There was another and a less pleasant surprise in store for Wellesley when he landed at Plymouth. He learnt that if he himself disliked the armistice2 of August 22, and the Convention of Cintra, the British public had gone far beyond him, and was in a state of frantic3 rage concerning them. To his anger and amazement4 he also learnt that he himself was considered no less responsible for the two agreements than were Dalrymple and Burrard. The fact that the former had told him to set his signature opposite to that of Kellermann on the document signed at Vimiero, had misled the world into regarding him as the negotiator and framer of the armistice. ‘Every whisperer who disliked the name of Wellesley[280]’—and Sir Arthur’s brother, the Governor-General, had made it very unpopular in certain quarters—was busy propagating the story that of the three generals who had lately commanded in Portugal, each one was as slack and supine as the others.
The wave of indignation which swept across England on the receipt of the news of the Convention of Cintra is, at this distance of time, a little hard to understand. Successes had not been so plentiful6 on the Continent during the last fifteen years, that an agreement which gave back its liberty to a whole kingdom need have been criticized with vindictive7 minuteness. But the news of Baylen had set the public mind on the look-out for further triumphs, and when the dispatches which gave an account of Roli?a and of Vimiero had come to hand, there had been a confident expectation that the next news received would be that Junot’s army had been scattered8 or captured, and that Lisbon had been set free. Then came a gap of thirteen days, caused by Dalrymple’s strange fit of silence. The only intelligence that reached London in this interval9 was the Bishop10 of Oporto’s letter of protest against the armistice, in which, without giving any definite details about that agreement,[p. 292] he denounced it as insulting to Portugal and unworthy of England. The public was prepared, therefore, to hear that something timid and base had been done, when Dalrymple’s dispatch of September 3, enclosing the Convention of Cintra, came to hand. It was easy to set forth11 the terms of that treaty in an odious12 light. Junot, it was said, had been beaten in the field, he was completely isolated13 from all the other French armies, and his surrender must have followed in a few days, if the British generals had only chosen to press their advantage. Instead of this, they preferred to let him return to France with the whole of his troops, and with most of his plunder15. He was not even compelled to release a corresponding number of British prisoners in return for the freedom secured to his army. In fact, his position was much better after than before his defeat at Vimiero, for the Convention granted him a quiet and safe return home with his force intact, while, even if he had won some success in battle, the best that he would have been able to secure himself would have been a retreat on Northern Spain, through the midst of great dangers. Excitable politicians and journalists used the most exaggerated language, and compared the Convention with that of Kloster Seven, and the conduct of the generals who had not pressed the campaign to its logical end with Admiral Byng’s shirking before Minorca. Caricatures were issued showing Dalrymple, Burrard, and Wellesley sporting the white feather, or hanging from three gibbets as traitors[281]. Nor was Admiral Cotton spared: he was denounced in bitter terms for taking the Russian ships as ‘deposits,’ when he should have towed them into Spithead as prizes: moreover the repatriation17 of the Russian crews was asserted to be a deadly blow at our unfortunate ally the King of Sweden.
The rage against the Convention was not confined to any one class or faction18 in the state. If some Whigs tried to turn it into the shape of an attack on the government, there were plenty of Tories who joined in the cry, begging their leaders in the ministry19 to dismiss and punish the three unpopular generals. A number of public meetings were held with the object of forcing the hands of the Duke of Portland and his colleagues, but the most prominent part in the agitation20 was taken by the Corporation of London.[p. 293] Recalling the old days of Wilkes and Beckford, they resolved that the Lord Mayor, with a deputation of Sheriffs, Aldermen, and Common-Councillors, should present a petition to the King begging him to order ‘an inquiry into this dishonourable and unprecedented22 transaction, for the discovery and punishment of those by whose misconduct and incapacity the cause of the kingdom and its allies has been so shamelessly sacrificed.’
Accordingly such a petition was laid before the King on October 12. Its terms are worth a moment’s attention, as they show very clearly the points on which popular indignation had been concentrated. ‘The treaty,’ it states, ‘is humiliating and degrading, because after a signal victory, by which the enemy appears to have been cut off from all means of succour or escape, we had the sad mortification23 of seeing the laurels24 so nobly acquired torn from the brows of our brave soldiers, and terms granted to the enemy disgraceful to the British name.... By this ignominious25 Convention British ships are to convey to France the French army and its plunder, where they will be at liberty immediately to recommence their active operations against us and our allies. And the full recognition of the title and dignity of Emperor of France[282], while all mention of the Government of Portugal is omitted, must be considered as highly disrespectful to the authorities of that country.’ There was another clause denouncing the sending back of the Russian sailors, but not so much stress was laid on this point. Finally the King is asked ‘in justice to the outraged26 feelings of a brave, injured, and indignant people, whose blood and treasure have been thus expended,’ to cause the guilty persons to be punished.
King George III replied to these flowers of oratory27 by a short speech which displays admirably that power of getting an occasional lucid28 glimpse of the obvious in which he was by no means deficient29. He was fully30 sensible, he said, of the loyalty31 and good intentions of the City of London, but he wished the deputation to remember that to pronounce judgement without previous trial and investigation32 was hardly consonant33 with the principles of British justice. He was always ready to institute an inquiry when the honour of the British arms was in question: and the interposition of the[p. 294] City of London was not necessary to induce him to set one on foot in this case, when the hopes and expectations of the nation had been so much disappointed.
It was not, however, till seventeen days later that his majesty’s formal orders for the summoning of a Court of Inquiry ‘to investigate into the late Armistice and Convention concluded in Portugal, and all the circumstances connected therewith,’ were communicated to the Commander-in-Chief. Dalrymple and Burrard, both of whom had now returned to England, were directed to hold themselves in readiness to present themselves before the court, and Wellesley, for the same reason, was directed to abandon his project of going back to the Peninsula in order to serve under Sir John Moore.
The members of the celebrated35 Court of Inquiry, which commenced its sittings on November 14, 1808, were seven in number, all general officers of great respectability and advanced years, men more likely, for the most part, to sympathize with caution than with daring. The president was Sir David Dundas, the author of a celebrated drill-book which had long been the terror of young officers: the other members were Lord Moira, Lord Heathfield[283], the Earl of Pembroke, and Generals Craig, Sir G. Nugent, and Nicholls. Not one of them has left behind a name to be remembered, save indeed Lord Moira, who, as Lord Rawdon in the old American War, had won the victory of Hobkirk’s Hill, and who was destined36 to be the next Viceroy of India and to make the name of Hastings famous for a second time in the East.
The court began its sittings on November 14, and did not terminate them till December 22. In the great hall of Chelsea Hospital, where its proceedings37 were held, there was much warm debate. As the details of the Campaign of Portugal were gradually worked out, not only by the cross-examination of Dalrymple, Burrard, and Wellesley, but by that of many of the other officers of rank who had been in Portugal—Spencer, Acland, Ferguson, Lord Burghersh, and others—the points on which the verdict of the court must turn gradually became clear. They were six in number:—Had Burrard been justified39 in preventing Wellesley from pursuing the French at the end of the battle of Vimiero? Had Dalrymple erred14 in refusing to take Wellesley’s advice to march[p. 295] on Mafra the next morning? Should Kellermann’s offer of an armistice have been accepted on the twenty-second, and, if so, were the terms granted him too favourable40? Lastly, was the Convention of Cintra itself justifiable41 under the existing circumstances, and were all its articles reasonable and proper? Much evidence was produced for and against each view on every one of these topics. On the first two Wellesley practically impeached42 Burrard and Dalrymple for unwarrantable slackness and timidity. He was so much in love with his own bold plans that his superior’s caution appeared to him contemptible43. He stood up to them and cross-questioned them with an acidity44 and a complete want of deference45 that seemed very reprehensible46 to military men steeped in the old traditions of unquestioning deference to one’s senior officers. Sir Walter Scott, who followed the inquiry with great interest, called him ‘a haughty47 devil,’ but expressed his admiration48 for him at the same moment[284]. It is curious to find that Wellesley showed less anger with Burrard, whose caution on the afternoon of the twenty-first really wrecked49 his plan of campaign, than with Dalrymple. The latter had snubbed him on his first arrival, had persistently50 refused him his confidence, and would not state clearly to the court that the armistice, though it bore Wellesley’s name, had not been drawn51 up or approved in detail by him. Of the numerous minor16 witnesses who were examined, all who had served at Roli?a and Vimiero spoke52 on Wellesley’s side: Spencer and Ferguson were especially strong in their statements. The fact was that they were intensely proud of their two fights, and looked upon Burrard as the man who had prevented them from entering Lisbon in triumph after capturing Junot and his whole host. So strong was this feeling that the brigadiers and field-officers of the eight brigades that fought at Vimiero had presented Wellesley with a handsome testimonial—a service of plate worth ￡1,000—as a sort of mark of confidence in him, and of protest against those who had stayed his hand.
On the other hand, Burrard and Dalrymple urged all the justifications53 of caution. Each had arrived at a crisis, the details of which could not be properly known to him from sheer want of time to master them. Each acknowledged that Wellesley had vehemently54 pressed him to strike boldly and promptly55, but thought that he had not been justified in doing so till he had made out for[p. 296] himself the exact situation of affairs. Burrard pleaded that Junot might have possessed56 reserves unknown to him, which might have changed the fortune of the fight if a headlong pursuit had been ordered. Wellesley had told him that none such existed (and this turned out to have been the fact), but he himself had not seen any clear proof of it at the time[285]. Dalrymple went even further, and stated that he had considered the whole conduct of the campaign, from the landing in Mondego Bay till the battle of Vimiero, terribly rash[286]. If he had permitted the army to march on Mafra on the twenty-second, the French from Torres Vedras might have taken him in the flank as he passed through a very difficult country, and the most disastrous57 results might have ensued. He was positive that nothing hazardous58 ought to have been attempted, and that it was necessary to wait for Sir John Moore’s division before pressing the French to extremity59.
With regard to the armistice and the Convention, all the three generals, when defending themselves, agreed that they were wise and justifiable. To clear the French out of Portugal without further fighting, and to recover Lisbon and all its resources intact, were ends so important that it was well worth while to sacrifice even the practical certainty of capturing all Junot’s army, after a resistance that might have been long and desperate. But as to the wisdom of certain clauses and articles, both in the document of August 22 and that of August 30, there was considerable difference of opinion. Wellesley proved that he had opposed many details of each agreement, and that he was in no way responsible for the final shape taken by them. He only assented60 to the general proposition that it was right to let the French army depart under a convention, rather than to force it to a capitulation. He considered that Dalrymple had yielded far too much, from his unwillingness61 to ‘drive Junot into a corner.’
On December 22 the Court of Inquiry issued its report. It was a very cautious and a rather inconclusive document. But its main point was that nothing had been done in Portugal which called for the punishment of any of the parties concerned: ‘On a consideration of all the circumstances, we most humbly62 submit our opinion that no further military proceeding38 is necessary,’ i.e. there was no ground for a court-martial on any one of the three British generals. As to[p. 297] Burrard’s refusal to pursue the French on the afternoon of Vimiero, there were ‘fair military grounds’ for his decision: the court omitted to say whether the decision itself was right or wrong. ‘It could not pronounce with confidence whether or not a pursuit could have been efficacious.’ As to the halt on the following day, for which Dalrymple no less than Burrard was responsible, ‘under the extraordinary circumstances that two new commanding generals arrived from the ocean and joined the army within the space of twenty-four hours, it is not surprising that the army was not carried forward until the second day after the action, from the necessity of the generals becoming acquainted with the actual state of things, and of their army, and proceeding accordingly.’ Finally, as to the Convention, ‘howsoever some of us may differ in our sentiments respecting its fitness in the relative situation of the two armies, it is our unanimous declaration that unquestionable zeal63 and firmness appear to have been exhibited throughout both by Sir Hew64 Dalrymple, Sir Harry65 Burrard, and Sir Arthur Wellesley.’ There was a special compliment inserted for Wellesley’s benefit, to the effect that his whole action, from the landing in Mondego Bay down to the battle of Vimiero, was ‘highly honourable21 and successful, and such as might have been expected from a distinguished66 officer.’
Such a report amounted to a plain acquittal of all the three generals, but it left so much unsaid that the Government directed the Commander-in-Chief to require from the members of the court their decision as to whether the armistice of the twenty-second and the Convention of the thirtieth were advisable, and, if they were advisable, whether their terms were proper, and honourable. On the twenty-seventh the court returned its answer: there was, this time, no unanimous report, but a series of written opinions, for the members of the body differed from each other on many points. As to the armistice, six members replied that they approved of it, one, but he the most distinguished of the seven—Lord Moira—said that he did not. On the question as to the definitive67 Convention there was more difference of opinion: Dundas, Lord Heathfield, Craig, and Nugent thought it fair and reasonable; Lord Moira, the Earl of Pembroke, and Nicholls considered it as unjustifiable, considering the relative situations of the two armies. The two last-named officers added short explanatory notes to their opinions, while Lord Moira subjoined to his a long and elaborate argument,[p. 298] a document which does not seem in the least to deserve the slighting reference made to it by Napier[287]. It is very sensible in its general drift. Lord Moira contended that while on August 22 there was no reason why an armistice should not have been concluded, yet the paper drawn up by Kellermann contained clauses that limited unduly68 the demands which the British commander might make in the subsequent Convention. Dalrymple ought, before conceding them, to have reflected that Junot’s anxious and hurried offer of terms betokened69 demoralization. If the French had been pressed, and a confident and haughty answer returned to their envoy70, Junot would have accepted any conditions that might be imposed upon him. His army was in such a state of disorder71 and dismay that it was most unlikely that he would have tried either to burn Lisbon or to retreat across the Alemtejo. Moreover, the contention72 that the deliverance of Portugal was the one object of the expedition, and that it was duly secured by the Convention, was a mistake. Lord Moira wished to point out that our armies were sent forth, not only to emancipate73 Portugal, but also to destroy the forces and lower the prestige of France by every means in their power. By forcing Junot to a capitulation, or by making the terms of the Convention more stringent74, a much greater blow might have been dealt to Bonaparte’s reputation. As an instance of what might have been done, he suggested that some remote and inconvenient75 landing-place—Belle Isle5 for example—might have been imposed upon the French troops, or they might have been compelled to engage not to serve for some specified76 time against England and her allies.
The Court of Inquiry had thus delivered its last opinion. But the matter of the Convention was not even yet at an end. The ministry resolved to inflict77 a rebuke78 on Dalrymple, not for his military action, on which they completely accepted the verdict of the seven generals, but for his political action in allowing the Articles XV, XVI, and XVII to be inserted in the Convention. These, it will be remembered, were the clauses which conceded certain privileges to the French inhabitants of Lisbon, and to the Portuguese79 who had compromised themselves by taking service under Junot. The Duke of York, as commander-in-chief, was[p. 299] ordered to convey to Dalrymple ‘His Majesty’s disapprobation of those articles in the Convention in which stipulations were made affecting the interests and feelings of the Spanish and Portuguese nations[288].’ It was to be impressed upon Sir Hew that it was most improper80 and dangerous to admit into a military convention articles of such a description, which (especially when carelessly and incautiously framed) might lead to the most injurious consequences. Furthermore, Dalrymple was to be gravely censured81 for his extraordinary delay in not sending the news of the armistice of the twenty-second till September 3, whereby ‘great public inconvenience’ had been caused.
It cannot be denied that these rebukes82 were well deserved: we have already pointed34 out that the three articles to which allusion83 is made were the only part of the Convention for which no defence is possible. It is equally clear that it was the thirteen days’ gap in the information sent home which gave time for the rise and development of the unreasoning popular agitation against the whole agreement made with Junot.
As to the verdict of the court, it does substantial justice to the case. There existed ‘fair military reasons’ for all that Burrard and Dalrymple had done, or left undone84. In a similar way ‘fair military reasons’ can be alleged85 for most of the main slips and errors committed during any campaign in the Napoleonic War—for Dupont’s stay at Andujar, or for Murray’s retreat from Tarragona, or for Grouchy’s operations on June 17 and 18, 1815. It would be unjust to punish old and respectable generals for mere86 errors of judgement, and inability to rise to the height of the situation. Burrard and Dalrymple had sacrificed the most brilliant possibilities by their torpid87 caution, after refusing to listen to Wellesley’s cogent88 arguments for bold action. But their conduct had resulted neither from cowardice89 nor from deliberate perversity90. The blame must rest quite as much on the government, which had entrusted91 the expedition to elderly men unaccustomed to command in the field, as on those men themselves. And as to the details of the armistice and Convention, we may well accept Wellesley’s verdict, that the gain secured by the rescue of Lisbon with all its wealth intact, and by the prompt termination of the campaign, fully justified the resolve not to drive Junot to extremity.
But there was an unexpressed corollary to the verdict of the[p. 300] court which the ministry fully realized, and upon which they acted. Burrard and Dalrymple, with their ‘fair military reasons,’ must never again appear in the field. It was not by such men that Bonaparte would be foiled and Spain emancipated92, and so they were relegated93 to home service and quiet retirement94 for the rest of their lives. Wellesley, on the other hand, was marked out as a man of energy, resource, and determination, eminently95 fit to be employed again. Within four months of the termination of the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry he was once more in command of the British army in the Peninsula.
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inquiry
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| n.打听，询问，调查，查问 | |
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armistice
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| n.休战，停战协定 | |
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frantic
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| adj.狂乱的，错乱的，激昂的 | |
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amazement
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| n.惊奇，惊讶 | |
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isle
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| n.小岛，岛 | |
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plentiful
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| adj.富裕的，丰富的 | |
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vindictive
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| adj.有报仇心的，怀恨的，惩罚的 | |
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scattered
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| adj.分散的，稀疏的；散步的；疏疏落落的 | |
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interval
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| n.间隔，间距；幕间休息，中场休息 | |
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bishop
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| n.主教，（国际象棋）象 | |
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forth
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| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
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odious
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| adj.可憎的，讨厌的 | |
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isolated
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| adj.与世隔绝的 | |
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erred
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| 犯错误，做错事( err的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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plunder
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| vt.劫掠财物，掠夺；n.劫掠物，赃物；劫掠 | |
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minor
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| adj.较小(少)的，较次要的；n.辅修学科；vi.辅修 | |
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repatriation
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faction
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ministry
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agitation
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| n.搅动；搅拌；鼓动，煽动 | |
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honourable
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| adj.可敬的；荣誉的，光荣的 | |
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unprecedented
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mortification
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laurels
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| n.桂冠，荣誉 | |
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ignominious
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| adj.可鄙的，不光彩的，耻辱的 | |
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outraged
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| a.震惊的，义愤填膺的 | |
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oratory
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lucid
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deficient
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| adj.不足的，不充份的，有缺陷的 | |
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fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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loyalty
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| n.忠诚，忠心 | |
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investigation
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| n.调查，调查研究 | |
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consonant
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pointed
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celebrated
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destined
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proceedings
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proceeding
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| n.行动，进行，(pl.)会议录，学报 | |
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justified
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favourable
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| adj.赞成的，称赞的，有利的，良好的，顺利的 | |
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justifiable
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| adj.有理由的，无可非议的 | |
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impeached
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| v.控告（某人）犯罪( impeach的过去式和过去分词 )；弹劾；对（某事物）怀疑；提出异议 | |
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contemptible
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| adj.可鄙的，可轻视的，卑劣的 | |
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acidity
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| n.酸度，酸性 | |
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deference
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| n.尊重，顺从；敬意 | |
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reprehensible
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| adj.该受责备的 | |
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haughty
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| adj.傲慢的，高傲的 | |
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admiration
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| n.钦佩，赞美，羡慕 | |
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wrecked
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| adj.失事的，遇难的 | |
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persistently
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| ad.坚持地；固执地 | |
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drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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spoke
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| n.（车轮的）辐条；轮辐；破坏某人的计划；阻挠某人的行动 v.讲，谈（speak的过去式）；说；演说；从某种观点来说 | |
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justifications
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| 正当的理由，辩解的理由( justification的名词复数 ) | |
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vehemently
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| adv. 热烈地 | |
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promptly
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| adv.及时地，敏捷地 | |
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possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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disastrous
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| adj.灾难性的，造成灾害的；极坏的，很糟的 | |
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hazardous
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| adj.(有)危险的，冒险的；碰运气的 | |
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extremity
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| n.末端，尽头；尽力；终极；极度 | |
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assented
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| 同意，赞成( assent的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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unwillingness
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| n. 不愿意，不情愿 | |
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humbly
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| adv. 恭顺地，谦卑地 | |
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zeal
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| n.热心，热情，热忱 | |
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hew
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| v.砍；伐；削 | |
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harry
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| vt.掠夺，蹂躏，使苦恼 | |
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distinguished
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| adj.卓越的，杰出的，著名的 | |
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definitive
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| adj.确切的，权威性的；最后的，决定性的 | |
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unduly
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| adv.过度地，不适当地 | |
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betokened
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| v.预示，表示( betoken的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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envoy
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| n.使节，使者，代表，公使 | |
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disorder
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| n.紊乱，混乱；骚动，骚乱；疾病，失调 | |
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contention
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| n.争论，争辩，论战；论点，主张 | |
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emancipate
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| v.解放，解除 | |
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stringent
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| adj.严厉的；令人信服的；银根紧的 | |
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inconvenient
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| adj.不方便的，令人感到麻烦的 | |
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specified
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| adj.特定的 | |
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inflict
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| vt.(on)把…强加给，使遭受，使承担 | |
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rebuke
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| v.指责，非难，斥责 [反]praise | |
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Portuguese
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| n.葡萄牙人；葡萄牙语 | |
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improper
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| adj.不适当的，不合适的，不正确的，不合礼仪的 | |
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censured
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| v.指责，非难，谴责( censure的过去式 ) | |
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rebukes
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| 责难或指责( rebuke的第三人称单数 ) | |
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allusion
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| n.暗示，间接提示 | |
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undone
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| a.未做完的，未完成的 | |
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alleged
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| a.被指控的，嫌疑的 | |
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mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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torpid
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| adj.麻痹的，麻木的，迟钝的 | |
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cogent
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| adj.强有力的，有说服力的 | |
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cowardice
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| n.胆小，怯懦 | |
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perversity
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| n.任性；刚愎自用 | |
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entrusted
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| v.委托，托付( entrust的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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emancipated
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| adj.被解放的，不受约束的v.解放某人（尤指摆脱政治、法律或社会的束缚）( emancipate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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relegated
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| v.使降级( relegate的过去式和过去分词 )；使降职；转移；把…归类 | |
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retirement
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| n.退休，退职 | |
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eminently
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| adv.突出地；显著地；不寻常地 | |
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