The present essay attempts to prove that all the principles which we need in order to explain our world and make it intelligible11, are within reach of our thought. Thus, the assumption of explanatory principles lying outside our world turns out to be the prejudice of an extinct philosophy which lived on vain dogmatic fancies. This ought to have been Kant’s conclusion, too, if he had really enquired12 into the powers of human thought. Instead, he demonstrated in the most complicated way that the constitution of our cognitive13 faculties14 does not permit us to reach the ultimate principles which lie beyond our experience. But we have no reason whatever for positing15 these principles in any such Beyond. Thus Kant has indeed refuted “dogmatic” philosophy, but he has put nothing in its place. Hence, all German philosophy which succeeded Kant has [376]evolved everywhere in opposition to him. Fichte, Schelling, Hegel simply ignored the limits fixed16 by Kant for our knowledge and sought the ultimate principles, not beyond, but within, the world accessible to human reason. Even Schopenhauer, though he does declare the conclusions of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason to be eternal and irrefutable truths, cannot avoid seeking knowledge of the ultimate grounds of the world along paths widely divergent from those of his master. But the fatal mistake of all these thinkers was that they sought knowledge of ultimate truths, without having laid the foundation for such an enterprise in a preliminary investigation17 of the nature of knowledge itself. Hence, the proud intellectual edifices18 erected20 by Fichte, Schelling and Hegel have no foundation to rest on. The lack of such foundations reacts most unfavourably upon the arguments of these thinkers. Ignorant of the importance of the world of pure ideas and of its relation to the realm of sense-perception, they built error upon error, one-sidedness upon one-sidedness. No wonder that their over-bold systems proved unable to withstand the storms of an age which recked nothing of philosophy. No wonder that many good things in these systems were pitilessly swept away along with the errors.
To remedy the defect which has just been indicated is the purpose of the following investigations21. They will not imitate Kant by explaining what our minds can not know: [377]their aim is to show what our minds can know.
The outcome of these investigations is that truth is not, as the current view has it, an ideal reproduction of a some real object, but a free product of the human spirit, which would not exist anywhere at all unless we ourselves produced it. It is not the task of knowledge to reproduce in conceptual form something already existing independently. Its task is to create a wholly new realm which, united with the world of sense-data, ends by yielding us reality in the full sense. In this way, man’s supreme22 activity, the creative productivity of his spirit, finds its organic place in the universal world-process. Without this activity it would be impossible to conceive the world-process as a totality complete in itself. Man does not confront the world-process as a passive spectator who merely copies in his mind the events which occur, without his participation23, in the cosmos24 without. He is an active co-creator in the world-process, and his knowledge is the most perfect member of the organism of the universe.
This view carries with it an important consequence for our conduct, for our moral ideals. These, too, must be regarded, not as copies of an external standard, but as rooted within us. Similarly, we refuse to look upon our moral laws as the behests of any power outside us. We know no “categorical imperative” which, like a voice from the Beyond, prescribes to us what to do or to leave undone25. Our moral [378]ideals are our own free creations. All we have to do is to carry out what we prescribe to ourselves as the norm of our conduct. Thus, the concept of truth as a free act leads to a theory of morals based on the concept of a perfectly26 free personality.
These theses, of course, are valid27 only for that part of our conduct the laws of which our thinking penetrates28 with complete comprehension. So long as the laws of our conduct are merely natural motives29 or remain obscure to our conceptual thinking, it may be possible from a higher spiritual level to perceive how far they are founded in our individuality, but we ourselves experience them as influencing us from without, as compelling us to action. Every time that we succeed in penetrating31 such a motive30 with clear understanding, we make a fresh conquest in the realm of freedom.
The relation of these views to the theory of Eduard von Hartmann, who is the most significant figure in contemporary philosophy, will be made clear to the reader in detail in the course of this essay, especially as regards the problem of knowledge.
A prelude32 to a Philosophy of Spiritual Activity—this is what the present essay offers. That philosophy itself, completely worked out, will shortly follow.
The ultimate aim of all science is to increase the value of existence for human personality. Whoever does not devote himself to science with this aim in view is merely modelling [379]himself in his own work upon some master. If he “researches,” it is merely because that happens to be what he has been taught to do. But not for him is the title of a “free thinker.”
The sciences are seen in their true value only when philosophy explains the human significance of their results. To make a contribution to such an explanation was my aim. But, perhaps, our present-day science scorns all philosophical33 vindication34! If so, two things are certain. One is that this essay of mine is superfluous35. The other is that modern thinkers are lost in the wood and do not know what they want.
In concluding this Preface, I cannot omit a personal observation. Up to now I have expounded36 all my philosophical views on the basis of Goethe’s world-view, into which I was first introduced by my dear and revered37 teacher, Karl Julius Schr?er, who to me stands in the very forefront of Goethe-students, because his gaze is ever focussed beyond the particular upon the universal Ideas.
But, with this essay I hope to have shown that the edifice19 of my thought is a whole which has its foundations in itself and which does not need to be derived38 from Goethe’s world-view. My theories, as they are here set forth39 and as they will presently be amplified40 in the Philosophy of Spiritual Activity, have grown up in the course of many years. Nothing but a deep sense of gratitude41 leads me to add that the affectionate sympathy of the Specht [380]family in Vienna, during the period when I was the tutor of its children, provided me with an environment, than which I could not have wished a better, for the development of my ideas. In the same spirit, I would add, further, that I owe to the stimulating42 conversations with my very dear friend, Miss Rosa Mayreder, of Vienna, the mood which I needed for putting into final form many of the thoughts which I have sketched43 provisionally as germs of my Philosophy of Spiritual Activity. Her own literary efforts, which express the sensitive and high-minded nature of a true artist, are likely before long to be presented to the public.
Vienna, December, 1891.
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1 morbid | |
adj.病的;致病的;病态的;可怕的 | |
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2 emancipation | |
n.(从束缚、支配下)解放 | |
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3 immortal | |
adj.不朽的;永生的,不死的;神的 | |
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4 opposition | |
n.反对,敌对 | |
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5 predecessors | |
n.前任( predecessor的名词复数 );前辈;(被取代的)原有事物;前身 | |
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6 inaccessible | |
adj.达不到的,难接近的 | |
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7 incapable | |
adj.无能力的,不能做某事的 | |
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8 attaining | |
(通常经过努力)实现( attain的现在分词 ); 达到; 获得; 达到(某年龄、水平、状况) | |
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9 precisely | |
adv.恰好,正好,精确地,细致地 | |
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10 impels | |
v.推动、推进或敦促某人做某事( impel的第三人称单数 ) | |
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11 intelligible | |
adj.可理解的,明白易懂的,清楚的 | |
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12 enquired | |
打听( enquire的过去式和过去分词 ); 询问; 问问题; 查问 | |
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13 cognitive | |
adj.认知的,认识的,有感知的 | |
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14 faculties | |
n.能力( faculty的名词复数 );全体教职员;技巧;院 | |
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15 positing | |
v.假定,设想,假设( posit的现在分词 ) | |
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16 fixed | |
adj.固定的,不变的,准备好的;(计算机)固定的 | |
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17 investigation | |
n.调查,调查研究 | |
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18 edifices | |
n.大建筑物( edifice的名词复数 ) | |
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19 edifice | |
n.宏伟的建筑物(如宫殿,教室) | |
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20 ERECTED | |
adj. 直立的,竖立的,笔直的 vt. 使 ... 直立,建立 | |
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21 investigations | |
(正式的)调查( investigation的名词复数 ); 侦查; 科学研究; 学术研究 | |
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22 supreme | |
adj.极度的,最重要的;至高的,最高的 | |
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23 participation | |
n.参与,参加,分享 | |
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24 cosmos | |
n.宇宙;秩序,和谐 | |
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25 undone | |
a.未做完的,未完成的 | |
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26 perfectly | |
adv.完美地,无可非议地,彻底地 | |
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27 valid | |
adj.有确实根据的;有效的;正当的,合法的 | |
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28 penetrates | |
v.穿过( penetrate的第三人称单数 );刺入;了解;渗透 | |
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29 motives | |
n.动机,目的( motive的名词复数 ) | |
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30 motive | |
n.动机,目的;adv.发动的,运动的 | |
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31 penetrating | |
adj.(声音)响亮的,尖锐的adj.(气味)刺激的adj.(思想)敏锐的,有洞察力的 | |
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32 prelude | |
n.序言,前兆,序曲 | |
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33 philosophical | |
adj.哲学家的,哲学上的,达观的 | |
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34 vindication | |
n.洗冤,证实 | |
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35 superfluous | |
adj.过多的,过剩的,多余的 | |
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36 expounded | |
论述,详细讲解( expound的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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37 revered | |
v.崇敬,尊崇,敬畏( revere的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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38 derived | |
vi.起源;由来;衍生;导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 );(从…中)得到获得;源于;(从…中)提取 | |
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39 forth | |
adv.向前;向外,往外 | |
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40 amplified | |
放大,扩大( amplify的过去式和过去分词 ); 增强; 详述 | |
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41 gratitude | |
adj.感激,感谢 | |
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42 stimulating | |
adj.有启发性的,能激发人思考的 | |
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43 sketched | |
v.草拟(sketch的过去式与过去分词形式) | |
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