1625.
Charles the First was more ambitious, and sufficiently6 proud of the English soldier to preserve the ancient English drum-march.[154] Soon after the final breach7 with Spain he imbibed8 from Buckingham the idea of a raid on the Spanish coast after the Elizabethan model, which eventually took shape in the expedition to Cadiz. Of all the countless9 mismanaged enterprises in our history this seems on the whole to have been the very worst. There was abundance of trained soldiers in England who had learned their duty in the Low Countries; and Edward Cecil, he whom we saw some few years back in command of the cavalry10 at Nieuport, begged that liberal offers might be made to induce them to serve. Officers again could be procured11 from the Low Countries, and therefore there should have been no difficulty in organising an excellent body of men. In[192] the matter of arms, however, though English cannon12 was highly esteemed13, Charles was forced to purchase what he needed from Holland, which was a sad reflection on our national enterprise. Accordingly over a hundred officers were recalled from Holland; and two thousand recruits were collected, to be sent in exchange for the same number of veterans from the Dutch service. Eight thousand men were then pressed for service in various parts of England, and the whole of them poured, without the least preparation to receive them, into Plymouth, where they gained for themselves the name of the plagues of England. Sir John Ogle15, a veteran who had served for years with Francis Vere, eyed these recruits narrowly for a time, old, lame16, sick and destitute17 men for the most part, and reflected how without stores, clothes, or money he could possibly convert them into soldiers. Then taking his resolution he threw up his command and took refuge in the Church. Very soon another difficulty arose. The States-General firmly refused to accept two thousand raw men in exchange for veterans, and shipped the unhappy recruits back to England. They too were turned into Plymouth and made confusion worse confounded. Then the arms arrived from Holland, and there was no money to pay men to unload them. The port became a chaos18. Buckingham had already shuffled19 out of the chief command and saddled it on Cecil, and the unfortunate man, good soldier though he was, was driven to his wit's end to cope with his task. His tried officers from Holland were displaced to make room for Buckingham's favourites, who were absolutely useless; and yet he was expected to clothe, arm, train, discipline, and organise21 ten thousand raw, naked men, work out every detail of a difficult and complicated expedition, and make every provision for it, all without help, without encouragement, and without money. Cash indeed was so scarce that the king could not afford to pay the expenses of his own journey to Plymouth.
Under such conditions it is hardly surprising that[193] the enterprise was a disastrous22 failure. A few butts23 of liquor left by the Spaniards outside Cadiz sufficed to set the whole force fighting with its own officers, and after weary weeks at sea, aggravated24 by heavy weather and by pestilence25, the result of bad stores, Cecil and the remains26 of his ten regiments28 returned home in misery29 and shame.[155]
1626.
A similar enterprise under Lord Willoughby in the following year failed in the same way for precisely30 the same reasons; but Buckingham, still unshaken in his confidence, led a third and a fourth expedition to Rochelle with equal disaster and equal disgrace. The captains had no more control over their men than over a herd31 of deer.[156] At last, at the outset of a fifth expedition, which promised similar failure, the dagger32 of Lieutenant33 Felton, a melancholy34 man embittered35 by deprivation36 of his pay, put an end to Buckingham and to all his follies37. On the whole he had not treated the soldiers worse than Elizabeth, but a man of Elizabeth's stamp was more than could be borne with.
Nevertheless, amid all these failures there were still plenty of men in England who had the welfare of the military profession at heart. Foremost among them was the veteran Edward Cecil, now Lord Wimbledon, who strove hard to do something for the defence of the principal ports, for the training of the nation at large, and in particular for the encouragement of cavalry. The mounted service had become strangely unpopular with the English at this time, whether because the eternal sieges of the Dutch war afforded it less opportunity of distinction, or because missile tactics had lowered it from its former proud station, it is difficult to say. Certain it is that officers of infantry39, and notably40 Monro, never lost an opportunity of girding at horsemen as fitted only to run away, and as preferring to be mounted only that they might run away the faster. But Cecil, though in this respect unique, was by no means the only man who [194]made his voice heard. Veteran after veteran took pen in hand and wrote of the discipline of Maurice of Nassau and, as time went on, of the system of Gustavus Adolphus; while on the other hand one ingenious gentleman, still jealous of the old national weapon, invented what he called a "double-arm," which combined the pike and the bow, the bow-staff being attached to the shaft41 of the pike by a vice14 which could be traversed on a hinge. Strange to say this belated weapon was not ill-received in military circles and found commendation even among Scotsmen.[157] On one important point, however, there was a general consensus43 of opinion, namely that the condition of the English militia was disgraceful, its system hopelessly inefficient44 and the corruption45 of its administration a scandal. The trained bands were hardly called out once in five years for exercise; few men knew how even to load their muskets46, and the majority were afraid to fire a shot except in salute47 of the colours, not daring to fire a bullet from want of practice.[158]. The Londoners, as usual, alone made a favourable48 exception to the general rule.
1639.
The real root of the evil was presently to be laid bare. The disputes between Charles the First and his subjects were assuming daily an acuter form, until at last they came to a head in the Scotch49 rebellion of 1639. It was imperative50 to raise an English force forthwith and move it up to the Border. Charles, as usual in the last stage of impecuniosity51, thought to save money by an exercise of old feudal52 rights, and summoned every peer with his retinue53 to attend him in person as his principal force of cavalry. It was a piece of tactless folly54 whereof none but a Stuart would have been guilty: the peers came in some numbers as they were bid, but they did not conceal55 their resentment56 against such proceedings57. [195]The foot were levied58 as usual by writ59 to the lord-lieutenant with the help of the press-gang, they behaved abominably60 on their march to the rendezvous61, and on arrival were found to be utterly62 inefficient. Their arms were of all sorts, sizes, and calibres, and the men were so careless in the handling of them that hardly a tent in the camp, not even the king's, escaped perforation by stray bullets. In other respects the organisation was equally deficient63; no provision had been made for the supply of victuals64 and forage65; and altogether it was fortunate that the force escaped, through the pacification66 of Berwick, an engagement with the veterans from the Swedish service under old Alexander Leslie that composed a large portion of the Scottish army.
1640.
The following year saw the war renewed. This time the farce67 of calling out a feudal body of horse was not repeated, but unexpected difficulties were encountered in raising the levies68 of foot. In 1639 the infantry had been drawn69 chiefly from the northern counties, where the tradition of eternal feuds70 with the Scots made men not altogether averse42 to a march to the Border. But in 1640 the trained bands of the southern counties were called upon, and they had no such feeling. It is possible that unusual rigour was employed in the process of impressment, for the authorities had been warned, after experience of the previous year, to allow no captains to play the Falstaff with their recruits. Be that as it may, the recalcitrance71 of the new levies was startling. From county after county came complaints of riot and disorder72. The Wiltshire men seized the opportunity to live by robbery and plunder73; the Dorsetshire men murdered an officer who had corrected a drummer for flagrant insubordination; in Suffolk the recruits threatened to murder the deputy-lieutenant; in London, Kent, Surrey, and half a dozen more counties the resistance to service was equally determined74; and when finally in July four thousand men reached the rendezvous at Selby, old Sir Jacob Astley could only designate them as the arch-knaves of the country. Money being of course[196] very scarce, the men were ill-clothed and ill-found, and their numbers were soon thinned by systematic75 desertion. A new difficulty cropped up in the matter of discipline. Lord Conway, who commanded the horse, had executed a man for mutiny; he now found that his action was illegal and that he required the royal pardon. If, he wrote, the lawyers are right and martial76 law is impossible in England, it would be best to break up the army forthwith: to hand men over to the civil power is to deliver them to the lawyers, and experience of the ship-money has shown what support could be expected from them.
There, in fact, lay the kernel77 of the whole matter; indiscipline was not only rife78 in the ranks but widespread throughout the nation. From long carelessness and neglect the organisation of the country for defence by land and sea had become not only obsolete79 but impossible and absurd. For centuries the old vessel80 had been patched and tinkered and filed and riveted81, occasionally by statute, more often by royal authority only, but chiefly by mere82 habit and custom. But now that the reaction which had established the new monarchy83 was over, and men, stirred by a counter-reaction, subjected the military system to the fierce heat of constitutional tests, the whole fabric84 fell asunder85 in an instant, and brought the new monarchy down headlong in its fall. The story is so instructive to a nation which has not yet given its standing86 army a permanent statutory existence, that it is worth while very briefly87 to trace the progress of the catastrophe88.
According to ancient practice, the various shires were called upon to provide their levies for the Scotch war with coat-money and with conduct-money to pay their expenses till they had passed the borders of the county, from which moment they passed into the king's pay. The writs89 to the lord-lieutenants distinctly stated that these charges would be refunded90 from the Royal Exchequer91, and though the chronic92 emptiness of the Royal Exchequer might diminish the value of the pledge, the form of the writ was distinctly consonant93 with[197] custom and precedent94. Many of the county gentlemen, however, refused to pay this coat- and conduct-money; they had been encouraged by the attacks made on military charges in the Short Parliament; and the Crown, aware of the general opposition95 to all its doings, did not venture to prosecute96. Another incident raised the general question of military obligations in an acuter form. In August 1640, Charles, sadly hampered97 by the general objections to military service on any terms, fell back on the old system of issuing Commissions of Array to the lord-lieutenants and sheriffs. In themselves Commissions of Array, especially when addressed to these particular officers, were nothing extraordinary; they had been in use to the reign of Queen Mary, and though more or less superseded99 by the appointment of lord-lieutenants, were by implication sanctioned by a statute of Henry the Fourth.
Now, however, these Commissions at once raised a storm. The deputy-lieutenants of Devon promptly100 approached the Council with an awkward dilemma101. To which service, they asked, were the gentry102 to attach themselves, to the trained bands or to the feudal service implied in the Commissions of Array; since both were equally enjoined103 by proclamation? The Council answered that the service in the trained bands must be personal, and the feudal obligation satisfied by deputy or by pecuniary104 composition; in other words, if the gentry halted between two services, they could not go wrong in performing both. A second question from the deputy-lieutenants was still more searching: how were the bands levied under the Commissions to be paid? The reply of the Council pointed105 out that the laws and customs of the realm required every man, in the event of invasion, to serve for the common defence at his own charge. Here Charles was strictly106 within his rights; and the plea of invasion was sound, since the Scots had actually passed the Tweed. Parliament, however, seized hold of the Commissions of Array, and after innumerable arguments as to their illegality, took[198] final refuge under the Petition of Right. Stripped of all redundant107 phrases, the position of the two parties was this: Charles asked how he could raise an army for defence of the kingdom, if the powers enjoyed by his predecessors108 were stripped from him; and Parliament answered that it had no intention of allowing him any power whatever to raise such an army.[159]
August 28.
1641,
May.
The campaign in the north was speedily ended by the advance of the Scots and by the rout109 of the small English detachment that guarded the fords of the Tyne at Newburn. The Scots then occupied Newcastle, and England to all intent lay at their mercy. Nothing could have better suited the opponents of the king. A treaty was patched up at Ripon which amounted virtually to an agreement to subsidise the Scotch army in the interest of the Parliament. The Scots consented to stay where they were in consideration of eight hundred and fifty pounds a day, failing the payment of which it was open to them to continue their march southward and impose their own terms. Charles could not possibly raise such a sum without recourse to Parliament, and the assembly with which he had now to do was that which is known to history as the Long Parliament. Within seven months it had passed an Act to prevent its dissolution without its own consent, and having thus secured itself, it allowed the English army to be disbanded, while the Scots, having played their part, retired110 once more across the Tweed.
1641-2.
1642.
It would be tedious to follow the widening of the breach during the year 1641. Both parties saw that war was inevitable111, and both struggled hard to keep the militia each in its own hands. The scramble112 was supremely113 ridiculous, since it was all for a prize not worth the snatching. Charles has been censured114 for throwing the whole military organisation out of gear because he wished to employ it for other objects than the safety of the kingdom, but it would be difficult, I[199] think, for any one to explain what military organisation existed. By the showing of the Parliamentary lawyers themselves, there was no statute to regulate it except the Statute of Winchester; in strictness there was no legal requirement for men to equip themselves otherwise than as in the year 1285. It was to the party that first made an army, not to that which preferred the sounder claim to regulate the militia, that victory was to belong. Strafford had perceived this long before, but three years were yet to pass before Parliament should realise it. The few movements worth noting in the scramble may be very briefly summarised. The king reluctantly consented to transfer the power of impressment to the justices of the peace with approval of Parliament, and abandoned his right to compel men to service outside their counties. But he refused to concede to Parliament the nomination115 of lord-lieutenants or the custody116 of strong places, and Parliament therefore simply arrogated117 to itself these privileges without further question. In July the Commons resolved to levy118 an army of ten thousand men, in August the King unfurled the Royal Standard at Nottingham; and so the Civil War began.
The lists of the two opposing armies of 1642 are still extant: the King's, of fourteen regiments of foot and eighteen troops of horse, and the Parliament's, of eighteen regiments of foot, seventy-five troops of horse, and five troops of dragoons; but it would be unprofitable to linger over them, for except on paper they were not armies at all. Two names however must be noticed. The first is that of the commander of the royal horse, Prince Rupert, a son of the Winter-King. He had now been domiciled in England for seven years, in the course of which he had found time to serve the Dutch, as we have seen, at the siege of Breda in 1639, and the Swedes in the following year, commanding with the latter a regiment27 of horse in more than one dashing engagement. He was now three-and-twenty, not an unripe119 age for a General in those days, as Condé was[200] presently to prove at Rocroi. The second name is that of the Captain of the Sixty-Seventh troop of the Parliamentary horse, Oliver Cromwell, a gentleman of Huntingdon, not inconspicuous as a member of Parliament but unknown to military fame. He was already forty-three years of age, and so far was little familiar with the profession of arms.[160]
On the 23rd of October these two men met at Edgehill, the first important action of the war, on which I shall not dwell further than to notice the part that they played therein. Rupert, knowing the deficiency of fire-arms in the royal cavalry, before the battle gave his horsemen orders to keep their ranks and to attack sword in hand, not attempting to use their pistols till they had actually broken into the enemy's squadrons. Here was an improvement on the Swedish system, a step nearer to shock-action, which was crowned by complete success. Oliver Cromwell having seen the havoc120 wrought121 by the Royalist cavalry, sought and found after the battle the cause of the inferiority of the Parliament's. "Your troops," he said to John Hampden, "are most of them old decayed serving-men and tapsters: their troops are gentlemen's sons and persons of quality. Do you think the spirits of such base and mean fellows will ever be able to encounter gentlemen who have courage, honour, and resolution in them? You must get men of a spirit that is likely to go as far as gentlemen will go, or you will be beaten still." Hampden heard and shook his head; he was a wise and worthy122 person, but he had probably an idea that no men except such as those which had been swept into the ranks by the King and the King's father could possibly be induced to become soldiers. So he said that it was a good notion but impracticable. Captain Cromwell set to work to show that it was not impracticable, and began to raise men who, in his own words,[201] made some conscience of what they did, and to teach them discipline.
December.
Meanwhile the helplessness of the Parliament in the early stages of the war was almost ludicrous; and though indeed few things are more remarkable123 than the rapid growth of administrative124 ability between the years 1642 and 1658, it must be admitted that at first the civil leaders of the people were little better than children. Nearly the whole nation, and with it the majority of legislators, had made up their minds that the first battle would decide the contest, and they were woefully disappointed when it did not do so. Failing at first to realise the elementary principle that money is the sinew of war the Houses trusted at first to irregular contributions for its support, nor was it until pressed to extremity126 that they determined to employ general taxation127. Money was the first and eternal difficulty, which however pressed even harder on the King than on the Parliament. The next obstacle was the utter collapse128 of the existing military organisation. The county levies were ready enough to fight in defence of their own homes, but they were unwilling129 to move far from them; and when the enemy had left their own particular quarter they thanked God that they were rid of him and returned to their usual avocations130. This again was a difficulty that beset131 both sides and was never overcome by the King. The Parliament tried to meet it by the establishment of associations of counties, which were virtually military districts, and did something, though not much, to widen the narrow sympathies of the militiamen. But these associations, though a step in the right direction, depended too much on the individual energy of the men at their head to attain132 uniform success; and one only, the Eastern, wherein Cromwell was the moving spirit, did for a time really efficient work.
A third and most formidable danger was the superiority of the Royalist cavalry. The long neglect of the mounted service left the supremacy133 to the ablest[202] amateurs, and the majority of these, though there were hundreds of gentlemen on the Parliamentary side, were undoubtedly134 for the King. Nor was it only the courage, honour, and resolution of which Cromwell had spoken that favoured them; they had from the nature of the case better horses, a higher standard of horsemanship and equipment, a quicker natural intelligence and a higher natural training. The thousand lessons which the county gentlemen learned when riding with hawk135 and hound were of infinite advantage in the casual and irregular warfare136 of the first two or three years; and whatever may be said of Rupert's ability on the battlefield, there can be no question that the work of his innumerable patrols was admirably done. The dashing character of Rupert was also an advantage in a sense to the King's cause, for it attracted to him a group of fellow hot-heads similar to those that had followed Thomas Felton under the Black Prince. One fatal defect however marred137 what should have been a most efficient cavalry, the blot138 that had been hit by Cromwell, indiscipline.
1643.
The campaign of 1643 found Parliament little wiser than before as to the true method of conducting a war. Though it had named Lord Essex as General it gave him no control over the operations of any army but his own, and there was consequently no unity38 either of design or of purpose. Charles, on the contrary, had a definite plan, which had been mapped out for him by some unknown hand and was within an ace20 of successful execution. He himself with one army fixed139 his headquarters at Oxford140; a second army under Newcastle was to advance from the north, a third under Prince Maurice and Sir Ralph Hopton from the extreme west, both converging141 on Charles as a centre; and the united forces were then to advance on London. Hopton, an experienced soldier and as noble a man as fought in the war, executed his part brilliantly, advancing victoriously142 into Somerset from Cornwall, and finally defeating the force specially98 sent to meet him by the Parliament at[203] Roundway Down. This action is memorable143 for the appearance, and it must be added the defeat, of what was probably the last fully125 mailed troop of horse ever seen in England, Sir Arthur Hazelrigg's "Lobsters," so called from the hardness of their shells. Hopton's advance was only stayed by the unwillingness144 of his Western levies to move any further from their homes. In the north again the Parliament had suffered disaster; the Fairfaxes, who were the mainstay of the cause, sustained a crushing defeat, and but one man stood in the way to bar Newcastle's march upon London.
That man however was Oliver Cromwell. Already he had begun to put in practice the scheme which Hampden had pronounced impracticable. He had chosen his recruits from the Puritan yeomen and farmers of the Eastern Counties, men who had thrown themselves heart and soul into the religious struggles of the time, who made some conscience of what they did, "who knew what they were fighting for and loved what they knew," and who thought it honourable145 to submit to rigid146 discipline for so noble a cause. Cromwell was now a colonel, and he had already shown the mettle147 of his force, while it was still incomplete, by defeating a body of twice its numbers in a skirmish at Grantham. This too he had done not by any novelty in tactics, for he admits that he attacked only at a pretty round trot148, but by superiority of handling and of discipline. With the same troops strengthened and improved he now advanced and met a strong force of Newcastle's advanced horse at Gainsborough; and by skilful149 man?uvring and full appreciation150 of the principle, as yet unwritten, that in the combat of cavalry victory rests with him that throws in the last reserves, he routed it completely. Following up his success he came, unexpectedly as he admits, upon the main body of Newcastle's army, both horse and foot. Horses and men were weary after a hard day's work and a long pursuit, but they showed a bold front; and Cromwell, drawing them off by alternate bodies, once again a movement which was not to be[204] found in the text-books,[161] safely effected his retreat. In truth the man was a born soldier, and probably a great deal fonder of the profession of arms, late though he had entered upon it, than he would have cared to admit. "I have a lovely company," he wrote shortly after this action, with the genuine pride of a good regimental officer; and in spite of the rigour of his discipline his troops increased until they were sufficient to fill two complete regiments.
The danger from the north was averted151 for the moment, but the situation was so critical that the Parliament authorised the impressment of men and raised Essex's army to a respectable total. But meanwhile negotiations152 had been opened with the Scots for the advance of their army against the King's forces in the north, and by September the conditions, military, financial, and religious, were agreed upon. This treaty brought home to the Parliament the necessity for immediately opening up its communications with the north and making a way whereby the Scots might penetrate153 further southward. The difficult task was achieved by the united efforts of two men who here fought their first action together, Thomas Fairfax and Oliver Cromwell. The day of Winceby must for this reason remain memorable in the history of the Army, not the less so because it brought Cromwell nearer to his death than any action before or after it.
1644.
By the close of the year Parliament began to realise that if the war were to be carried to a successful issue, some more effective force than mere trained bands must be called into existence. It accordingly voted that Essex's army should be fixed at a permanent establishment of ten thousand foot and four thousand horse with a regular rate of monthly pay. This was progress in the right direction, but in the disorder of the financial administration it was extremely doubtful whether the scheme would not be wrecked154 by its cost. Meanwhile[205] the Scots had crossed the Tweed and fairly entered as partners with the Parliament in the rebellion. This new factor led to the formation of a Committee of Both Kingdoms for the subsequent conduct of the war, an important step towards unity of design and administration but clogged155 by one fatal defect, namely, that the military members—Essex, Manchester, Waller, and Cromwell—were all absent in the field, and that the direction of operations therefore fell entirely156 into the hands of civilians157. A Committee was better than a whole House, and that was all that could be said, for the new directorate soon came into collision with its officers in the field. On the invasion of the Scots, Charles of necessity altered his plan of campaign and detached Rupert to the north, who marked the line of his advance in deeper than ordinary lines of desolation and bloodshed. The Parliamentary generals in the north, Fairfax and Manchester, were at the time engaged upon the siege of York. The Committee, scared by the terror of Rupert's march, ordered them to raise the siege and move southward to meet him. They flatly refused; and their persistence158 in their own design led to the greatest military success hitherto achieved by the Parliament, the victory of Marston Moor159.
July 2.
Of no battle are contemporary accounts more difficult of reconciliation160 than those of Marston Moor, but the main features of the action are distinguishable and may be briefly set down. Both armies consisted of about twenty-three thousand men, and were drawn up in two lines, the infantry in the centre and the cavalry in the flanks. On the Royalist side Rupert, as was usual for the Commander-in-Chief, led the right wing,[162] five thousand horse in one hundred troops; his centre, fourteen thousand foot, was under Eythin, a veteran officer imported from Germany; his left, four thousand cavalry, was led by Goring161. On the Parliamentary[206] side Ferdinand, Lord Fairfax, commanded the right wing of horse, the first line consisting of English, the second of Scots; the centre was composed principally of Scottish infantry under old Alexander Leslie, Earl of Leven; the left wing of horse was commanded by Cromwell, his first line being composed of English, and the second of Scots under the leadership of David Leslie.
With extraordinary rashness and folly Rupert led his army down close to the enemy and posted it within striking distance, trusting that a ditch which covered his front would suffice to protect him from attack. The two forces having gazed at each other during the whole afternoon without moving, he at last dismounted between half-past six and seven and called for his supper, an example which was followed by several of his officers. The Parliamentary army seized the moment to advance with its whole line to the attack. Cromwell on the left led his cavalry across the ditch, and, though Rupert was quickly in the saddle to meet him, routed the leading squadrons of the Royalists. Rupert's supports however were well in hand, and falling on Cromwell threw his troops into disorder[163] till David Leslie, an excellent officer, brought up the Parliamentary supports in their turn and routed the Royalists. Then superior discipline told; Cromwell's men quickly rallied and the whole of Rupert's horse fled away in disorder. In the centre the Parliamentary infantry was for a time equally successful, but the horse on the right wing came to utter disaster. The ground on the right was unfavourable for cavalry, being broken up by patches of gorse; and although Thomas Fairfax with a small body of four hundred men, armed with lances, broke through the enemy and rode in disorder right round the rear of the Royalist army, the main body was hopelessly beaten. Goring, after the Swedish fashion, had dotted bodies of[207] musketeers among his horse, who did their work admirably. Part of Goring's troopers galloped162 off first to pursue, and then to plunder the baggage, while the remainder turned against the Scotch infantry and pressed them so hard that, in spite of Leven's efforts, almost every battalion163 was broken and dispersed164. Three alone behaved magnificently and stood firm, till in the nick of time Cromwell returned from the left to rescue them. His appearance turned the scale, and the victory of the Parliament was made certain and complete.
Rupert after the action gave Cromwell the name of Ironside; he had never encountered so tough an adversary165 before. Marston Moor may indeed be termed the first great day of the English cavalry. We find, curiously166 enough, examples of three different schools in the field, the old school of the lance under Thomas Fairfax, the Swedish of mixed horse and musketeers under Goring, and the new English of Rupert and Cromwell; but the greatest of these is Cromwell's. He alone had his men under perfect control, and had trained them not only to charge, but what is far more difficult, to rally.
Little more than a week later came the first sign of an entirely new departure in the Parliament's conduct of the war. In spite of Marston Moor the general position of its affairs was anything but favourable. The inefficiency167 of local committees and the narrow self-seeking of local forces, combined with the jealousy168 of rival commanders and the absence of a commander-in-chief, threatened to bring swift and sudden dissolution to the cause. Time had aggravated rather than diminished the evil, and unless it were remedied forthwith, it would be useless to continue the war. Sir William Waller, an able commander, who had frequently suffered defeat less from his own incapacity than from the impossibility of keeping a force together, gave the authorities plainly to understand that unless they formed a distinct permanent army of their own, properly organised, properly disciplined, and regularly paid they could not hope for success.
Mutiny, desertion, and indiscipline had dogged every[208] step of the local levies, as the Parliament very well knew; but experience still more bitter was needed before it could be induced to take Waller's advice. For the present it voted the formation of an army of ten thousand foot and three thousand horse and ordered it to be ready to march in eight days. Ignorance and infatuation could hardly go further than this. Shortly after came a great disaster in the west, nothing less than the capitulation of Essex's whole army. Then came the second battle of Newbury, which left the King in a decidedly improved position. Finally at the close of the campaign the Parliamentary forces sank into a condition which was nothing short of deplorable, the dissensions among the commanders rose to a dangerous height, and as a crowning symptom of the general collapse the Eastern Association, the strongest of all the local bodies, declared that its burden was heavier than it could bear and threw itself upon the Parliament. In the face of such a crisis the Houses could hesitate no longer, and on the 23rd of November they made over the whole state of the forces to the Committee of Both Kingdoms, with directions to consider a frame or model of the whole militia.
Thus the work that should have been done years before by Elizabeth was at length taken in hand; and the broken-down machinery169 of the Plantagenets was at last to be superseded. There was of course jealousy as to the hands in which so powerful an engine should be placed, and the difficulty was overcome only by the Self-denying Ordinance170, which debarred members of both Houses of Parliament from command, and laid the ablest soldier in England aside as impartially171 as inefficient peers like Manchester and Essex. But such an evil as this could be easily remedied, for something more than an ordinance is required at such times to exclude the ablest man from the highest post. To bring the New Model into being was the first and greatest task; and this was done by the Ordinance of the 15th of February 1645. The time was come, and England had at last a regular, and as was soon to be seen, a standing army.
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reign
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| n.统治时期，统治，支配，盛行；v.占优势 | |
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statute
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| n.成文法，法令，法规；章程，规则，条例 | |
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militia
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| n.民兵，民兵组织 | |
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repealed
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| 撤销，废除( repeal的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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5
organisation
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| n.组织，安排，团体，有机休 | |
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6
sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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7
breach
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| n.违反，不履行；破裂；vt.冲破，攻破 | |
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imbibed
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| v.吸收( imbibe的过去式和过去分词 )；喝；吸取；吸气 | |
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countless
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| adj.无数的，多得不计其数的 | |
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cavalry
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| n.骑兵；轻装甲部队 | |
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11
procured
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| v.（努力）取得， （设法）获得( procure的过去式和过去分词 )；拉皮条 | |
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12
cannon
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| n.大炮，火炮；飞机上的机关炮 | |
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13
esteemed
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| adj.受人尊敬的v.尊敬( esteem的过去式和过去分词 )；敬重；认为；以为 | |
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14
vice
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| n.坏事；恶习；[pl.]台钳，老虎钳；adj.副的 | |
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15
ogle
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| v.看；送秋波；n.秋波，媚眼 | |
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16
lame
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| adj.跛的，(辩解、论据等)无说服力的 | |
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17
destitute
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| adj.缺乏的；穷困的 | |
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18
chaos
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| n.混乱，无秩序 | |
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19
shuffled
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| v.洗（纸牌）( shuffle的过去式和过去分词 )；拖着脚步走；粗心地做；摆脱尘世的烦恼 | |
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20
ace
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| n.A牌；发球得分；佼佼者；adj.杰出的 | |
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21
organise
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| vt.组织，安排，筹办 | |
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22
disastrous
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| adj.灾难性的，造成灾害的；极坏的，很糟的 | |
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23
butts
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| 笑柄( butt的名词复数 )； （武器或工具的）粗大的一端； 屁股； 烟蒂 | |
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24
aggravated
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| 使恶化( aggravate的过去式和过去分词 )； 使更严重； 激怒； 使恼火 | |
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25
pestilence
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| n.瘟疫 | |
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26
remains
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| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
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27
regiment
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| n.团，多数，管理；v.组织，编成团，统制 | |
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28
regiments
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| （军队的）团( regiment的名词复数 )； 大量的人或物 | |
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29
misery
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| n.痛苦，苦恼，苦难；悲惨的境遇，贫苦 | |
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30
precisely
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| adv.恰好，正好，精确地，细致地 | |
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31
herd
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| n.兽群，牧群；vt.使集中，把…赶在一起 | |
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32
dagger
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| n.匕首，短剑，剑号 | |
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33
lieutenant
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| n.陆军中尉，海军上尉；代理官员，副职官员 | |
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34
melancholy
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| n.忧郁，愁思；adj.令人感伤（沮丧）的，忧郁的 | |
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35
embittered
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| v.使怨恨，激怒( embitter的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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36
deprivation
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| n.匮乏；丧失；夺去，贫困 | |
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37
follies
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| 罪恶，时事讽刺剧； 愚蠢，蠢笨，愚蠢的行为、思想或做法( folly的名词复数 ) | |
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38
unity
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| n.团结，联合，统一；和睦，协调 | |
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39
infantry
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| n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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40
notably
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| adv.值得注意地，显著地，尤其地，特别地 | |
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41
shaft
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| n.(工具的)柄，杆状物 | |
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42
averse
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| adj.厌恶的；反对的，不乐意的 | |
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43
consensus
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| n.(意见等的)一致，一致同意，共识 | |
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44
inefficient
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| adj.效率低的，无效的 | |
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45
corruption
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|
| n.腐败，堕落，贪污 | |
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46
muskets
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| n.火枪，（尤指）滑膛枪( musket的名词复数 ) | |
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47
salute
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|
| vi.行礼，致意，问候，放礼炮；vt.向…致意，迎接，赞扬；n.招呼，敬礼，礼炮 | |
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48
favourable
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| adj.赞成的，称赞的，有利的，良好的，顺利的 | |
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49
scotch
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|
| n.伤口，刻痕；苏格兰威士忌酒；v.粉碎，消灭，阻止；adj.苏格兰(人)的 | |
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50
imperative
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|
| n.命令，需要；规则；祈使语气；adj.强制的；紧急的 | |
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51
impecuniosity
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|
| n.（经常）没有钱，身无分文，贫穷 | |
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52
feudal
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| adj.封建的，封地的，领地的 | |
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53
retinue
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| n.侍从；随员 | |
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54
folly
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| n.愚笨，愚蠢，蠢事，蠢行，傻话 | |
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55
conceal
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| v.隐藏，隐瞒，隐蔽 | |
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56
resentment
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| n.怨愤，忿恨 | |
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57
proceedings
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| n.进程，过程，议程；诉讼(程序)；公报 | |
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58
levied
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| 征（兵）( levy的过去式和过去分词 )； 索取； 发动（战争）； 征税 | |
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59
writ
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| n.命令状，书面命令 | |
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60
abominably
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| adv. 可恶地，可恨地，恶劣地 | |
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61
rendezvous
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|
| n.约会，约会地点，汇合点；vi.汇合，集合；vt.使汇合，使在汇合地点相遇 | |
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62
utterly
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| adv.完全地，绝对地 | |
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63
deficient
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|
| adj.不足的，不充份的，有缺陷的 | |
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64
victuals
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| n.食物；食品 | |
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65
forage
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| n.(牛马的)饲料，粮草；v.搜寻，翻寻 | |
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66
pacification
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| n. 讲和，绥靖，平定 | |
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67
farce
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|
| n.闹剧，笑剧，滑稽戏；胡闹 | |
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68
levies
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| （部队）征兵( levy的名词复数 )； 募捐； 被征募的军队 | |
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69
drawn
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|
| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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70
feuds
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| n.长期不和，世仇( feud的名词复数 ) | |
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71
recalcitrance
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| n.固执，顽抗 | |
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72
disorder
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| n.紊乱，混乱；骚动，骚乱；疾病，失调 | |
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73
plunder
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|
| vt.劫掠财物，掠夺；n.劫掠物，赃物；劫掠 | |
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74
determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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75
systematic
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|
| adj.有系统的，有计划的，有方法的 | |
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76
martial
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|
| adj.战争的，军事的，尚武的，威武的 | |
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77
kernel
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|
| n.(果实的)核，仁；(问题)的中心，核心 | |
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78
rife
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|
| adj.(指坏事情)充斥的，流行的，普遍的 | |
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79
obsolete
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|
| adj.已废弃的，过时的 | |
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80
vessel
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| n.船舶；容器，器皿；管，导管，血管 | |
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81
riveted
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| 铆接( rivet的过去式和过去分词 )； 把…固定住； 吸引； 引起某人的注意 | |
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82
mere
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|
| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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83
monarchy
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| n.君主，最高统治者；君主政体，君主国 | |
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84
fabric
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| n.织物，织品，布；构造，结构，组织 | |
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85
asunder
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|
| adj.分离的，化为碎片 | |
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86
standing
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|
| n.持续，地位；adj.永久的，不动的，直立的，不流动的 | |
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87
briefly
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| adv.简单地，简短地 | |
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88
catastrophe
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| n.大灾难，大祸 | |
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89
writs
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| n.书面命令，令状( writ的名词复数 ) | |
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90
refunded
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|
| v.归还，退还( refund的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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91
exchequer
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| n.财政部；国库 | |
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92
chronic
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| adj.(疾病)长期未愈的，慢性的；极坏的 | |
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93
consonant
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| n.辅音；adj.[音]符合的 | |
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94
precedent
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| n.先例，前例；惯例；adj.在前的，在先的 | |
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95
opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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96
prosecute
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| vt.告发；进行；vi.告发，起诉，作检察官 | |
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97
hampered
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| 妨碍，束缚，限制( hamper的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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98
specially
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| adv.特定地；特殊地；明确地 | |
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99
superseded
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| [医]被代替的，废弃的 | |
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100
promptly
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| adv.及时地，敏捷地 | |
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101
dilemma
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| n.困境，进退两难的局面 | |
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102
gentry
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| n.绅士阶级，上层阶级 | |
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103
enjoined
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| v.命令( enjoin的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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104
pecuniary
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|
| adj.金钱的；金钱上的 | |
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105
pointed
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| adj.尖的，直截了当的 | |
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106
strictly
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| adv.严厉地，严格地；严密地 | |
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107
redundant
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| adj.多余的，过剩的；(食物)丰富的；被解雇的 | |
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108
predecessors
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| n.前任( predecessor的名词复数 )；前辈；（被取代的）原有事物；前身 | |
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109
rout
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| n.溃退，溃败；v.击溃，打垮 | |
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110
retired
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| adj.隐退的，退休的，退役的 | |
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111
inevitable
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| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
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112
scramble
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| v.爬行，攀爬，杂乱蔓延，碎片，片段，废料 | |
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113
supremely
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| adv.无上地，崇高地 | |
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114
censured
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| v.指责，非难，谴责( censure的过去式 ) | |
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115
nomination
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| n.提名，任命，提名权 | |
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116
custody
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| n.监护，照看，羁押，拘留 | |
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117
arrogated
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| v.冒称，妄取( arrogate的过去式和过去分词 )；没来由地把…归属（于） | |
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118
levy
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| n.征收税或其他款项，征收额 | |
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119
unripe
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| adj.未成熟的；n.未成熟 | |
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120
havoc
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| n.大破坏，浩劫，大混乱，大杂乱 | |
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121
wrought
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| v.引起；以…原料制作；运转；adj.制造的 | |
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122
worthy
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| adj.(of)值得的，配得上的；有价值的 | |
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123
remarkable
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| adj.显著的，异常的，非凡的，值得注意的 | |
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124
administrative
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| adj.行政的，管理的 | |
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125
fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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126
extremity
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| n.末端，尽头；尽力；终极；极度 | |
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127
taxation
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| n.征税，税收，税金 | |
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128
collapse
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| vi.累倒；昏倒；倒塌；塌陷 | |
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129
unwilling
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| adj.不情愿的 | |
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130
avocations
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| n.业余爱好，嗜好( avocation的名词复数 )；职业 | |
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131
beset
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| v.镶嵌；困扰，包围 | |
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132
attain
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| vt.达到，获得，完成 | |
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133
supremacy
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| n.至上；至高权力 | |
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134
undoubtedly
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| adv.确实地，无疑地 | |
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135
hawk
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| n.鹰，骗子；鹰派成员 | |
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136
warfare
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| n.战争(状态)；斗争；冲突 | |
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137
marred
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| adj. 被损毁, 污损的 | |
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138
blot
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| vt.弄脏（用吸墨纸）吸干；n.污点，污渍 | |
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139
fixed
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| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
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140
Oxford
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| n.牛津（英国城市） | |
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141
converging
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| adj.收敛[缩]的，会聚的，趋同的v.（线条、运动的物体等）会于一点( converge的现在分词 )；（趋于）相似或相同；人或车辆汇集；聚集 | |
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142
victoriously
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| adv.获胜地，胜利地 | |
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143
memorable
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| adj.值得回忆的，难忘的，特别的，显著的 | |
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unwillingness
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| n. 不愿意，不情愿 | |
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honourable
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| adj.可敬的；荣誉的，光荣的 | |
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146
rigid
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| adj.严格的，死板的；刚硬的，僵硬的 | |
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147
mettle
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| n.勇气，精神 | |
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148
trot
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| n.疾走，慢跑；n.老太婆；现成译本；(复数）trots:腹泻（与the 连用）；v.小跑，快步走，赶紧 | |
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149
skilful
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| (=skillful)adj.灵巧的，熟练的 | |
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150
appreciation
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| n.评价；欣赏；感谢；领会，理解；价格上涨 | |
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151
averted
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| 防止，避免( avert的过去式和过去分词 )； 转移 | |
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152
negotiations
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| 协商( negotiation的名词复数 )； 谈判； 完成（难事）； 通过 | |
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153
penetrate
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| v.透(渗)入；刺入，刺穿；洞察，了解 | |
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154
wrecked
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| adj.失事的，遇难的 | |
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155
clogged
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| （使）阻碍( clog的过去式和过去分词 )； 淤滞 | |
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156
entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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157
civilians
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| 平民，百姓( civilian的名词复数 )； 老百姓 | |
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persistence
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| n.坚持，持续，存留 | |
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159
moor
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| n.荒野，沼泽；vt.(使)停泊；vi.停泊 | |
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160
reconciliation
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| n.和解，和谐，一致 | |
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161
goring
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| v.（动物）用角撞伤，用牙刺破( gore的现在分词 ) | |
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galloped
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| （使马）飞奔，奔驰( gallop的过去式和过去分词 )； 快速做[说]某事 | |
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163
battalion
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| n.营；部队；大队(的人) | |
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164
dispersed
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| adj. 被驱散的, 被分散的, 散布的 | |
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adversary
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| adj.敌手，对手 | |
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curiously
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| adv.有求知欲地；好问地；奇特地 | |
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167
inefficiency
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| n.无效率，无能；无效率事例 | |
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168
jealousy
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| n.妒忌，嫉妒，猜忌 | |
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169
machinery
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| n.(总称)机械，机器；机构 | |
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170
ordinance
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| n.法令；条令；条例 | |
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impartially
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| adv.公平地，无私地 | |
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