For only one single day did the incubus1 of Burrard rest upon the British army in Portugal, though that day was one on which he succeeded in changing a decisive victory, which might have laid a whole kingdom at his feet, into an ordinary successful defensive2 action. He had stopped Wellesley’s triumphant3 march at noon on August 21; early on the morning of the twenty-second Sir Hew4 Dalrymple appeared in Maceira Bay, disembarked, and took over the command. He naturally began his tenure7 of control by interviewing his two predecessors8, whose divergent views as to the situation and its requirements were laid before him. He was an old man, and unpractised in the field: he had only seen war in the wretched Flanders campaign of 1793-4. His prejudice was in favour of caution, and he was not slow to let it be seen that he regarded Wellesley’s actions in the past, and still more his plans for the future, as rash and hazardous9. ‘On the first interview that I had with Sir Hew Dalrymple,’ said Wellesley at the Court of Inquiry10 in the following winter, ‘I had reason to believe that I did not possess his confidence: nay11 more, that he was prejudiced against any opinions which I should give him[237].’ The veteran’s ill-concealed hostility12 was, we cannot doubt, mainly due to an unhappy inspiration of Castlereagh, who had sent him a letter bidding him ‘take Sir Arthur Wellesley into his particular confidence, as he had been, for a length of time past, in the closest habits of communication with His Majesty’s ministers with respect to the affairs of Spain.’ He was also directed ‘to make the most prominent use of him which the rules of the service would permit[238].’ Such a letter very naturally caused Dalrymple to look upon the young lieutenant-general as a sort of emissary from the Government, sent to overrule his plans and curb13 his full power of command. He was inclined, consciously or unconsciously, to entertain a strong[p. 264] prejudice against anything that Wellesley might recommend: and we cannot doubt that the latter, always stiff and haughty14, was at this moment in a state of suppressed fury at the foiling of his plans by Burrard on the preceding day. Probably, in his own cold way, he let his indignation appear, and Dalrymple may have been glad of an excuse for repressing him.
The plan which Wellesley had drawn15 up for the conduct of the campaign, and which he now urged upon his chief, is detailed16 in the proceedings17 of the Court of Inquiry. He had hoped to get Sir John Moore’s division, whose arrival was just reported, sent to Santarem, to cut off any attempt of Junot to escape out of the Lisbon peninsula by following the road along the right bank of the Tagus: the Portuguese18 were to be brought up to assist. Meanwhile the army which had fought at Vimiero was to turn the position of Torres Vedras, on which the enemy had retired19, by marching along the sea-coast by the route that leads to Mafra. If Junot let them march past him, he would infallibly lose Lisbon; for they could, by forcing the pace, arrive in the capital as soon as he. If he abandoned Torres Vedras, and fell back on Mafra or Montechique as soon as he saw them moving, he would have to fight a second battle on the twenty-third or twenty-fourth, with an army which had been gravely demoralized by the events of Roli?a and Vimiero, and which could not receive much succour from Lisbon: for the populace of that city, when apprised20 of the defeat of the French, would undoubtedly21 have burst into insurrection, and would have required for its repression22 every man of the 5,000[239] troops who had been left to hold it down. There was a third possibility, that Junot, on hearing that the English were marching past his flank, might have hastened from Torres Vedras to attack their line of march by one of the cross-roads (such as that from Torres Vedras to Puente de Roll), which cut down to the Atlantic coast. But Wellesley had convinced himself that this chance would not occur: he reckoned, very rightly, on the exhaustion23 of the enemy on the day after such a crushing blow as Vimiero. As a matter of fact, on the morning of the twenty-second, at the moment when the head of the British column, if it had marched, would have been outflanking their position, Junot[p. 265] and those of his generals who were not hors de combat were sitting in council of war at Torres Vedras, with despair in their souls, and resolving to ask for terms on which to evacuate24 Portugal. Kellermann was just about to ride in to the English lines to open negotiations25[240]. The idea of an ‘offensive return’ by the French was in the head of the cautious Burrard[241]: but not in that of Wellesley, who had made up his mind ‘that they would act in Portugal as they did in Egypt: they tried their strength once in the field, and having failed they would have continued to retreat till they could have got into safety. I do not believe that any corps27 could have fallen on the flank of our march on the twenty-third.’ The only course open to the French, in his opinion, was to throw over any idea of holding the capital, withdraw its garrison28, and cross the Tagus at Saccavem or Villafranca, or Santarem, by means of the ships which lay in the river, and the large fleet of barges29 which is always to be found in and near Lisbon. Having passed the Tagus they might cut their way through the insurgents30 of the Alemtejo, disperse31 the Spanish levies32 about Elvas and Badajoz, and press north through Estremadura to join Bessières[242]. This very idea did for a moment flash through the brains of some of Junot’s council of war at Torres Vedras: but there lay on their minds, like a nightmare, the remembrance of their awful march through the Estremaduran mountains in the preceding autumn. If, journeying unopposed from Ciudad Rodrigo to Lisbon, they had been nearly starved in that wilderness33, what would be their fate if they had to cut their way through an insurrection, with the English army hanging on their heels? The most hopeful could only say that perhaps half the army might struggle through to Old Castile.
Wellesley’s arguments to Dalrymple had no further effect than to induce that general to make up his mind that the troops should march not on the twenty-second but on the twenty-third, and not on Mafra but on Torres Vedras. Sir John Moore’s division was to be brought down at once to Maceira Bay, to join the main army, and not to be sent (as Wellesley had urged) to Santarem. With[p. 266] the aid of this reinforcement Dalrymple hoped to be strong enough to force back Junot into Lisbon. The resolve meant fatal delay: Moore did not begin to disembark till August 25, and his last men did not get ashore34 till August 30. On that day only could Junot have been attacked seriously, and meanwhile he would have obtained nine days in which to fortify35 his positions and to place Lisbon in a thorough state of defence. The consequences entailed36 would have been a long siege, the probable devastation37 of the Portuguese capital, and the protraction of operations into November and December. Even then there would still have been Elvas and Almeida to be recaptured[243].
But things were not destined38 to take this course. Dalrymple was busy drafting his orders for the movement of the next day on Torres Vedras, when an alarm ran through the camp that the French were at hand, and the whole force flew to arms. This rumour39 was caused by the folly40 of a Portuguese cavalry41 officer, whose vedettes had seen French horsemen in the distance; he imagined an army on the move and reported its approach. What he had really seen was General Kellermann, with two squadrons of dragoons as his escort, bearing the white flag, and about to propose to the British commander-in-chief the evacuation of Portugal by the French army under a convention.
We have already mentioned the fact that on the early morning of the twenty-second, Junot had called together at Torres Vedras a council of war composed of all his surviving generals—Loison, Kellermann, Delaborde (who attended though suffering from two severe wounds), Thiébault, the chief of the staff, Taviel, the commander of the artillery42, Col. Vincent, the chief engineer, and Trousset, the chief commissary at Lisbon. Junot’s spirits were very low: he began by explaining that he had only fought at Vimiero to save the honour of the French arms, not because he hoped for victory—a statement which will not bear investigation43 in the light of his previous dispatches and letters[244]. The British, he said, were expecting huge reinforcements from the sea: Freire was now moving on Obidos, another Portuguese corps on Santarem: the reports of the state of public opinion in Lisbon were most alarming. Under these circumstances, ought the army to try the fortune of battle a second time? And if it must, what plan[p. 267] should be adopted? If it could not, what alternative remained? When such was the spirit of the leader, it was easy to foresee the replies of his subordinates. The army, they soon resolved, had done its best in the most honourable44 fashion, but it was not ready for another fight. Indeed the stragglers had not yet finished pouring into Torres Vedras, and the wearied rearguard which covered them had only reached the defile45 in front of the town two hours after midnight[245]. The army, unmolested as it was, did not get into fighting trim again till two days after Vimiero. On the twenty-second it was still in a state of complete disorganization: if Dalrymple had marched on Mafra he would not have found a man in his path.
Having resolved that the army was not ready for another battle, the council of war had three alternatives before it: to fall back to cover Lisbon on the positions of Mafra and Montechique; to evacuate Lisbon, cross the Tagus, and make for Elvas; or to try to negotiate with the British. The decision was soon made in favour of the third: Lisbon, without regular fortifications, and swarming46 with a discontented populace, would be a mere48 snare49 for the army. The retreat via Elvas on Old Castile would mean the slow but certain destruction of the whole corps[246]. For it was now known that Joseph Bonaparte had evacuated50 Madrid, and that Burgos was probably the nearest point where a French force was to be found. Not one of the officers present had the heart to make a serious proposal for such a retreat. It only remained to try whether Dalrymple was open to receive an offer: if he could be tempted51 by the prospect52 of receiving Lisbon with all its magazines and riches intact, he might allow the French army to return under safe conduct to their own land. Kellermann, who could understand English, more or less, and was considered a skilful53 diplomatist, was charged with the negotiations. He rode out of Torres Vedras between ten and eleven in the morning with his escort, charged with ample powers to treat. As he passed the rearguard in the pass, four miles outside the town, he told the officer in command that he was going to visit the English ‘to see if he could get the army out of the mousetrap[247].’
[p. 268]
By two o’clock Kellermann was conferring with the English commander—he was astonished to find that it was Dalrymple and not Wellesley. The reception that he met was an agreeable surprise to him. Dalrymple showed his pleasure at the broaching54 of the idea of a convention in the most undisguised fashion. The fact was that he was very glad to avoid the possible dangers of an immediate55 advance and a second fight. He called in Burrard and Wellesley to the interview, and from his unguarded ‘asides’ to them, Kellermann soon learnt that Moore had not yet landed, and that till he was ashore Dalrymple did not feel safe. This gave the Frenchman a confidence which he had not at first possessed56, and he at once assumed an air of self-reliance which he had been far from showing when he rode out of Torres Vedras. Instead of merely trying to save the army at all costs, he began to haggle57 about details, and to speak about the possibility of resuming hostilities58—the last thing in the world that he really desired[248].
There was no doubt that a convention by which Portugal and all its fortresses59 could be recovered without the necessity of firing another shot was an eminently61 desirable thing. Wellesley did not hesitate a moment in advising his superiors to take the offer. Burrard had given away the certainty of recapturing Lisbon yesterday: Dalrymple, by delaying his advance, had on this very morning sacrificed the second chance (a much less brilliant one, it must be confessed) of ending the campaign by a single blow. If Junot’s proposals were rejected and hostilities were resumed, there lay before the British army either a siege of Lisbon, which could not fail to ruin the city, or a long stern-chase after the French, if they should resolve to cross the Tagus and march off through the Alemtejo. No doubt it would sound better in the ears of the British public if the surrender or destruction of Junot’s army could be reported. But as a matter of practical expediency62, the recovery of Lisbon and all its wealth unharmed was worth far more than the capture of a French army at the cost of much time, many lives, and the ruin of the Portuguese capital. The loss of 25,000 soldiers would be nothing to Napoleon, who disposed of more than half a million men: the blow to his pride would be almost as great if he lost Portugal by a convention as if he lost it by a capitulation. As a matter of fact he was much incensed63 at Junot, and would have dealt hardly with him if Dupont had not[p. 269] drawn off his wrath64 by failing in an even more disastrous65 fashion[249].
After hearing what Kellermann had to say, the three English generals withdrew into an inner room, and after a very short discussion agreed to treat. They told their visitor that he might have a forty-eight hours’ suspension of hostilities at once, and that they would open negotiations on the general base that Junot and his army should be allowed to evacuate Portugal by sea without any of the forms of capitulation, and be returned to their own country on British ships. The details would take much discussion: meanwhile they invited Kellermann to dine with them and to settle the main lines of the Convention before he returned to his commander. There was a long post-prandial debate, which showed that on two points there was likely to be trouble; one was the way in which Siniavin’s Russian fleet in the Tagus was to be treated: the other was how much the French should be allowed to carry away with them from Portugal. Kellermann said that he asked for no more than their ‘military baggage and equipments,’ but he seemed to have a large idea of what came under these headings[250].
Meanwhile the terms of the suspension of hostilities were successfully drafted; the line of the Zizandre river was to be fixed66 as that of demarcation between the two hosts. Neither of them was to occupy Torres Vedras: Dalrymple undertook to get the armistice67 recognized by Freire and the other Portuguese generals in the field. They were not to advance beyond Leiria and Thomar. The garrisons68 at Elvas, Almeida, Peniche, and elsewhere were to be included in the Convention, unless it should turn out that any of them had surrendered before August 25—which as a matter of fact they had not. The Russian fleet in the Tagus was to be treated as if in a neutral port. This last clause was much objected to by Wellesley, who found also several minor69 points in the agreement of which he could not approve. But by the directions of[p. 270] Dalrymple he signed the suspension of arms after a protest; his superior had told him that it was ‘useless to drive the French to the wall upon points of form[251].’
The subsequent negotiations for a definite convention occupied seven days, from August 23 to 30. On the first-named day Junot evacuated Torres Vedras, according to the stipulations of the agreement made by Kellermann. He retired to the line of hills behind him, establishing Loison’s division at Mafra and Delaborde’s at Montechique. Dalrymple, on the other hand, moved his head quarters forward to Ramalhal, a position just north of Torres Vedras, and only nine miles from Vimiero. In this respect he profited less than the French from the suspension of hostilities: it is true that he got leisure to disembark Moore’s troops, but Junot gained the much more important advantage of a safe retreat to a good position, and of leisure to strengthen himself in it. It must not be supposed, however, that he was in a comfortable situation; Lisbon was seething70 with suppressed rebellion. The news of French victories, which had been published to quiet the people, had soon been discovered to be nothing more than an impudent71 fiction. At any moment an insurrection might have broken out: the garrison and the mob were alike in a state of extreme nervous tension, which took shape on the one side in assassinations72, and on the other in wanton firing at every person who approached a sentinel, or refused to stand when challenged by a patrol.
The negotiations for a definitive73 convention suffered several checks. At one moment it seemed likely that the Portuguese army might give trouble. General Freire arrived at Ramalhal in a state of high wrath, to protest that he ought to have been made a party to the suspension of hostilities. There was, as Napier remarks, more plausibility74 than real foundation in his objection[252], for his motley army had taken no part whatever in the operations that had brought Junot to his knees. But he could make a distinct point when he asked by what authority Dalrymple had given promises as to his neutrality in the agreement with Kellermann, or laid down lines which he was not to pass. Freire was all the bolder because his levies were now being strengthened by the forces from Oporto which the Bishop75 had lately raised, while a small Spanish brigade under the Marquis of Valladares, lent by[p. 271] the Galician Junta76, had come down as far as Guarda. But he contented47 himself with protests, without committing any definite act that might have rendered the Convention impossible.
A more dangerous source of possible rupture77 was the view of the situation taken by Sir Charles Cotton, the admiral in command of the British blockading squadron off the mouth of the Tagus. As Wellesley had foreseen, the naval78 men were determined79 to secure the possession of the Russian ships of Siniavin. Cotton refused to entertain the proposal that such a force should be allowed a free departure from Lisbon, as if from a neutral port, and should be given a long start before being pursued. He had held the Russians under blockade for many a weary month, and was not going to abandon his hold upon them. Why should the French evacuation of Portugal place Siniavin in a better position than he had ever occupied before? The admiral declared that he saw no reason why the Russians should be included in the Convention at all. If there was going to be any agreement made with them, he should conduct it himself, treating directly with Siniavin instead of through a French intermediary.
Sir Hew Dalrymple was forced to report to the French commander these objections of the admiral. It seemed possible for a moment that the difficulty would not be got over, and that war must recommence. Wellesley strongly advised his chief to try the game of bluff80—to announce to Junot that operations would be resumed at the end of the stipulated81 forty-eight hours, as Sir Charles Cotton had objected to the terms of the armistice, but that he was prepared to take into consideration any new proposals which might be made to him before the interval82 of two days expired[253]. Such a firm policy, he thought, would induce the French to yield the point—all the more because Junot and Siniavin were known to be on very bad terms. But Dalrymple would not accept this plan. He merely reported the admiral’s proposals to Junot, without any intimation that the resumption of hostilities must result from their rejection83. This move placed the power of playing the game of brag84 in the Frenchman’s hands. Seeing that Dalrymple did not seem to desire to break off negotiations, he assumed an indignant tone, and began to talk of his determination not to concede an inch, and of the harm that he could do if he were forced to fight. ‘The English might take away the half-drafted convention: he[p. 272] would have none of it. He would defend Lisbon street by street: he would burn as much of it as he could not hold, and it should cost them dear to take from him what remained[254].’ At the same time he made a final proposal to Siniavin, that he should put ashore his 6,000 seamen85 and marines, to take part in the defence of Lisbon on the land side. This was only part of the game of bluff, and intended for the benefit of the English rather than of Siniavin, for Junot knew perfectly86 well, from the latter’s previous conduct, that he was bent87 on playing his own hand, and would not fire a single shot to help the French.
All Junot’s desperate language was, in fact, no more than a device to squeeze better terms out of Dalrymple. The actual point on which the argument grew hot was a mere pretext88, for the Russian admiral utterly89 refused to assist the French, and intimated that he should prefer to conclude a separate convention of his own with Sir Charles Cotton. Clearly it was not worth while for the Duke of Abrantes to risk anything on behalf of such a torpid90 ally.
Accordingly the Convention was reduced to a definitive form between August 27 and 30. Colonel George Murray, the quartermaster-general, acted as the British negotiator, while Kellermann continued to represent Junot. The details were settled in Lisbon, where Murray took up his residence, sending back frequent reports to his superior officer at Ramalhal. Dalrymple and Cotton carried their point in that no allusion91 whatever was made to the Russians in the document. Junot found a salve for his injured pride by remembering that he had slipped a mention of Napoleon as ‘Emperor of the French,’ into the text of the suspension of hostilities[255]: in this he thought that he had won a great success, for the British Government had hitherto refused to recognize any such title, and had constantly irritated its adversaries92 by alluding93 to the master of the Continent as ‘General Bonaparte,’ or the ‘actual head of the French executive.’
The terms of the Convention need close study[256]: it comprised twenty-two articles and three supplementary94 paragraphs of addenda95. The first article provided that the French should surrender Lisbon[p. 273] and the Portuguese fortresses in their existing condition, without harming or dismantling96 them. The second and third granted the army of Junot a safe departure by sea in English vessels97: they were not to be considered prisoners of war, might take their arms and baggage, and were to be landed at any port between Rochefort and L’Orient. The fourth, fifth, and sixth articles attempted to define the property which the French might take away—their horses, their guns of French calibre (but not any that they might have found in the Portuguese arsenals98), with sixty rounds for each piece, their wagons99, their military chest, in short, ‘all their equipment, and all that is comprehended under the name of property of the army.’ It was found, later on, that these paragraphs had been too loosely worded, and gave much endless occasion for disputes. The next six articles settled the manner in which the departing army was to embark5, and the order in which each of the strongholds that it evacuated was to be given up to the British. The thirteenth and fourteenth articles arranged for the appointment of commissaries by each side, to deal with disputed points in the Convention, and added the curious clause that ‘where a doubt arose as to the meaning of any article, it should be explained favourably100 to the French army.’
But the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth articles were the most objectionable part of the Convention. It was true that they secured that no more taxes or contributions were to be raised by Junot, and that undischarged fines which he had laid on the Portuguese should be regarded as cancelled. But they also provided that French civilians101 in Portugal might either depart with the army, or, if they preferred it, might be allowed to remain behind unmolested, and have a year in which to dispose of their property. This might perhaps pass: not so, however, the ensuing clause, which provided that Portuguese subjects should not be rendered accountable for their political conduct during the French occupation: all who had taken service with the usurping103 government were to be placed under the protection of the British, and to suffer no injury in person or property. They were also to be granted liberty to depart with the French army if they chose.
The five remaining articles were unimportant. The eighteenth secured the release of Caraffa and the rest of Junot’s Spanish prisoners, and provided that in return the few French officers of the army of Portugal, whom the Spaniards had captured at Oporto and Elvas, should be liberated104. The twenty-first permitted Junot[p. 274] to send one of his aides-de-camp directly to France to carry the news of the Convention, so that preparations might be made for the reception of the troops[257].
Three unimportant supplementary articles were added below the signatures of Murray and Kellermann: one stipulated that French civilian102 prisoners in the hands of the English and Portuguese should be released, another that Junot’s army should subsist105 on its own magazines till it embarked6, a third that the British should permit the entry of provisions into Lisbon, now that the Convention had been concluded.
Such was the celebrated106 agreement which was destined to gain a most unhappy notoriety in England under the name of the ‘Convention of Cintra,’ a designation which it is hard to understand, for it was first sketched107 at Torres Vedras, and was discussed and ratified108 at Lisbon. The only connexion which it had with Cintra was that Dalrymple’s dispatch to the British Government, enclosing the document in its latest form, was dated from that pleasant spot in the environs of Lisbon. But it would perhaps be pedantic109 to give any other name to such a well-known document, than that under which it has been known for the last ninety-three years.
After a careful investigation of the details of this famous agreement, the conclusion at which the impartial110 student will probably arrive is that while on the military side it was justifiable111, it presented grave political faults. In order to recover Lisbon with its arsenals, its forts and its shipping112, all intact, Dalrymple might without serious blame have granted even more to the French. By the Convention he saved, not only the wealth of the capital, and the lives of the troops who must have fallen in storming it, but, most important of all, time. If he had but known the value of that commodity, he might have been in Madrid at the head of all his British troops by October 1, or even earlier. ‘I do not know what Sir Hew proposes to do,’ wrote Wellesley the morning after the Convention was signed, ‘but if I were in his situation I would have 20,000 men in Madrid in less than a month from this day[258]’ But the importance of time was never realized by the old commander-in-chief: he was superseded113 long before his army had[p. 275] even moved up to the Portuguese frontier. Looking, therefore, at the Convention in the broadest aspect, we hold that its military advantages entirely114 outweighed115 those which might have been secured by a prolongation of hostilities. But this conclusion does not mean that there were not points in the military part of the agreement that might have been modified with advantage.
It is when we turn to the political section of the Convention that we light upon grave faults and mistakes on the part of Dalrymple. The first and foremost was that he signed the document without previously116 submitting certain portions of it to the Portuguese government. In the sixteenth and seventeenth articles the British general took upon himself to grant certain favours both to French civilians resident in Portugal, and to Portuguese subjects who had taken service under Junot, which he had no authority to concede. These were points which concerned not the British army but the Portuguese civil administration, and should not have been decided117 without a consultation118 with our allies, and a permission from them to make terms on their behalf. The sixteenth article allowed Frenchmen resident in Lisbon to remain there for a year after the Convention, if they did not chose to leave the country with Junot and his troops. To permit subjects of the hostile power to remain in Lisbon for so long was, of course, most distasteful to the Portuguese government, which was naturally desirous of expelling at once, according to the ordinary customs of war, a body of persons many of whom had made themselves the partners and instruments of Junot’s peculations, and who for the next twelve months would serve as spies and purveyors of intelligence to the French Emperor. Nothing more than the leave to quit Lisbon in Junot’s wake should have been secured to them, unless the Junta of Regency gave its consent. The seventeenth article is even more objectionable: a considerable portion of the bureaucracy of Portugal had been weak and criminal enough to acquiesce119 in the French usurpation120, and to make themselves the tools of the Duke of Abrantes. It was natural that their countrymen should feel deeply indignant with them; and their lot was likely to be so hard that it was but rational and humane121 to give them leave to quit the kingdom. But considering that they had deserved very ill of the state, it was surely wrong for the British general to promise to take them under his special protection, and to guarantee them against injury to their persons or property. He had no power to grant them an amnesty for their[p. 276] past ill-doing; that could be given only by the Portuguese government. When the latter resumed its ordinary functions at Lisbon, it was absurd that it should be prevented, by the Convention, from taking into consideration the cases of such of these unpatriotic persons as it might wish to deal with. When, therefore, Kellermann broached122 to Dalrymple the sixteenth and seventeenth articles, the latter should have refused to accept them without a reference to the Junta at Oporto. He might have granted both the French and the Portuguese satellites of Junot a free passage out of Portugal, with such of their goods as they could carry, but more than this he could not rationally concede on his own authority.
It was fortunate, therefore, that the practical harm done did not turn out to be very great. Both the aliens and the natives covered by these two clauses were so perfectly aware of their own unpopularity in Lisbon, that they absconded123 almost en masse. The populace of the capital had given them fair warning of what they might expect, for not only were they threatened and insulted in the streets whenever they were out of sight of a French sentry124, but unknown hands posted on the walls lists of houses to be sacked and individuals to be hung as soon as Junot’s army should have sailed. The watchwords, ‘Death to the French’ and ‘Death to the traitors,’ were muttered even under the muzzles125 of the cannon126, which had been trained on all the main streets, to keep down the insurrection for the few days which had to elapse before the embarkation127. The invaders128, therefore, had to take away with them a very large body of civilian dependants129, headed by the Comte de Novion, a French émigré, who, after being hospitably130 entertained in Lisbon for many years, had shown his gratitude131 by accepting the post of head of Junot’s police—a capacity in which he had much odd business to transact132.
But besides Articles XVI and XVII of the Convention there were other clauses to which Dalrymple should not have given his assent133 without consulting the representatives of his allies. Almeida was being blockaded by a mass of Portuguese militia134, and Elvas, a few days after the treaty had been signed, was attacked by a Spanish force sent out from Badajoz by Galluzzo, the Captain-General of Estremadura. No British soldier had yet been seen within a hundred miles of either fortress60. What was to be done if the generals of the besieging135 troops refused to abide136 by an agreement which they had not been asked to sign, and which had[p. 277] not even been laid before their respective governments ere it was definitively137 ratified? A grave crisis, as we shall find, was created by Dalrymple’s neglect to foresee this difficulty. His conduct all through the days of negotiation26 was very strange; not only did he make no proper attempt to communicate with the Portuguese authorities, but he actually left his own government uninformed of his proceedings for a fortnight. He failed to send them any dispatch to announce the armistice of August 22, and only forwarded that detailing the Convention of August 30 on the fourth day of the succeeding month.
Dalrymple’s main reason for leaving the Portuguese out of the negotiations was that the Junta at Oporto had not yet been formally recognized as the legitimate138 government of Portugal[259]. Wellesley, no doubt, had conferred with the Bishop, given him arms and munitions139, procured140 from him food and draught141 animals, and asked his advice, but the British ministry142 had not yet acknowledged the existence of any regular executive in Portugal. This being so, Dalrymple thought himself justified143 in acting144 as if there were none in being; and it cannot be denied that thereby145 he saved himself much present trouble, at the cost of future friction146. All, therefore, that he did was to inform the Junta’s agent at the British head quarters, one Pinto da Souza, that he was negotiating with Junot for the evacuation of Lisbon, and that he was open to receive any observations which the Junta might make. The same announcement was made to Bernardino Freire, who had ridden over to Ramalhal[260] to complain that he and his army were not mentioned in the armistice of August 22. Both Freire and the Junta were treated as persons whose opinions it was useful to obtain, not as constituted authorities whose consent to the definitive convention was necessary in order to make it binding147. Dalrymple tried to cover himself during the subsequent inquiry by maintaining that the Convention was purely148 military, and concerned the French and English armies alone: but this plea cannot seriously be put forward in face of Articles XV, XVI, and XVII, all of which are concerned with problems of civil government, which would arise after the French army should have embarked. Each[p. 278] of these articles clearly required the ratification149 of some proper Portuguese authority to make it valid150.
Both the Bishop of Oporto and General Freire were deeply wounded by the way in which Dalrymple ignored their status—the prelate more justly than the soldier, for he had done his best to assist the British army, while Freire by his captious151 and impracticable behaviour had been more of a hindrance152 than a help. The Bishop charged the representative of the Supreme153 Junta in London to complain to the British Government as to the behaviour of their generals, denouncing not only their neglect to make the Junta a party to the Convention, but also the terms of that document, which were stated to be far too favourable154 to Junot. Owing to Dalrymple’s extraordinary delay in apprising155 the ministry of the details of the treaty, the Bishop’s excited denunciations of the agreement had currency for nearly a fortnight, before any one in England knew what exactly had been granted to Junot, or how far the Junta was justified in its wrath.
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triumphant
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| adj.胜利的，成功的；狂欢的，喜悦的 | |
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4
hew
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| v.砍；伐；削 | |
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5
embark
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| vi.乘船，着手，从事，上飞机 | |
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6
embarked
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| 乘船( embark的过去式和过去分词 )； 装载； 从事 | |
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tenure
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| n.终身职位；任期；(土地)保有权，保有期 | |
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predecessors
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| n.前任( predecessor的名词复数 )；前辈；（被取代的）原有事物；前身 | |
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hazardous
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| adj.(有)危险的，冒险的；碰运气的 | |
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inquiry
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| n.打听，询问，调查，查问 | |
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11
nay
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| adv.不；n.反对票，投反对票者 | |
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hostility
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| n.敌对，敌意；抵制［pl.］交战，战争 | |
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13
curb
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| n.场外证券市场，场外交易；vt.制止，抑制 | |
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14
haughty
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| adj.傲慢的，高傲的 | |
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15
drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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detailed
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| adj.详细的，详尽的，极注意细节的，完全的 | |
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17
proceedings
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| n.进程，过程，议程；诉讼(程序)；公报 | |
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18
Portuguese
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| n.葡萄牙人；葡萄牙语 | |
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19
retired
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| adj.隐退的，退休的，退役的 | |
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20
apprised
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| v.告知，通知( apprise的过去式和过去分词 )；评价 | |
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21
undoubtedly
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| adv.确实地，无疑地 | |
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22
repression
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| n.镇压，抑制，抑压 | |
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23
exhaustion
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| n.耗尽枯竭，疲惫，筋疲力尽，竭尽，详尽无遗的论述 | |
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24
evacuate
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| v.遣送；搬空；抽出；排泄；大(小)便 | |
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25
negotiations
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| 协商( negotiation的名词复数 )； 谈判； 完成（难事）； 通过 | |
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26
negotiation
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| n.谈判，协商 | |
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27
corps
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| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
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28
garrison
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| n.卫戍部队；驻地，卫戍区；vt.派(兵)驻防 | |
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29
barges
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| 驳船( barge的名词复数 ) | |
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30
insurgents
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| n.起义，暴动，造反( insurgent的名词复数 ) | |
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31
disperse
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| vi.使分散；使消失；vt.分散；驱散 | |
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32
levies
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| （部队）征兵( levy的名词复数 )； 募捐； 被征募的军队 | |
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33
wilderness
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| n.杳无人烟的一片陆地、水等，荒漠 | |
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34
ashore
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| adv.在(向)岸上，上岸 | |
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35
fortify
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| v.强化防御，为…设防；加强，强化 | |
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36
entailed
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| 使…成为必要( entail的过去式和过去分词 )； 需要； 限定继承； 使必需 | |
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37
devastation
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| n.毁坏；荒废；极度震惊或悲伤 | |
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38
destined
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| adj.命中注定的；(for)以…为目的地的 | |
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39
rumour
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| n.谣言，谣传，传闻 | |
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40
folly
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| n.愚笨，愚蠢，蠢事，蠢行，傻话 | |
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41
cavalry
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| n.骑兵；轻装甲部队 | |
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42
artillery
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| n.(军)火炮，大炮；炮兵(部队) | |
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43
investigation
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| n.调查，调查研究 | |
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44
honourable
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| adj.可敬的；荣誉的，光荣的 | |
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45
defile
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| v.弄污，弄脏；n.(山间)小道 | |
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46
swarming
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| 密集( swarm的现在分词 )； 云集； 成群地移动； 蜜蜂或其他飞行昆虫成群地飞来飞去 | |
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47
contented
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| adj.满意的，安心的，知足的 | |
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48
mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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49
snare
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| n.陷阱，诱惑，圈套；（去除息肉或者肿瘤的）勒除器；响弦，小军鼓；vt.以陷阱捕获，诱惑 | |
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50
evacuated
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| 撤退者的 | |
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51
tempted
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| v.怂恿（某人）干不正当的事；冒…的险（tempt的过去分词） | |
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52
prospect
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| n.前景，前途；景色，视野 | |
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53
skilful
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| (=skillful)adj.灵巧的，熟练的 | |
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54
broaching
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| n.拉削；推削；铰孔；扩孔v.谈起( broach的现在分词 )；打开并开始用；用凿子扩大（或修光）；（在桶上）钻孔取液体 | |
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55
immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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56
possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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57
haggle
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| vi.讨价还价，争论不休 | |
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58
hostilities
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| n.战争；敌意(hostility的复数)；敌对状态；战事 | |
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59
fortresses
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| 堡垒，要塞( fortress的名词复数 ) | |
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60
fortress
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| n.堡垒，防御工事 | |
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61
eminently
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| adv.突出地；显著地；不寻常地 | |
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62
expediency
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| n.适宜；方便；合算；利己 | |
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63
incensed
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| 盛怒的 | |
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64
wrath
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| n.愤怒，愤慨，暴怒 | |
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65
disastrous
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| adj.灾难性的，造成灾害的；极坏的，很糟的 | |
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66
fixed
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| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
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67
armistice
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| n.休战，停战协定 | |
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68
garrisons
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| 守备部队，卫戍部队( garrison的名词复数 ) | |
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69
minor
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| adj.较小(少)的，较次要的；n.辅修学科；vi.辅修 | |
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70
seething
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| 沸腾的，火热的 | |
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71
impudent
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| adj.鲁莽的，卑鄙的，厚颜无耻的 | |
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72
assassinations
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| n.暗杀( assassination的名词复数 ) | |
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73
definitive
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| adj.确切的，权威性的；最后的，决定性的 | |
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74
plausibility
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| n. 似有道理, 能言善辩 | |
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75
bishop
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| n.主教，（国际象棋）象 | |
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76
junta
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| n.团体；政务审议会 | |
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77
rupture
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| n.破裂；(关系的)决裂；v.(使)破裂 | |
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78
naval
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| adj.海军的，军舰的，船的 | |
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79
determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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80
bluff
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| v.虚张声势，用假象骗人；n.虚张声势，欺骗 | |
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81
stipulated
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| vt.& vi.规定；约定adj.[法]合同规定的 | |
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82
interval
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| n.间隔，间距；幕间休息，中场休息 | |
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83
rejection
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| n.拒绝，被拒，抛弃，被弃 | |
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84
brag
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| v./n.吹牛，自夸；adj.第一流的 | |
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85
seamen
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| n.海员 | |
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86
perfectly
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| adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地 | |
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87
bent
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| n.爱好，癖好；adj.弯的；决心的，一心的 | |
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88
pretext
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| n.借口，托词 | |
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89
utterly
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| adv.完全地，绝对地 | |
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90
torpid
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| adj.麻痹的，麻木的，迟钝的 | |
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91
allusion
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| n.暗示，间接提示 | |
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92
adversaries
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| n.对手，敌手( adversary的名词复数 ) | |
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93
alluding
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| 提及，暗指( allude的现在分词 ) | |
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94
supplementary
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| adj.补充的，附加的 | |
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95
addenda
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| n.附录，附加物；附加物( addendum的名词复数 )；补遗；附录；（齿轮的）齿顶（高） | |
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96
dismantling
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| （枪支）分解 | |
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97
vessels
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| n.血管( vessel的名词复数 )；船；容器；（具有特殊品质或接受特殊品质的）人 | |
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98
arsenals
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| n.兵工厂，军火库( arsenal的名词复数 )；任何事物的集成 | |
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99
wagons
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| n.四轮的运货马车( wagon的名词复数 )；铁路货车；小手推车 | |
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100
favourably
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| adv. 善意地，赞成地 =favorably | |
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101
civilians
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| 平民，百姓( civilian的名词复数 )； 老百姓 | |
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102
civilian
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| adj.平民的，民用的，民众的 | |
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103
usurping
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| 篡夺，霸占( usurp的现在分词 )； 盗用； 篡夺，篡权 | |
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104
liberated
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| a.无拘束的，放纵的 | |
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105
subsist
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| vi.生存，存在，供养 | |
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106
celebrated
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| adj.有名的，声誉卓著的 | |
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107
sketched
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| v.草拟（sketch的过去式与过去分词形式） | |
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108
ratified
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| v.批准，签认（合约等）( ratify的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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109
pedantic
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| adj.卖弄学问的；迂腐的 | |
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110
impartial
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| adj.(in,to)公正的，无偏见的 | |
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111
justifiable
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| adj.有理由的，无可非议的 | |
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112
shipping
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| n.船运（发货，运输，乘船） | |
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113
superseded
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| [医]被代替的，废弃的 | |
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114
entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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115
outweighed
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| v.在重量上超过( outweigh的过去式和过去分词 )；在重要性或价值方面超过 | |
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116
previously
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| adv.以前，先前（地） | |
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117
decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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118
consultation
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| n.咨询；商量；商议；会议 | |
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119
acquiesce
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| vi.默许，顺从，同意 | |
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120
usurpation
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| n.篡位；霸占 | |
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121
humane
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| adj.人道的，富有同情心的 | |
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122
broached
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| v.谈起( broach的过去式和过去分词 )；打开并开始用；用凿子扩大（或修光）；（在桶上）钻孔取液体 | |
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123
absconded
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| v.（尤指逃避逮捕）潜逃，逃跑( abscond的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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124
sentry
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| n.哨兵，警卫 | |
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125
muzzles
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| 枪口( muzzle的名词复数 )； （防止动物咬人的）口套； （四足动物的）鼻口部； （狗）等凸出的鼻子和口 | |
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126
cannon
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| n.大炮，火炮；飞机上的机关炮 | |
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127
embarkation
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| n. 乘船, 搭机, 开船 | |
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128
invaders
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| 入侵者，侵略者，侵入物( invader的名词复数 ) | |
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129
dependants
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| 受赡养者，受扶养的家属( dependant的名词复数 ) | |
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130
hospitably
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| 亲切地，招待周到地，善于款待地 | |
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131
gratitude
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| adj.感激，感谢 | |
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132
transact
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| v.处理；做交易；谈判 | |
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assent
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| v.批准，认可；n.批准，认可 | |
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militia
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| n.民兵，民兵组织 | |
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135
besieging
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| 包围，围困，围攻( besiege的现在分词 ) | |
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136
abide
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| vi.遵守；坚持；vt.忍受 | |
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definitively
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| adv.决定性地，最后地 | |
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legitimate
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| adj.合法的，合理的，合乎逻辑的；v.使合法 | |
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munitions
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| n.军火，弹药；v.供应…军需品 | |
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procured
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| v.（努力）取得， （设法）获得( procure的过去式和过去分词 )；拉皮条 | |
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141
draught
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| n.拉，牵引，拖；一网（饮，吸，阵)；顿服药量，通风；v.起草，设计 | |
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142
ministry
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| n.(政府的)部；牧师 | |
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143
justified
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| a.正当的，有理的 | |
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144
acting
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| n.演戏，行为，假装；adj.代理的，临时的，演出用的 | |
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thereby
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| adv.因此，从而 | |
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friction
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| n.摩擦，摩擦力 | |
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binding
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| 有约束力的，有效的，应遵守的 | |
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purely
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| adv.纯粹地，完全地 | |
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ratification
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| n.批准，认可 | |
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valid
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| adj.有确实根据的；有效的；正当的，合法的 | |
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151
captious
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| adj.难讨好的，吹毛求疵的 | |
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152
hindrance
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| n.妨碍，障碍 | |
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153
supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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favourable
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| adj.赞成的，称赞的，有利的，良好的，顺利的 | |
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apprising
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| v.告知，通知( apprise的现在分词 )；评价 | |
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