1744.
In England the preparations by no means corresponded with the necessities of the position. The estimates indeed provided for a force of twenty-one thousand British in Flanders in 1744 as against sixteen thousand in the previous year, but only at the cost of depleting5 the weak garrison6 left in England; for the actual number of men voted for the two years was the same. All British officers of experience strongly urged upon the Government the importance of being first in the field,[177][104] but when an army was to be made up in different proportions of English, Dutch, Germans, and Austrians it needed a Marlborough to bring the discordant7 Courts into harmony as well as to make ready the troops for an early campaign. By the beginning of April eighty thousand French soldiers had marched from their winter quarters, and were concentrated on the frontier between the Scheldt and the Sambre, while the Allies were still scattered8 about in cantonments, not exceeding even then a total strength of fifty-five thousand men. Wade9, the English commander, delayed first by confusion at home and next by contrary winds, was still in England while the French were concentrating, and not a single English recruit to repair the losses of the past campaign had arrived in Flanders. Then arose disputes as to the disposition10 of the Allied11 forces, both Austrians and Dutch being nervously12 apprehensive13 of leaving their towns on the frontier without garrisons14. When in the second week in May the Allied Army was at last collected close to Brussels, it was still weaker by twenty thousand men than it should have been, and found itself confronted with the task of holding Flanders, Brabant, Hainault, and the Sambre against a superior force of French.[178] May passed away and June came, but the Allies remained helpless and motionless in their camp, while Saxe, after a short march westward15, turned north and advanced steadily16 between the Scheldt and the Lys. His principal object was not very difficult to divine. By the middle of June his detachments had seized Ypres and Fort Knock, which commanded the canal from Nieuport to Ypres, thus cutting off the British from one of their bases on the coast. It remained to be seen whether he would aim next at Ostend, where the whole of the British stores of ordnance17 were accumulated, or whether he would attempt Bruges and Ghent in order to secure the navigation of the Bruges Canal as well as of the Scheldt and Lys. Again, it was[105] always open to him, if he pleased, to besiege18 Tournay, a fortress19 which the Allies would not willingly lose. Thus the problem set to the Allies was not easy of solution; but of all solutions they chose the worst. The Dutch and Austrians could not bear the notion of forsaking20 any one of their darling strongholds, and insisted that the strength of the army should be frittered away in providing weak garrisons for the defence of all.[179] Wade, to do him justice, was for keeping all the troops together, crossing the Scheldt, and taking up a strong position to cover Ghent; but the Austrians would not consent lest they should expose Brussels.[180] Wade was certainly not a strong man, but he must not be too hardly judged. Marlborough had spent the most anxious days of all his campaigns in distraction21 between the safety of Ghent and of Brussels, and had only extricated22 himself by the march that preceded the battle of Oudenarde.
July.
Meanwhile King George had been exerting himself with great energy, but two months too late, to provide Wade with additional troops, both British and Dutch, and had begged that Prince Charles of Lorraine might cross the Rhine with his whole army, and direct the operations in Flanders as Commander-in-Chief of all the Allies. It was a wise step in every way, since the Prince's relationship to Queen Maria Theresa assured to him the seniority in rank which was needed to hold so heterogeneous23 a host in coherence24. Prince Charles did his share of the work admirably, forcing his passage across the Rhine with great skill in the face of the French, and taking up a strong position on the frontier of Alsace. A few days later the British reinforcements reached Wade, and King George issued positive orders to [106]him to take the offensive and "commence hostilities25 of all kinds."[181]
July 20 31 .
It seemed, indeed, as if the time were come for pressing home upon the French; but just at this critical moment Frederick of Prussia intervened in favour of France, and by a threat to invade Bohemia brought Prince Charles back quickly over the Rhine. None the less Wade and his fellows held a council of war and resolved to bring Saxe to action if possible. King George gave his gracious approval to their plan, and on the 31st of July the Allies turned westward and crossed the Scheldt. It still remained to be seen, however, whether Saxe would allow an action to be forced on him; for he lay now, entrenched26 to the teeth, on the Lys between Menin and Courtrai, which was a pretty clear indication that he would not. At this moment Lord Stair, who had followed the course of operations carefully from England, came forward, like a true pupil of Marlborough, with a new plan of campaign. His advice was that the Allies should turn Saxe's tactics against himself. They should march south to Orchies, between Lille and Tournay, and there encamp, where they would be within reach of half a dozen French fortified28 towns. The French would not dare to leave the fortresses29 defenceless; and the garrisons necessary to render them secure would absorb the whole of their force in the field. Then the Allies could send detachments into France and lay Picardy under contribution, or possibly carry out the plan, rejected two years before, of a march to the Seine. The King of Prussia's action only made some bold stroke of the kind the more imperative30.[182]
Stair had gained over the Austrian general D'Arenberg to this project in 1742; but it was hardly likely [107]to be accepted by him now. Carteret, in forwarding Stair's memorandum31 to Wade, gave him no positive orders except at least to do something; but poor Wade found it impossible to make the Austrians do anything. The Allies having crossed the Scheldt halted inactive for weeks, and no persuasion32 could induce D'Arenberg to move. At last the army did march down to the plains of Lille, but without its artillery33, so that it could not be said seriously to threaten the French fortresses. The Dutch and Austrians had undertaken to furnish a siege-train, but had taken no step to procure34 one of the ten thousand horses that were required to transport it. After a short sojourn35 in the south the Allies marched helplessly northward36 once more. August passed away and September came, but even in the fourth month of the campaign the Dutch and Austrians were still without their artillery.[183] Wade boldly proposed to force Saxe's lines on the Lys: the Austrians refused. He proposed to pounce37 on a detachment of fourteen thousand men which Saxe had imprudently isolated38 from his main army: D'Arenberg carefully sent a weak body of cavalry39 to reveal to the detachment the danger of its position. Finally, in the first week of October, the Allies retired40 into winter-quarters, which was precisely41 the object for which D'Arenberg had been working from the first. Despite the English subsidies42, he had no money with which to pay his troops, and he wished to spare the Austrian Netherlands the burden of furnishing forage43 and contributions. Wade, sick in body and distressed44 in mind, at once resigned his command. He had had enough of the Austrian alliance, and King George before long was to have enough of it also.[184]
1745.
Once again, despite the endless length to which the [108]war was dragging on, the establishment of the British forces remained virtually unaugmented for the year 1745. The troops allotted45 for service in Flanders were indeed raised to a strength of twenty-five thousand men, but this was effected only by reducing the garrison of Great Britain to fifteen thousand, which, as events were to prove before the year's end, created a situation of perilous46 weakness. Moreover, the past campaign had revealed a failing in one of the confederated powers which was hardly less serious than the impecuniosity47 and selfishness of Austria. The Dutch army, which under Marlborough had done such brilliant service, was become hopelessly inefficient48. The competition of rival demagogues for popular favour had reduced it to such weakness in numbers that it hardly sufficed to find efficient garrisons for the fortified towns. Concurrently49 its discipline had suffered, and General Ligonier had already complained that the Dutch troops which served with the Allies in 1744 were intolerably insubordinate and disorderly, setting a bad example to the whole army.[185] In February 1745 Ligonier again brought the matter to the notice of the English Government. The Dutch, he said, would probably keep all their men in garrison, and if the Allies were so weak that they could only find garrisons for the fortresses on the frontier, the French would be free to go where they pleased. It would be far better, therefore, to make a great effort, collect a hundred thousand men, take the offensive, and end the war in a single campaign. Ten thousand men would be required to guard the line of the Bruges Canal, and the remainder should besiege Maubeuge and Landre?y and enter France by the line of the Sambre, making the Meuse the main line of communication, as open alike to the passage of reinforcements from England, from Holland,[109] and from Germany.[186] Such counsel was not likely to find acceptance with the men who had mismanaged the war so far. One important change, however, was made by the appointment of the Duke of Cumberland to be Commander-in-Chief in Flanders, and also in Great Britain.[187] The Duke at the time of this promotion50 still wanted a month to complete his twenty-fifth year, but he had from his boyhood been an enthusiastic soldier, he had studied his profession, he had shown bravery at Dettingen, and, young though he might be, he was older than Condé had been when he first gained military fame. Finally, it was an immense advantage that a prince of a reigning51 family should preside over so motley an army as that of the Allies, since there would be the less disposition to cavil52 at his authority.
April 22 May 3.
April 19 30 .
April 28 May 9.
Cumberland entered upon his work energetically enough, crossed over to Flanders early in April, made all his arrangements for concentration at Brussels on the 2nd of May, and actually began his march southward on the following day.[188] Even so, however, Marshal Saxe had taken the field before him, assembling his troops in Hainault, as in the previous year, so that it was impossible to divine which of the fortresses of the barrier he might intend to attack. After a feint which pointed4 to the siege of Mons, he marched rapidly upon Tournay and invested it on the 30th of April, screening his movements so skilfully53 with his cavalry that not a word of his operations reached Cumberland until nearly a week later. Cumberland, after leaving Soignies on the 3rd of May, moved slowly south-westward by Cambron, Maulbay, and Leuse, and arrived on the evening of the 9th at Brissoel, within sight of Saxe's army. The ground immediately in front of the Allies [110]was broken by little copses, woods, and enclosures, all of them crammed54 with mercenary irregular troops—Pandours, Grassins, and the like—which, imitated first from the Austrians, had by this time become a necessary part of the French as of every army. Beyond this broken ground a wide plain swept in a gentle, almost unbroken slope to the village of Fontenoy, which formed the centre of Saxe's position. The advanced parties of irregulars, together with twelve squadrons drawn55 up on the slope before Fontenoy, forbade Cumberland's further advance for that day, and the Allies encamped for the night. Headquarters were fixed56 at Maubray, a village in full sight of Fontenoy, and a bare mile and a half to the south-eastward57 of the French camp.
April 29 May 10.
On the next day the French advanced posts were pushed out of the copses, and Cumberland, together with the Prince of Waldeck and the Count of K?nigseck, who commanded the Dutch and the Austrians respectively, went forward to reconnoitre the position. Saxe's army occupied the crest58 of the slope, lying astride of the two roads that lead from Condé and from Leuse to Tournay. His right rested on the village of Anthoin and on the Scheldt, the tower of Anthoin Castle marking the western boundary of his position with clearness enough. From thence his line extended due east along the crest of the height for nearly two miles to the village of Fontenoy. A few hundred yards before Fontenoy stands the hamlet of Bourgeon, but this was now veiled in smoke and flame, having been fired by the Pandours as they retired. From Anthoin to Fontenoy Saxe's front faced due south, but eastward from Fontenoy it turned back almost at right angles to the forest of Barry and the village of Ramecroix, fronting considerably59 to eastward of south. The village of Vezon, however, which lies in the same straight line with Fontenoy due east of Anthoin, was also occupied by the French as an advanced post. This was quickly cleared by Cumberland's troops, and the Allied Generals completed their[111] reconnaissance. The position was undoubtedly60 strong by nature and had been strengthened still further by art. Beyond Anthoin the French right flank was secured by a battery erected61 on the western bank of the Scheldt, while the village itself was entrenched, and held by two brigades. Between Anthoin and Fontenoy three redoubts had been constructed, and the space was defended by three brigades of infantry62 backed by eight squadrons of horse. Fontenoy itself had been fortified with works and cannon63, and made as strong as possible; and from Fontenoy to the forest of Barry ran a double line of entrenchments, the first line held by nine and the second by eleven battalions64 of infantry. At the edge of the forest of Barry were two more redoubts, the foremost of them called the Redoubt d'Eu, both armed with cannon to sweep the open space between the forest and Fontenoy; in rear of the forest were posted nine more battalions, and in rear of all two strong lines of cavalry. The flower of the French army, both horse and foot, was stationed in this space on Saxe's left, for the English had the right of the line in the Allied Army, and Saxe knew the reputation of the red-coats.
The Allied Generals decided66 to attack on the following day. K?nigseck, it is said, was for harassing67 Saxe's communications and compelling him to raise the siege of Tournay; but finding himself overruled by Cumberland and by Waldeck he gave way. Cumberland's force was decidedly inferior in numbers, being less than fifty thousand against fifty-six thousand men, but he was young and impetuous, and had been strongly impressed by the disastrous68 inaction of the preceding campaign. It was agreed that the Dutch and Austrians should assail69 the French centre and right, the Dutch in particular being responsible for Fontenoy, while the British attacked the French left between that village and the forest of Barry.
April 30 May 11.
At two o'clock on the following morning the British began to move out of their camp upon Vezon,[112] the cavalry leading. The advance took much time, for there were many narrow lanes to be traversed before the force could debouch70 upon the slope, and when the slope was passed it was still necessary to defile71 through the village of Vezon. Cumberland's order of attack was simple. Brigadier Ingoldsby, with the Twelfth and Thirteenth Foot, the Forty-second Highlanders, a Hanoverian battalion65, and three six-pounder cannon, was to assault the Redoubt d'Eu on the right flank of the line of the British advance, and to carry it with the bayonet. The remainder of the infantry was simply to march up across the thousand yards of open ground between it and Fontenoy and sweep the enemy out of their entrenchments.
Before five o'clock the advanced squadrons of the British horse, fifteen in all, under General Campbell, had passed through Vezon and deployed72 in the plain beyond, to cover the formation of the infantry for the attack. The French batteries in Fontenoy and the redoubt at once opened fire on them, but the cavalry endured the fire for an hour unmoved, until at length a shot carried away General Campbell's leg. The gallant73 veteran, who had fought at Malplaquet, and was now seventy-eight years of age, was carried dying from the field, full of lamentation74 that he could take no further part in the action. No one but himself seems to have known for what purpose his squadrons had been brought forward, and accordingly after his fall they were withdrawn75. The infantry then moved up to the front, where General Ligonier proceeded to form them in two lines, without further interruption, to use his own simple words, than a lively and murderous cannonade from the French. Cumberland meanwhile ordered up seven six-pounders to the right of the British front, which quickly came into action. Conspicuous76 before the French front rode an officer on a white horse, and the English gunners at once began to lay wagers77 who should kill him. The second or third shot brought the white charger to the ground, and his rider was[113] carried, shattered and dying, to the rear. He was Count Grammont, the gallant but thoughtless officer who had spoiled the combinations of Noailles at Dettingen. Then, turning to their more legitimate78 work, the gunners quickly made their presence felt among the French field-batteries; but the round shot never ceased to plough into the scarlet79 ranks of the British from Fontenoy and from the Redoubt d'Eu. Ligonier's two lines of infantry were soon formed, with the cavalry in two more lines in their rear, and the General presently sent word to Cumberland that he was ready to advance as soon as Waldeck should lead his Dutch against Fontenoy. The name of the aide-de-camp who carried this message should not be omitted, for he was Captain Jeffery Amherst of the First Guards.
Thereupon the Dutch and Austrians, in the centre and left, advanced against Fontenoy and Anthoin, but flinching80 from the fire in front, and above all from that in their flank from the battery on the other side of the Scheldt, soon shrank back under cover and could not be induced to move forward again.[189] Worst of all, the Dutch cavalry was smitten81 with panic, galloped82 back on to the top of some of the British squadrons, and fled away wildly to Hal crying out that all was lost. Things therefore went ill on the Allied left; and meanwhile on the right there was enacted84 a blunder still more fatal. For Ingoldsby, misconceiving his instructions, hesitated to make his attack on the Redoubt d'Eu, and despite repeated orders from Cumberland never delivered it at all. Cumberland, however, was impatient. Without further delay he placed himself at the head of the British, who were standing85 as Ligonier had arrayed them, in most beautiful order. In the first line, counting from right to left, stood a battalion of the First Guards,[114] another of the Coldstreams, and another of the Scots Guards, the First, Twenty-first, Thirty-first, Eighth, Twenty-fifth, Thirty-third, and Nineteenth; in the second line the Buffs occupied the post of honour on the right, and next to them came in succession the Twenty-third, Thirty-second, Eleventh, Twenty-eighth, Thirty-fourth, and Twentieth. Certain Hanoverian battalions joined them on the extreme left. The drums beat, the men shouldered arms, and the detachments harnessed themselves to the two light field-guns that accompanied each battalion. Ingoldsby saw what was going forward and aligned86 his battalions with them on the right. Then the word was given to advance, and the two lines moved off with the slow and measured step for which they were famous in Europe.
Forward tramped the ranks of scarlet, silent and stately as if on parade. Full half a mile of ground was to be traversed before they could close with the invisible enemy that awaited them in the entrenchments over the crest of the slope, and the way was marked clearly by the red flashes and puffs87 of white smoke that leaped from Fontenoy and the Redoubt d'Eu on either flank. The shot plunged88 fiercely and more fiercely into the serried89 lines as they advanced into that murderous cross-fire, but the gaping90 ranks were quietly closed, the perfect order was never lost, the stately step was never hurried. Only the Hanoverians in the second line, finding that they were cramped91 for space, dropped back quietly and decorously, and marched on in third line behind the British. Silent and inexorable the scarlet lines strode on. They came abreast92 of village and redoubt, and the shot which had hitherto swept away files now swept away ranks. Then the first line passed beyond redoubt and village, and the French cannon took it in reverse. The gaps grew wider and more frequent, the front grew narrower as the men closed up, but still the proud battalions advanced, strewing93 the sward behind them with scarlet, like some mass of red[115] blossoms that floats down a lazy stream and sheds its petals94 as it goes.
At last the crest of the ridge95 was gained and the ranks of the French battalions came suddenly into view little more than a hundred yards distant, their coats alone visible behind the breastwork. Next to the forest of Barry, and exposed to the extreme right of the British, a line of red showed the presence of the Swiss Guards; next to them stood a line of blue, the four battalions of the French Guards, and next to the Guards a line of white, the regiments96 of Courtin, Aubeterre, and of the King, the choicest battalions of the French army. Closer and closer came the British, still with arms shouldered, always silent, always with the same slow, measured tread, till they had advanced to within fifty yards of the French. Then at length Lord Charles Hay of the First Guards stepped forward with flask98 in hand, and doffing99 his hat drank politely to his enemies. "I hope, gentlemen," he shouted, "that you are going to wait for us to-day and not swim the Scheldt as you swam the Main at Dettingen. Men of the King's company," he continued, turning round to his own people, "these are the French Guards, and I hope you are going to beat them to-day"; and the English Guards answered with a cheer. The French officers hurried to the front, for the appearance of the British was a surprise to them, and called for a cheer in reply, but only a half-hearted murmur100 came from the French ranks, which quickly died away and gave place to a few sharp words of command; for the British were now within thirty yards. "For what we are about to receive may the Lord make us truly thankful," murmured an English Guardsman as he looked down the barrels of the French muskets101, but before his comrades round him had done laughing the French Guards had fired; and the turn of the British had come at last.[190]
[116]
For despite that deadly march through the cross-fire of the French batteries to the muzzles102 of the French muskets, the scarlet ranks still glared unbroken through the smoke; and now the British muskets, so long shouldered, were levelled, and with crash upon crash the volleys rang out from end to end of the line, first the First Guards, then the Scots, then the Coldstreams, and so through brigade after brigade, two battalions loading while the third fired, a ceaseless, rolling, infernal fire. Down dropped the whole of the French front rank, blue coats, red coats and white, before the storm. Nineteen officers and six hundred men of the French and Swiss Guards fell at the first discharge; regiment97 Courtin was crushed out of existence; regiment Aubeterre, striving hard to stem the tide, was swept aside by a single imperious volley which laid half of its men on the ground. The British infantry were perfectly103 in hand; their officers could be seen coolly tapping the muskets of the men with their canes104 so that every discharge might be low and deadly, and nothing could withstand their fire; while the battalion guns also poured in round after round of grape with terrible effect. The first French line was utterly105 shattered and broken. Even while the British were advancing Saxe had brought up additional troops to meet them and had posted regiments Couronne and Soissonois in rear of the King's regiment, and the Brigade Royal in rear of the French Guards; but all alike went down before the irresistible106 volleys. The red-coats continued their triumphant107 advance for full three hundred yards into the heart of the French camp, and old Ligonier's heart leaped within him, for he thought that the battle was won.
Saxe for his part thought little differently from Ligonier; but though half dead with dropsy, reduced to suck a bullet to assuage108 his intolerable thirst, so[117] weak that he could not ride but was carried about the field in a wicker litter, the gallant German never for a moment lost his head. Sending a message to the French King, who with the Dauphin was watching the action from a windmill in the rear, to retire across the Scheldt without delay, he strove to gain time to rally his infantry. On the first repulse109 of the French Guards Cumberland had detached two battalions to help the Dutch by a flanking attack on Fontenoy. Seeing that this movement must be checked at all hazards, Saxe headed these troops back by a charge of cavalry; whereupon one of the battalions extended itself along the left flank of the British. Partly in this way, partly owing to the incessant110 play of the French artillery on both flanks, the two British lines assumed the form of two huge oblong columns which gradually became welded into one. The change was not untimely, for now the first line of the French cavalry, which had been posted in rear of the forest of Barry, came down upon the British at full gallop83, but only to reel back shivered to fragments by the same terrible fire. Then the second line tried its fortune, but met with no better fate. Finally, the Household Cavalry, the famous Maison du Roi, burning with all the ardour of Dettingen unavenged, was launched against the scarlet columns, and like its predecessors111, came flying back, a mob of riderless horses and uncontrollable men, decimated, shattered and repulsed112 by the never-ending fire. "It was like charging two flaming fortresses rather than two columns of infantry."[191]
Nevertheless some time was hereby gained for the broken French infantry to reform. The British, once arrived within the French camp, came to a halt, and looked at last to see how the Dutch were faring on their left. As has already been told, Waldeck's attack had been a total failure, and the British, unsupported and always under a cross-fire of artillery, fell back to the crest of the ridge and were reformed for a second[118] attack. Waldeck undertook to make another attempt on Fontenoy, and Cumberland in reliance upon his help again advanced at the head of the British. But meanwhile Saxe had brought forward his reserves from Ramecroix, and among them the Irish brigade, to meet him, while artillery had also been brought up from the French right to play upon the British front. The French Guards and the rest of the troops of the French first line had also been rallied, and the task of the British was well-nigh desperate. The Irish brigade, which consisted of six battalions, was made up not of Irish only but of Scots and English also, desperate characters who went into action with a rope round their necks, and would fight like devils. Yet, even in this second attack the British carried their advance as far as in the first, the perfection of their fire-discipline enabling them to beat back even the Irish brigade for a time. But their losses had been frightfully heavy; the Dutch would not move one foot to the attack of Fontenoy, and the cannonade in front added to that in the flanks became unendurable. The French infantry likewise closed round on them in superior numbers on both flanks, and it became apparent that there was nothing for it but a retreat.
Ligonier sent back two battalions to secure the roads leading through Vezon, and the retreat then began in perfectly good order. The French Household Cavalry made a furious charge upon the rear of the column as it faced about, but found to its cost that the infernal fire was not yet quenched113. The three battalions of Guards and a battalion of Hanoverians turned sternly about to meet them, and gave them a few parting volleys, which wholly extinguished one regiment and brought down every officer of another. A few British squadrons, the Blues114 conspicuous among them, pushed forward, in spite of heavy losses, through the cross-fire to lend what help they could, and the remnant of the heroic battalions retired, facing about[119] in succession at every hundred yards, as steadily and proudly as they had advanced.
Their losses in the action were terribly severe. Of the fifteen thousand infantry, English and Hanoverian, for the Hanoverians bore themselves not less nobly than their Allies, nearly six thousand were killed or wounded, the casualties of the twenty English battalions just exceeding four thousand men. The heaviest sufferers were the Twelfth and Twenty-third regiments, both of which lost over three hundred men, the Twenty-first and Thirty-first, which lost rather less than three hundred men apiece, and the three battalions of Guards, which lost each of them about two hundred and fifty. Of the Generals of Foot, Cumberland, Ligonier, and Brigadier Skelton, though in the hottest of the fire, alone came off unhurt; all of the rest were either killed or wounded. Many regiments of cavalry also suffered not a little, in particular the Blues and Royal Dragoons; and the total loss of the British cavalry exceeded three hundred men and six hundred horses. The loss of the French was never made public, but was certainly at least equal to that of the Allies. Contemporary accounts set it down, with no great improbability, at fully27 ten thousand men. As an example of the prowess of British infantry, Fontenoy stands almost without a parallel in its history. The battalions formed under a cross-fire of artillery, remained halted under the same fire, advanced slowly for half a mile in perfect order under the same fire, and marched up to within pistol-shot of the French infantry to receive their volley before they discharged a shot. They shattered the French battalions to pieces, repulsed three separate attacks of cavalry, halted under a heavy cannonade, retired for some distance and reformed under a cross-fire, advanced again with both artillery and musketry playing on front and flanks, made the bravest brigade in the French service recoil115, repelled116 another desperate attack of cavalry, and retired slowly and orderly under a cross-fire almost to the end. By consent of all the British[120] commanders it was Ingoldsby's misunderstanding of his orders and his failure to capture the Redoubt d'Eu that lost the battle; and Ingoldsby was duly tried by court-martial for his behaviour. He was, however, acquitted117 of all but an error in judgment118; and indeed there was no question of cowardice119, for he accompanied the remainder of the infantry in its advance with his own detachment and was severely120 wounded. It is customary to blame Cumberland for dashing his head against a wall in attempting such an attack, but he could hardly have been expected to count on such bad luck as the failure of Ingoldsby on one flank and of the Dutch on the other. The sheer audacity121 of his advance went near to give him the victory. Saxe owned that he never dreamed that any General would attempt such a stroke, or that any troops would execute it. Cumberland is blamed also for not attacking either the Redoubt d'Eu or Fontenoy after he had penetrated122 into the French camp. This charge is less easy to rebut123, for the French always know when they are beaten, and seeing their left rolled up and troops advancing on Fontenoy in flank and rear would probably have given up the game for lost, and that the more readily since their ammunition124 in Fontenoy was for the moment nearly exhausted125. Even so, however, Saxe's reserves were always at hand at Ramecroix, and would have required to be held in check. Another puzzling question, namely, why Cumberland did not make greater use of his artillery in the action, is answered by the fact that the contractors126 for the horsing of the guns ran off with the horses early in the day. Such an occurrence was by no means unusual, and yet it never happened to Marlborough, not even at Malplaquet. Altogether, the conclusion seems to be that Cumberland stumbled on to a brilliant feat127 of arms by mistake, and, though seconded by his troops with bravery equal to his own, was not a General of sufficient capacity to turn his success to account.
At the close of the action Cumberland retreated to[121] Ath and encamped under the guns of that fortress, leaving his wounded to the mercy of the French, who, by a strange perversion128 of their usual chivalry129, treated them with shameful130 barbarity. Among the wounded, strangely enough, were a few of the new sect131 of Methodists founded by John Wesley, who faced death and wounds with the stern exultation132 that had once inspired the troopers of Cromwell. One of them wrote to Wesley, that even after a bullet in each arm had forced him to retire from the field, he hardly knew whether he was on earth or heaven, such was the sweetness of the day. This man and a few more of his kind probably helped their fellow-sufferers through the misery133 of the days following the battle, until Cumberland's furious remonstrances134 with Saxe procured135 for them better treatment.
June 30 July 11.
August.
From Ath Cumberland fell back to Lessines and drew out such British corps136 as were in garrison in Flanders to replace those which had suffered most heavily in the action. Meanwhile Tournay, very shortly after the battle, fell by treachery into the hands of the French; and Saxe's field-army being thus raised to a force nearly double that of the Allies, Cumberland was reduced to utter helplessness. The mischief137 of Fontenoy lay not in the repulse and the loss of men, for the British did not consider themselves to have been beaten, but in the destruction of all confidence in the Dutch troops. The troubles which had harassed138 Wade to despair now reappeared. Cumberland, despite his inferiority in strength, was expected somehow to defend Flanders, Brabant, and above all Brussels, and yet simultaneously139 to keep an active army in the field. Worse than this, he attempted to fulfil the expectation. Against his better judgment he weakened his force still further by detaching a force for the garrison of Mons,[192][122] and then, instead of taking up a strong position on the Scheldt to cover Ghent at all hazards, he yielded to the pressure of the Austrians and crossed the Dender to cover Brussels.[193] Halting too long between two opinions he at last sent off a detachment for the defence of Ghent, half of which was cut off and turned back with heavy loss, while the other half, after enduring much rough usage on the march, entered Ghent only to see the town surprised by the French on the following day. Four British regiments took part in this unlucky enterprise and suffered heavy loss, while the Royal Scots and the Twenty-third, which had been despatched to Ghent after Fontenoy, of course became prisoners.[194] Moreover, a vast quantity of British military stores were captured in Ghent, although Cumberland had a week before ordered that they should be removed.[195] After this blow Cumberland retired to Vilvorde, a little to the north of Brussels, still hoping to cover both that city and Antwerp, and so to preserve his communications both with Germany and with the sea. Here again he sacrificed his better judgment to the clamour of the Austrians, for he would much have preferred to secure Antwerp only. His position was in fact most critical, and he was keenly alive to it.[196] Just when his anxiety was greatest there came a letter from the Secretary of State, announcing that invasion of England was imminent140, and hoping that troops could be spared from Flanders without prejudice to his operations. "What!" answered Ligonier indignantly, "Are you aware that the enemy has seventy thousand men against our thirty thousand, and that they can place a superior force on the canal before us and send another army round [123]between us and Antwerp to cut off our supplies and force us to fight at a disadvantage? This is our position, and this is the result of providing His Royal Highness with insufficient141 troops; and yet you speak of our having a corps to spare to defend England!"[197]
Walker & Boutall del.
To face page 122.
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1743.
DETTINGEN, June 16th 27th 1743.
FONTENOY, April 30th May 11th 1745.
Aug. 13 24 .
Sept.
Oct.
Saxe's plan for reducing the Allies was in fact uniformly the same throughout the whole of the war, namely to cut off their communications with the sea on one side and with Germany on the other. Even before he began to press Cumberland northward toward Antwerp he had detached a force to lay siege to Ostend, which was the English base. Cumberland, on his side, had advised that the dykes142 should be broken down and the country inundated143 in order to preserve it, and both Dutch and Austrians had promised that this should be done; but as usual it was not done, and before the end of August Ostend had surrendered to the French. The English base was then perforce shifted to Antwerp. But by this time the requests for the return of troops to England had become urgent and imperative orders. First ten battalions were recalled, then the rest of the foot, and at last practically the whole of the army, including Cumberland himself.[198] It is now time to explain the causes for the alarm in England.
Authorities.—The official account of Fontenoy was drawn up by Ligonier in French and translated into English, with some omissions144, for publication. The French version is far the better and will be found in the State Papers. The account in the Life of the Duke of Cumberland is poor, though valuable as having been drawn up from the reports of the English Generals. Of the French accounts Voltaire's is the best known, and, as might be expected from such a hand, admirably spirited. More valuable are the accounts in the Conquête des Pays Bas, in the Mémoires du Maréchal de Saxe, where Saxe's own report may be read, in the Campagnes des Pays Bas, and in Espagnac. The newspapers furnish a few picturesque145 incidents of some value.
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1 despatch | |
n./v.(dispatch)派遣;发送;n.急件;新闻报道 | |
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2 collapse | |
vi.累倒;昏倒;倒塌;塌陷 | |
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3 incompetent | |
adj.无能力的,不能胜任的 | |
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4 pointed | |
adj.尖的,直截了当的 | |
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5 depleting | |
使大大的减少,使空虚( deplete的现在分词 ); 耗尽,使枯竭 | |
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6 garrison | |
n.卫戍部队;驻地,卫戍区;vt.派(兵)驻防 | |
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7 discordant | |
adj.不调和的 | |
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8 scattered | |
adj.分散的,稀疏的;散步的;疏疏落落的 | |
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9 wade | |
v.跋涉,涉水;n.跋涉 | |
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10 disposition | |
n.性情,性格;意向,倾向;排列,部署 | |
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11 allied | |
adj.协约国的;同盟国的 | |
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12 nervously | |
adv.神情激动地,不安地 | |
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13 apprehensive | |
adj.担心的,恐惧的,善于领会的 | |
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14 garrisons | |
守备部队,卫戍部队( garrison的名词复数 ) | |
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15 westward | |
n.西方,西部;adj.西方的,向西的;adv.向西 | |
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16 steadily | |
adv.稳定地;不变地;持续地 | |
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17 ordnance | |
n.大炮,军械 | |
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18 besiege | |
vt.包围,围攻,拥在...周围 | |
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19 fortress | |
n.堡垒,防御工事 | |
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20 forsaking | |
放弃( forsake的现在分词 ); 弃绝; 抛弃; 摒弃 | |
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21 distraction | |
n.精神涣散,精神不集中,消遣,娱乐 | |
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22 extricated | |
v.使摆脱困难,脱身( extricate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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23 heterogeneous | |
adj.庞杂的;异类的 | |
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24 coherence | |
n.紧凑;连贯;一致性 | |
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25 hostilities | |
n.战争;敌意(hostility的复数);敌对状态;战事 | |
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26 entrenched | |
adj.确立的,不容易改的(风俗习惯) | |
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27 fully | |
adv.完全地,全部地,彻底地;充分地 | |
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28 fortified | |
adj. 加强的 | |
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29 fortresses | |
堡垒,要塞( fortress的名词复数 ) | |
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30 imperative | |
n.命令,需要;规则;祈使语气;adj.强制的;紧急的 | |
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31 memorandum | |
n.备忘录,便笺 | |
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32 persuasion | |
n.劝说;说服;持有某种信仰的宗派 | |
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33 artillery | |
n.(军)火炮,大炮;炮兵(部队) | |
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34 procure | |
vt.获得,取得,促成;vi.拉皮条 | |
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35 sojourn | |
v./n.旅居,寄居;逗留 | |
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36 northward | |
adv.向北;n.北方的地区 | |
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37 pounce | |
n.猛扑;v.猛扑,突然袭击,欣然同意 | |
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38 isolated | |
adj.与世隔绝的 | |
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39 cavalry | |
n.骑兵;轻装甲部队 | |
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40 retired | |
adj.隐退的,退休的,退役的 | |
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41 precisely | |
adv.恰好,正好,精确地,细致地 | |
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42 subsidies | |
n.补贴,津贴,补助金( subsidy的名词复数 ) | |
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43 forage | |
n.(牛马的)饲料,粮草;v.搜寻,翻寻 | |
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44 distressed | |
痛苦的 | |
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45 allotted | |
分配,拨给,摊派( allot的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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46 perilous | |
adj.危险的,冒险的 | |
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47 impecuniosity | |
n.(经常)没有钱,身无分文,贫穷 | |
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48 inefficient | |
adj.效率低的,无效的 | |
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49 concurrently | |
adv.同时地 | |
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50 promotion | |
n.提升,晋级;促销,宣传 | |
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51 reigning | |
adj.统治的,起支配作用的 | |
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52 cavil | |
v.挑毛病,吹毛求疵 | |
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53 skilfully | |
adv. (美skillfully)熟练地 | |
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54 crammed | |
adj.塞满的,挤满的;大口地吃;快速贪婪地吃v.把…塞满;填入;临时抱佛脚( cram的过去式) | |
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55 drawn | |
v.拖,拉,拔出;adj.憔悴的,紧张的 | |
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56 fixed | |
adj.固定的,不变的,准备好的;(计算机)固定的 | |
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57 eastward | |
adv.向东;adj.向东的;n.东方,东部 | |
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58 crest | |
n.顶点;饰章;羽冠;vt.达到顶点;vi.形成浪尖 | |
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59 considerably | |
adv.极大地;相当大地;在很大程度上 | |
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60 undoubtedly | |
adv.确实地,无疑地 | |
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61 ERECTED | |
adj. 直立的,竖立的,笔直的 vt. 使 ... 直立,建立 | |
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62 infantry | |
n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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63 cannon | |
n.大炮,火炮;飞机上的机关炮 | |
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64 battalions | |
n.(陆军的)一营(大约有一千兵士)( battalion的名词复数 );协同作战的部队;军队;(组织在一起工作的)队伍 | |
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65 battalion | |
n.营;部队;大队(的人) | |
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66 decided | |
adj.决定了的,坚决的;明显的,明确的 | |
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67 harassing | |
v.侵扰,骚扰( harass的现在分词 );不断攻击(敌人) | |
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68 disastrous | |
adj.灾难性的,造成灾害的;极坏的,很糟的 | |
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69 assail | |
v.猛烈攻击,抨击,痛斥 | |
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70 debouch | |
v.流出,进入 | |
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71 defile | |
v.弄污,弄脏;n.(山间)小道 | |
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72 deployed | |
(尤指军事行动)使展开( deploy的过去式和过去分词 ); 施展; 部署; 有效地利用 | |
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73 gallant | |
adj.英勇的,豪侠的;(向女人)献殷勤的 | |
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74 lamentation | |
n.悲叹,哀悼 | |
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75 withdrawn | |
vt.收回;使退出;vi.撤退,退出 | |
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76 conspicuous | |
adj.明眼的,惹人注目的;炫耀的,摆阔气的 | |
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77 wagers | |
n.赌注,用钱打赌( wager的名词复数 )v.在(某物)上赌钱,打赌( wager的第三人称单数 );保证,担保 | |
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78 legitimate | |
adj.合法的,合理的,合乎逻辑的;v.使合法 | |
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79 scarlet | |
n.深红色,绯红色,红衣;adj.绯红色的 | |
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80 flinching | |
v.(因危险和痛苦)退缩,畏惧( flinch的现在分词 ) | |
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81 smitten | |
猛打,重击,打击( smite的过去分词 ) | |
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82 galloped | |
(使马)飞奔,奔驰( gallop的过去式和过去分词 ); 快速做[说]某事 | |
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83 gallop | |
v./n.(马或骑马等)飞奔;飞速发展 | |
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84 enacted | |
制定(法律),通过(法案)( enact的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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85 standing | |
n.持续,地位;adj.永久的,不动的,直立的,不流动的 | |
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86 aligned | |
adj.对齐的,均衡的 | |
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87 puffs | |
n.吸( puff的名词复数 );(烟斗或香烟的)一吸;一缕(烟、蒸汽等);(呼吸或风的)呼v.使喷出( puff的第三人称单数 );喷着汽(或烟)移动;吹嘘;吹捧 | |
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88 plunged | |
v.颠簸( plunge的过去式和过去分词 );暴跌;骤降;突降 | |
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89 serried | |
adj.拥挤的;密集的 | |
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90 gaping | |
adj.口的;张口的;敞口的;多洞穴的v.目瞪口呆地凝视( gape的现在分词 );张开,张大 | |
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91 cramped | |
a.狭窄的 | |
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92 abreast | |
adv.并排地;跟上(时代)的步伐,与…并进地 | |
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93 strewing | |
v.撒在…上( strew的现在分词 );散落于;点缀;撒满 | |
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94 petals | |
n.花瓣( petal的名词复数 ) | |
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95 ridge | |
n.山脊;鼻梁;分水岭 | |
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96 regiments | |
(军队的)团( regiment的名词复数 ); 大量的人或物 | |
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97 regiment | |
n.团,多数,管理;v.组织,编成团,统制 | |
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98 flask | |
n.瓶,火药筒,砂箱 | |
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99 doffing | |
n.下筒,落纱v.脱去,(尤指)脱帽( doff的现在分词 ) | |
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100 murmur | |
n.低语,低声的怨言;v.低语,低声而言 | |
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101 muskets | |
n.火枪,(尤指)滑膛枪( musket的名词复数 ) | |
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102 muzzles | |
枪口( muzzle的名词复数 ); (防止动物咬人的)口套; (四足动物的)鼻口部; (狗)等凸出的鼻子和口 | |
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103 perfectly | |
adv.完美地,无可非议地,彻底地 | |
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104 canes | |
n.(某些植物,如竹或甘蔗的)茎( cane的名词复数 );(用于制作家具等的)竹竿;竹杖 | |
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105 utterly | |
adv.完全地,绝对地 | |
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106 irresistible | |
adj.非常诱人的,无法拒绝的,无法抗拒的 | |
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107 triumphant | |
adj.胜利的,成功的;狂欢的,喜悦的 | |
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108 assuage | |
v.缓和,减轻,镇定 | |
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109 repulse | |
n.击退,拒绝;vt.逐退,击退,拒绝 | |
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110 incessant | |
adj.不停的,连续的 | |
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111 predecessors | |
n.前任( predecessor的名词复数 );前辈;(被取代的)原有事物;前身 | |
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112 repulsed | |
v.击退( repulse的过去式和过去分词 );驳斥;拒绝 | |
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113 quenched | |
解(渴)( quench的过去式和过去分词 ); 终止(某事物); (用水)扑灭(火焰等); 将(热物体)放入水中急速冷却 | |
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114 blues | |
n.抑郁,沮丧;布鲁斯音乐 | |
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115 recoil | |
vi.退却,退缩,畏缩 | |
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116 repelled | |
v.击退( repel的过去式和过去分词 );使厌恶;排斥;推开 | |
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117 acquitted | |
宣判…无罪( acquit的过去式和过去分词 ); 使(自己)作出某种表现 | |
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118 judgment | |
n.审判;判断力,识别力,看法,意见 | |
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119 cowardice | |
n.胆小,怯懦 | |
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120 severely | |
adv.严格地;严厉地;非常恶劣地 | |
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121 audacity | |
n.大胆,卤莽,无礼 | |
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122 penetrated | |
adj. 击穿的,鞭辟入里的 动词penetrate的过去式和过去分词形式 | |
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123 rebut | |
v.辩驳,驳回 | |
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124 ammunition | |
n.军火,弹药 | |
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125 exhausted | |
adj.极其疲惫的,精疲力尽的 | |
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126 contractors | |
n.(建筑、监造中的)承包人( contractor的名词复数 ) | |
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127 feat | |
n.功绩;武艺,技艺;adj.灵巧的,漂亮的,合适的 | |
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128 perversion | |
n.曲解;堕落;反常 | |
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129 chivalry | |
n.骑士气概,侠义;(男人)对女人彬彬有礼,献殷勤 | |
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130 shameful | |
adj.可耻的,不道德的 | |
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131 sect | |
n.派别,宗教,学派,派系 | |
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132 exultation | |
n.狂喜,得意 | |
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133 misery | |
n.痛苦,苦恼,苦难;悲惨的境遇,贫苦 | |
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134 remonstrances | |
n.抱怨,抗议( remonstrance的名词复数 ) | |
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135 procured | |
v.(努力)取得, (设法)获得( procure的过去式和过去分词 );拉皮条 | |
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136 corps | |
n.(通信等兵种的)部队;(同类作的)一组 | |
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137 mischief | |
n.损害,伤害,危害;恶作剧,捣蛋,胡闹 | |
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138 harassed | |
adj. 疲倦的,厌烦的 动词harass的过去式和过去分词 | |
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139 simultaneously | |
adv.同时发生地,同时进行地 | |
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140 imminent | |
adj.即将发生的,临近的,逼近的 | |
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141 insufficient | |
adj.(for,of)不足的,不够的 | |
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142 dykes | |
abbr.diagonal wire cutters 斜线切割机n.堤( dyke的名词复数 );坝;堰;沟 | |
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143 inundated | |
v.淹没( inundate的过去式和过去分词 );(洪水般地)涌来;充满;给予或交予(太多事物)使难以应付 | |
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144 omissions | |
n.省略( omission的名词复数 );删节;遗漏;略去或漏掉的事(或人) | |
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145 picturesque | |
adj.美丽如画的,(语言)生动的,绘声绘色的 | |
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