It is, therefore, an entirely5 new work. Comte can imagine without difficulty that it might have been reserved for another than himself. His personal mission might have been limited to the foundation of the philosophy which puts an end to the “mental anarchy6.” The ethics7 and the religion which were to be established upon this philosophy, to put an end to moral and political anarchy, would, in this case, have been the work of one of his successors. Stubborn labour and good fortune allowed Comte to undertake this work himself. But even in 1845, he says how “under the holy influence of Mdme. de Vaux,” he had very clearly seen his two careers as distinct and as one, these two careers of which the second was to transform philosophy into religion, as the first had changed science into philosophy.
The object of the present work is to study Comte’s philosophy properly so called, leaving aside the transformation8 of this philosophy into religion. The choice which we thus make is not an arbitrary one, since, in order to justify9 it, we have the distinction formally established by Comte himself, when he admits that his philosophy and his religion might have been the work of two different persons.
It will perhaps be asked in what our position differs from that of Littré, and of the “incomplete positivists.” By the difference, we shall answer, which separates the historical from the dogmatic point of view. It is from the latter point of view that Littré and his friends reject the “systematisation of the feelings,” the subjective10 method and the religion of Humanity. It is as positivists that they connect themselves with the first half of the doctrine11, and that they exclude the second half. But we are here working from the historical point of view, and the historian, while using his right to define the limits of his work has nothing to exclude from15 the doctrine which he sets forth12. As a matter of fact far from claiming with Littré that the second part of Comte’s work weakens and contradicts the first, we have recognised that they both form a whole of which he had drawn13 out the plan in his early writings, and that he was not wrong in taking as an epigraph for his Politique positive the fine words of the poet-philosopher: What is a great life? A thought of youth fulfilled in riper age.
But then, why only study the first of the two careers, why not respect the integrity of that whole which, according to us, Littré ought not to have disregarded?—We do respect it, for we do not arbitrarily exclude from the doctrine any of the parts which Comte included in it. If we make the philosophy proper the sole object of this study, in it we shall ever have before our minds the idea of the greater whole in which Comte placed it. On this condition alone, our study will be accurate. But once this condition is fulfilled we do not consider that we exceed our right, in concentrating our effort upon the philosophy.
There are two different ways of conceiving the history of a doctrine. The historian may place himself exactly in the mental attitude of the philosopher whom he studies, and think again after him his leading ideas, as indeed he should do; but further, he can judge, just as the philosopher himself does, of the respective importance of problems, without allowing himself to distinguish what is secondary from what is essential. The historical work then assumes the shape of a “monography,” or of an “intellectual biography;” or else, while endeavouring to penetrate14 to the heart of the system, in order to grasp it in its principles, the historian may nevertheless place himself outside it and above it, and try to “situate” it in the general evolution of philosophy. Then the system is better understood in its entirety, since we can see its relations with the preceding, contemporary and following doctrines15. At the16 same time it becomes possible to separate what is of enduring philosophical interest, from what was merely of secondary or momentary16 importance, although the author may have judged otherwise. To borrow from Comte a distinction which he often uses, the former of these methods is better suited to erudition, the latter to history.
Applied17 to the study of his doctrine, the first method would have us to consider positive philosophy with him as simply preparatory to the Religion of Humanity, which was the first and the last goal of his efforts. The writer should undoubtedly18 give a large place to this “préambule indispensable,” to this great fundamental work, in which Comte lays down the intellectual bases of his political and religious system. But he ought nevertheless to subordinate it to this system and place in the front rank the “social reorganisation,” the dogma, the worship and the régime of the Religion of Humanity, the institution of a spiritual power, in fact the whole of that portion of Comte’s work in which he takes up again “the Catholic programme of the Middle Ages,” confident of fulfilling it better than Catholicism itself ever did.
Now it is not in this part of his work that Comte shows himself most original, and that his thought has been most fruitful. The problem of “social reorganisation” does not belong to him alone. Its presence is felt, so to speak, in the air at the time that Comte’s youth was passing away. The common aspirations19 of the generation which grew up with him were to re-establish order and to fix the conditions of progress, to determine the relations of Ethics to Politics, and to put a new religion in the place apparently20 left free by Catholicism. The Politique positive which claims to satisfy these aspirations, corresponds in Comte’s system (all proper allowance being made for the substance of the doctrines) to what the Saint Simon school had already attempted to do before 1830. It comes thirty years later than the previous attempts of the17 same kind, because Comte wanted to found his “social organisation” upon philosophy and morality, and because this speculative21 effort occupied the better part of his youth and of his maturity22. But it originated in fact in the first third of the century as is proved by the pamphlets reprinted by Comte. When it appears between 1850 and 1857, a new generation brought up in other political and social circumstances gives it only passing attention. Other problems command attention more forcibly, and claim a more urgent solution. The philosophy of history no longer excites the same passionate23 interest. Men are less anxious to see the birth of a new religion, and Catholicism has proved that its vitality24 is still very strong.
Therefore neither Comte’s genius, nor the precautions which he thought he had taken to place his “social reorganisation” upon a rational basis, could shield it from the common fate which sooner or later overtakes all attempts similar to his own. Undoubtedly the Politique positive and the other works of Comte’s second career are full of just and deep views. Whatever may be the subject upon which a great mind has worked it is always interesting and profitable to see what the reflection of that mind has discovered in it. But, in fact, that portion of his work, which to him was the most important, is far from maintaining this position in the eyes of the historian.
By his Politique positive Comte only represents his generation. By his philosophy properly so called he is a “representative man” of his entire century. Is it necessary to prove this? The intellectual history of our age witnesses to it at every step. Of all the systems which found birth in France in the XIX. century, this one alone found a hearing beyond the frontiers and left a deep impression upon foreign thinkers. Comte’s philosophy was at first received in England and in Holland even with more sympathy than in France. John Stuart Mill, Herbert Spencer, George Lewes, George Elliot and a number of English philosophers and writers drew more18 or less of their inspiration from it. To this day, it is defended by men of great talent in England. It is true that no German philosopher had the same personal relations with Comte as John Stuart Mill, but as a matter of fact, for thirty years the positive spirit has gradually gained ground in the German Universities. To be convinced of this, it is enough to see how metaphysics are set aside in them and to observe the lines on which the moral and social sciences are taught. In the Latin countries of the two hemispheres Comte’s influence has been exercised with even greater strength, in Spain, in Portugal, in South America; and North America has also its Positivist societies. In his life time, Comte had already found there some of his most devoted25 disciples26. In France the principal “vehicles” of Positivist philosophy have been the works of two writers who, in their time, were those most beloved by the public; Renan and Taine, although they were not positivists, have perhaps done more for the diffusion27 of the ideas and method of Comte than Littré and all the other positivists together.
It is true that Taine owes a great deal to Spinoza and to Hegel, and more still to Condillac. Among his contemporaries he seems to be especially connected with John Stuart Mill and Spencer. But through them it is from Comte that he proceeds, and there we find the origin of the greater number of his leading ideas. His conception of literary history, of criticism, of the philosophy of art, in a word, his effort to bring into the study of the moral sciences the method used in the natural sciences, all this is chiefly derived28 from Auguste Comte. The Histoire de la Litterature anglaise is, in a sense, an application of the positive theory according to which the evolution of the arts and literatures is governed by necessary laws which constitute its solidarity29 with that of morals, of institutions and of beliefs. The theory of the “moment” and of the “milieu” which is the chief one in Taine’s work was certainly not unknown in the XVIII.19 century. But it is Comte who generalised it by bringing Lamarck nearer to Montesquieu; it is he who taught Taine the general definition, at once biological and social, of the idea of the “milieu.”
Renan spoke30 of Comte with extreme severity, and not without some disdain31. He owned, however, that later on Comte’s name would be one of the most representative ones of this century, and he had himself strongly felt his influence. We must certainly take into account all the other French and foreign sources from which this mind at once so supple32 and so large, drew inspiration. But is it not from Comte, as much as from Hegel, that he learnt to regard history as the “sacred science of humanity,” to expect from it what before was demanded from theology, to transform the ancient dogmas of Providence33 and of optimism into the belief in the positive idea of progress, and finally to conceive that truth and goodness are not immutable34 and immoveable realities, but are realised by degrees through the effort of successive generations?
These two examples will suffice to show the point of extreme diffusion which has been reached by the positive spirit.
This spirit is so intimately mingled35 with the general thought of our time that we scarcely notice it, just as we do not pay attention to the air we breathe. History, romance, and, even poetry have reflected its influence and, being charged with it, have contributed to its diffusion. Contemporary Sociology is the creation of Comte; scientific Psychology36, in a certain degree has also sprung from him. From all these signs, it is not rash to conclude that positive philosophy expresses some of the most characteristic tendencies of the age.
We are therefore conforming to historical reality when we attach ourselves, in Comte’s work, to the philosophy which constitutes its most original, and up to the present time its20 most fruitful and living part. It matters little that he himself should only have considered it as a preliminary portion of his work. How often has the speculative effort made by a great thinker for the purpose of establishing practical conclusions proved to be of more enduring interest than those conclusions themselves!
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1
philosophical
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| adj.哲学家的，哲学上的，达观的 | |
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notably
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| adv.值得注意地，显著地，尤其地，特别地 | |
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destined
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| adj.命中注定的；(for)以…为目的地的 | |
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speculations
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| n.投机买卖( speculation的名词复数 )；思考；投机活动；推断 | |
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entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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anarchy
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| n.无政府状态；社会秩序混乱，无秩序 | |
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ethics
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| n.伦理学；伦理观，道德标准 | |
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transformation
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| n.变化；改造；转变 | |
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justify
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| vt.证明…正当(或有理)，为…辩护 | |
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subjective
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| a.主观(上)的，个人的 | |
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doctrine
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| n.教义；主义；学说 | |
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forth
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| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
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drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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penetrate
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| v.透(渗)入；刺入，刺穿；洞察，了解 | |
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doctrines
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| n.教条( doctrine的名词复数 )；教义；学说；（政府政策的）正式声明 | |
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momentary
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| adj.片刻的，瞬息的；短暂的 | |
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applied
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| adj.应用的；v.应用，适用 | |
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undoubtedly
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| adv.确实地，无疑地 | |
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aspirations
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| 强烈的愿望( aspiration的名词复数 )； 志向； 发送气音； 发 h 音 | |
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apparently
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| adv.显然地；表面上，似乎 | |
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speculative
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| adj.思索性的，暝想性的，推理的 | |
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maturity
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| n.成熟；完成；(支票、债券等)到期 | |
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passionate
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| adj.热情的，热烈的，激昂的，易动情的，易怒的，性情暴躁的 | |
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vitality
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| n.活力，生命力，效力 | |
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devoted
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| adj.忠诚的，忠实的，热心的，献身于...的 | |
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disciples
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| n.信徒( disciple的名词复数 )；门徒；耶稣的信徒；（尤指）耶稣十二门徒之一 | |
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diffusion
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| n.流布；普及；散漫 | |
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derived
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| vi.起源；由来；衍生；导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取 | |
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solidarity
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| n.团结；休戚相关 | |
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spoke
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| n.（车轮的）辐条；轮辐；破坏某人的计划；阻挠某人的行动 v.讲，谈（speak的过去式）；说；演说；从某种观点来说 | |
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disdain
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| n.鄙视，轻视；v.轻视，鄙视，不屑 | |
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supple
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| adj.柔软的，易弯的，逢迎的，顺从的，灵活的；vt.使柔软，使柔顺，使顺从；vi.变柔软，变柔顺 | |
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providence
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| n.深谋远虑，天道，天意；远见；节约；上帝 | |
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immutable
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| adj.不可改变的，永恒的 | |
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mingled
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| 混合，混入( mingle的过去式和过去分词 )； 混进，与…交往[联系] | |
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psychology
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| n.心理，心理学，心理状态 | |
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