II THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM OF KANT’S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

It is usual to designate Kant as the founder¹ of the Theory of Knowledge in the modern sense. Against this view it might plausibly² be argued that the history of philosophy records prior to Kant numerous investigations³ which deserve to be regarded as something more than mere⁴ beginnings of such a science. Thus Volkelt, in his fundamental work on the Theory of Knowledge,1 remarks that the critical treatment of this discipline took its origin already with Locke. But in the writings of even older philosophers, yes, even in the philosophy of Ancient Greece, discussions are to be found which at the present day are usually undertaken under the heading of Theory of Knowledge. However, Kant has revolutionised all problems under this head from their very depths up, and, following him, numerous thinkers have worked them through so thoroughly⁵ that all the older attempts at solutions may be found over again either in Kant himself or else in his successors. Hence, [281]for the purposes of a purely⁶ systematic⁷, as distinct from a historical, study of the Theory of Knowledge, there is not much danger of omitting any important phenomenon by taking account only of the period since Kant burst upon the world with his Critique of Pure Reason. All previous epistemological achievements are recapitulated⁸ during this period.

The fundamental question of Kant’s Theory of Knowledge is, How are synthetic⁹ judgments¹¹ a priori possible? Let us consider this question for a moment in respect of its freedom from presuppositions. Kant asks the question precisely¹² because he believes that we can attain¹³ unconditionally¹⁴ certain knowledge only if we are able to prove the validity of synthetic judgments a priori. He says: “Should this question be answered in a satisfactory way, we shall at the same time learn what part reason plays in the foundation and completion of those sciences which contain a theoretical a priori knowledge of objects;”2 and, further, “Metaphysics stands and falls with the solution of this problem, on which, therefore, the very existence of Metaphysics absolutely depends.”3

Are there any presuppositions in this question, as formulated¹⁷ by Kant? Yes, there are. For the possibility of a system of absolutely [282]certain knowledge is made dependent on its being built up exclusively out of judgments which are synthetic and acquired independently of all experience. “Synthetic” is Kant’s term for judgments in which the concept of the predicate adds to the concept of the subject something which lies wholly outside the subject, “although it stands in some connection with the subject,”4 whereas in “analytic¹⁸” judgments the predicate affirms only what is already (implicitly) contained in the subject. This is not the place for considering the acute objections which Johannes Rehmke5 brings forward against this classification of judgments. For our present purpose, it is enough to understand that we can attain to genuine knowledge only through judgments which add to one concept another the content of which was not, for us at least, contained in that of the former. If we choose to call this class of judgments, with Kant, “synthetic,” we may agree that knowledge in judgment¹⁰ form is obtainable only where the connection of predicate and subject is of this synthetic sort. But, the case is very different with the second half of Kant’s question, which demands that these judgments are to be formed a priori, i.e., independently of all experience. For one thing, it is altogether possible6 that such judgments do not occur at [283]all. At the start of the Theory of Knowledge we must hold entirely¹⁹ open the question, whether we arrive at any judgments otherwise than by experience, or only by experience. Indeed, to unprejudiced reflection the alleged²⁰ independence of experience seems from the first to be impossible. For, let the object of our knowledge be what it may—it must, surely, always present itself to us at some time in an immediate²¹ and unique way; in short, it must become for us an experience. Mathematical judgments, too, are known by us in no other way than by our experiencing them in particular concrete cases. Even if, with Otto Liebmann,7 for example, we treat them as founded upon a certain organisation²² of our consciousness, this empirical character is none the less manifest. We shall then say that this or that proposition is necessarily valid¹⁶, because the denial of its truth would imply the denial of our consciousness, but the content of a proposition can enter our knowledge only by its becoming an experience for us in exactly the same way in which a process in the outer world of nature does so. Let the content of such a proposition include factors which guarantee its absolute validity, or let its validity be based on other grounds—in either case, I can possess myself of it only in one way and in no other: it must be presented to me in experience. This is the first objection to Kant’s view. [284]

The other objection lies in this, that we have no right, at the outset of our epistemological investigations, to affirm that no absolutely certain knowledge can have its source in experience. Without doubt, it is easily conceivable that experience itself might contain a criterion guaranteeing the certainty of all knowledge which has an empirical source.

Thus, Kant’s formulation of the problem implies two presuppositions. The first is that we need, over and above experience, another source of cognitions. The second is that all knowledge from experience has only conditional¹⁵ validity. Kant entirely fails to realise that these two propositions are open to doubt, that they stand in need of critical examination. He takes them over as unquestioned assumptions from the dogmatic philosophy of his predecessors²³ and makes them the basis of his own critical inquiries²⁴. The dogmatic thinkers assume the validity of these two propositions and simply apply them in order to get from each the kind of knowledge which it guarantees. Kant assumed their validity and only asks, What are the conditions of their validity? But, what if they are not valid at all? In that case, the edifice²⁵ of Kantian doctrine²⁶ lacks all foundation whatever.

The whole argumentation of the five sections which precede Kant’s formulation of the problem, amounts to an attempt to prove that the propositions of Mathematics are [285]synthetic.8 But, precisely the two presuppositions which we have pointed²⁷ out are retained as mere assumptions in his discussions. In the Introduction to the Second Edition of the Critique of Pure Reason we read, “experience can tell us that a thing is so and so, but not that it cannot be otherwise,” and, “experience never bestows²⁸ on its judgments true or strict universality, but only the assumed and relative universality of induction²⁹.”9 In Prologomena,10 we find it said, “First, as regards the sources of metaphysics, the very concept of Metaphysics implies that they cannot be empirical. The principles of Metaphysics (where the term ‘principles’ includes, not merely its fundamental propositions, but also its fundamental concepts), can never be gained from experience, for the knowledge of the metaphysician has precisely to be, not physical, but ‘metaphysical,’ i.e., lying beyond the reach of experience.” Lastly Kant says in the Critique of Pure Reason: “The first thing to notice is, that no truly mathematical judgments are empirical, but always a priori. They carry necessity on their very face, and therefore cannot be derived³⁰ from experience. Should anyone demur³¹ to this, I am willing to limit my assertion to the propositions of Pure [286]Mathematics, which, as everybody will admit, are not empirical judgments, but perfectly³² pure a priori knowledge.”11

We may open the Critique of Pure Reason wherever we please, we shall always find that in all its discussions these two dogmatic propositions are taken for granted. Cohen12 and Stadler13 attempt to prove that Kant has established the a priori character of the propositions of Mathematics and Pure Natural Science. But all that Kant tries to do in the Critique may be summed up as follows. The fact that Mathematics and Pure Natural Science are a priori sciences implies that the “form” of all experience has its ground in the subject. Hence, all that is given by experience is the “matter” of sensations. This matter is synthesised by the forms, inherent in the mind, into the system of empirical science. It is only as principles of order for the matter of sense that the formal principles of the a priori theories have function and significance. They make empirical science possible, but they cannot transcend³³ it. These formal principles are nothing but the synthetic judgments a priori, which therefore extend, as conditions of all possible empirical knowledge, as far as that knowledge but no further. Thus, the Critique of Pure Reason, so far from proving the a priori character of Mathematics and [287]Pure Natural Science, does but delimit the sphere of their applicability on the assumption that their principles must become known independently of experience. Indeed, Kant is so far from attempting a proof of the a priori character of these principles, that he simply excludes that part of Mathematics (see the quotation³⁴ above) in which, even according to his view, that character might be called in question, and confines himself to the part in which he thinks he can infer the a priori character from the bare concepts involved. Johannes Volkelt, too, comes to the conclusion that “Kant starts from the explicit³⁵ presupposition” that “there actually does exist knowledge which is universal and necessary.” He goes on to remark, “This presupposition which Kant has never explicitly³⁶ questioned, is so profoundly contradictory³⁷ to the character of a truly critical Theory of Knowledge, that the question must be seriously put whether the Critique is to be accepted as critical Theory of Knowledge at all.” Volkelt does, indeed, decide that there are good grounds for answering this question in the affirmative, but still, as he says, “this dogmatic assumption does disturb the critical attitude of Kant’s epistemology in the most far-reaching way.”14 In short, Volkelt, too, finds that the Critique of Pure Reason is not a Theory of Knowledge free from all assumptions.

In substantial agreement with our view are [288]also the views of O. Liebmann,15 Holder,16 Windelband,17 Ueberweg,18 Eduard von Hartmann,19 and Kuno Fischer,20 all of whom acknowledge that Kant makes the a priori character of Pure Mathematics and Physics the basis of his whole argumentation.

The propositions that we really have knowledge which is independent of all experience, and that experience can furnish knowledge of only relative universality, could be accepted by us as valid only if they were conclusions deduced from other propositions. It would be absolutely necessary for these propositions to be preceded by an inquiry³⁸ into the essential nature of experience, as well as by another inquiry into the essential nature of knowing. The former might justify³⁹ the first, the latter the second, of the above two propositions. [289]

It would be possible to reply to the objections which we have urged against the Critique of Pure Reason, as follows. It might be said that every Theory of Knowledge must first lead the reader to the place where the starting-point, free from all presuppositions, is to be found. For, the knowledge which we have at any given moment of our lives is far removed from this starting-point, so that we must first be artificially led back to it. Now, it is true that some such mutual⁴⁰ understanding between author and reader concerning the starting-point of the science is necessary in all Theory of Knowledge. But such an understanding ought on no account to go beyond showing how far the alleged starting-point of knowing is truly such. It ought to consist of purely self-evident, analytic propositions. It ought not to lay down any positive, substantial affirmations which influence, as in Kant, the content of the subsequent argumentation. Moreover, it is the duty of the epistemologist to show that the starting-point which he alleges⁴¹ is really free from all presuppositions. But all this has nothing to do with the essential nature of that starting-point. It lies wholly outside the starting-point and makes no affirmations about it. At the beginning of mathematical instruction, too, the teacher must exert himself to convince the pupil of the axiomatic⁴² character of certain principles. But no one will maintain that the content of the axioms is in any way made dependent on these [290]prior discussions of their axiomatic character.21 In exactly the same way, the epistemologist, in his introductory remarks, ought to show the method by which we can reach a starting-point free from all presuppositions. But the real content of the starting-point ought to be independent of the reflections by which it is discovered. There is, most certainly, a wide difference between such an introduction to the Theory of Knowledge and Kant’s way of beginning with affirmations of quite definite, dogmatic character.

1 Founder   

n.创始者，缔造者

参考例句：

• He was extolled as the founder of their Florentine school.他被称颂为佛罗伦萨画派的鼻祖。
• According to the old tradition,Romulus was the founder of Rome.按照古老的传说，罗穆卢斯是古罗马的建国者。

2 plausibly   

似真地

参考例句：

• The case was presented very plausibly. 案情的申述似很可信。
• He argued very plausibly for its acceptance. 他为使之认可辩解得头头是道。

3 investigations   

（正式的）调查( investigation的名词复数 )； 侦查； 科学研究； 学术研究

参考例句：

• His investigations were intensive and thorough but revealed nothing. 他进行了深入彻底的调查，但没有发现什么。
• He often sent them out to make investigations. 他常常派他们出去作调查。

4 mere   

adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过

参考例句：

• That is a mere repetition of what you said before.那不过是重复了你以前讲的话。
• It's a mere waste of time waiting any longer.再等下去纯粹是浪费时间。

5 thoroughly   

adv.完全地，彻底地，十足地

参考例句：

• The soil must be thoroughly turned over before planting.一定要先把土地深翻一遍再下种。
• The soldiers have been thoroughly instructed in the care of their weapons.士兵们都系统地接受过保护武器的训练。

6 purely   

adv.纯粹地，完全地

参考例句：

• I helped him purely and simply out of friendship.我帮他纯粹是出于友情。
• This disproves the theory that children are purely imitative.这证明认为儿童只会单纯地模仿的理论是站不住脚的。

7 systematic   

adj.有系统的，有计划的，有方法的

参考例句：

• The way he works isn't very systematic.他的工作不是很有条理。
• The teacher made a systematic work of teaching.这个教师进行系统的教学工作。

8 recapitulated   

v.总结，扼要重述( recapitulate的过去式和过去分词 )

参考例句：

• At the climax of the movement the \"fixed idea\" is recapitulated by full orchestra ff. 在这个乐章的高潮处，整个乐队以ff的力度重现“固定乐思”。 来自辞典例句
• He recapitulated the main points of the speech. 他把讲话的重点扼要重述了一遍。 来自互联网

9 synthetic   

adj.合成的，人工的；综合的；n.人工制品

参考例句：

• We felt the salesman's synthetic friendliness.我们感觉到那位销售员的虚情假意。
• It's a synthetic diamond.这是人造钻石。

10 judgment   

n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见

参考例句：

• The chairman flatters himself on his judgment of people.主席自认为他审视人比别人高明。
• He's a man of excellent judgment.他眼力过人。

11 judgments   

判断( judgment的名词复数 )； 鉴定； 评价； 审判

参考例句：

• A peculiar austerity marked his judgments of modern life. 他对现代生活的批评带着一种特殊的苛刻。
• He is swift with his judgments. 他判断迅速。

12 precisely   

adv.恰好，正好，精确地，细致地

参考例句：

• It's precisely that sort of slick sales-talk that I mistrust.我不相信的正是那种油腔滑调的推销宣传。
• The man adjusted very precisely.那个人调得很准。

13 attain   

vt.达到，获得，完成

参考例句：

• I used the scientific method to attain this end. 我用科学的方法来达到这一目的。
• His painstaking to attain his goal in life is praiseworthy. 他为实现人生目标所下的苦功是值得称赞的。

14 unconditionally   

adv.无条件地

参考例句：

• All foreign troops must be withdrawn immediately and unconditionally. 所有外国军队必须立即无条件地撤出。
• It makes things very awkward to have your girls going back unconditionally just now! 你们现在是无条件上工，真糟糕！ 来自子夜部分

15 conditional   

adj.条件的，带有条件的

参考例句：

• My agreement is conditional on your help.你肯帮助我才同意。
• There are two forms of most-favored-nation treatment:conditional and unconditional.最惠国待遇有两种形式:有条件的和无条件的。

16 valid   

adj.有确实根据的；有效的；正当的，合法的

参考例句：

• His claim to own the house is valid.他主张对此屋的所有权有效。
• Do you have valid reasons for your absence?你的缺席有正当理由吗？

17 formulated   

v.构想出( formulate的过去式和过去分词 )；规划；确切地阐述；用公式表示

参考例句：

• He claims that the writer never consciously formulated his own theoretical position. 他声称该作家从未有意识地阐明他自己的理论见解。 来自《简明英汉词典》
• This idea can be formulated in two different ways. 这个意思可以有两种说法。 来自《现代汉英综合大词典》

18 analytic   

adj.分析的，用分析方法的

参考例句：

• The boy has an analytic mind. 这男孩有分析的头脑。
• Latin is a synthetic language,while English is analytic.拉丁文是一种综合性语言，而英语是一种分析性语言。

19 entirely   

ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地

参考例句：

• The fire was entirely caused by their neglect of duty. 那场火灾完全是由于他们失职而引起的。
• His life was entirely given up to the educational work. 他的一生统统献给了教育工作。

20 alleged   

a.被指控的，嫌疑的

参考例句：

• It was alleged that he had taken bribes while in office. 他被指称在任时收受贿赂。
• alleged irregularities in the election campaign 被指称竞选运动中的不正当行为

21 immediate   

adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的

参考例句：

• His immediate neighbours felt it their duty to call.他的近邻认为他们有责任去拜访。
• We declared ourselves for the immediate convocation of the meeting.我们主张立即召开这个会议。

22 organisation   

n.组织，安排，团体，有机休

参考例句：

• The method of his organisation work is worth commending.他的组织工作的方法值得称道。
• His application for membership of the organisation was rejected.他想要加入该组织的申请遭到了拒绝。

23 predecessors   

n.前任( predecessor的名词复数 )；前辈；（被取代的）原有事物；前身

参考例句：

• The new government set about dismantling their predecessors' legislation. 新政府正着手废除其前任所制定的法律。 来自《简明英汉词典》
• Will new plan be any more acceptable than its predecessors? 新计划比原先的计划更能令人满意吗？ 来自《简明英汉词典》

24 inquiries   

n.调查( inquiry的名词复数 )；疑问；探究；打听

参考例句：

• He was released on bail pending further inquiries. 他获得保释，等候进一步调查。
• I have failed to reach them by postal inquiries. 我未能通过邮政查询与他们取得联系。 来自《现代汉英综合大词典》

25 edifice   

n.宏伟的建筑物(如宫殿，教室)

参考例句：

• The American consulate was a magnificent edifice in the centre of Bordeaux.美国领事馆是位于波尔多市中心的一座宏伟的大厦。
• There is a huge Victorian edifice in the area.该地区有一幢维多利亚式的庞大建筑物。

26 doctrine   

n.教义；主义；学说

参考例句：

• He was impelled to proclaim his doctrine.他不得不宣扬他的教义。
• The council met to consider changes to doctrine.宗教议会开会考虑更改教义。

27 pointed   

adj.尖的，直截了当的

参考例句：

• He gave me a very sharp pointed pencil.他给我一支削得非常尖的铅笔。
• She wished to show Mrs.John Dashwood by this pointed invitation to her brother.她想通过对达茨伍德夫人提出直截了当的邀请向她的哥哥表示出来。

28 bestows   

赠给，授予( bestow的第三人称单数 )

参考例句：

• Second, Xie Lingyun bestows on basic subject and emotion connotation. 谢灵运赋的基本主题及情感内涵。
• And the frigid climate bestows Heilongjiang rich resources of ice and snow. 寒冷的气候赋予了其得天独厚的冰雪资源。

29 induction   

n.感应，感应现象

参考例句：

• His induction as a teacher was a turning point in his life.他就任教师工作是他一生的转折点。
• The magnetic signals are sensed by induction coils.磁信号由感应线圈所检测。

30 derived   

vi.起源；由来；衍生；导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取

参考例句：

• Many English words are derived from Latin and Greek. 英语很多词源出于拉丁文和希腊文。 来自《简明英汉词典》
• He derived his enthusiasm for literature from his father. 他对文学的爱好是受他父亲的影响。 来自《简明英汉词典》

31 demur   

v．表示异议，反对

参考例句：

• Without demur, they joined the party in my rooms. 他们没有推辞就到我的屋里一起聚餐了。
• He accepted the criticism without demur. 他毫无异议地接受了批评。

32 perfectly   

adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地

参考例句：

• The witnesses were each perfectly certain of what they said.证人们个个对自己所说的话十分肯定。
• Everything that we're doing is all perfectly above board.我们做的每件事情都是光明正大的。

33 transcend   

vt.超出，超越(理性等)的范围

参考例句：

• We can't transcend the limitations of the ego.我们无法超越自我的局限性。
• Everyone knows that the speed of airplanes transcend that of ships.人人都知道飞机的速度快于轮船的速度。

34 quotation   

n.引文，引语，语录；报价，牌价，行情

参考例句：

• He finished his speech with a quotation from Shakespeare.他讲话结束时引用了莎士比亚的语录。
• The quotation is omitted here.此处引文从略。

35 explicit   

adj.详述的，明确的；坦率的；显然的

参考例句：

• She was quite explicit about why she left.她对自己离去的原因直言不讳。
• He avoids the explicit answer to us.他避免给我们明确的回答。

36 explicitly   

ad.明确地，显然地

参考例句：

• The plan does not explicitly endorse the private ownership of land. 该计划没有明确地支持土地私有制。
• SARA amended section 113 to provide explicitly for a right to contribution. 《最高基金修正与再授权法案》修正了第123条，清楚地规定了分配权。 来自英汉非文学 - 环境法 - 环境法

37 contradictory   

adj.反驳的，反对的，抗辩的；n.正反对，矛盾对立

参考例句：

• The argument is internally contradictory.论据本身自相矛盾。
• What he said was self-contradictory.他讲话前后不符。

38 inquiry   

n.打听，询问，调查，查问

参考例句：

• Many parents have been pressing for an inquiry into the problem.许多家长迫切要求调查这个问题。
• The field of inquiry has narrowed down to five persons.调查的范围已经缩小到只剩5个人了。

39 justify   

vt.证明…正当(或有理)，为…辩护

参考例句：

• He tried to justify his absence with lame excuses.他想用站不住脚的借口为自己的缺席辩解。
• Can you justify your rude behavior to me?你能向我证明你的粗野行为是有道理的吗？

40 mutual   

adj.相互的，彼此的；共同的，共有的

参考例句：

• We must pull together for mutual interest.我们必须为相互的利益而通力合作。
• Mutual interests tied us together.相互的利害关系把我们联系在一起。

41 alleges   

断言，宣称，辩解( allege的第三人称单数 )

参考例句：

• The newspaper article alleges that the mayor is corrupt. 报纸上断言该市长腐败。
• Steven was tardy this morning and alleges that his bus was late. 史提芬今天早上迟到的说词是公车误点了。

42 axiomatic   

adj.不需证明的，不言自明的

参考例句：

• It is axiomatic that life is not always easy.生活并不总是一帆风顺，这是明摆着的事实。
• It is axiomatic that as people grow older they generally become less agile.人年纪越大通常灵活性越差，这是不言而喻的。