All these results will be ordered, protected and sanctified by the positive religion, or religion of Humanity, of which Auguste Comte, in his “second career” established the dogma, the worship and the régime.
Without entering into the details of this religious construction we see that, like the ethics14 and the politics, it depends upon the “perfect mental coherence” founded, in the first place, by positive philosophy. In its turn, this perfect mental coherence, reduces itself to the unity15 of the understanding, whose necessary and sufficient conditions are “homogeneity of doctrine17 and unity of method.” Now, when Comte began to write, this homogeneity and this unity already existed for all the categories of natural phenomena. The moral and social phenomena alone were still an exception. In conclusion everything was reduced to this question: “can moral and social facts be studied in the same way as the other natural phenomena?” If not, we must be resigned to the indefinite duration of the disorder18 of minds, and consequently of the disorder of customs and institutions. But, if the contrary is true, then the human understanding reaches the unity to which it aspires19. Is sociology impossible? then we have no politics and no religion. Is sociology founded? then all the rest is based upon it.
Thus, the creation of social science is the decisive moment in Comte’s philosophy. Everything starts from it and comes back to it. As in Platonism, all paths lead to the theory of ideas, so, from all the avenues of positivism we see sociology. Here, as in a common centre, are joined the philosophy of the sciences, the theory of knowledge, the philosophy of history,345 psychology20, ethics, politics and religion. Here, in a word, is realised the unity of system, a unity which, in Comte’s eyes, is the best proof of its truth.
If, in sociology, we chiefly consider the end which Comte proposes to attain21 by its means, it is true that this doctrine is principally a political one, and the very title of Comte’s second great work bears this out. But, considered in itself, it is essentially22 a speculative effort, and the principle of a philosophy in the proper sense of the term. What Kant called a totality of experience is made possible by the creation of social science.
Before Comte, this totality had been attempted many times. But those who attempted it started from this postulate23 that philosophy is specifically distinct from scientific knowledge proper. Whether philosophy were dogmatic or critical, whether it had bearings upon the essence of things or rather upon the laws of the mind, it none the less presented characteristics of its own, which seemed to separate it from positive science, and even allowed it to dominate over this science, and to “explain” its principles. Comte rejects this postulate. He is going to endeavour to see if, by taking the contrary postulate as his foundation, he will not succeed better than his predecessors24.
In order to reject the postulate admitted by philosophers before him, he appeals at the same time to arguments founded on facts and demonstration25; but we must notice that, in his doctrine, these two orders of arguments logically reduce themselves to one another. Indeed he says, up to the present time no philosophy which commands acceptance by all minds has been established. Idealisms, materialisms, pantheisms from all sources and in every shape have never done more than ruin the doctrines27 opposed to them, without becoming finally established themselves. Those systems claimed to give a rational knowledge of that which by nature346 is beyond the reach of science. They prided themselves upon explaining the essence, the cause, the end and the order of the phenomena of the universe. Thus they could only build up temporary conceptions which were undoubtedly28 indispensable at the time but which were doomed29 to die. Metaphysics is never anything but a rationalised theology which is weakened by this very fact, and deprived of what constituted its strength during the period when it was an object of belief.
But in the name of what principle can Comte discern what is and what is not “beyond the reach of science?” In order to justify30 a distinction of this kind should he not before everything begin by a criticism of the human mind, that is to say by a theory of knowledge similar to that proposed by Kant in his “Criticism of Pure Reason”? M. Renouvier endeavours to show that, through the absence of this preliminary criticism, with which Comte dispensed31, his philosophy remains32 superficial. Mr. Max Muller expressly says that there is no need to take into account a philosophical33 doctrine which proceeds as if the “Criticism of Pure Reason” had not been written.
On the whole the objection reduces itself to reproaching Comte with not having attempted to do what he considered to be impracticable: namely, not to have determined34 the intellectual laws by the analysis of the mind reflecting upon itself. But, it is said, by what right does he affirm that this is impossible? Because, like all the others, these laws can only be discovered by means of the observation of facts, and because the only method which is suitable for the discovery of intellectual facts is the sociological method: the nature of these facts being such that, especially from the dynamic point of view, they can only be grasped in the evolution of humanity. The theory of knowledge demanded by M. Renouvier and Mr. Max Muller is not wanted in positive philosophy. It is not seen in this philosophy, because it is347 not presented in its traditional form. It is there none the less; but, instead of consisting in an analysis a priori of thought, as a preliminary to philosophy, it is not separated from the philosophy itself. It is one of the many aspects of sociology.
In the positive doctrine, as in all the others, there are dialectics—dialectics which are no longer abstract and logical, but real and historical. They do not seek to see the laws of the human mind through an effort at reflection in which the mind, beneath the phenomena, apprehends35 its very essence. They endeavour to discover these laws in the necessary sequence of periods which constitute the progress of the human mind. They, in their turn, study the “universal subject” whose forms, categories and principles have been determined by Kant a priori. But this universal subject is no longer reason grasping itself, so to speak, outside and above the conditions of time and of experience: it is the human mind becoming conscious of the laws of its activity through the study of its own past. Instead of the “absolute ego” of “impersonal reason,” or of the “conscience of the understanding,” positive philosophy analyses the intellectual history of humanity. It has then neither ignored nor neglected the problem. It has put it in new terms, and has been obliged to deal with it by a new method.
The critic is free to point out the defects of this method and the insufficiency of these terms. But, to reproach positive philosophy with not having dealt with the problem in the usual form in which it is taken by metaphysicians, and, for this reason, to put it aside unexamined, is to commit a kind of “petitio principii.” If Comte abstains36 from attempting an abstract theory of knowledge, he gives philosophical reasons for his refusal to do so. Before condemning37 him, it is but right to examine them. Had he done what M. Renouvier and Mr. Max Muller reproach him with having omitted,348 he would have contradicted himself. There would have been no reason for the existence of his system. He claimed to have reformed the very conception of philosophy: can we reproach him with the fact that his conception does not coincide with the view preferred by his adversaries38? Briefly39 that which, according to Comte, characterises positive philosophy, is that it no longer requires for its constitution what in the judgment40 of M. Renouvier and Mr. Max Muller on the contrary, is indispensable. Are they or is he in the right? The question cannot evidently be solved by the mere41 affirmation of those interested. The examination of the doctrines themselves is necessary.
II.
The position taken by Comte may be briefly defined in a few words. Seeing that philosophy, such at least as it had been conceived until the XIX. century, could not assume the characteristics of science, he asks himself whether one would not succeed better by endeavouring to give the characteristics of science to philosophy. Like Kant, he might have compared the revolution he was attempting to that accomplished42 by Copernicus in astronomy, had he not preferred to present it as prepared and gradually brought about by the very “progress” of science and philosophy.
According to his own expression then he endeavours “to transform science into philosophy.” But on what conditions will the transformation43 be effected? If science were to lose in it its characteristics of positiveness, of reality, and of relativity, to assume those of a metaphysical doctrine, this change would be neither desirable nor possible. The transformation will simply consist in giving to science the philosophical character which it does not yet possess, namely universality. While thus acquiring a new property, positive science should349 lose none of those which it already possesses, and which constitute its value.
Thus, in the “transformation of science into philosophy,” what is transformed at bottom is not science which remains itself while becoming general from being special: it is philosophy rather which is transformed. The latter will henceforth undoubtedly be conceived as the highest and most comprehensive form of positive knowledge, but as constituting a part of that knowledge. It has been said that Comte does away with philosophy, by reducing it to being merely the “generalisation of the highest results of the sciences.” This is not a proper interpretation45 of his thought. Up to the present time the duties performed by the philosophical doctrines have been indispensable. Comte intends that his system shall fulfil them in future. Beside science properly so-called, which is always special, philosophy which represents the “point of view of the whole” must arise. On this condition alone can the government of minds and the “perfect logical coherence” become possible.
Philosophy will then not merely be a “generalisation of the highest results of the sciences.” The synthesis of the sciences must be brought about according to a principle to which they will be all related. It must really be a “summing up of experience.” But if this philosophy thus coalesces46 with science it must also be real like it, and all real knowledge is necessarily positive and relative. In short, the distinction between science and philosophy implies no specific difference between these two kinds of speculation47. On the contrary, there exists between them homogeneity of doctrine and unity of method.
Therein lies the novelty of Comte’s system. The question was, without leaving the scientific point of view, to discover a single universal conception of the whole of Reality as we find it in experience. The solution of this problem was found on350 the day when Comte created social science. For indeed, in the first place, sociology makes the positive method universal by extending it to the highest order of natural phenomena accessible to us. Moreover, once it is established as a special science, ipso facto it assumes the character of a universal science, and consequently of a philosophy. Under a certain aspect, sociology is the sixth and last of the fundamental sciences. Under another aspect it is the only science, since the other sciences may be regarded as great sociological facts, and since the whole of what is given to us is subordinated to the supreme48 idea of humanity.
Such is the way in which the transformation of science into philosophy takes place. If it dates from the foundation of sociology, it is because, once this last positive science has been created, nothing remains in nature of which we conceive the possibility of obtaining an absolute knowledge. “The relative character of scientific conception is necessarily inseparable from the true notion of natural laws, in the same way as the chimerical49 tendency to absolute knowledge spontaneously accompanies whatever use we make of the logical fictions or of metaphysical entities50.”370
Considered as a whole, the object of positive science, according to Comte, necessarily coincides with that of philosophy. For both of them it is the whole of the reality given to us. The human mind cannot exert itself in a vacuum. What it might draw from itself, without the help of experience, (if such a conception be not absurd), is purely51 fictitious52, and has no objective value. If then the human mind remains attached to a metaphysical philosophy, this can only be in so far as the mind still conceives the whole or a part of reality from the absolute point of view, that is to say in so far as it still fails to understand that the laws of phenomena alone are within its reach, and persists in seeking the essence351 and the first or final cause for some among them. There was a time when the whole of reality was so understood. The conception of the world was then entirely53 metaphysical or partly theological. But the human mind has gradually constituted the positive science, first of the more simple and more general phenomena, and then of the more complicated ones. Finally the most complex of all, that is to say, the moral and social phenomena alone remained untouched by the scientific form. Let us suppose that this last order of facts is conquered by the positive method: the metaphysical mode of thought being no longer possessed54 of real objects, ipso facto disappears. At the same time the positive mode of thought becomes universal, and positive philosophy is founded.
In this way two great connected facts which occupy a considerable place in the philosophical history of our century are explained. We understand: 1. that the fate of metaphysics appears to be closely bound up with that of psychology, of ethics of the philosophy of history and of the moral sciences in general, while the connection between physics, for instance and metaphysics seems to be very weak; 2. that the foundation of sociology determines that of positive philosophy. So long as psychology speculates upon the nature of the soul and upon the laws of thought; ethics, upon the final cause of man, the philosophy of history, upon the final cause of humanity; metaphysics remains standing16. Indeed it seems better able than positive knowledge to lead the human mind to a conception of the whole of the real. It appears to be all the more appropriate for doing this in that the point of view of the Absolute can be easily made to harmonise with the point of view of the Universal, in the same way as the conception of substance, whatever it may be, leads without any difficulty to the conception of the unity of substance. But, from the day when we no longer should seek anything but the laws of psychical55, moral and social facts, refraining from any hypothesis as to352 causes and essences, (a method already made use of for all the other categories of phenomena), three results would be obtained at a single blow: metaphysical philosophy would disappear, social science would be created, and positive philosophy would be founded.
According to the essential law of social dynamics56, the metaphysical stage is never anything but a transitory one between the theological and the positive stages. The human intellect could not pass immediately from the former to the latter. The metaphysical stage which can assume an endless number of forms and of degrees, insensibly leads it from one to the other. Metaphysical philosophy partakes of the theological in so far as it claims to “explain” the totality of the Real by means of a first principle, and of the positive, in so far as it endeavours to demonstrate its “explanations,” and to bring them into accordance with the real knowledge already acquired. It originates in theology and it ends in science. But, however near it may come to positive knowledge, its original theological brand is never effaced58. Were they compelled to choose between the theological and the positive doctrines, metaphysicians would certainly adopt the former. The essence of metaphysical philosophy is to tend towards the absolute, whilst positive philosophy only seeks the relative. In favouring the progress of positive science, metaphysical philosophy was working to make itself useless.
To those then who reproach him with not leaving any function proper to philosophy, Comte would answer that, in his doctrine, philosophy is on the contrary better defined and more fully59 constituted than in any other. Indeed metaphysical philosophy has never been anything but a compromise, destined60 to satisfy more or less, the needs of theological explanation and of rational science. But positive philosophy is pure and unalloyed with heterogenous elements. It gives353 to the whole of experience all the intelligibility61 which we can hope for, through the discovery of laws, and, in particular, of the encyclop?dic laws. By making humanity the supreme end at once of our speculation and of our activity, it furnishes morality and politics with a definite basis, and gives religion an object. In this way, according to Comte, positive philosophy is more truly a philosophy than metaphysics, since it secures the homogeneity of knowledge and the “perfect mental coherence,” and it is also more truly religious since, as its final conclusion, it shows that the end of the intellect itself lies in devotion to humanity.
III.
Every new philosophical doctrine is in general guided by a double tendency. At the same time it seeks to establish its originality62 and to find out its antecedents. In order to reach the former result, it criticises preceding and contemporary doctrines, and shows that, better than any of the others, it succeeds in “summing up experience.” But, at the same time, it discovers a pedigree for itself in history which is never very difficult to establish.
Like the others, positive philosophy fulfils this twofold requirement, in such measure, however, as its particular nature and the definition of its object reasonably allow. Properly speaking, it does not undertake to refute the metaphysical systems which it deems itself destined to replace. Those systems in refuting positive philosophy, are faithful to their principle; and positive philosophy is faithful to its own principle in not following their example. It suffices for it to “locate” them in the general evolution of the human mind, and to show, according to this law of evolution, how the very necessity which brought them into being is also the cause of their disappearance63. Their office is fulfilled, their354 part is ended. It matters little that they should seek to prolong an ebbing64 existence; cases of survival may slacken the rate of progress, but they are powerless to arrest it. And so positive philosophy is the only one which can be perfectly65 just towards its adversaries. “It ceases,” says Comte, “being critical in regard to the whole of the past.” In order to be established, it does not require to combat and to supplant66 the philosophies which have preceded it. With itself, it places all doctrines in history. It substitutes the historical genesis to abstract dialectics.
Undoubtedly Comte recognises a long series of his precursors67 properly so-called, in the double line of philosophers and scientific men who have contributed to the progress of the positive spirit from Aristotle and Archimedes to Condorcet and Gall68. But positive philosophy, none the less, looks upon itself as heir to all the philosophies, even to those which are most opposed to its principle. For they, like the others, have been necessary moments in the progress which was to end in the positive system.
Thus considered in its relation to the metaphysical speculation which preceded it, this system does not refute it, for it is neither necessary nor even possible for it to do so. Neither does it incorporate it within itself, for it could not do so without a formal contradiction. Still, according to Comte’s own confession69, it proceeds from metaphysics as much as from science properly so-called. In what then does this relation consist, if positive philosophy neither opposes nor adopts previous doctrines?—It transposes them. What its predecessors had studied from the absolute point of view, it projects upon the relative plane.
As we proceeded we have noted70 more than one of these transpositions. It may perhaps not be useless to make a recapitulation of them here, without, however, claiming for it perfect completeness.
355
Metaphysical Philosophy. Positive Transpositions.
I. Distinction between potentiality and reality. I. Distinction between the statical and the dynamical points of view, or between order and progress.
II. Principle of finality. II. Principle of the conditions of existence.
III. Theory of innateness71. III. Definition of human nature as immutable72, evolution creating nothing, but bringing out the latent potentialities in that nature.
IV. The idea of the universe. IV. The idea of the world.
V. All the phenomena of the universe are related to one another. V. The idea of humanity is the only really universal conception, because the conditions of existence of human societies are in a necessary relation, not only with the laws of our organisation, but also with all the physical and chemical laws of our planet, and the mechanical laws of the solar system.
VI. The Aristotelian theory of science, (knowledge through causes, a priori), and Cartesian theory, (deductive knowledge starting from the simple). VI. Science consists in substituting rational prevision to the empirical establishment of facts.
VII. The principles of mathematics are synthetical73 a priori propositions. (Kant). VII. Geometry and mechanics are natural sciences, and pure analysis can never establish their principles.
VIII. The order of the universe is the basis of moral order: (Stoics, Spinoza, Leibnitz). VIII. The conduct of man is regulated externally by the whole of the laws of the world in which he lives.
IX. The history of humanity is directed by a providential wisdom. IX. The evolution of humanity is accomplished according to a law.
X. The notion of a natural law does not necessarily imply a mechanism74. X. The various orders of natural phenomena are irreducible and nevertheless convergent75, the real becoming richer at each new degree.
XI. Theory of the immortality76 of the soul. XI. Theory of the “subjective existence,” or of survival in the consciousness of others.
XII. Rational theology. XII. The positive science of Humanity.
This list might easily be prolonged. Once again it shows us that, in the history of philosophy as in history in general, the result of the most apparently77 radical78 revolutions is not so much to abolish as to transform. Thus, Kant’s philosophy might seem to be entirely opposed to that of Leibnitz. Yet we see that the metaphysics of Leibnitz is to be found almost in its entirety in Kant. Of this dogmatic philosophy Kant has preserved the doctrine. He only rejected its dogmatism; which, as a matter of fact, was of capital importance. In the same way, positive philosophy has often been presented as the formal negation79 of the philosophy which preceded it. When we verify this, we nearly always find them both concerned with the same problems, and often reaching analogous80 solutions. Here again it is only a question of transposition; an extremely serious one it is true, on account of all that it implies.
Errors of interpretation are very often due to a lack of357 historical perspective. Once they have been formulated81 and adopted by current opinion they are difficult to rectify82. Time is needed in order that beneath superficial differences, deep seated resemblances may appear. During many years Kant was in all sincerity83 looked upon as a sceptic in France. Those who criticised him could not conceive how any one could give up metaphysical dogmatism, without at the same time abandoning the doctrines which had been cast in the metaphysical form before Kant. In the same way, in the eyes of most of his adversaries, Comte’s system must have appeared as the very negation of philosophy, because the terms “philosophy” and “relative” seemed incompatible84 to them. But this system, which is an effort to realise, from the point of view of positive science, the unity of the understanding, and the “perfect logical coherence,” in reality ends by putting the traditional problems of philosophy in a form suitable to the spirit of our age.
IV.
If the relationship between Comte’s philosophy and the doctrines which preceded it is sufficiently85 evident, it does not follow that this philosophy has brought with it nothing new. On the contrary, the “transposition” of problems and the constant effort to substitute the relative to the absolute point of view, entails86 serious consequences with very far reaching effects. Some of these were at once apparent, and first served to characterise positive philosophy in the eyes of the public. Others, more remote, but no less important, appeared more slowly.
The negative consequences almost alone attracted attention at first. The chief characteristic of the new philosophy seemed to be the denial of the legitimacy87 and even of the possibility of metaphysics in all its forms: rational psychology, the358 philosophical theory of matter and of life, rational theology, etc. It seemed also to deny the possibility of introspective psychology, of ethics in its traditional form, as well as of logic5. In a word, one after another, it excluded all the parts of what constituted a “course of philosophy.” No wonder, then, if this doctrine which took the name of “positive” appeared to be chiefly negative.
However, in reality, the negation only affected88 the so-called “rational” or “philosophical sciences.” Comte reproached them with what Aristotle calls τ? κ?νω? ζητε?ν. Stringently89 applying the principle of the relativity of knowledge, he refused to admit anything absolute. He was therefore perfectly true to himself in rejecting doctrines founded upon metaphysical principles. But this entirely negative aspect of his philosophy is very far from being the one according to which we can best understand it. Truly speaking, it is only preparatory, and historians have often committed the mistake of allowing people to believe that it is essential. “We only destroy what we replace,” said Comte.
The question was not to ruin but to transform the psychological, moral and social sciences. As we have seen, positive philosophy does not deny the possibility of a psychology.
On the contrary, it establishes that psychical phenomena, like the others, are subject to laws, and that these laws must be looked for by the positive method. It only rejects the psychology of the ideologists as abstract, and that of Cousin as metaphysical. It claims that, in presence of the phenomena which he is studying, the psychologist should assume the same attitude as the biologist or the physicist90, that any search after cause or essence should be carefully avoided, that any metaphysical or ethical91 after-thought should be set aside. Then a science of physical phenomena will be established; still it will only be able to study the highest mental functions in the “universal subject,” in humanity. If we wish to do so,359 we may continue to call it by its traditional name, although it is to the old psychology only what the chemistry of our day is to alchemy.
A similar transformation gives rise to social science. Here again, the indispensable condition for the scientific knowledge of facts and of laws is a new attitude of mind in presence of these facts. We must set aside what interests us subjectively92 in them, and consider what is “specifically social” in them, just as the physiologist93 studies what is “specifically biological” in the phenomena of the organism. M. Durkheim, as a real heir of Auguste Comte, reasonably maintains that this is a condition sine qua non of positive sociology. This only exists as a science if there are facts which are properly social, subject to special laws, besides the more general laws of nature which rule them also, and if these facts, by constant objective characteristics, are sufficiently distinct from the phenomena called psychological.
Positive psychology is now already constituted. Positive sociology is being formed. The science of language, the science of religions, the history of art are also assuming a positive form. The movement which has begun, and of which we only see the beginnings, will probably extend much further than we think. It supposes at least a provisional separation between the scientific interest and the political, moral and religious interests. Being already constituted for a considerable part of our knowledge, this separation for the remainder is still distasteful to the traditional habits of the majority of minds. We are accustomed to speculate upon physical or chemical nature with perfect disinterestedness95 as to the metaphysical consequences of the results which we may obtain. For we are convinced that the laws of these phenomena do not necessarily imply any consequences of this kind, or that they can be almost indifferently brought into accord with any form of metaphysics we may be pleased to adopt. What do physics,360 chemistry, natural philosophy prove, as to the destiny of man or the supreme cause of the universe? Nothing, and it does not occur to us to be surprised at it. We consider that these sciences are in accordance with their definition if they give us a knowledge of the laws of phenomena, and if this knowledge enables us within certain limits to exercise a rational and efficacious action upon nature.
Are we in the same position in what concerns psychology and the moral and social sciences? This is doubtful. The very name of “moral sciences” is significant enough on this point. We cannot refrain from thinking that these sciences “prove” something outside themselves. For several of the schools of this century, psychology is still the path that leads to metaphysics. Spirituality and the immortality of the soul seem to have a direct interest in it. In a more or less conscious manner orthodox political economy has found itself “proving” the legitimacy of the modern capitalist régime, and has represented it as being in conformity96 with the immutable laws of nature. The historical materialism26 of Marx “proves” the necessity of collectivism. History too often serves national interests, or political parties.
Comte’s most interesting and fertile leading idea is that the sciences conceived in this way are still in their infancy97 and do not deserve their name. Those who take them up should, in the first place, convince themselves of the fact that they prove no more in favour of spiritualism or materialism, of protection or of free exchange, than physics or chemistry prove in favour of the unity or the plurality of substances in the universe. In the school of the more advanced sciences men may be taught to distinguish between the objects of positive research and the metaphysical or practical questions. They will see also that the human mind did not begin by making this distinction in the case of inorganic98 and of living nature. For a long time it could only think of physical361 phenomena religiously. Without the admirable effort of the Greek men of science and philosophers, we might yet find ourselves in this period, and positive philosophy might still be awaiting the hour of its birth. To-day this philosophy has come into being. In order to prove finally established, it requires that individual and social human nature should become the object of a science as disinterested94 as physics and biology have already become. From that day alone will the “Social sciences” be definitely constituted.
It is true that since in a certain way the object of these sciences is ourselves, it seems paradoxical to look upon them in the same way as if it were a question of salts or of crystals. We persist in believing that any knowledge of this order, as soon as it is acquired, admits of immediate57 applications to our condition or conduct. But this is an illusion. Is not the importance of the “milieu” in which we find ourselves, and of the forces which affect us from without for our welfare and even for our preservation99 which depends upon them at every moment, a simple matter of evidence? Nevertheless, we seek a purely abstract, scientific knowledge of the laws of phenomena, because we know that our effective power upon natural forces is subordinate to science. In the same way we separate physiology100 from therapeutics and medicine, and we especially await the progress of these from physiology. So in the same way, p?dagogy, rational economy, politics, and in general all the social arts in the future will be subordinated to the theoretical science of the individual and social nature of man, when this science has been constituted by means of a purely positive method, and is no longer expected to “prove” anything but its laws.
This may perhaps be the work of centuries. We are only witnessing its early beginnings. We still have only a vague idea of a polity founded upon science; and we do not yet know what individual and social psychology will yield as a positive362 science. Comte anticipated results which could not be immediate. This is yet another feature which he has in common with Descartes, to whom we have so often had occasion to compare him. Having conceived a certain mathematical ideal of physical science, Descartes pictured the problems of nature, and especially of living nature, as being infinitely101 less complex than they are. Our scientific men to-day no longer venture to put to themselves the biological questions whose solution appeared to Descartes to be comparatively easy. In the same way, Auguste Comte, having recognised that moral and social phenomena should be objects of science, just as those of inorganic and living nature, believed this new science to be far more advanced by his own labours than it was in reality.
It is easy to understand his mistake. He was anxious to proceed to the “social reorganisation,” in view of which he was constructing his philosophy. Then, given the conception he had formed of social science, he was bound to think that the discovery of the great dynamic law of the three States was sufficient to finally constitute it. In his eyes “the hardest part of the work was done.” Sociologists at present believe that almost everything remains to be done. But, here again, we may renew the comparison between Descartes and Comte. In the work of both, without much difficulty, we can distinguish what is done by the scientific man properly so-called and what is done by the philosopher. It is the same with Comte the sociologist102 as with Descartes the physicist. Their hypotheses have met with the fate common to scientific labours, of which Comte himself has so well set forth44 the necessary transitoriness. The other portion of their work, more general in character, is possessed of more enduring qualities. In this sense, and setting aside his political and religious views, which belong to another order, the speculative philosophy of Comte is living still, and pursues its evolution363 even within the minds of those who are engaged in opposing it.
THE END.
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coherence
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primitive
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phenomena
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subsist
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logic
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speculative
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penal
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incapable
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lasting
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organisation
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poetical
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unity
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standing
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| n.持续，地位；adj.永久的，不动的，直立的，不流动的 | |
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doctrine
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| n.教义；主义；学说 | |
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disorder
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| n.紊乱，混乱；骚动，骚乱；疾病，失调 | |
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aspires
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| v.渴望，追求( aspire的第三人称单数 ) | |
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psychology
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| n.心理，心理学，心理状态 | |
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attain
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| vt.达到，获得，完成 | |
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essentially
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| adv.本质上，实质上，基本上 | |
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postulate
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| n.假定，基本条件；vt.要求，假定 | |
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predecessors
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| n.前任( predecessor的名词复数 )；前辈；（被取代的）原有事物；前身 | |
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demonstration
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| n.表明，示范，论证，示威 | |
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materialism
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| n.［哲］唯物主义，唯物论；物质至上 | |
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doctrines
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| n.教条( doctrine的名词复数 )；教义；学说；（政府政策的）正式声明 | |
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undoubtedly
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| adv.确实地，无疑地 | |
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doomed
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| 命定的 | |
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justify
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| vt.证明…正当(或有理)，为…辩护 | |
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dispensed
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| v.分配( dispense的过去式和过去分词 )；施与；配（药） | |
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remains
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| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
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philosophical
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| adj.哲学家的，哲学上的，达观的 | |
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determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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apprehends
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| 逮捕，拘押( apprehend的第三人称单数 )； 理解 | |
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abstains
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| 戒（尤指酒），戒除( abstain的第三人称单数 )； 弃权（不投票） | |
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condemning
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| v.（通常因道义上的原因而）谴责( condemn的现在分词 )；宣判；宣布…不能使用；迫使…陷于不幸的境地 | |
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adversaries
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| n.对手，敌手( adversary的名词复数 ) | |
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briefly
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| adv.简单地，简短地 | |
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judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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accomplished
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| adj.有才艺的；有造诣的；达到了的 | |
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transformation
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| n.变化；改造；转变 | |
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forth
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| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
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interpretation
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| n.解释，说明，描述；艺术处理 | |
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coalesces
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| v.联合，合并( coalesce的第三人称单数 ) | |
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speculation
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| n.思索，沉思；猜测；投机 | |
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supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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chimerical
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| adj.荒诞不经的，梦幻的 | |
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entities
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| 实体对像； 实体，独立存在体，实际存在物( entity的名词复数 ) | |
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purely
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| adv.纯粹地，完全地 | |
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fictitious
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| adj.虚构的，假设的；空头的 | |
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entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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psychical
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| adj.有关特异功能现象的；有关特异功能官能的；灵魂的；心灵的 | |
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dynamics
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| n.力学，动力学，动力，原动力；动态 | |
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immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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effaced
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| v.擦掉( efface的过去式和过去分词 )；抹去；超越；使黯然失色 | |
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fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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destined
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| adj.命中注定的；(for)以…为目的地的 | |
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intelligibility
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| n.可理解性，可理解的事物 | |
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originality
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| n.创造力，独创性；新颖 | |
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disappearance
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| n.消失，消散，失踪 | |
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ebbing
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| （指潮水）退( ebb的现在分词 )； 落； 减少； 衰落 | |
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perfectly
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| adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地 | |
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supplant
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| vt.排挤；取代 | |
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precursors
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| n.先驱( precursor的名词复数 )；先行者；先兆；初期形式 | |
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gall
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| v.使烦恼，使焦躁，难堪；n.磨难 | |
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confession
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| n.自白，供认，承认 | |
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noted
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| adj.著名的，知名的 | |
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innateness
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| n.天生，天赋 | |
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immutable
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| adj.不可改变的，永恒的 | |
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synthetical
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| adj.综合的，合成的 | |
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mechanism
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| n.机械装置；机构，结构 | |
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convergent
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| adj.会聚的 | |
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immortality
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| n.不死，不朽 | |
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apparently
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| adv.显然地；表面上，似乎 | |
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radical
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| n.激进份子，原子团，根号；adj.根本的，激进的，彻底的 | |
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negation
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| n.否定；否认 | |
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80
analogous
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| adj.相似的；类似的 | |
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81
formulated
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| v.构想出( formulate的过去式和过去分词 )；规划；确切地阐述；用公式表示 | |
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82
rectify
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| v.订正，矫正，改正 | |
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sincerity
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| n.真诚，诚意；真实 | |
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84
incompatible
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| adj.不相容的，不协调的，不相配的 | |
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sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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86
entails
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| 使…成为必要( entail的第三人称单数 )； 需要； 限定继承； 使必需 | |
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legitimacy
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| n.合法，正当 | |
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affected
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| adj.不自然的，假装的 | |
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stringently
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| adv.严格地，严厉地 | |
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physicist
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| n.物理学家，研究物理学的人 | |
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ethical
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| adj.伦理的，道德的，合乎道德的 | |
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subjectively
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| 主观地； 臆 | |
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physiologist
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| n.生理学家 | |
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disinterested
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| adj.不关心的，不感兴趣的 | |
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disinterestedness
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conformity
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| n.一致，遵从，顺从 | |
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infancy
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| n.婴儿期；幼年期；初期 | |
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inorganic
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| adj.无生物的；无机的 | |
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preservation
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| n.保护，维护，保存，保留，保持 | |
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100
physiology
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| n.生理学，生理机能 | |
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101
infinitely
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| adv.无限地，无穷地 | |
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102
sociologist
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| n.研究社会学的人，社会学家 | |
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