodge
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| v.闪开，躲开，避开；n.妙计，诡计 | |
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insignificant
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| adj.无关紧要的，可忽略的，无意义的 | |
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battalions
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| n.（陆军的）一营（大约有一千兵士）( battalion的名词复数 )；协同作战的部队；军队；（组织在一起工作的）队伍 | |
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battalion
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| n.营；部队；大队(的人) | |
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demonstrations
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| 证明( demonstration的名词复数 )； 表明； 表达； 游行示威 | |
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standing
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dummy
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| n.假的东西；(哄婴儿的)橡皮奶头 | |
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ERECTED
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| adj. 直立的，竖立的，笔直的 vt. 使 ... 直立，建立 | |
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promenade
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| n./v.散步 | |
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vividly
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| adv.清楚地，鲜明地，生动地 | |
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lurid
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| adj.可怕的；血红的；苍白的 | |
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corps
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| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
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51
immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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groves
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| 树丛，小树林( grove的名词复数 ) | |
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dominant
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| adj.支配的，统治的；占优势的；显性的；n.主因，要素，主要的人(或物)；显性基因 | |
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54
secrecy
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| n.秘密，保密，隐蔽 | |
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55
supremacy
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| n.至上；至高权力 | |
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diminution
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| n.减少；变小 | |
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defensive
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| adj.防御的；防卫的；防守的 | |
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trenches
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| 深沟，地沟( trench的名词复数 )； 战壕 | |
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marshy
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| adj.沼泽的 | |
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entrusted
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| v.委托，托付( entrust的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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partially
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| adv.部分地，从某些方面讲 | |
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entrenched
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| adj.确立的，不容易改的(风俗习惯) | |
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entailed
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| 使…成为必要( entail的过去式和过去分词 )； 需要； 限定继承； 使必需 | |
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intercept
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| vt.拦截，截住，截击 | |
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opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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