I interpose a chapter here in order to carry events in other parts of the theatre of war up to the date of the capture of Bloemfontein.
A sketch1 will suffice, since specifically mounted operations were few. No body, either of mixed mounted troops or of regular Cavalry2 reckoned separately, comparable in size to that formed by Roberts in the main theatre, existed anywhere else. The largest homogeneous mounted force outside this area was Brabant’s newly raised Colonial division, nominally3 3,000 strong, which, in conjunction with Gatacre’s troops, had been deputed to push back the invaders4 of Eastern Cape5 Colony from Dordrecht and Stormberg, while Clements, succeeding French in the positions opposite Colesberg, checked the menace to Central Cape Colony. Brabant, however, seems not to have been able to muster6 an effective strength of more than 2,000 during the period under review. That fine permanent corps7, the Cape Mounted Rifles, was a strong, stiffening8 element in an otherwise raw force of Cape Colony volunteers. Fortunately, the work before them was not severe, for the success of Roberts in the north threw the Boers into a strictly9 defensive10 attitude from the middle of February onwards, and in the early days of March caused 151a general retreat. A successful attack upon Labuschagne’s Nek, between Dordrecht and Jamestown, on March 4, gave the recruits confidence.
Clements had had a much harder task than Gatacre and Brabant. Stronger forces opposed him, and the Boer retreat set in later. Early in February all the regular Cavalry, save two squadrons of Inniskilling Dragoons, had been diverted to Roberts’s command. There remained, besides these squadrons, 500 Australian horsemen, together with Infantry11 and Artillery12 which made up the force to a total strength of about 5,000 men and 14 guns. Against Clements—if the official estimate is correct—the forces at one time were as great as 11,000. Clements, fighting stubbornly, was forced back south of Rensburg, and, in the course of the retreat, all his mounted troops, and particularly the Australians, did excellent service—fire-tactics, of course, being the universal rule. The danger was soon over. On February 21 Clements was reinforced with 900 mounted men and two batteries, and at about the same period the tide of invasion slackened. A week later, on the news of Paardeberg, the Boers were in full retreat for the north. By the middle of March—two days after the fall of Bloemfontein—Clements, Gatacre, and Brabant were all within the Free State borders.
We need not enter at any length either into the siege of Ladysmith or into the long series of operations which ended in its relief. The numerical facts, broadly speaking, were that White, with 13,000 men and 51 guns, was invested by a force under Joubert which originally numbered 23,000 men and 17 guns, but which dwindled13 gradually by abstractions to the Tugela, to Cronje, and to Colesberg, and finally fell to a strength of about 5,000; while, on the line of the Tugela, Buller, reinforced in the period following Colenso to a strength of 30,000 men and 73 guns, faced Louis Botha and Lukas Meyer with a 152strength which varied14 in round numbers from 7,000 to 9,000 men and about 18 guns.
As in the western theatre and in every other part of the field of war, the rifle, whether in the hands of mounted men or Infantry, was the decisive weapon. Artillery, as a mere15 statement of the relative strengths in that arm shows, was comparatively negligible. Sword and lance were out of court. Every responsible person at the time realized this fact. Short as we were of mounted troops, nobody would have dreamed of asking for more troops trained to shock on the ground that shock was either requisite16 or possible.
The most striking circumstance about the mounted troops in Natal17—upwards of 5,000 in number—was the fact that rather more than half were locked up in Ladysmith during the whole four months of the sieges. Four Cavalry regiments19, besides the Natal Carbineers, other Natal Volunteers, and the greater part of the Imperial Light Horse—2,800 men in all—were demobilized in this way. The mistake, no doubt, was serious, and White has been freely blamed for it. At the same time, it is only fair to White to put ourselves in his position, and recognize that the question of retaining or parting with his mounted troops was subsidiary to the much larger problem which originally faced him in deciding what was to be the r?le of the Natal army after the battle of Ladysmith on October 30, 1899. Had he possessed20, in his force of professional mounted regiments, troops really capable, in conjunction with the volunteers, of tackling the Boer mounted riflemen, it is difficult to believe that, in spite of the moral and material value of Ladysmith, he would have accepted investment there as an alternative to the maintenance of his army as an active field-force. But the battle of the 30th, revealing a deficiency in the striking-power of the army as a whole, had revealed a weakness in the Cavalry which was in no way attributable to moral 153causes, but simply to armament and training. This circumstance must have influenced him powerfully in resolving to accept investment, a resolve which it is exceedingly difficult to impugn22. A retreat to the Tugela, harassed23 by a greatly superior Boer force, whose temper was exhilarated by the success at Nicholson’s Nek, would have been a hazardous24 operation. It is no reflection on the regular Cavalry, but the simple truth, to say that they had not as yet shown the capacity to act as rear-guard for such a retreat.
But what kind of investment was White to accept? Here, no doubt, he is open to the charge of compromising between two logical alternatives, the one being to send away instantly the bulk of his mounted troops and Field Artillery, and with the rest of his force to accept a formal siege, with the purely25 passive object of detaining as many Boers as he could; the other, to keep his force intact, and maintain a defence so active and supple26 in character as to enable him to cut loose at any moment and co-operate with the relieving force. Although something like this latter course was evidently in his mind, as it would naturally be in the mind of any spirited Field Commander, he did not clearly grasp the determining factors and act accordingly. He did not foresee the initial impotence of Buller before the Colenso position, also largely attributable to a deficiency in efficient mounted troops. He occupied too small a perimeter27 to permit of elastic28 offence, and he forgot that the tactical weakness of his Cavalry was an obstacle even more serious to the kind of operations he had in his mind than it was to the larger plan of complete freedom which he had rejected. This weakness again became manifest in the small offensive operations of November 14 and December 7–8. Then came Buller’s failure at Colenso, and henceforth White’s attitude, though courageous29 and unyielding, was strictly passive. This was all the more 154to be regretted because the Boer attitude, save for the one big attack of January 5 on C?sar’s Camp and Wagon30 Hill, and for the minor31 attack on November 9, was equally passive, while their numbers sank to a point well below the strength of the garrison32.
White’s mounted troops were reduced by degrees to the r?le of foot-soldiers, and in that capacity took their share in the defence. The part played by the regular Cavalry, gallant33 as it was, could not have been, and was not, so important as that played by the irregulars, who were genuine, though improvised34 riflemen. All alike took part in the great fight of January 5, and by common consent the chief honours belong to the Imperial Light Horse, whose heroic defence of Wagon Point, the key to the threatened position, at a cost of 25 per cent. of the numbers engaged, was as fine a feat35 of arms as their final attack at Elandslaagte. It was by a detachment of the same regiment18, in conjunction with a body of Natal Mounted Volunteers, that the brilliant little sortie of December 7–8 was carried out and the two heavy guns on Pepworth Hill destroyed.
During the last month of the siege, when forage36 became scarce, and 75 per cent. of the Cavalry horses had to be turned adrift or converted into food, the troopers returned their lances, swords, and carbines to store, received rifles instead, and took regular posts in the defence. That change of weapons once made, it is almost inconceivable that it should not have been adhered to when horses were once more available. Why deliberately37 revert38 to an inferior firearm? Why deliberately resume steel weapons whose futility39 was manifest? Tradition—nothing more: the ineradicable habit of associating together the horse and the steel weapon as complementary elements of the highest mounted efficiency; the same habit which induces General French, in defending the arme blanche, to say that “nothing is gained by ignoring the horse, the 155sword, and the lance,” as though these weapons were inseparable adjuncts of the horse, and as though South African experience were not one long and costly40 proof of the contrary.
Buller’s mounted force, about 2,600 strong during the period following Colenso, was composed mainly of South African irregulars,[35] with two and a half Cavalry regiments, and a few regular Mounted Infantry. It played a creditable, though not a distinguished41, part in the operations. The battles, from the British point of view, were all pre-eminently Infantry battles. In one instance only, so far as I am aware, was a mounted corps employed in conjunction with Infantry in a really critical and desperate fight, and that was the detachment of Thorneycroft’s Mounted Infantry at Spion Kop. For the rest, we find them operating on the wings, seizing advanced positions, and guarding the flanks of the main attack. Fire-tactics are the invariable rule, and efficiency in fire-tactics the test of general utility.
There is reason to believe that the mounted troops might have been employed to greater advantage had the higher command of the army been in stronger hands. Though they were less than half as numerous as the mounted force at the disposal of Lord Roberts, they were on the average more than a quarter, and sometimes not far from a third, the strength of the whole Boer force opposed to them—a tolerably high proportion, if we reflect that the Boers, immensely strong though their position was, had to sustain the attacks of 20,000 Infantry, to say nothing of an overwhelming number of guns.
The most hopeful enterprise in which the mounted troops were ever actually engaged was in the opening 156operations of the Spion Kop campaign (January 18 to 20), when Dundonald’s brigade of 1,500 men, including one Cavalry regiment, acted as advance-guard to Sir Charles Warren, who, with the greater part of the army, was deputed by Buller to turn the Boer right, while Lyttelton threatened the centre.[36] One of the most disappointing features of a painful story was the waste of a golden opportunity for utilizing42 mounted strength against an enemy whose high tactical mobility43 rendered surprise exceedingly difficult. Dundonald, a Cavalry man, certainly did his utmost, and, as far as he was allowed, did well. Unnecessary delays had attended the turning movement from the first, but a considerable measure of surprise was, in fact, obtained. Few Boers had rallied to the threatened flank; none were entrenched45. Dundonald, operating boldly in advance, gained on the evening of the 18th a position, overlooking Acton Homes, which might, under vigorous generalship, have been turned to great strategical advantage. His men were in high fettle owing to the skilful46 surprise and defeat of a Boer detachment which rode out to check them. But Warren seems to have regarded his mounted troops wholly in a protective light, and to have resented anything approaching independent action. The chance was thrown away[37] and 157the operations never recovered from the initial sluggishness47 of movement.
Another opportunity for a vigorous use of mounted troops came after the great fight at Pieter’s Hill (February 27), which led to the relief of Ladysmith and to a general retreat of the Boer forces both from the beleaguered48 town and from the Tugela heights. If we regard all Buller’s previous operations as one long-drawn battle—and in a sense they may so be regarded—now, it would seem, was the time for pursuit. The two leaders of horse were undoubtedly49 anxious to pursue. Men and horses were alike fresh. Buller refrained. There is a 158general agreement that he was wrong. Whatever the prospects50 of success, he should unquestionably have tried, for instinctive51 and habitual52 mounted energy was the vital need in South Africa if a mounted enemy was to be not only defeated, but conquered.
At the same time, a close examination of the facts does not appear to justify53 the assumption of the Times historian that a pursuit would have involved the Boers in utter destruction and defeat. The critic lays excessive and indiscriminating stress on the demoralization of the enemy. He forgets that Botha’s troops and the investing force combined numbered in all about 13,000 men, as against 2,600 of our mounted troops; that there was not much question of further co-operation by our Infantry, who were exhausted54 by ten days of continuous fighting, and that the encounters which actually did take place between our mounted troops (regulars and irregulars alike) and the Boer rear-guard were not of such a character as to warrant a belief that a general pursuit, begun at the earliest possible moment, would have led to the destruction of the Boer army.
Both the German and British Official Historians correctly point out that, in order to have been really effective, the intervention55 of the mounted troops should have begun at, or immediately after, the climax56 of the great Infantry fight on the 27th. Here was just the difficulty: The British attack, delivered on a front of about three miles, was threefold—upon Railway Hill, Inniskilling Hill and Pieter’s Hill, the latter representing the extreme Boer left, the only quarter at which the mounted troops could possibly have intervened. The two first positions were stormed in magnificent style by the Infantry, supported by a tremendous fire of Artillery, and were won at about 5 p.m. and 5.30 p.m. respectively—that is, very late in the afternoon. On the left, at Pieter’s Hill, the Boers still stood desperately57 at bay. It was not till 6.30, in the 159growing dusk, that the southern, or nearest, crest58 of the hill, held by the Standerton and Heidelberg commandos, was carried by a final charge of 300 Irish Fusiliers, who lost a third of their strength engaged and had all their officers killed or wounded. The northern part of the hill was still obstinately59 held when the battle came to an end, and was evacuated60 only during the night.
According to the “Official History,” the same unyielding attitude was shown by the most valiant61 among the defenders62 of the other two hills, who “clung most stubbornly to the broken ground behind these kopjes,” after their trenches63 had been carried, and it was in view, we are told, of these signs of dangerous resistance that Buller abandoned the idea of a mounted pursuit. He was wrong, it must be concluded, even at this late hour, when darkness and the Boer rear-guards must have severely64 limited effective action; but his real fault lay farther back, in retaining the mounted brigades well in the rear and out of sight all day instead of planting them opposite the Boer left flank, where they would have acted at least as a passive menace to the enemy, and might have caused a premature65 retirement66 during daylight. We may speculate at will on what might have happened. All we can say with confidence is that the Boers were never more formidable than on this culminating day of four months’ strenuous67 resistance, and that only by using their own fire methods with the utmost energy and determination could our troopers have turned a defeat into a rout68.
On that night a general Boer retreat set in. Among the besiegers of Ladysmith, who had not fired a shot, something in the nature of a genuine panic reigned69, but the great majority of these had a long start in respect both of time and distance. Botha’s commandos, too, gained fully21 twelve hours’ start, for, in spite of a strong 160appeal from Barton on Pieter’s Hill for a prompt advance by a flying column of all arms, Buller made no preparation for a swift movement by the mounted troops. On the morning of the 28th they were still behind the Tugela. A block on the pontoon-bridge delayed the irregular brigade under Dundonald till 8 a.m., and the regular Cavalry brigade under Burn-Murdoch till 9 a.m. Their orders were to work north-west and north-east respectively, not to “pursue.” Still, limited as their orders were, they experienced considerable difficulty in carrying them out. Botha had organized adequate rear-guards to protect his retreat. Dundonald was checked twice within two miles of Pieter’s Station, and, on the second occasion, had to send for the assistance of Burn-Murdoch, who, by a later order of Buller’s, and against his own repeated requests, had been kept inactive in the gorge70 between Pieter’s Hill and the Station. The combined brigades having eventually driven off this detachment of the enemy, Burn-Murdoch moved on to the north-east, but in his turn was brought to a complete standstill at the Klip River by the rifle and Artillery fire of another Boer rear-guard, which was covering the withdrawal71 of guns and waggons72 from Umbulwana Mountain. He held his ground till dusk, prevented the destruction of the wooden bridge which spanned the Klip at this point, and informed Buller that he intended to remain where he was for the night, and to pursue on the morrow. Buller, for inadequate73 reasons, recalled him. Dundonald, meanwhile, still meeting with sporadic74 opposition75, pushed on slowly in the late afternoon towards Ladysmith, finally sending in two squadrons, whose arrival denoted the definite relief of the town.
Buller had now, definitely and finally, set his face against pursuit. Yet even on the morning of March 1 the chances of success, which had steadily76 diminished, were still considerable. Although most of the Free State 161forces and a substantial part of the Transvaal forces were out of danger, the plain east of Ladysmith was still thronged77 with waggons and guns, the last of which did not reach Elandslaagte till nightfall. Even as near as Modder Spruit Station siege-guns were entrained as late as 11 a.m. Despair reigned in the Boer army as a whole. A resolute78 pursuit must, we can fairly surmise79, have led to the capture of a considerable quantity of material and many guns. But we are bound equally to affirm that here, as at every previous stage of these operations, and according to our invariable experience through nearly three years of war in South Africa, the measure of success would have been the measure of our ability to overcome defensive fire-tactics with yet more vigorous offensive fire-tactics. That Botha, who had effectually covered his retreat on the 28th with parties of the same men who had gone through the nerve-shattering experiences of the previous ten days, culminating in the desperate struggle overnight, would have subsequently allowed his transport and guns to be captured without an effort for their defence, is a tempting80, but an altogether illusory, hypothesis. Analogy points the other way. It was one of the most striking characteristics of the war that, however great the depression of the undisciplined mass, there were always to be found a few indomitable spirits who were prepared to sell their lives dearly to avert81 disgrace. We saw this at Poplar Grove82, when the opportunity for our mounted troops, if we consider the relative numbers engaged, while making full allowance for the relative condition of the horses, was far better than at Ladysmith. Botha himself, the ablest of all the Boer leaders, had again and again in the last few months proved his power to restore discipline and nerve among his burghers. His rear-guard tactics, whatever the strength he might have managed to raise, would in form have been those of Poplar Grove and of his own resistance to Burn-Murdoch and 162Dundonald on the 28th. Something more effective than French’s action at Poplar Grove, and more effective than the action of Dundonald and Burn-Murdoch on the 28th, would have been needed to secure results of really supreme83 importance. As for the arme blanche, we need not regard it seriously as a contingent84 factor. If it possessed any utility, it had in the course of the war innumerable opportunities of proving the fact—above all, in cases of pursuit against Boer rear-guards. We can scarcely draw negative evidence from occasions where the opportunity was denied.[38]
Buller has placed on record his reasons for not undertaking85 a pursuit.[39] The only one that need concern us is, curiously86 enough, his insistence87 on this very point—Boer skill in rear-guard actions—a skill which he considered it so futile88 to combat, that, on this occasion, he thought it not even advisable to try. And he bases his view on his own experience in the first Boer War, twenty years before. The admission throws much light on his handling of the mounted troops under his command during the South African campaign, and, in particular, on his dispositions89 during the battle of Pieter’s Hill. He had calculated rightly on a victory that day, and, departing from the usual practice, deliberately kept his 163mounted men fresh and concentrated in rear of the army, in order to complete the victory by a pursuit. But the kind of victory he hoped for was one which excluded the possibility of rear-guard actions. In other words, he was a prey90 to that antiquated91 habit of thought which was an inheritance from the days prior to the magazine rifle, and which took shape in dreams of massed Cavalry on fresh mounts, whirling, sabre in hand, at the psychological moment, through hordes92 of helpless fugitives93. Even in 1866 this habit of mind was antiquated. It does not seem to have occurred to him, nor does it seem to occur to some of the present advocates of the arme blanche, that skill in rear-guard actions, often sneeringly94 alluded95 to as skill in “evasion,” and always spoken of as if it were some miraculous96 attribute of the Boers, was, in reality, the simple exercise, by the use of horse and rifle combined, of one of the most important of the functions of any corps of mounted troops, Cavalry included, especially in the case of the numerically weaker side; and that its counterpart—power to pierce a rear-guard, and drive home a victory, a power correspondingly dependent on the use of horse and rifle combined—is a no less crucial test of mounted efficiency. By these tests, among others, Cavalry in future wars will be judged.
Defensive skill in the Boers suggests the allied44 question: Had they, in the course of the long struggle for Ladysmith, shown any new development of offensive power? That is a question we must always be asking, as we contrast the merits of the steel weapon and the firearm in war. As I have often before remarked, there can be no sharp distinction between defensive and offensive action: excellence97 in the one is wrapped up with excellence in the other. The British seizure98 of Spion Kop, for example, was an aggressive stroke; the Boer counter-attack was a measure of defensive necessity. Regarded in this light, Botha’s defence of the line of the Tugela 164merits the highest praise. Make what allowance we will for defects in British generalship, for the ever-present prejudice against incurring99 heavy loss of life, and for the extraordinary natural strength of the Tugela heights, the fact stands out plainly that no class of troops but mounted riflemen, experts in horse, rifle, and spade alike—and first-class men at that—could, with numbers comparatively so small, have held for so long a position whose extent for purposes of defence cannot be estimated at less than thirty miles. Neither European Cavalry nor European Infantry of that date could have held it for a week against a European force of all arms and of the given superiority—the former from lack of spade and rifle power, the latter from lack of mobility. But measuring the Boers by their own standard, did they fully develop their own offensive potentialities?
The answer must be, I think, in the negative. But we cannot in this case afford to be too sweeping100 or positive. We must remember, here as elsewhere, that the dead-weight of numerical superiority, especially in Artillery, gives a force of low mobility, like the British force, a defensive power disproportionately greater than its offensive power. Still, there were undoubtedly a few occasions when the Boers missed opportunities for counter-strokes. By common consent, I think, the best opportunity of all was on February 23 and 24, when the position of Buller’s army, huddled101 together in Hart’s Hollow and other parts of the Colenso basin, after the magnificent but unavailing assaults of the 23rd, was in the highest degree dangerous.[40] A casual outburst of Boer fire on the night of the 24th actually caused a partial panic among the troops in Hart’s Hollow. According to the German historian, who quotes a German officer present with Botha at the time, Botha’s reason for not ordering a counter-stroke 165on the 24th was that it would “cost too many lives.” If so, it was a costly error, an irreparable error. But there was much excuse for it. Moral administrative102 weaknesses, from which we were free, had sapped their strength from the first, and among these troops on the Tugela at this latter end of February, in spite of Botha’s untiring efforts, the tension was becoming unbearable103. We have only to contrast the same man, leading tried veterans of the same commandos in latter phases of the war, to understand the full aggressive power that mounted riflemen can develop. Nevertheless, we must, as far as we can, disentangle technical from moral causes, and it remains104 true that up to this point the Boers had not brought into line the horse and the rifle as the twin factors of aggressive mobility.
The offensive honours rested with the British Infantry. I hope by this time that the reader is beginning to realize how indefinable is the border-line between mounted and dismounted attacks, both of which equally draw their power from that master of modern battle-fields, the rifle. Look at Wagon Hill, where soldiers classed as mounted riflemen were engaged against soldiers classed as Infantry, mounted riflemen, and Cavalry. Here is a case where one almost forgets which class had horses and which had not. When we read of the memorable105 charge of the Devons, we care very little whether they were Infantry or Mounted Infantry, recognizing, as we must, that, in the given conditions, such efforts are within the power of both classes alike. Our ambition should be to discover how and when the horse may be made to serve as an engine of still more formidable tactics. Look, too, at the Infantry charges on February 23 and at the battle of Pieter’s Hill. Watch the old problem of mobility versus106 vulnerability being worked out in terms of foot-soldiers, and, without rushing to the impracticable extreme of demanding that all riflemen should be 166provided with horses, observe how close is the analogy when the same problem is worked out in terms of horse-soldiers. Note how the German historian, from whom nothing will force any compromising allusion107 to shock as a function of Cavalry, lest the whole edifice108 of Cavalry theory should tumble about his ears, slips unconsciously into the deprecation of “shock” in Infantry, without sufficient fire-preparation.[41] But for those separate mental compartments109, would not some glimmering110 of the analogy have occurred to him? Observe, on the other hand, the fundamental differences between the steel weapon of the foot-soldier and the steel weapon of the Cavalry, the efficacy of the former being conditional111, not only on the vigour112 and skill of the previous fire-fight, but on being used at the climax of the fire-fight, still in association with the rifle, and still on foot; the efficacy of the latter a minus quantity, and, for the same reason, everywhere and always, because it was not only incompatible113 with, but by the habits of mind it engendered114, and by the nature of equipment it involved, actively115 prejudicial to the vigorous offensive use of the firearm.
Grasp now the nature of the problem which confronted us in this war. Our foes116 were not only riflemen, but mounted riflemen, comparatively few in numbers, but able both to fight stoutly117 and to retreat safely when overcome in combat. Infantry, though they possess the power to overcome and eject mounted riflemen, have not the power to catch and destroy them, simply because Infantry move too slowly. The responsibility for securing complete victory lay with our mounted troops acting118 as mounted riflemen.
Widening our horizon to include the whole area of the war at this period, we perceive that the Cavalry theory, so far as it was based on the arme blanche, had collapsed119. 167The only and not especially remarkable120 achievement of that weapon is the pursuit at Elandslaagte on the second day of hostilities121. Everywhere else we have seen it directly or indirectly122 crippling the Cavalry, and the greater the numbers employed and the larger the measure of independence permitted, the more unmistakable is the cause. When the Cavalry succeed strategically, as in the ride to Kimberley and back to Paardeberg, they succeed in spite of disabilities traceable to arme blanche doctrine123. When they succeed tactically, as in the Colesberg operations and in containing Cronje’s force on the eve of Paardeberg, they succeed through the carbine, in spite of its inferiority as a weapon of precision. In tactical offence, the paramount124 raison d’être of the arme blanche, and in reconnaissance, they show marked weakness.
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sketch
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| n.草图；梗概；素描；v.素描；概述 | |
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cavalry
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| n.骑兵；轻装甲部队 | |
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nominally
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| 在名义上，表面地； 应名儿 | |
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invaders
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| 入侵者，侵略者，侵入物( invader的名词复数 ) | |
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cape
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| n.海角，岬；披肩，短披风 | |
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muster
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| v.集合，收集，鼓起，激起；n.集合，检阅，集合人员，点名册 | |
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corps
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| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
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stiffening
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| n. (使衣服等)变硬的材料, 硬化 动词stiffen的现在分词形式 | |
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strictly
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| adv.严厉地，严格地；严密地 | |
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defensive
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| adj.防御的；防卫的；防守的 | |
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infantry
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| n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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artillery
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| n.(军)火炮，大炮；炮兵(部队) | |
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dwindled
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| v.逐渐变少或变小( dwindle的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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varied
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| adj.多样的，多变化的 | |
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mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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requisite
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| adj.需要的，必不可少的；n.必需品 | |
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natal
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| adj.出生的，先天的 | |
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regiment
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| n.团，多数，管理；v.组织，编成团，统制 | |
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regiments
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| （军队的）团( regiment的名词复数 )； 大量的人或物 | |
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possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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impugn
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| v.指责，对…表示怀疑 | |
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harassed
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| adj. 疲倦的，厌烦的 动词harass的过去式和过去分词 | |
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hazardous
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| adj.(有)危险的，冒险的；碰运气的 | |
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purely
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| adv.纯粹地，完全地 | |
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26
supple
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| adj.柔软的，易弯的，逢迎的，顺从的，灵活的；vt.使柔软，使柔顺，使顺从；vi.变柔软，变柔顺 | |
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27
perimeter
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| n.周边，周长，周界 | |
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28
elastic
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| n.橡皮圈，松紧带；adj.有弹性的；灵活的 | |
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29
courageous
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| adj.勇敢的，有胆量的 | |
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30
wagon
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| n.四轮马车，手推车，面包车；无盖运货列车 | |
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31
minor
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| adj.较小(少)的，较次要的；n.辅修学科；vi.辅修 | |
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32
garrison
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| n.卫戍部队；驻地，卫戍区；vt.派(兵)驻防 | |
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33
gallant
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| adj.英勇的，豪侠的；(向女人)献殷勤的 | |
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34
improvised
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| a.即席而作的,即兴的 | |
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35
feat
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| n.功绩；武艺，技艺；adj.灵巧的，漂亮的，合适的 | |
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36
forage
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| n.(牛马的)饲料，粮草；v.搜寻，翻寻 | |
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37
deliberately
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| adv.审慎地；蓄意地；故意地 | |
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38
revert
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| v.恢复，复归，回到 | |
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39
futility
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| n.无用 | |
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40
costly
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| adj.昂贵的，价值高的，豪华的 | |
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41
distinguished
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| adj.卓越的，杰出的，著名的 | |
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42
utilizing
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| v.利用，使用( utilize的现在分词 ) | |
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43
mobility
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| n.可动性，变动性，情感不定 | |
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44
allied
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| adj.协约国的；同盟国的 | |
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45
entrenched
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| adj.确立的，不容易改的(风俗习惯) | |
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46
skilful
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| (=skillful)adj.灵巧的，熟练的 | |
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47
sluggishness
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| 不振，萧条，呆滞；惰性；滞性；惯性 | |
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48
beleaguered
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| adj.受到围困[围攻]的；包围的v.围攻( beleaguer的过去式和过去分词)；困扰；骚扰 | |
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49
undoubtedly
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| adv.确实地，无疑地 | |
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50
prospects
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| n.希望，前途(恒为复数) | |
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51
instinctive
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| adj.(出于)本能的；直觉的；(出于)天性的 | |
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52
habitual
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| adj.习惯性的；通常的，惯常的 | |
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53
justify
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| vt.证明…正当(或有理)，为…辩护 | |
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54
exhausted
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| adj.极其疲惫的，精疲力尽的 | |
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55
intervention
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| n.介入，干涉，干预 | |
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56
climax
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| n.顶点；高潮；v.(使)达到顶点 | |
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57
desperately
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| adv.极度渴望地，绝望地，孤注一掷地 | |
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58
crest
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| n.顶点；饰章；羽冠；vt.达到顶点；vi.形成浪尖 | |
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59
obstinately
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| ad.固执地，顽固地 | |
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60
evacuated
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| 撤退者的 | |
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61
valiant
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| adj.勇敢的，英勇的；n.勇士，勇敢的人 | |
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defenders
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| n.防御者( defender的名词复数 )；守卫者；保护者；辩护者 | |
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63
trenches
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| 深沟，地沟( trench的名词复数 )； 战壕 | |
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severely
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| adv.严格地；严厉地；非常恶劣地 | |
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premature
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| adj.比预期时间早的；不成熟的，仓促的 | |
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retirement
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| n.退休，退职 | |
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67
strenuous
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| adj.奋发的，使劲的；紧张的；热烈的，狂热的 | |
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68
rout
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| n.溃退，溃败；v.击溃，打垮 | |
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69
reigned
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| vi.当政，统治（reign的过去式形式） | |
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70
gorge
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| n.咽喉，胃，暴食，山峡；v.塞饱，狼吞虎咽地吃 | |
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71
withdrawal
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| n.取回，提款；撤退，撤军；收回，撤销 | |
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72
waggons
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| 四轮的运货马车( waggon的名词复数 )； 铁路货车； 小手推车 | |
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73
inadequate
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| adj.(for,to)不充足的，不适当的 | |
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74
sporadic
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| adj.偶尔发生的 [反]regular；分散的 | |
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75
opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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76
steadily
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| adv.稳定地；不变地；持续地 | |
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77
thronged
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| v.成群，挤满( throng的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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78
resolute
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| adj.坚决的，果敢的 | |
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79
surmise
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| v./n.猜想，推测 | |
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80
tempting
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| a.诱人的, 吸引人的 | |
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81
avert
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| v.防止，避免；转移(目光、注意力等) | |
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82
grove
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| n.林子，小树林，园林 | |
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83
supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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84
contingent
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| adj.视条件而定的；n.一组，代表团，分遣队 | |
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85
undertaking
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| n.保证，许诺，事业 | |
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86
curiously
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| adv.有求知欲地；好问地；奇特地 | |
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87
insistence
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| n.坚持；强调；坚决主张 | |
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88
futile
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| adj.无效的，无用的，无希望的 | |
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89
dispositions
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| 安排( disposition的名词复数 )； 倾向； （财产、金钱的）处置； 气质 | |
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prey
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| n.被掠食者，牺牲者，掠食；v.捕食，掠夺，折磨 | |
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91
antiquated
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| adj.陈旧的，过时的 | |
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92
hordes
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| n.移动着的一大群( horde的名词复数 )；部落 | |
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93
fugitives
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| n.亡命者，逃命者( fugitive的名词复数 ) | |
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94
sneeringly
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| 嘲笑地，轻蔑地 | |
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95
alluded
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| 提及，暗指( allude的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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96
miraculous
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| adj.像奇迹一样的，不可思议的 | |
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97
excellence
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| n.优秀，杰出，(pl.)优点，美德 | |
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98
seizure
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| n.没收；占有；抵押 | |
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99
incurring
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| 遭受，招致，引起( incur的现在分词 ) | |
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100
sweeping
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| adj.范围广大的，一扫无遗的 | |
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101
huddled
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| 挤在一起（huddle的过去式与过去分词形式） | |
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102
administrative
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| adj.行政的，管理的 | |
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103
unbearable
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| adj.不能容忍的；忍受不住的 | |
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104
remains
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| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
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105
memorable
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| adj.值得回忆的，难忘的，特别的，显著的 | |
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106
versus
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| prep.以…为对手，对；与…相比之下 | |
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107
allusion
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| n.暗示，间接提示 | |
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108
edifice
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| n.宏伟的建筑物(如宫殿，教室) | |
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109
compartments
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| n.间隔( compartment的名词复数 )；（列车车厢的）隔间；（家具或设备等的）分隔间；隔层 | |
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110
glimmering
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| n.微光，隐约的一瞥adj.薄弱地发光的v.发闪光，发微光( glimmer的现在分词 ) | |
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111
conditional
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| adj.条件的，带有条件的 | |
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112
vigour
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| （=vigor）n.智力，体力，精力 | |
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113
incompatible
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| adj.不相容的，不协调的，不相配的 | |
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114
engendered
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| v.产生（某形势或状况），造成，引起( engender的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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115
actively
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| adv.积极地，勤奋地 | |
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116
foes
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| 敌人，仇敌( foe的名词复数 ) | |
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117
stoutly
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| adv.牢固地，粗壮的 | |
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118
acting
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| n.演戏，行为，假装；adj.代理的，临时的，演出用的 | |
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119
collapsed
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| adj.倒塌的 | |
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120
remarkable
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| adj.显著的，异常的，非凡的，值得注意的 | |
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121
hostilities
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| n.战争；敌意(hostility的复数)；敌对状态；战事 | |
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122
indirectly
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| adv.间接地，不直接了当地 | |
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123
doctrine
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| n.教义；主义；学说 | |
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124
paramount
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| a.最重要的，最高权力的 | |
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