After completing his arrangements for the two sweeping1 flank-movements that were destined2 to entrap3 Blake and Casta?os, the Emperor moved forward from Burgos on November 22, along the great road to Madrid by Lerma and Aranda de Duero. His advance was completely masked by the broad screen of cavalry4 which had gone on in front of him. Lasalle was ahead, Milhaud on the right flank, and covered by them he moved with ease across the plain of Old Castile. He brought with him a very substantial force, all the Imperial Guard, horse and foot, Victor and his 1st Corps5, and the reserve-cavalry of Latour-Maubourg and Lahoussaye. King Joseph and his household troops were left behind at Burgos, to preserve the line of communication with Vittoria and Bayonne. The flanks were quite safe, with Ney and Moncey lying out upon the left, and Soult and Lefebvre upon the right. In a few days—supposing that the armies of Blake and Casta?os fell into the snare6, or were at least broken and scattered7—the Emperor hoped to be able to draw in both Ney and Lefebvre to aid in his enveloping8 attack upon Madrid. Nor was this all: the corps of Mortier and Junot were now approaching the Pyrenees, and would soon be available as a great central reserve. The whole force put in motion against Madrid was enormous: the Emperor had 45,000 men under his own hand: Ney and Lefebvre could dispose of 40,000 more: Mortier and Junot were bringing up another 40,000 in the rear. Omitting the troops left behind on the line of communication and the outlying corps of Soult and Moncey, not less than 130,000 men were about to concentrate upon Madrid.
The Emperor halted at Aranda from November 23 to 28, mainly (as it would seem) to allow the two great flanking operations to work themselves out. When Soult reported that Blake’s much-chased army had dissolved into a mere9 mob, and taken refuge in the fastnesses of the Asturias, and when Lannes sent in the news[p. 451] of Tudela, the Emperor saw that it was time to move. On the twenty-eighth he marched on Madrid, by the direct high-road that crosses the long and desolate11 pass of the Somosierra.
Meanwhile the Spaniards had been granted nineteen days since the rout12 of Gamonal in which to organize the defence of their capital—a space in which something might have been done had their resources been properly applied13 and their commanders capable. It is true that even if every available man had been hurried to Madrid, the Emperor must still have prevailed: his numbers were too overwhelming to be withstood. But this fact does not excuse the Junta14 for not having done their best to hold him back. It is clear that when the news of Gamonal reached them, on the morning of the twelfth, orders should have been sent to Casta?os to fall back on the capital by way of Calatayud and Siguenza, leaving Palafox and the Aragonese to ‘contain’ Moncey as long as might be possible. Nothing of the kind was done, and the army of the Centre—as we have seen—was still at Tudela on the twenty-third. There was another and a still more important source of aid available: the English army from Portugal had begun to arrive at Salamanca on November 13: its rearguard had reached that city ten days later. With Sir John Moore’s designs and plans of campaign we shall have to deal in another chapter. It must suffice in this place to say that he was now within 150 miles of Madrid by a good high-road: the subsidiary column under Hope, which had with it nearly the whole of the British artillery15, was at Talavera, still nearer to the capital. If the Junta had realized and frankly16 avowed17 the perils19 of the situation, there can be no doubt that they would have used every effort to bring Moore to the defence of Madrid. Seven or eight good marches could have carried him thither20. But the Spaniards did nothing of the kind: refusing to realize the imminence21 of the danger, they preferred to urge on Mr. Frere, the newly arrived British minister, a scheme for the union of Moore’s forces with Blake’s broken ‘Army of the Left[502].’ They suggested that Hope’s division might be[p. 452] brought up to reinforce the capital, but that the rest of the British troops should operate in the valley of the Douro. This proposition was wholly inadmissible, for Hope had with him all Moore’s cavalry and most of his guns. To have separated him from his chief would have left the latter incapable22 of any offensive movement. Hope declined to listen to the proposal, and marched via the Escurial to join the main army[503].
The fact was that the Junta still persisted in the foolish belief that Napoleon had no more than 80,000 men disposable in Northern Spain, instead of the 250,000 who were really at his command. They looked on the French advance to Burgos as a mere reconnaissance in force made by a single corps, and in this notion the imbecile Belvedere did his best to confirm them, by stating in his dispatch that the force which had routed him amounted to no more than 3,000 horse and 6,000 infantry23[504]. Instead of calling in Casta?os and making a desperate appeal for aid to Moore, the Junta contented24 themselves with endeavouring to reorganize the wrecks25 of the army of Estremadura, and pushing forward the belated fragments of the 1st and 3rd Andalusian divisions, which still lingered in Madrid, as well as the few Castilian levies26 that were now available for service in the field. Nothing can show their blind self-confidence more clearly than their proclamation of November 15, put forward to attenuate27 the ill effects on the public mind of the news of the rout of Gamonal. ‘The Supreme28 Junta of Government’—so runs the document—‘in order to prevent any more unhappy accidents of this kind, has already taken the most prudent29 measures; it has nominated Don Joseph Heredia to the command of the army of Estremadura: it has ordered all the other generals of the Army of the Right to combine their movements: it has given stringent30 orders for the prompt reinforcement of the above-named army.... There is every hope that the enemy, who now boasts of having been able to advance as far as Burgos, will soon be well chastised31 for his temerity32. And if it is certain—as the reports from the frontier assure us—that the Emperor of the French has come in person to inspect the conduct[p. 453] of his generals and his troops in Spain, we may hope that the valiant33 defenders34 of our fatherland may aspire35 to the glory of making him fly, with the same haste with which they forced his brother Joseph to abandon the throne and the capital of which he vainly thought that he had taken possession[505].’
Since they systematically36 undervalued the number of Napoleon’s host, and refused to believe that there was any danger of a serious attack on Madrid during the next few days, it was natural that the Junta should waste, in the most hopeless fashion, the short time of respite37 that was granted to them between the rout of Gamonal and Napoleon’s advance from Aranda. They hurried forward the troops that were close at hand to hold the passes of the watershed38 between Old and New Castile, and then resumed their usual constitutional debates.
The forces available for the defence of Madrid appear absurdly small when we consider the mighty39 mass of men that Bonaparte was leading against them. Nearly half of the total was composed of the wrecks of the Estremaduran army. Belvedere, as it will be remembered, had brought back to Lerma the remains40 of his 1st and 2nd Divisions, and rallied them on his intact 3rd Division. The approach of Lasalle’s cavalry on November 11 scared them from Lerma, and the whole body, now perhaps 8,000 or 9,000 strong, fell back on Aranda. From thence we should have expected that they would retire by the high-road on Madrid, and take post in the pass of the Somosierra. But the Estremaduran officers decided41 to retreat on Segovia, far to the left, leaving only a handful of men[506] to cover the main line of access to the capital. It looks as if a kind of ‘homing instinct’ had seized the whole army, and compelled them to retire along the road that led to their own province. The only explanation given by their commanders was that they hoped to pick up in this direction many of the fugitives42 who had not rallied to their main body (one cannot say to their colours, for most of them had been captured by the[p. 454] French) on the day after Gamonal[507]. At Segovia the unhappy Belvedere was superseded43 by Heredia, whom the Junta had sent down from Aranjuez to reorganize the army.
The other troops available for the defence of Madrid consisted mainly of the belated fractions of the army of Andalusia, which Casta?os had summoned so many times to join him on the Ebro, but which were still, on November 15, in or about Madrid. They were supposed to be completing their clothing and equipment, and to be incorporating recruits. But considering the enormous space of time that had elapsed since Baylen, it is not unfair to believe that the true reason for their detention44 in the capital had been the Junta’s wish to keep a considerable body of troops in its own immediate45 neighbourhood. It was convenient to have regiments46 near at hand which had not passed under the control of any of the generals commanding the provincial48 armies. There were in Madrid no less than nine battalions50 of the original division of Reding—all regulars and all corps who had distinguished51 themselves at Baylen[508]. Of the 3rd Division there were two regular and two old militia52 battalions[509]. The remainder of the available force in the capital consisted of four battalions of new levies raised in the capital (the 1st and 2nd Regiments of the ‘Volunteers of Madrid’), of one new corps from Andalusia (the 3rd Volunteers of Seville), and of fragments of four regiments of cavalry[510]. The whole division, twelve thousand strong, was placed under the charge of General San Juan, a veteran of good reputation[511]. But he was only a subordinate: the supreme[p. 455] command in Madrid was at this moment in dispute between General Eguia, who had just been appointed as head of the whole ‘Army of Reserve,’ and the Marquis of Castelar, Captain-General of New Castile. The existence of two rival authorities on the spot did not tend to facilitate the organization of the army, or the formation of a regular plan of defence. Eguia, succeeding at last in asserting his authority, ordered San Juan with his 12,000 men to defend the Somosierra, while Heredia with the 9,000 Estremadurans was to hold the pass of the Guadarrama, the alternative road from Old Castile to Madrid via Segovia and San Ildefonso. These 21,000 men were all that could be brought up to resist Napoleon’s attack, since the Junta had neglected to call in its more distant resources. It is clear that from the first they were doomed53 to failure, for mountain chains are not like perpendicular54 walls: they cannot be maintained merely by blocking the roads in the defiles56. Small bodies of troops, entrenched57 across the actual summit of the pass, can always be turned by an enemy of superior numbers; for infantry can easily scramble58 up the flanking heights on each side of the high-road. These heights must be held by adequate forces, arranged in a continuous line for many miles on each side of the defile55, if the position is not to be outflanked. Neither Heredia nor San Juan had the numbers necessary for this purpose.
It was open to Napoleon to attack both the passes, or to demonstrate against one while concentrating his main force on the other, or to completely ignore the one and to turn every man against the other. He chose the last-named alternative: a few cavalry only were told off to watch the Estremadurans at Segovia, though Lefebvre and the 4th Corps were ultimately sent in that direction. The main mass of the army marched from Aranda against the Somosierra. San Juan had not made the best of his opportunities: he had done no more than range his whole artillery across the pass at its culminating point, with a shallow earthwork to protect it. This only covered the little plateau at the head of the defile: the flanking heights on either side were not prepared or entrenched. They were steep, especially on the right side of the road, but nowhere inaccessible59 to infantry moving in skirmishing order. At the northern foot of the pass lies the little town of[p. 456] Sepulveda, which is reached by a road that branches off from the Madrid chaussée before it commences to mount the defile. To this place San Juan pushed forward a vanguard, consisting of five battalions of veteran line troops[512], a battery, and half his available cavalry. It is hard to see why he risked the flower of his little army in this advanced position: they were placed (it is true) so as to flank any attempt of the French to advance up the high-road. But what use could there be in threatening the flank of Napoleon’s 40,000 men with a small detached brigade of 3,500 bayonets? And how were the troops to join their main body, if the Emperor simply ‘contained’ them with a small force, and pushed up the pass?
Napoleon left Aranda on November 28: on the twenty-ninth he reached Boceguillas, near the foot of the mountains, where the Sepulveda road joins the great chaussée, at the bottom of the pass. After reconnoitring the Spanish position, he sent a brigade of fusiliers of the Guard, under Savary, to turn the enemy out of Sepulveda. Meanwhile he pushed his vanguard up the defile, to look for the position of San Juan. Savary’s battalions failed to dislodge Sarden’s detachment before nightfall: behind the walls of the town the Spaniards stood firm, and after losing sixty or seventy men Savary drew off. His attack was not really necessary, for the moment that the Emperor had seized the exit of the defile, the force at Sepulveda, on its cross-road, was cut off from any possibility of rejoining its commander-in-chief, and stood in a very compromised position. Realizing this fact, Colonel Sarden retreated in the night, passed cautiously along the foot of the hills, and fell back on the Estremaduran army at Segovia. The only result, therefore, of San Juan’s having made this detachment to threaten the Emperor’s flank, was that he had deprived himself of the services of a quarter of his troops—and those the best in his army—when it became necessary to defend the actual pass. He had now left to oppose Napoleon only six battalions of regulars, two of militia, and seven of raw Castilian and Estremaduran levies: the guns which he had established in line across the little plateau, at the crest60 of the pass, seem to have been sixteen in number. The Emperor could bring against him about five men to one.
[p. 457]
The high-road advances by a series of curves up the side of the mountain, with the ravine of the little river Duraton always on its right hand. The ground on either flank is steep but not inaccessible. Cavalry and guns must stick to the chaussée, but infantry can push ahead with more or less ease in every direction. There were several rough side-tracks on which the French could have turned San Juan’s position, by making a long circling movement. But Bonaparte disdained61 to use cautious measures: he knew that he had in front of him a very small force, and he had an exaggerated contempt for the Spanish levies. Accordingly, at dawn on the thirtieth, he pushed up the main defile, merely taking the precaution of keeping strong pickets62 of infantry out upon the flanking heights.
When, after a march of about seventeen miles up the defile, the French reached the front of San Juan’s position, the morning was very far spent. It was a dull November day with occasional showers of rain, and fogs and mists hung close to the slopes of the mountains. No general view of the ground could be obtained, but the Emperor made out the Spanish guns placed across the high-road, and could see that the heights for some little way on either hand were occupied. He at once deployed63 the division of Ruffin, belonging to Victor’s corps, which headed his line of march. The four battalions of the 96th moved up the road towards the battery: the 9th Léger spread out in skirmishing order to the right, the 24th of the Line to the left. They pressed forward up the steep slopes, taking cover behind rocks and in undulations of the ground: their progress was in no small degree helped by the mist, which prevented the Spaniards from getting any full view of their assailants. Presently, for half a mile on each flank of the high-road, the mountain-side was alive with the crackling fire of the long lines of tirailleurs. The ten French battalions were making their way slowly but surely towards the crest, when the Emperor rode to the front. He brought up with him a battery of artillery of the Guard, which he directed against the Spanish line of guns, but with small effect, for the enemy had the advantage in numbers and position. Bonaparte grew impatient: if he had waited a little longer Ruffin’s division would have cleared the flanking heights without asking for aid. But he was anxious to press the combat to a decision, and had the greatest contempt for the forces in front of him. His main idea[p. 458] at the moment seems to have been to give his army and his generals a sample of the liberties that might be taken with Spanish levies. After noting that Victor’s infantry were drawing near the summit of the crest, and seemed able to roll back all that lay in front of them, he suddenly took a strange and unexpected step. He turned to the squadron of Polish Light Horse, which formed his escort for the day, and bade them prepare to charge the Spanish battery at the top of the pass. It appeared a perfectly64 insane order, for the Poles were not 100 strong[513]: they could only advance along the road four abreast65, and then they would be exposed for some 400 yards to the converging66 fire of sixteen guns. Clearly the head of the charging column would be vowed18 to destruction, and not a man would escape if the infantry supports of the battery stood firm. But Bonaparte cared nothing for the lives of the unfortunate troopers who would form the forlorn hope, if only he could deliver one of those theatrical67 strokes with which he loved to adorn68 a Bulletin. It would be tame and commonplace to allow Victor’s infantry to clear the heights on either side, and to compel the retreat of the Spanish guns by mere outflanking. On the other hand, it was certain that the enemy must be growing very uncomfortable at the sight of the steady progress of Ruffin’s battalions up the heights: the Emperor calculated that San Juan’s artillerymen must already be looking over their shoulders and expecting the order to retire, when the crests69 above them should be lost. If enough of the Poles struggled through to the guns to silence the battery for a moment, there was a large chance that the whole Spanish line would break and fly down hill to Buitrago and Madrid. To support the escort-squadron he ordered up the rest of the Polish regiment47 and the chasseurs à cheval of the Guard: if the devoted70 vanguard could once reach the guns 1,000 sabres would support them and sweep along the road. If, on the other hand, the Poles were exterminated71, the Guard cavalry would be held back, and nothing would have been lost, save the lives of the forlorn hope.
[p. 459]
General Montbrun led the Polish squadron forward for about half the distance that separated them from the guns: so many saddles were emptied that the men hesitated, and sought refuge in a dip of the ground where some rocks gave them more or less cover from the Spanish balls. This sight exasperated72 the Emperor: when Walther, the general commanding the Imperial Guard, rode up to him, and suggested that he should wait a moment longer till Victor’s tirailleurs should have carried the heights on each side of the road, he smote73 the pommel of his saddle and shouted, ‘My Guard must not be stopped by peasants, mere armed banditti[514].’ Then he sent forward his aide-de-camp, Philippe de Ségur, to tell the Poles that they must quit their cover and charge home. Ségur galloped74 on and gave his message to the chef d’escadron Korjietulski: the Emperor’s eye was upon them, and the Polish officers did not shrink. Placing themselves at the head of the survivors75 of their devoted band they broke out of their cover and charged in upon the guns, Ségur riding two horses’ lengths in front of the rest. There were only 200 yards to cross, but the task was impossible; one blasting discharge of the Spanish guns, aided by the fire of infantry skirmishers from the flanks, practically exterminated the unhappy squadron. Of the eighty-eight who charged four officers and forty men were killed, four officers (one of them was Ségur) and twelve men wounded[515]. The foremost of these bold riders got within thirty yards of the guns before he fell.
Having thus sacrificed in vain this little band of heroes, Bonaparte found himself forced, after all, to wait for the infantry. General Barrois with the 96th Regiment, following in the wake of the lost squadron, seized the line of rocks behind which the Poles had taken refuge before their charge, and began to exchange a lively musketry fire with the Spanish battalions which flanked and guarded the guns. Meanwhile the 9th and 24th Regiments on either side had nearly reached the crest of the heights. The[p. 460] enemy were already wavering, and falling back before the advance of Barrois’ brigade, whose skirmishers had struggled to the summit just to the right of the grand battery on the high-road, when the Emperor ordered a second cavalry charge. This time he sent up Montbrun with the remaining squadrons of the Polish regiment, supported by the chasseurs à cheval of the Guard. The conditions were completely changed, and this second attack was delivered at the right moment: the Spaniards, all along the line, were now heavily engaged with Victor’s infantry. When, therefore, the horsemen rode furiously in upon the guns, it is not wonderful that they succeeded in closing with them, and seized the whole battery with small loss. The defenders of the pass gave way so suddenly, and scattered among the rocks with such speed, that only 200 of them were caught and ridden down. The Poles pursued those of them who retired76 down the road as far as Buitrago, at the southern foot of the defile, but without inflicting77 on them any very severe loss; for the fugitives swerved78 off the path, and could not be hunted down by mounted men among the steep slopes whereon they sought refuge. The larger part of the Spaniards, being posted to the left of the chaussée, fled westward79 along the side of the mountain and arrived at Segovia, where they joined the army of Estremadura. With them went San Juan, who had vainly tried to make his reserve stand firm behind the guns, and had received two sword-cuts on the head from a Polish officer. Only a small part of the army fled to the direct rear and entered Madrid.
The story of the passage of the Somosierra has often been told as if it was an example of the successful frontal attack of cavalry on guns, and as if the Poles had actually defeated the whole Spanish army. Nothing of the kind occurred: Napoleon, as we have seen, in a moment of impatience81 and rage called upon the leading squadron to perform an impossibility, and caused them to be exterminated. The second charge was quite a different matter: here the horsemen fell upon shaken troops already closely engaged with infantry, and broke through them. But if they had not charged at all, the pass would have been forced none the less, and only five minutes later than was actually the case[516]. In short, it[p. 461] was Ruffin’s division, and not the cavalry, which really did the work. Napoleon, with his habitual82 love of the theatrical and his customary disregard of truth, wrote in the 13th Bulletin that the charge of the Polish Light Horse decided the action, and that they had lost only eight killed and sixteen wounded! This legend has slipped into history, and traces of its influence will be found even in Napier[517] and other serious authors.
The combat of the Somosierra, in short, is only an example of the well-known fact that defiles with accessible flank-slopes cannot be held by a small army against fourfold numbers. To state the matter shortly, fifteen battalions of Spaniards (five of them regular battalions which had been present at Baylen) were turned off the heights by the ten battalions of Ruffin: the cavalry action was only a spectacular interlude. The Spanish infantry, considering that there were so many veteran corps among them, might have behaved better. But they did not suffer the disgrace of being routed by a single squadron of horse as Napoleon asserted; and if they fought feebly their discouragement was due, we cannot doubt, to the fact that they saw the pass packed for miles to the rear with the advancing columns of the French, and knew that Ruffin’s division was only the skirmishing line (so to speak) of a great army.
On the night of November 30, Napoleon descended83 the pass and fixed84 his head quarters at Buitrago. On the afternoon of December 1 the advanced parties of Latour-Maubourg’s and Lasalle’s cavalry rode up to the northern suburbs of Madrid: on[p. 462] the second the French appeared in force, and the attack on the city began.
The Spanish capital was, and is, a place incapable of any regular defence. It had not even, like Valencia and Saragossa, the remains of a mediaeval wall: its development had taken place in the sixteenth century, when serious fortifications had gone out of date. Its streets were broad and regular, unlike the tortuous85 lanes which had been the real strength of Saragossa. Nothing separates the city from its suburbs save ornamental86 gates, whose only use was for the levy87 of octroi duties. Madrid is built in a level upland, but there is a rising ground which dominates the whole place: it lies just outside the eastern limit of the city. On it stood the palace of the Buen Retiro (which gives its name to the height), and several other public buildings, among them the Observatory88 and the royal porcelain89 manufactory, known as La China. The latter occupied the more commanding and important section of the summit of the hill. Between the Retiro and the eastern side of the city lies the public park known as the Prado, a low-lying open space laid out with fountains, statues, and long avenues of trees. Three broad and handsome streets[518] run eastward90 and terminate in the Prado, just opposite the Retiro, so that cannon91 planted either by the palace or by La China can search them from end to end. This was so obvious that Murat, during his occupation of Madrid in April and May, had built three redoubts, one large and two small, facing down into the city and armed with guns of position. The inhabitants of Madrid had partly dismantled92 them after the departure of the French—and did themselves no harm thereby93, for these earthworks were useless for defence against an enemy from without: they could be employed to overawe the city but not to protect it[519].
Ever since the rout of Gamonal, those members of the Junta who were gifted with ordinary foresight94 must have realized that it was probable that the Emperor would appear ere long before the gates of the capital. But to avoid alarming the excitable populace, the fact was concealed95 as long as possible, and it was given out that Madrid would be defended at the impregnable Somosierra. It was not till November 25 that any public measures for the fortification of the capital were spoken of. On that day the[p. 463] Junta issued a proclamation placing the charge of the capital in the hands of the Marquis of Castelar, Captain-General of New Castile, and of Don Tomas de Morla, the officer who had won a name by bombarding and capturing the French fleet at Cadiz in June. Under their directions, preparations were begun for putting the city in a state of defence. But the military men had a strong and well-founded belief that the place was indefensible, and that all efforts made to fortify96 it were labour thrown away: the fight must be made at the Somosierra, not at the gates of Madrid. It was not till the news of the rout of San Juan’s army on the thirtieth came to hand, that any very serious work was executed. But when this disaster was known there was a sudden and splendid outburst of energy. The populace, full of vindictive97 memories of May 2, were ready and willing to fight, and had no conception of the military weakness of their situation. If Saragossa had defended itself street by street, why, they asked, should not Madrid do the same? Their spirits were so high and their temper so ferocious98, that the authorities realized that they must place themselves at the head of the multitude, or be torn to pieces as traitors100. On December 1 a Junta of Defence was formed, under the presidency101 of the Duke of Infantado, in which Morla and Castelar were given a large and heterogeneous102 mass of colleagues—magistrates103, officers, and prominent citizens forming an unwieldy body very unfit to act as an executive council of war. The military resources at their disposal were insignificant104: there was a handful of the fugitives from the Somosierra—Castelar estimated them as not more than 300 or 400 in all[520]—and two battalions of new levies from the south, which had arrived only on the morning of December 1. The organized forces then were not more than 2,500 or 3,000 in all. But there was a vast and unruly mob of citizens of Madrid and of peasants, who had flocked into the city to aid in its defence. Weapons rather than men were wanting, for when 8,000 muskets105 from the Arsenal106 had been served out, the supply ran short. All private persons owning firearms of any description were invited to hand them in to the Junta: but this resource soon failed, and finally pikes were served out, and even mediaeval weapons from the royal armoury and the family collections of certain grandees107. How many men, armed in one way or another,[p. 464] took part in the defence of Madrid will never be known—it cannot have been less than 20,000, and may have amounted to much more.
Not merely the combatants, but the whole population of both sexes turned themselves with absolute frenzy108 to the work of fortification. In the two days which they had at their disposal they carried out an enormous and ill-compacted scheme for surrounding the whole city with lines. In front of each of the gates a battery was established, formed of earth reveted with paving-stones: to connect these a continuous wall was made, by joining together all the exterior109 houses of the town with earthworks, or with piles of stones and bricks pulled down from buildings in the suburbs. On several fronts ditches were excavated110: the more important streets were blocked with barricades111, and the windows and doors of exposed buildings were built up. There were very few engineers at the disposal of the Junta of Defence, and the populace in many places worked not under skilled guidance but by the light of nature, executing enormous but perfectly useless works. ‘The batteries,’ wrote a prominent Spanish witness, ‘were all too small: they were so low that they did not prevent the gates and streets which they defended from being enfiladed: the guns being placed en barbette were much exposed, and were dominated by the artillery which the enemy afterwards placed on the high ground [i.e. the Retiro heights]. The low parapets and the want of proportion between them and their banquettes left the infantry unsheltered: indeed they were harmed rather than helped by the works, for the splinters of the paving-stones which formed the parapets proved more deadly to the garrison112 than did the enemy’s cannon-balls. The batteries were too low at the flanks, and placed so close to the buildings in their rear that the guns could not easily be worked nor the infantry supports move freely. The gates behind being all of hewn stone, every ball that struck them sent such a shower of fragments flying that the effect was like grape: it forced the defenders to lie flat, and even then caused terrible loss[521].’ It may be added that not only were the works unscientifically executed, but that the most tiresome113 results were produced by the misguided energy of persons who threw up barricades, or dug cuttings, behind them, so that it was[p. 465] very hard to send up reinforcements, and quite impossible to withdraw the guns from one battery for use in another.
It was natural that these self-taught engineers should neglect the one most important point in the defences of Madrid. The Retiro heights were the key of the city: if they were lost, the whole place lay open to bombardment from the dominating ground. But nothing was done here, save that the old French works round the factory of La China were repaired, the buildings of the palace, barracks, and hospital in the vicinity barricaded114, and a low continuous earthwork constructed round the summit of the hill. It should have been turned into a regular entrenched camp, if the city was really to be defended.
The Junta of Defence did its best to preserve order and introduce discipline: all the armed men were paraded in the Prado, told off into bands, and allotted115 their posts around the circumference116 of the city. But there were many idle hands, and much confusion: it was inevitable117 that mobs should collect, with the usual consequences. Cries of ‘Treason’ were raised, some houses were sacked, and at least one atrocious murder was committed. The Marquis of Perales was president of the sub-committee which the Junta had appointed to superintend the manufacture and distribution of ammunition118. Among the cartridges119 given out to the people some were found in which sand had been substituted for powder—probably they were relics120 of some petty piece of peculation121 dating back to the times of Godoy. When this was discovered, a furious mob ran to the house of the marquis, beat him to death, and dragged his corpse122 through the streets on a hurdle[522].
If the populace of Madrid was full of blind self-confidence, and imagined that it had the power to beat off the assault of Napoleon, its leaders were in a much more despondent123 frame of mind. Morla was one of those who had joined the patriotic124 party merely[p. 466] because he thought it was the winning side: he was deeply disgusted with himself, and was already contemplating125 the traitorous126 desertion to the enemy which has covered his name with eternal disgrace. Castelar seems to have been weak and downhearted. The Duke of Infantado was enough of a soldier to see the hopeless inefficiency127 of the measures of defence which had been adopted. The only chance of saving Madrid was to hurry up to its aid the two field-armies which were within touch—the old Andalusian divisions (now under La Pe?a), which, by orders of the Supreme Junta, were marching from Calatayud on the capital, and the routed bands of Heredia and San Juan at Segovia. Urgent appeals were sent to both of these hosts to press forward without delay: Infantado himself rode out to meet the army of the Centre, which on this day [Dec. 1] had not long passed Siguenza in its retreat, and was still nearly eighty miles from the capital. He met it at Guadalajara on the next day, in very bad condition, and much reduced by long marches and starvation: with the colours there were only 9,000 foot and 2,000 horse, and these were in a state of half-developed mutiny. The rest of the 20,000 men who had escaped from Tudela were ranging in small bands over the country-side, in search of food, and were not rallied for many days. There was not much to be hoped for from the army of the Centre, and it was evident that it could not reach Madrid till December 3 or 4. The troops of San Juan and Heredia were not so far distant, but even they had fifty-five miles to march from Segovia, and—as it turned out—the capital had fallen before either of the field-armies could possibly come to its aid. Still more fruitless were the attempts made at the last moment to induce Sir John Moore to bring up the British expeditionary force from Salamanca—he was 150 miles away, and could not have arrived before December 7, three days after the capitulation had been signed.
Napoleon dealt with the insurgents128 of Madrid in a very summary manner. On December 1—as we have already seen—his vedettes appeared before the city: on the morning of the second the dragoons of Lahoussaye and Latour-Maubourg came up in force and invested the northern and eastern fronts of the city. At noon the Emperor himself appeared, and late in the afternoon the infantry columns of Victor’s corps. December 2 was one of Bonaparte’s lucky days, being the anniversary of Austerlitz, and he had indulged in a faint hope that an open town like the Spanish[p. 467] capital might do him the courtesy of surrendering without a blow, like Vienna in 1805, or Berlin in 1806. Accordingly he sent a summons to the Junta in the afternoon; but the Spaniards were in no mood for yielding. General Montbrun, who rode up to the gates with the white flag, was nearly mobbed by enraged129 peasants, and the aide-de-camp who took the dispatch into the city was only saved from certain death by the exertions130 of some Spanish officers of the line. The Junta sent him back with the haughty131 reply that ‘the people of Madrid were resolved to bury themselves under the ruins of their houses rather than to permit the French troops to enter their city.’
Since the ‘sun of Austerlitz’ was not destined to set upon the triumphal entry of the Emperor into the Spanish capital, it became necessary to prepare for the use of force. As a preliminary for an attack on the following morning, Lapisse’s division of Victor’s corps was sent forward to turn the Spaniards out of many isolated132 houses in front of their line of entrenchments, which were being held as advanced posts. The ground being cleared, preparations could be made for the assault. The moment that Bonaparte cast eyes on the place, he realized that the heights of the Retiro were the key of the position. Under cover of the night, therefore, thirty guns were ranged in line opposite the weak earthworks which crowned the eminence133. Artillery in smaller force was placed in front of several of the northern and eastern gates of the city, to distract the attention of the garrison from the critical point. Before dawn the Emperor sent in another summons to surrender, by the hands of an artillery officer who had been captured at the Somosierra. It is clear that he wished, if possible, to enter Madrid without being obliged to deliver up the city to fire and sword: it would be unfortunate if his brother’s second reign134 were to begin under such unhappy conditions. But it is hard to understand how he could suppose that the warlike frenzy of the Spaniards would have died down between the afternoon of December 2 and the dawn of December 3. All the reply that he obtained was a proposal from the Captain-General Castelar, that there should be a suspension of arms for twelve hours. The sole object of this delay was to allow the Spanish field-armies time to draw nearer to Madrid. Recognizing the fact—which was obvious enough—the Emperor gave orders for an immediate assault. A cannonade was opened against the gates of Los Pozos, the Recoletos, Fuencarral, and several others on the northern and eastern sides of[p. 468] the city. Considerable damage was done to the Spanish defences, but these attacks were all subsidiary. The real assault was delivered against the Retiro heights. The heavy cannonade which was directed against the Spanish works soon opened several breaches135. Then Villatte’s division of Victor’s corps was sent in to storm the position, a feat80 which it accomplished136 with the greatest ease. The garrison of this all-important section of the defences consisted of a single battalion49 of new levies—the Regiment of Mazzaredo—and a mass of armed citizens. They were swept out of their works, and pursued downhill into the Prado. Pressing onward137 among the avenues and fountains, Villatte’s division took in the rear the defenders of the three neighbouring gates, and then, pushing in among the houses of the city, made a lodgement in the palace of the Duke of Medina Celi, and several other large buildings. There was now nothing between the French army and the heart of Madrid save the street-barricades, which the populace had thrown up behind the original lines of defence.
If Napoleon had chosen to send into the fight the rest of Victor’s corps, and had pushed forward the whole of his artillery to the edge of the captured heights, with orders to shell the city, there can be little doubt that Madrid might have been stormed ere nightfall. Its broad streets did not give the facilities of defence that Saragossa had possessed138, and the Emperor had at his disposal not a weak and heterogeneous army, such as Verdier had commanded, but more than 40,000 veteran troops. His artillery, too, had on the Retiro a vantage-ground such as did not exist outside the Aragonese capital. Nevertheless the Emperor did not press the attack, and once more sent in a demand for the surrender of the place, at about eleven in the morning of December 3.
The populace of Madrid did not yet recognize its own forlorn state, and was keeping up a vigorous fusillade at the gates and behind the barricades. It had suffered severe loss from the French artillery, owing to the unscientific construction of the defences, but was not yet ready to yield. But the Junta was in a very different frame of mind: the military men thoroughly139 understood the situation, and were expecting to see a hundred guns open from the crest of the Retiro within the next few minutes. Their civilian140 colleagues, the magistrates, and local notables were looking forward with no enviable feelings to the conflagration141 and the general sack that seemed to be at hand. In short the idea of rivalling[p. 469] Saragossa was far from their thoughts. When Napoleon’s letter, offering ‘pardon to the city of Madrid, protection and security for the peaceful inhabitants, respect for the churches and the clergy142, oblivion for the past,’ was delivered to the Junta, the majority decided to treat with him. They sent out as negotiators General Morla, representing the military element, and Don Bernardo Iriarte[523], on behalf of the civil authorities. Napoleon treated these delegates to one of those scenes of simulated rage which he was such an adept143 at producing—his harangue144 was quite in the style of the famous allocutions to Lord Whitworth and to Metternich. It was necessary, he thought, to terrify the delegates. Accordingly he let loose on Morla a storm of largely irrelevant145 abuse, stringing together accusations146 concerning the bombardment of the French fleet at Cadiz, the violation147 of the Convention of Baylen, the escape of La Romana’s troops from the Baltic, and (strangest of all!) the misconduct of the Spanish troops in Roussillon during the war of 1793-5. He ended by declaring that unless the city had been surrendered by six o’clock on the following morning, every man taken in arms should be put to the sword.
Morla was a very timid man[524], moreover he was already meditating148 submission149 to King Joseph: he returned to the Junta in a state of absolute collapse150, and gave such a highly coloured account of the Emperor’s wrath151, and of the number of the French army, that there was no further talk of resistance. The main difficulty was to stop the promiscuous152 firing which was still going on at the outposts, and to induce the more exasperated section of the mob to quit the city or to lay down their arms. Many of them took the former alternative: the Marquis of Castelar, resolved to avoid captivity153, got together his handful of regular troops, and fled in haste by the road towards Estremadura: he was followed by some thousands of peasants, and by a considerable number of persons who thought themselves too much compromised to be able to remain behind. Having got rid of the recalcitrants, the Junta drew up a form of capitulation in eleven articles, and sent it out to the French camp. Napoleon, anxious above all things to get possession of the city as soon as possible, accepted it almost without discussion, though it contained many clauses entirely154 in[p. 470]appropriate to such a document. As he did not intend to observe any of the inconvenient155 stipulations, he did not care to waste time in discussing them[525]. Morla and Fernando de Vera, governor of the city, came back with the capitulation duly ratified156 by Berthier, and next morning the gates were opened, a division under General Belliard marched in, and the Spaniards gave up their artillery and laid down their muskets without further trouble. After the spasmodic burst of energy which they had displayed during the last four days, the citizens showed a melancholy157 apathy158 which surprised the conquerors159. There was no riot or confusion, nor were any isolated attempts at resistance made. Hence the occupation of Madrid took place without any scenes of bloodshed or pillage160, the Emperor for his part keeping a very stern hand upon the soldiery, and sending in as small a garrison as could safely be allotted to the task.
Madrid having fallen after no more than two days of resistance, the two Spanish field-armies which were marching to its aid were far too late to be of any use. The army of the Centre under La Pe?a had reached Guadalajara at nightfall on December 2: there it was met by the Duke of Infantado, who had come out from Madrid to hurry on the troops. At his solicitation161 the wearied and disorganized host, with Ney’s corps pressing hard on its heels, marched for San Torcaz and Arganda, thus placing itself in a most dangerous position between the Emperor and the corps that was in pursuit. Fortunately La Pe?a got early news of the capitulation, and swerving162 southward from Arganda, made for the passage of the Tagus at Aranjuez. But Bonaparte had sent out part of Victor’s corps to seize that place, and when the army of the Centre drew near, it found French troops in possession [December 6]. With Ney behind, Victor in front, and Bessières’ cavalry ranging all over the plain of New Castile, the Spaniards were in grave danger. But they escaped by way of Estremera, crossed the ferries on the Upper Tagus, and finally rallied—in a[p. 471] most miserable163 and disorganized condition—at Cuenca. The artillery, unable to leave the high-road, had been sent off three days before, from Guadalajara towards the kingdom of Murcia, almost without an escort: by a piece of extraordinary luck it escaped without seeing an enemy.
The doings of the disorganized divisions of San Juan and Heredia, which had marched from Segovia on December 2, were much more discreditable. Late on the third they reached the Escurial, some thirty miles from Madrid, and were met by fugitives from the capital, who reported that the Retiro had been stormed, and that the Junta of Defence was debating about a surrender. The two commanders were doubting whether they ought not to turn back, when their troops broke out into mutiny, insisting that the march on Madrid must be continued. After a scene of great disorder164 the generals gave in, and resumed their advance on the morning of the fourth, just at the moment when Morla was opening the gates to Napoleon. They had only gone a few miles when certain news of the capitulation was received. There followed a disgraceful scene; the cry of treason ran down the ranks: some battalions disbanded themselves, others attacked their own officers, and the whole mass dissolved and went off in panic to Talavera, leaving its artillery abandoned by the wayside. They had not even seen a French vedette, or fired a single shot, yet they fled in utter rout for sixty miles, and only halted when they could run no further. Seven or eight thousand men out of the two armies were got together at Talavera, on the sixth; but when, next morning, San Juan attempted to take up the command again, they raised the idiotic165 cry that he wished to lead them forward into the midst of Napoleon’s armies in order to force them to surrender! The unfortunate general was hunted down, shot as he was trying to escape from a window, and hung from a large elm-tree just outside the town. This was the most disgraceful scene of the whole campaign in 1808. It was not for some days later that the remnants of this miserable army were reduced to some shadow of discipline, and consented to march under the command of new generals.
It is clear that even if Madrid had held out for a day or two more, by dint166 of desperate street-fighting, it would have got no effective aid from the armies in the field. We cannot therefore say that the Junta of Defence did much harm by its tame sur[p. 472]render. From the military point of view Madrid was indefensible: on the other hand it was eminently167 desirable, from the political point of view, that Napoleon should not enter the place unopposed, to be received, as at Vienna or Berlin, by obsequious168 deputations mouthing compliments, and bearing the keys of the city on silver salvers. It was far better, in the long run, for Spain and for Europe that he should be received with cannon-balls, and forced to fight his way in. This simple fact made all his fictions to the effect that he was only opposed by the rabble169, the monks170, and the agents of England appear absurd. He could not, after this, pretend to introduce his brother Joseph as a legitimate171 sovereign quietly returning to his loyal capital. So much was secured by the two days’ resistance of Madrid: on the other hand, when once the French were inside the city, and further resistance would have ended merely in general pillage and conflagration, it would have required more than Spartan172 resolution for the Junta to go on fighting. If Madrid had been burnt like Moscow, the moral effect on Spain and on Europe would, no doubt, have been enormous. But the heterogeneous council of war, composed of dispirited officers and local notables trembling for their homes, could hardly be expected to see this. They yielded, considering that they had already done enough by way of protest—and even with Saragossa in our mind we should be loth to say that their capitulation was culpable173. The one shameful174 thing about the surrender was that within a few days both Morla, the military head of the defence, and several of the chief civil officials, swore allegiance to Joseph Bonaparte, and took service under him. Such treason on the part of prominent men did more to encourage the invader175 and to dishearten Spain and her allies than the loss of half a dozen battles. For, when once desertion begins, no one knows where it will stop, and every man distrusts his neighbour as a possible traitor99. Madrid, as we have already said, was not a true national capital, nor was its loss a fatal blow; but that its chief defenders should shamelessly throw over the cause of their country, and join the enemy, was a symptom of the most dire10 and deadly sort. But, fortunately, the fate of the country was not in the hands of its corrupt176 bureaucracy, but in those of its much-enduring people.
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1
sweeping
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| adj.范围广大的，一扫无遗的 | |
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destined
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| adj.命中注定的；(for)以…为目的地的 | |
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entrap
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| v.以网或陷阱捕捉，使陷入圈套 | |
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cavalry
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| n.骑兵；轻装甲部队 | |
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corps
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| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
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snare
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| n.陷阱，诱惑，圈套；（去除息肉或者肿瘤的）勒除器；响弦，小军鼓；vt.以陷阱捕获，诱惑 | |
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scattered
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| adj.分散的，稀疏的；散步的；疏疏落落的 | |
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enveloping
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| v.包围，笼罩，包住( envelop的现在分词 ) | |
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mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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dire
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| adj.可怕的，悲惨的，阴惨的，极端的 | |
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desolate
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| adj.荒凉的，荒芜的；孤独的，凄凉的；v.使荒芜，使孤寂 | |
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rout
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| n.溃退，溃败；v.击溃，打垮 | |
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applied
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| adj.应用的；v.应用，适用 | |
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junta
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| n.团体；政务审议会 | |
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artillery
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| n.(军)火炮，大炮；炮兵(部队) | |
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frankly
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| adv.坦白地，直率地；坦率地说 | |
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avowed
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| adj.公开声明的，承认的v.公开声明，承认( avow的过去式和过去分词) | |
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vowed
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| 起誓，发誓（vow的过去式与过去分词形式） | |
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perils
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| 极大危险( peril的名词复数 )； 危险的事（或环境） | |
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thither
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| adv.向那里；adj.在那边的，对岸的 | |
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imminence
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| n.急迫，危急 | |
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incapable
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| adj.无能力的，不能做某事的 | |
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infantry
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| n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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contented
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| adj.满意的，安心的，知足的 | |
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wrecks
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| n.沉船( wreck的名词复数 )；（事故中）遭严重毁坏的汽车（或飞机等）；（身体或精神上）受到严重损伤的人；状况非常糟糕的车辆（或建筑物等）v.毁坏[毁灭]某物( wreck的第三人称单数 )；使（船舶）失事，使遇难，使下沉 | |
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levies
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| （部队）征兵( levy的名词复数 )； 募捐； 被征募的军队 | |
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attenuate
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| v.使变小，使减弱 | |
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supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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prudent
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| adj.谨慎的，有远见的，精打细算的 | |
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stringent
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| adj.严厉的；令人信服的；银根紧的 | |
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chastised
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| v.严惩（某人）（尤指责打）( chastise的过去式 ) | |
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temerity
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| n.鲁莽，冒失 | |
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valiant
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| adj.勇敢的，英勇的；n.勇士，勇敢的人 | |
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defenders
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| n.防御者( defender的名词复数 )；守卫者；保护者；辩护者 | |
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aspire
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| vi.(to，after)渴望，追求，有志于 | |
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systematically
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| adv.有系统地 | |
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respite
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| n.休息，中止，暂缓 | |
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watershed
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| n.转折点，分水岭，分界线 | |
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mighty
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| adj.强有力的；巨大的 | |
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remains
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| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
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decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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fugitives
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| n.亡命者，逃命者( fugitive的名词复数 ) | |
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superseded
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| [医]被代替的，废弃的 | |
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detention
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| n.滞留，停留；拘留，扣留；(教育)留下 | |
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immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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regiments
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| （军队的）团( regiment的名词复数 )； 大量的人或物 | |
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regiment
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| n.团，多数，管理；v.组织，编成团，统制 | |
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provincial
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| adj.省的，地方的；n．外省人，乡下人 | |
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battalion
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| n.营；部队；大队(的人) | |
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battalions
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| n.（陆军的）一营（大约有一千兵士）( battalion的名词复数 )；协同作战的部队；军队；（组织在一起工作的）队伍 | |
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51
distinguished
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| adj.卓越的，杰出的，著名的 | |
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militia
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| n.民兵，民兵组织 | |
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doomed
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| 命定的 | |
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perpendicular
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| adj.垂直的，直立的；n.垂直线，垂直的位置 | |
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defile
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| v.弄污，弄脏；n.(山间)小道 | |
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defiles
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| v.玷污( defile的第三人称单数 )；污染；弄脏；纵列行进 | |
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entrenched
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| adj.确立的，不容易改的(风俗习惯) | |
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scramble
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| v.爬行，攀爬，杂乱蔓延，碎片，片段，废料 | |
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inaccessible
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| adj.达不到的，难接近的 | |
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crest
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| n.顶点；饰章；羽冠；vt.达到顶点；vi.形成浪尖 | |
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disdained
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| 鄙视( disdain的过去式和过去分词 )； 不屑于做，不愿意做 | |
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62
pickets
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| 罢工纠察员( picket的名词复数 ) | |
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63
deployed
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| （尤指军事行动）使展开( deploy的过去式和过去分词 )； 施展； 部署； 有效地利用 | |
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64
perfectly
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| adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地 | |
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65
abreast
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| adv.并排地；跟上(时代)的步伐，与…并进地 | |
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66
converging
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| adj.收敛[缩]的，会聚的，趋同的v.（线条、运动的物体等）会于一点( converge的现在分词 )；（趋于）相似或相同；人或车辆汇集；聚集 | |
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67
theatrical
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| adj.剧场的，演戏的；做戏似的，做作的 | |
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68
adorn
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| vt.使美化，装饰 | |
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69
crests
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| v.到达山顶（或浪峰）( crest的第三人称单数 )；到达洪峰，达到顶点 | |
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70
devoted
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| adj.忠诚的，忠实的，热心的，献身于...的 | |
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71
exterminated
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| v.消灭，根绝( exterminate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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72
exasperated
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| adj.恼怒的 | |
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73
smote
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| v.猛打，重击，打击( smite的过去式 ) | |
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74
galloped
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| （使马）飞奔，奔驰( gallop的过去式和过去分词 )； 快速做[说]某事 | |
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75
survivors
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| 幸存者，残存者，生还者( survivor的名词复数 ) | |
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76
retired
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| adj.隐退的，退休的，退役的 | |
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77
inflicting
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| 把…强加给，使承受，遭受( inflict的现在分词 ) | |
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78
swerved
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| v.（使）改变方向，改变目的( swerve的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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79
westward
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| n.西方，西部；adj.西方的，向西的；adv.向西 | |
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80
feat
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| n.功绩；武艺，技艺；adj.灵巧的，漂亮的，合适的 | |
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81
impatience
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| n.不耐烦，急躁 | |
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82
habitual
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| adj.习惯性的；通常的，惯常的 | |
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83
descended
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| a.为...后裔的，出身于...的 | |
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84
fixed
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| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
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85
tortuous
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| adj.弯弯曲曲的，蜿蜒的 | |
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86
ornamental
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| adj.装饰的；作装饰用的；n.装饰品；观赏植物 | |
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87
levy
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| n.征收税或其他款项，征收额 | |
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88
observatory
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| n.天文台，气象台，瞭望台，观测台 | |
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89
porcelain
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| n.瓷；adj.瓷的，瓷制的 | |
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90
eastward
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| adv.向东；adj.向东的；n.东方，东部 | |
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91
cannon
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| n.大炮，火炮；飞机上的机关炮 | |
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92
dismantled
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| 拆开( dismantle的过去式和过去分词 )； 拆卸； 废除； 取消 | |
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93
thereby
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| adv.因此，从而 | |
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94
foresight
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| n.先见之明，深谋远虑 | |
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95
concealed
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| a.隐藏的，隐蔽的 | |
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96
fortify
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| v.强化防御，为…设防；加强，强化 | |
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97
vindictive
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| adj.有报仇心的，怀恨的，惩罚的 | |
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98
ferocious
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| adj.凶猛的，残暴的，极度的，十分强烈的 | |
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99
traitor
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| n.叛徒，卖国贼 | |
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100
traitors
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| 卖国贼( traitor的名词复数 )； 叛徒； 背叛者； 背信弃义的人 | |
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101
presidency
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| n.总统(校长，总经理)的职位(任期) | |
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102
heterogeneous
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| adj.庞杂的；异类的 | |
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103
magistrates
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| 地方法官，治安官( magistrate的名词复数 ) | |
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104
insignificant
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| adj.无关紧要的，可忽略的，无意义的 | |
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105
muskets
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| n.火枪，（尤指）滑膛枪( musket的名词复数 ) | |
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106
arsenal
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| n.兵工厂，军械库 | |
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107
grandees
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| n.贵族，大公，显贵者( grandee的名词复数 ) | |
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108
frenzy
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| n.疯狂，狂热，极度的激动 | |
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109
exterior
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| adj.外部的，外在的；表面的 | |
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110
excavated
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| v.挖掘( excavate的过去式和过去分词 )；开凿；挖出；发掘 | |
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111
barricades
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| 路障，障碍物( barricade的名词复数 ) | |
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112
garrison
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| n.卫戍部队；驻地，卫戍区；vt.派(兵)驻防 | |
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113
tiresome
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| adj.令人疲劳的，令人厌倦的 | |
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114
barricaded
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| 设路障于，以障碍物阻塞( barricade的过去式和过去分词 )； 设路障[防御工事]保卫或固守 | |
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115
allotted
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| 分配，拨给，摊派( allot的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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116
circumference
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| n.圆周，周长，圆周线 | |
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117
inevitable
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| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
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118
ammunition
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| n.军火，弹药 | |
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119
cartridges
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| 子弹( cartridge的名词复数 )； （打印机的）墨盒； 录音带盒； （唱机的）唱头 | |
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120
relics
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| [pl.］n.遗物，遗迹，遗产；遗体，尸骸 | |
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121
peculation
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| n.侵吞公款[公物] | |
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122
corpse
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| n.尸体，死尸 | |
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123
despondent
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| adj.失望的，沮丧的，泄气的 | |
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124
patriotic
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| adj.爱国的，有爱国心的 | |
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125
contemplating
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| 深思，细想，仔细考虑( contemplate的现在分词 )； 注视，凝视； 考虑接受（发生某事的可能性）； 深思熟虑，沉思，苦思冥想 | |
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126
traitorous
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| adj. 叛国的, 不忠的, 背信弃义的 | |
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127
inefficiency
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| n.无效率，无能；无效率事例 | |
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128
insurgents
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| n.起义，暴动，造反( insurgent的名词复数 ) | |
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129
enraged
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| 使暴怒( enrage的过去式和过去分词 )； 歜； 激愤 | |
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130
exertions
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| n.努力( exertion的名词复数 )；费力；（能力、权力等的）运用；行使 | |
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131
haughty
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| adj.傲慢的，高傲的 | |
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132
isolated
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| adj.与世隔绝的 | |
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133
eminence
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| n.卓越，显赫；高地，高处；名家 | |
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134
reign
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| n.统治时期，统治，支配，盛行；v.占优势 | |
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135
breaches
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| 破坏( breach的名词复数 )； 破裂； 缺口； 违背 | |
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136
accomplished
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| adj.有才艺的；有造诣的；达到了的 | |
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137
onward
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| adj.向前的，前进的；adv.向前，前进，在先 | |
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138
possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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139
thoroughly
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| adv.完全地，彻底地，十足地 | |
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140
civilian
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| adj.平民的，民用的，民众的 | |
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141
conflagration
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| n.建筑物或森林大火 | |
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142
clergy
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| n.[总称]牧师，神职人员 | |
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143
adept
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| adj.老练的，精通的 | |
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144
harangue
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| n.慷慨冗长的训话，言辞激烈的讲话 | |
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145
irrelevant
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| adj.不恰当的，无关系的，不相干的 | |
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146
accusations
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| n.指责( accusation的名词复数 )；指控；控告；（被告发、控告的）罪名 | |
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147
violation
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| n.违反(行为)，违背(行为)，侵犯 | |
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148
meditating
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| a.沉思的，冥想的 | |
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149
submission
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| n.服从，投降；温顺，谦虚；提出 | |
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150
collapse
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| vi.累倒；昏倒；倒塌；塌陷 | |
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151
wrath
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| n.愤怒，愤慨，暴怒 | |
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152
promiscuous
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| adj.杂乱的，随便的 | |
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153
captivity
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| n.囚禁；被俘；束缚 | |
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154
entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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155
inconvenient
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| adj.不方便的，令人感到麻烦的 | |
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156
ratified
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| v.批准，签认（合约等）( ratify的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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157
melancholy
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| n.忧郁，愁思；adj.令人感伤（沮丧）的，忧郁的 | |
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158
apathy
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| n.漠不关心，无动于衷；冷淡 | |
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159
conquerors
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| 征服者，占领者( conqueror的名词复数 ) | |
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160
pillage
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| v.抢劫；掠夺；n.抢劫，掠夺；掠夺物 | |
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161
solicitation
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| n.诱惑；揽货；恳切地要求；游说 | |
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162
swerving
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| v.（使）改变方向，改变目的( swerve的现在分词 ) | |
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163
miserable
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| adj.悲惨的，痛苦的；可怜的，糟糕的 | |
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164
disorder
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| n.紊乱，混乱；骚动，骚乱；疾病，失调 | |
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165
idiotic
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| adj.白痴的 | |
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166
dint
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| n.由于，靠；凹坑 | |
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167
eminently
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| adv.突出地；显著地；不寻常地 | |
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168
obsequious
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| adj.谄媚的，奉承的，顺从的 | |
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169
rabble
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| n.乌合之众，暴民；下等人 | |
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170
monks
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| n.修道士，僧侣( monk的名词复数 ) | |
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171
legitimate
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| adj.合法的，合理的，合乎逻辑的；v.使合法 | |
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172
spartan
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| adj.简朴的，刻苦的；n.斯巴达；斯巴达式的人 | |
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173
culpable
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| adj.有罪的，该受谴责的 | |
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174
shameful
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| adj.可耻的，不道德的 | |
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175
invader
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| n.侵略者，侵犯者，入侵者 | |
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176
corrupt
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| v.贿赂，收买；adj.腐败的，贪污的 | |
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