INTRODUCTION
The Philosophy of the Sciences is one of the leading parts of Comte’s work. No other brings out more clearly the essential differences which distinguish his doctrine1 from previous systems.
In Comte’s eyes the philosophy of the sciences is inseparable from the philosophy of history and from the theory of progress. For the sciences are great sociological facts and, as such, are subject, in their evolution, to invariable laws. The method of the philosophy of the sciences could therefore only be the positive method, ever like to itself.
Moreover,—and this is an immediate2 consequence of this first consideration,—the object of the positive philosophy of the sciences is in no way to “explain” what the sciences themselves do not explain. The sciences, as is well known, do not inquire into their data and their principles. They consider them as sufficiently3 established by the implicit4 consent of all men, or at least by the universal usage of learned men. The geometer leaves to others the care of speculating upon the essence of space, or upon the a priori character of his definitions. The physicist5, if he form an idea of matter for himself, unhesitatingly adopts the one which appears to be the most immediately advantageous6, that is to say, the one which is best in accordance with what he knows of its properties and of its laws. He attributes no more value than that of a simple hypothesis to this idea.
Up to the present the business of solving the questions which the scientific man does not examine has belonged to122 the philosopher—understand by this term the metaphysician. It is for him to seek what matter, time, movement, space, etc., may be “in themselves.” Whether he descends7 from metaphysics to the positive sciences, or ascends8 from the latter to metaphysics, he always endeavours to show that such and such a transcendental hypothesis is more in accordance than any other with what we know to-day of the laws of nature. In a word; the philosophy of the sciences has been, in general, an effort to interpret scientific knowledge metaphysically. This explanation remains9 in respect to such a knowledge an “extrinsic denomination10.” It explains but does not touch it.
Now, according to Comte, there are not two forms of knowledge, the one positive and properly speaking scientific the other metaphysical and properly called philosophical11. The whole of our real knowledge in the end bears upon special or general facts. There can therefore be no question of a philosophy which should be essentially12 distinct from positive knowledge. Any attempt to explain by essences, causes, principles or ends, is excluded by the positive method. Metaphysical problems can no longer be set and, in this sense, when they disappear, the philosophy of the sciences disappears with them.
But, on the other hand, as we have already seen, the positive sciences are not self-sufficient. They need to be crowned and ordered by a philosophy. If then a philosophy is indispensable, and if, at the same time, this philosophy must be positive, relative like the sciences themselves, and homogeneous with them, only one solution remains possible. The philosophy of the sciences will consist in substituting the point of view of the whole to that of the parts. It will still be a product of the positive spirit; but in it this spirit from special will have become general; from particular it will have become universal.
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This universal character remains common to Comte’s philosophy and to that of his predecessors13. But Comte did not understand it as they did. For metaphysicians in general, and still for Kant, universality is the distinctive14 sign of knowledge which does not come from experience, which is therefore necessary and a priori. Comte, who does not know of any a priori in the Kantian sense, calls that knowledge universal which remains relative, and which is founded upon induction15, but which regulates the other forms of knowledge in the order of generality. Thus the principle of laws is universal. The encyclop?dic laws of phenomena16 are universal. The point of view of humanity is universal, because from this point of view a synthesis of the whole of our knowledge is possible. And, as universality is a relative thing, we conceive universalities of different orders.
Henceforth the philosophy of the sciences is easily defined. Are we concerned with a certain science considered by itself? The philosophy of this science consists in embracing at a glance the whole, the object and the method, as opposed to the special point of view of the scientific man who follows the discovery of more or less special laws in a branch of this science, but such a philosophy necessarily remains imperfect and fragmentary. The philosophy of a science is only really established in the general philosophy of the sciences, that is to say by a view at once synthetic18 and single of all the sciences, in which are co-ordinated the objects which they study, the laws which they discover, the methods which they make use of, and the ends which they should pursue.
It has been said that this is not a philosophy of the sciences but simply a “synthesis of the most general results of the positive sciences.” Comte partly accepts and partly rejects the objection. If he is reproached with not having constructed a philosophy of the sciences according to the old spirit, that is to say an effort at “explanation,” which goes beyond the124 point of view of positive science, he grants the objection. He considers all philosophy of this kind as out of the question. Is it said that there is no difference between his point of view and that of the scientific man properly so called, unless it be that he successively goes through all the fundamental sciences? Comte calls our attention to the fact that it is not enough to place these sciences side by side to obtain their philosophy. A new point of view, truly universal, although always relative, is needed. How could Comte have distinguished19 otherwise, in each science, what is lasting20 and in conformity21 with the positive spirit from what is decaying and still bears the mark of the theological and metaphysical spirit? Could he especially have fixed22 the relations which the sciences should maintain among themselves, and could he have imposed upon them a discipline whose principle was not to be found in any one of them?
Thus, until Auguste Comte’s time, the philosophy of the sciences had been a metaphysical conception, joined more or less closely to the whole of positive knowledge. Comte endeavoured to form a conception of this whole, which should be philosophical while remaining positive. It is this conception which is especially set forth17 in the three first volumes of the Cours de philosophie positive. From the static point of view it is founded upon the hierarchy23 of the sciences, the unity24 of the method, and the homogeneity of knowledge. From the dynamic point of view, it endeavours to show the progressive convergence of all the sciences towards sociology, the final and universal science. With this “guiding thread,” Comte will be able to establish in turn the philosophy of each fundamental science, without ever losing sight of the relation which it bears to the whole of the others.
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1 doctrine | |
n.教义;主义;学说 | |
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2 immediate | |
adj.立即的;直接的,最接近的;紧靠的 | |
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3 sufficiently | |
adv.足够地,充分地 | |
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4 implicit | |
a.暗示的,含蓄的,不明晰的,绝对的 | |
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5 physicist | |
n.物理学家,研究物理学的人 | |
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6 advantageous | |
adj.有利的;有帮助的 | |
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7 descends | |
v.下来( descend的第三人称单数 );下去;下降;下斜 | |
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8 ascends | |
v.上升,攀登( ascend的第三人称单数 ) | |
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9 remains | |
n.剩余物,残留物;遗体,遗迹 | |
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10 denomination | |
n.命名,取名,(度量衡、货币等的)单位 | |
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11 philosophical | |
adj.哲学家的,哲学上的,达观的 | |
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12 essentially | |
adv.本质上,实质上,基本上 | |
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13 predecessors | |
n.前任( predecessor的名词复数 );前辈;(被取代的)原有事物;前身 | |
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14 distinctive | |
adj.特别的,有特色的,与众不同的 | |
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15 induction | |
n.感应,感应现象 | |
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16 phenomena | |
n.现象 | |
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17 forth | |
adv.向前;向外,往外 | |
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18 synthetic | |
adj.合成的,人工的;综合的;n.人工制品 | |
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19 distinguished | |
adj.卓越的,杰出的,著名的 | |
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20 lasting | |
adj.永久的,永恒的;vbl.持续,维持 | |
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21 conformity | |
n.一致,遵从,顺从 | |
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22 fixed | |
adj.固定的,不变的,准备好的;(计算机)固定的 | |
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23 hierarchy | |
n.等级制度;统治集团,领导层 | |
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24 unity | |
n.团结,联合,统一;和睦,协调 | |
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