Four days after the battle of Ucles Napoleon quitted Spain. He had rested at Valladolid from January 6 to January 17, after his return from the pursuit of Sir John Moore. Though he had failed to entrap2 the British Army he was not discontented with his achievements. He was fully3 convinced that he had broken the back of the Spanish insurrection, and that he could safely return to France, leaving the completion of the work to his brother and his marshals. He was anxious to hear that Saragossa had fallen, and that the English had been driven out of the Peninsula. When these two events should have come to pass, his armies might resume, under the guidance of his subordinates, the original advance against Portugal and Andalusia which had been so effectually frustrated4 by Moore’s daring move.
Meanwhile he spent full eleven days at Valladolid, busy with all manner of desk-work, connected not merely with Spain, but with the affairs of the whole continent. He was evidently anxious to leave an impression of terror behind him: he hectored and bullied6 the unfortunate Spanish deputations that were compelled to come before him in the most insulting fashion. His harangues7 generally wound up with the declaration that if he was ever forced to come back to Spain in arms, he would remove his brother Joseph, and divide the realm into subject provinces, which should be governed by martial8 law. Some French soldiers (probably marauders) having been assassinated9, he arrested and threatened to hang the whole municipality of Valladolid, finally releasing them only when three persons accused (rightly or wrongly) of the murders were delated to him[p. 16] and executed. He sent advice to King Joseph to deal in the same way with Madrid: nothing would keep the capital quiet, he wrote, but a good string of executions[26]. It was to be many years before he realized that hanging did no good in Spain, and was only repaid by additional assassinations10. In return for this good advice to his brother, he extorted11 from him fifty of the choicest pictures of the royal gallery at Madrid; but in compensation Joseph was invited to annex12 all that he might choose from the private collections of the exiled Spanish nobility and the monasteries13 of the capital[27].
Suggestions have sometimes been made that Napoleon hastened his departure from Spain, because he saw that the suppression of the insurrection would take a much longer time than he had originally supposed, and because he wished to transfer to other hands the lengthy14 and inglorious task of hunting down the last armies of the Junta. This view is certainly erroneous: his three months’ stay in Spain had not opened the Emperor’s eyes to the difficulties of the business that he had taken in hand. Though many of his couriers and aides-de-camp had already been ambuscaded and shot by the peasantry, though he was already beginning to see that a blockhouse and a garrison15 would have to be placed at every stage on the high-roads, he believed that these sinister16 signs were temporary, and that the country-side, after a few sanguinary lessons had been given, would sink down into the quiet of despair.
His final legacy17 to his brother, on departing, was a long dispatch giving a complete plan of operations for the next campaign. Soult, after forcing the English to embark18, was to march on Oporto. Napoleon calculated that he ought to capture it on February 1, and that on February 10 he would be[p. 17] in front of Lisbon. The Portuguese19 levies20 he practically disregarded as a fighting force, and he was ignorant that there still remained 8,000 or 10,000 British troops on the Tagus, who would serve to stiffen21 their resistance.
When Soult should have captured Oporto, and be well on the way to Lisbon, Victor was to go forward with his own 1st Corps22, the division of Leval from the 4th Corps, and the cavalry23 of Milhaud, Latour-Maubourg, and Lasalle. He was to strike at Estremadura, occupy Merida and Badajoz, and join hands with Soult along the Tagus. Lisbon being reduced, Victor was to borrow a division from Soult and march on Seville with 40,000 men. With such a force, as the Emperor calculated, he would subdue24 the whole of Andalusia with ease.
Meanwhile Saragossa must (as Napoleon rightly thought) fall some time in February. When it was disposed of, the 3rd and 5th Corps would provide a garrison for Aragon, and then march on Valencia, which would be attacked and subdued25 much about the same time that Victor would arrive at Seville. St. Cyr would have made an end of the Catalans long before. Thus the whole Peninsula would be subdued ere the summer was over. There was nowhere a Spanish army that could make head against even 10,000 French troops. The only possible complication would be that Moore’s army might conceivably take ship, not for England, but for Lisbon or Cadiz. If the English, ‘the only enemy who could create difficulties,’ took this course, the Emperor might have to give further orders. But it does not seem that he regarded this as a likely contingency26, since he had conceived an even exaggerated idea of the losses and demoralization which the British had suffered in the retreat to Corunna. To Joseph he wrote, ‘reserve yourself for the expedition to Andalusia, which may start three weeks hence. With 40,000 men, marching by an unexpected route [i.e. by Badajoz, not by La Carolina], you will surprise the enemy and force him to submit. This is an operation which will make an end of the war: I leave the glory of it to you[28].’ To Jerome Napoleon he wrote in the most laconic28 style, ‘the Spanish affair is done with[29],’ and then proceeded to discuss the general politics of the[p. 18] Continent, as if his whole attention could now be given to the doings of Austria and Russia. On January 18 he rode out of Valladolid, and after six days of incessant29 travel reached Paris on the 24th. His first care after his arrival was to scare the intriguers of the capital into good behaviour. His second was to endeavour to treat Austria after the same fashion. He had not yet made up his mind whether the ministers of Francis II meant mischief30, or whether they had merely been presuming on his long absence in Spain: on the whole he thought that they could be reduced to order by bold language, and by the ostentatious movement of troops on the Rhine and upper Danube. But he was not sure of his conclusion: in his correspondence letters stating that Austria has been brought to reason, alternate with others in which she is accused of incorrigible31 perversity32, and a design to make war in the spring[30]. The Emperor’s suspicions are most clearly shown by the fact that in February he ordered the whole of the Imperial Guard, except two battalions33 and three squadrons, to be brought up from Spain and directed on Paris[31]. In the same month he sent secret orders to the princes of the Confederation of the Rhine, to bid them be ready to mobilize their contingents35 at short notice.
It is clear that as regards the affairs of Spain the Emperor was in January and February, 1809, as much deluded36 as he had been seven months before, in June, 1808. The whole plan of campaign which he dictated37 at Valladolid, and sent as his parting gift to Joseph and Jourdan, was absolutely impracticable, and indicated a fundamental ignorance of the character of the Spanish war. It would have been a perfectly38 sensible document if the struggle had been raging in Italy or Germany, though even there the calculations of distance and time would have been rather hazardous39. Twenty-three days were given to Soult to expel the English, to pacify40 Galicia, to take Oporto,[p. 19] and to march on Lisbon! Even granting that all had gone as the Emperor desired, the estimate was too short by half. It was midwinter; Galicia and northern Portugal form one of the most mountainous regions in Europe: their roads are vile41; their food supplies are scanty42; their climate at that season of the year detestable. Clearly the task given to Soult could not be executed in the prescribed time[32].
But this is a minor43 point: it was not so much in his ‘logistics’ that the Emperor went wrong as in his general conception of the character of the war. He imagined that in dealing44 with Spain he might act as if he were dealing with Austria or Prussia—indeed that he had an enormous extra advantage in the fact that the armies of Ferdinand VII were infinitely45 inferior in mere5 fighting power to those of Francis II or Frederick William III. By all the ordinary rules of modern warfare46, a nation whose capital had been occupied, and whose regular armies had been routed and half-destroyed, ought to have submitted without further trouble. The Emperor was a little surprised that the effect of Espinosa and Gamonal, of Tudela and Ucles, had not been greater. He had almost expected to receive overtures47 from the Junta, asking for terms of submission48. But somewhat disappointed though he might be, he had not yet realized that Spain was not as other countries. The occupation of Madrid counted for little or nothing. The insurrectionary armies, when driven into a corner, did not capitulate, but dispersed49, and fled in small parties over the hills, to reunite on the first opportunity. Prussian or Austrian troops under similar circumstances would have quietly laid down their arms. But to endeavour to grasp a Spanish corps was like clutching at a ball of quicksilver: the mass dispersed in driblets between the fingers of the manipulator, and the small rolling pellets ultimately united to form a new force. Large captures of Spaniards only took place on the actual battle-field (as at Ucles or Oca?a), or when an army had shut itself up in a fortress50 and could not get away, as happened at Saragossa and Badajoz. Unless actually penned in between bayonets, the insurgents51 abandoned cannon52 and[p. 20] baggage, broke their ranks and disappeared, to gather again on some more propitious53 day, either as fresh armies or as guerrilla bands operating upon the victor’s lines of communication.
Nor was this all: in Italy, Germany, and Austria Bonaparte had dealt with regions where the population remained quiescent54 when once the regular army had been beaten. Risings like that of Verona in 1797, or of the Tyrol in 1805, were exceptional. The French army was wont55 to go forward without being forced to leave large garrisons56 behind it, to hold down the conquered country-side. A battalion34 or two placed in the chief towns sufficed to secure the communication of the army with France. Small parties, or even single officers bearing dispatches, could ride safely for many miles through an Italian or Austrian district without being molested57. It was not thus in Spain: the Emperor was to find that every village where there was not a French garrison would be a focus of active resistance, and that no amount of shooting or hanging would cow the spirits of the peasantry. It was only after scores of aides-de-camp had been murdered or captured, and after countless58 small detachments had been destroyed, that he came to realize that every foot of Spanish soil must not only be conquered but also held down. If there was a square of ten miles unoccupied, a guerrilla band arose in it. If a district thirty miles long lacked a brigade to garrison it, a local junta with a ragged59 apology for an army promptly60 appeared. Three hundred thousand men look a large force on paper, but when they have to hold down a country five hundred miles broad they are frittered away to nothing. This Great Britain knows well enough from her recent South African experience: but it was not a common matter of knowledge in 1809. If the Emperor had been told, on the day of his entry into Madrid, that even three years later his communication with Bayonne would only be preserved by the maintenance of a fortified61 post at every tenth milestone62, he would have laughed the idea to scorn. Still more ridiculous would it have appeared to him if he had been told that it would take a body of 300 horse to carry a dispatch from Salamanca to Saragossa, or that the normal garrison of Old Castile would have to be kept at 15,000 men, even when there was no regular Spanish army nearer to it than Oviedo or Astorga. In short he, and all[p. 21] Europe, had much to learn as to the conditions of warfare in the Peninsula. If he had realized them in March, 1808, there would have been no treachery at Bayonne, and the ‘running sore,’ as he afterwards called the Spanish war, would never have broken forth63.
Meanwhile the conquest of Spain was hung up for a month and more after the victory of Ucles. The Emperor had bidden Joseph and Jourdan to wait till the February rains were over, before sending out the great expedition against Andalusia; the siege of Saragossa was prolonged far beyond expectation, and Soult in Galicia (as we shall presently see) found the time-allowance which his master had set him inadequate64 to the verge65 of absurdity66. The French made no further move of importance till March.
The Central Junta, therefore, were granted three full months from the date of their flight from Aranjuez to Seville, in which to reorganize their armies for the oncoming campaign of 1809—a respite67 which they gained (as we have already shown) purely68 and solely69 through Moore’s splendid inspiration of the march to Sahagun.
The members of the Junta trailed into Seville at various dates between December 14 and December 17. Their rapid journey at midwinter through the Sierra de Guadalupe and the still wilder Sierra Morena had been toilsome and exhausting[33]. It proved fatal to their old president, Florida Blanca, who died of bronchitis only eleven days after he had arrived at Seville. In his stead a Castilian Grandee70 of unimpeachable71 patriotism72 but very moderate abilities, the Marquis of Astorga, was elected to the presidential chair. The Junta had no enviable task before it: the news of the disasters on the Ebro and the fall of Madrid had thrown the nation into a paroxysm of unreasoning fury. Ridiculous charges of treason were being raised against all those who had been in charge of the war. Blake and Casta?os (of all people!) were being openly accused of having sold themselves to Napoleon. There were a number of political assassinations in the regions to which the French had not yet penetrated73: most of the victims were old friends of Godoy. It looked at first as if[p. 22] the central government would be unable to restore any sort of order, or to organize any further resistance. Some of the local juntas74, whose importance had disappeared with the meeting of the Supreme75 Junta, showed signs of wishing to resume their ancient independence. Those of Seville and Jaen were especially disobliging. But the evils of disunion were so obvious that even the most narrow-minded particularists settled down after a time into at least a formal obedience76 to the central government.
The enforced halt made by the French after Napoleon’s departure for Madrid was the salvation77 of Spain. By the month of January things were beginning to assume a more regular aspect, and some attempt was made to face the situation. The most favourable78 part of that situation was that money at least was not wanting for the moment. The four or five millions of dollars which the British Government had distributed to the provincial79 Juntas and to the ‘Central’ had long been spent, and in 1809 no more than ￡387,000 in specie was advanced to Spain. Spent also was the enormous amount of money accruing80 from patriotic81 gifts and local assessments82. But there had just arrived at Cadiz a large consignment83 of specie from America. The Spanish colonies in the New World had all adhered without hesitation84 to the cause of Ferdinand VII, and their first and most copious85 contribution had just come to hand. Not only had the Governors of Mexico and Peru and the other provinces strained every nerve to raise money, but a vast patriotic fund had been collected by individuals. There were rich merchants and land-holders in America who made voluntary offerings of sums as large as 100,000 or 200,000 dollars apiece. The money which came to hand early in 1809 amounted to more than ￡2,800,000, and much more was received ere the close of the year. It was with this sum, far more than with British money, that the Spanish armies were paid and fed: but their equipment mainly came from England. The stores of arms, clothing, and munition86 which had existed in the arsenals87 of the Peninsula when the war broke out, had all been exhausted88 in the autumn, and had not even sufficed to equip fully the unfortunate armies which were beaten on the Ebro. The government and the local juntas had set up new manufactories at Seville, Valencia, and elsewhere,[p. 23] which were already turning out a large quantity of weapons, accoutrements, and uniforms: it was now that the armies began to appear in the rough brown cloth of the country and in leather shakos, abandoning the old white uniform and plumed89 hat which had been the garb90 of the Spanish line. But the reclothing and rearmament of the troops could never have been completed without the enormous consignments91 of cloth, powder, muskets92, lead, and leather work which came from England. It is true that much was lost by the fortune of war before it could be utilized—notably the considerable amount of muskets, ammunition93, and cloth which had been landed in Galicia for La Romana’s army. This, as we have seen, was either destroyed by Sir John Moore’s army or captured by Soult, because the Galician Junta had kept it waiting too long at the base. But all that went to Andalusia, Valencia, and Catalonia came safely to hand. Palafox’s army was re-equipped, just before the second siege of Saragossa began, with British stores sent up by Colonel Doyle from Tarragona. The armies of the south and east also received enormous consignments of necessaries.
It remains94 to speak of the purely military aspect of the Junta’s position. When January began, the wrecks95 of the Spanish armies were distributed in a wide semicircle reaching from Oviedo to Gerona, while the French lay in their midst. In the Asturias there were still 14,000 or 15,000 men under arms: the relics96 of Acevedo’s division of Blake’s army had fallen back, and joined the other levies which the local Junta had assembled. The whole force was watching the two lines on which the French could conceivably move during the winter—the coast route from Santander to Gijon, and the pass of Pajares which leads from Leon to Oviedo.
In Galicia, La Romana’s army, now engaged in the miserable97 retreat from Astorga to Orense, had fallen into the most wretched condition. Of the 22,000 men who had been assembled at Leon in December only 6,000 or 7,000 were now to be found: the Galician battalions had melted home when the army fell back among their native mountains. They cannot be much blamed, for they were suffering acute starvation: in the spring they came back to join the colours readily enough. The regulars, who still hung together, were famished98, naked, typhus-ridden,[p. 24] and incapable99 of any great exertion100. Their general’s only care was to keep them as far as possible from Soult and Ney, till the winter should have passed by, and food and clothing be procured102.
Between La Romana’s men at Orense and the army of Estremadura on the Tagus there was no Spanish force in the field. When Lapisse and D’Avenay had occupied Zamora and Salamanca, the only centre of resistance in Leon was the fortress of Ciudad Rodrigo, which was held by a handful of local militia103. Portuguese troops were beginning to collect in its rear at Almeida, but with them the Junta had nothing to do.
The Estremaduran army had now passed from the hands of Galluzzo to those of Cuesta. The Junta, in spite of the memories of Cabezon and Rio Seco, had once more given the obstinate104 and incapable old soldier an important command. Apparently105 they had been moved by the widespread but idiotic106 cry imputing107 treachery to the generals who had been beaten on the Ebro, and gave Cuesta an army because (with all his faults) no one ever dreamed of accusing him of treachery or sympathy with the French. His forces consisted (1) of the wrecks of Belvedere’s army from Gamonal, (2) of the débris of San Juan’s army from Madrid, (3) of new Estremaduran levies, which had not gone forward to Burgos in October, but had remained behind to complete their organization, (4) of the four dismounted cavalry regiments109 from Denmark, which had been sent to the south when La Romana landed at Santander, in order to procure101 equipment and horses. In all, the army of Cuesta had no more than 10,500 foot and 2,000 or 2,500 horse. The spirit of the old troops of San Juan and Belvedere was still very bad, and they were hardly recovered from their December mutinies and murders. After Lefebvre had driven them back from the Tagus, and occupied the bridges of Almaraz and Arzobispo, the Estremadurans had retired110 to Merida and Truxillo: on January 11 their most advanced position was at the last-named place.
To the east of Estremadura lay the weakest point of the Spanish line: Andalusia and its mountain barrier of the Sierra Morena were almost undefended in January, 1809. It will be remembered that all through the autumn of the preceding year the local juntas, intoxicated111 with the fumes112 of Baylen, had let the months slip by without doing much to organize the ‘Army[p. 25] of Reserve,’ of which they had spoken so much in August and September. It resulted that, when Reding had marched for Catalonia, and the last belated fractions of Casta?os’ army had been forwarded to Madrid, Andalusia was almost destitute114 of troops. When the Junta fled to Seville, it looked around for an army with which to defend the passes of the Sierra Morena. Nothing of the kind existed: the only force available consisted of nine or ten battalions, mainly new levies, which were dispersed through the ‘Four Kingdoms’ completing their armament and organization. They were hastily mobilized and pushed forward to the Sierra Morena, but not more than 6,000 bayonets and 500 sabres could be collected. This was the sole force that lay between the French at Madrid and the Junta at Seville. The charge of the division, whose head quarters were placed at La Carolina, was given to the Marquis del Palacio, who in the general shifting of commanders had just been recalled from Catalonia.
The British Government’s knowledge of the danger to which Andalusia was exposed, from the absolute want of troops to defend it, led to an untoward115 incident, which did much to endanger its friendly relations with the Junta. On hearing of the fall of Madrid, and of Moore’s retreat towards Galicia, Canning harked back to one of his old ideas of the previous summer, the notion that British troops might be sent to the south of Spain, if a safe basis for their operations were secured. This, as the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs believed, would best be provided by the establishment of a garrison in Cadiz. It was all-important that this great centre of commerce should not fall into the hands of the French, and early in January it was known in London that there was no adequate Spanish force ready to defend the passes of Andalusia. If Napoleon had an army large enough to provide, not only for the pursuit of Moore, but for the dispatch of a strong corps for an attack on Seville, it seemed probable that the French might overrun Southern Spain as far as the sea, without meeting with serious opposition116. Accordingly, Canning wrote to Frere, on the fourteenth day of the new year, 1809, to offer the assistance of a considerable British force for the defence of Andalusia, if Cadiz were placed in their hands.
‘The question of the employment of a British army in the[p. 26] south of Spain,’ he wrote, ‘depends essentially117 upon the disposition118 of the Spanish Government to receive a corps of that army into Cadiz. Without the security to be afforded by that fortress, it is impossible to hazard the army in the interior, after the example of the little co-operation which Sir John Moore represents himself to have received from the Spaniards in the north.... In consequence of the imminent119 danger, and of the pressing necessity for immediate120 decision arising from Sir John Moore’s retreat, and from the defenceless state in which you represent Andalusia to be, His Majesty’s Government have deemed it right (without waiting for the result of your communication with the Central Junta) to send a force direct to Cadiz, to be admitted into that fortress. Four thousand men under Major-General Sherbrooke are directed to sail immediately, and he is informed that he is to expect instructions from you on his arrival, containing the determination of the Spanish Government respecting his admission into Cadiz.... In the event of a refusal of the Junta to afford this proof of confidence, Major-General Sherbrooke is directed to proceed to Gibraltar[34].’
The last paragraph of this dispatch shows that Canning’s intentions were perfectly honourable121, and that he did not intend to bring any pressure to bear upon the Junta in the event of their refusing to admit a British garrison into Cadiz. His views were founded upon the information available in London when he wrote, and he was under the impression that a French army might probably be marching upon Seville at the moment when his letter would reach Frere’s hands. But—as we have seen—the diversion of the main force of Napoleon’s army of invasion against Moore, had rendered any such expedition impossible, and no immediate danger was really to be apprehended122.
The same idea, however, had entered into Frere’s mind, and long before he received Canning’s dispatch he had been sounding members of the Central Junta as to the way in which they would look on a proposal to send British troops to Cadiz. The answer which he received from their secretary, Martin de Garay, was not reassuring123: Don Martin ‘energetically repudiated’ the project: there would be no objection, he said, to admit a garrison, if Cadiz became ‘the ultimate point of retreat’ of the armies and[p. 27] government of Spain. But the danger that had appeared so pressing some weeks before had passed by, the French had stopped their advance, and the Junta were now hoping to defend Estremadura and the course of the Tagus. The invaders124, as they trusted, would be met and checked on the line of Alcantara and Almaraz. They deprecated any sending of British troops to Cadiz, and hoped that Lisbon would be the point to which reinforcements would be dispatched, as its evacuation would have deplorable results. De Garay, in a second letter, spoke113 of rumours125 to the effect that Cradock was proposing to evacuate126 Portugal, and trusted that they were not true. As a matter of fact they were, and that timid commander was already making secret preparations to embark.
Frere gave up for the present any idea of pressing the project further, unless the French should recommence their advance on Andalusia. He had not yet received Canning’s dispatch from London, and did not know that the home government had taken to heart the plan for occupying Cadiz and sending a large expedition to Andalusia. But on February 2, before any hint of the kind had reached him, he was informed by a dispatch from Lisbon that troops had been already sent off to Cadiz[35]. This step was the work of Sir George Smith, one of the numerous British military agents in the Peninsula, who had taken upon himself to force events to an issue, without first taking the precaution of communicating either with the home government or the British ambassador at Seville. Smith was a hasty and presumptuous127 man, full of zeal128 without discretion129. The defencelessness of Andalusia had impressed him, just as it had impressed Canning and Frere. But instead of opening communications with the Junta, as they had both done, he had merely written in very urgent terms to Cradock, and adjured130 him to detach troops from the scanty garrison of Portugal in order to secure Cadiz. The general, when thus pressed, consented to fall in with the scheme, and set aside a brigade under Mackenzie, which he shipped off from Lisbon at twenty-four hours’ notice (February 2). He also ordered the 40th regiment108, then in garrison at Elvas, to march on Seville. Both Cradock and Smith were gravely to blame, for they had no authorization[p. 28] to attempt to occupy Cadiz, without obtaining the consent of the Spanish Government[36]. They should have consulted both Frere and the Junta before moving a man: but it was only when the troops had actually embarked131 that they thought fit to notify their action to the ambassador at Seville.
On receiving their letters Frere was placed in an unenviable position. Having just seen his own proposals negatived by the Junta in polite but decisive terms, he now learnt that a British force had been sent off to carry out precisely132 the plan which the Spaniards had refused to take into consideration. Four days later he was informed that Mackenzie’s brigade, which had chanced upon a favourable wind, was actually lying in Cadiz harbour, and that Sir George Smith was endeavouring to induce the local authorities of the place to permit them to land. The Junta, as was inevitable133, suspected Frere of having been in the plot, and imagined that he was trying to force their hand by the display of armed force. Cadiz was at Smith’s mercy, for it was only garrisoned134 by its urban guards; and the populace were by no means unwilling135 to see the British land, for the fear of the French was upon them, and they welcomed the approach of reinforcements of any kind.
The supreme authority in Cadiz at this moment was the Marquis of Villel, a special commissioner136 sent down by the Central Junta, of which he was a member. He refused to be cajoled by Smith, and very properly referred his demand for permission to disembark to the government at Seville. The latter, not unnaturally137 incensed138, turned for explanations to Frere. The ambassador’s conduct when placed in this dilemma139 was by no means wise or straightforward140. Instead of frankly141 disavowing Smith’s action, he adopted the tortuous142 course[37] of[p. 29] pretending that the expedition from Lisbon had been sent with his knowledge and consent, but that he would not allow it to land without the leave of the Junta. The Spaniards replied in terms of some indignation, and returned a frank negative to the demand. Their secretary, de Garay, wrote that the unexpected appearance of General Mackenzie’s force was ‘painful and disagreeable intelligence, Cadiz being no longer in danger from the French, and two Spanish regiments being already on their way to reinforce the garrison. The measure which had been taken would admit of a thousand interpretations143, and a consent to hand over the fortress to the British would compromise the Central Junta with the whole nation.’ The fact was that Spanish public opinion was strongly opposed to allowing the British to obtain a foothold in Cadiz; there was a deeply-rooted notion abroad that, if once occupied, the place might be kept permanently144 in our hands, and be turned into a second Gibraltar.
Unfortunately for the credit of Great Britain with her allies, tumults145 broke out at Cadiz within a few days of the arrival of Mackenzie’s army, which supplied an excuse to malevolent146 Spaniards for attributing the worst motives147 to their allies. As a matter of fact they were not stirred up by Sir George Smith or any other emissary of the British Government, but were the results of the eccentric behaviour of the Marquis de Villel[38]. This personage was a very strange character, a sort of nineteenth-century Spanish Puritan, with a taste for playing the benevolent148 despot. He attributed the misfortunes of his country (and not without much reason) to her moral decadence149. His idea of the way to commence her regeneration was peculiar150, considering the[p. 30] circumstances of the time. He issued an edict commanding all married pairs living apart, to reunite, issued laws repressing theatre-going, late hours, and gambling151, legislated152 concerning the length of ladies’ skirts, and organized a grand battue against women of light reputation, of whom he imprisoned153 some scores. When he proceeded to engage in a sort of moral inquisition into the private life of all classes, he naturally became very unpopular, and on the first opportunity the populace rose against him. He had ordered into the city a newly-embodied ‘Swiss’ battalion, raised from the prisoners of Dupont’s army and other deserters of all nationalities. The cry was raised by his enemies that he was admitting Frenchmen in disguise into the sacred fortress, with the purpose of betraying it to the enemy. Other rumours were put about to the effect that he was deliberately154 neglecting the fortifications, and supplying the batteries with powder adulterated with sand[39].
When the foreign battalion drew near to Cadiz on February 22, and began to march up the long spit which connects the city with the Isla de Leon, the storm burst. A mixed multitude of rioters shut the gates against the troops, and then swept the streets, maltreating Villel’s subordinates, and slaying155 Don José Heredia the commander of the coast-guard, a person very unpopular with the smugglers, who formed an appreciable156 element in the crowd. The High Commissioner himself was besieged157 in his house, hunted from it, and nearly murdered: he only escaped by the kind offices of the head of a Capuchin convent, who took him within his gates, and made himself responsible to the rioters for keeping the refugee in safe custody158. The mob next tried to break open the state prison, for the purpose of slaying General Caraffa and other political captives. Fortunately Felix Jones, the military Governor, succeeded in saving these unhappy persons, by the not over-willing aid of the urban guards, many of whom had joined in the outbreak.
The rioters expressed great friendliness159 for the British, and many of them kept inviting160 the troops in the offing to come ashore161. It was very lucky that no attention was paid to these solicitations[40], for if they had landed the worst suspicions of[p. 31] the Junta would have appeared justified162, and the insurrection would have been attributed to the machinations of Frere or Smith. Fortunately the latter had died, only a few days before the troubles broke out, the victim of a fever which carried him off after no more than twenty-four hours of illness. If he had survived till the twenty-second, he would have been quite capable of taking the fatal step of listening to the appeals of the rioters, and ordering the troops ashore.
As it turned out the whole expedition ended in an absurd fiasco. When the riots had died down, the Junta recalled the eccentric de Villel, but they would not listen to any proposals from Frere for admitting British troops into Cadiz, even when he suggested that only two battalions should remain there, while the rest, including Sherbrooke’s division, which was expected to arrive in a few days, should come up and join the 40th regiment at Seville, with the ultimate purpose of marching into Estremadura. The Junta replied that ‘the loyalty163 of the British Ministry164 and the generosity165 of its efforts to assist Spain were beyond suspicion: but the National Government must respect national prejudices, and avoid exposing itself to censure166. If there were any urgent danger, they would have no hesitation in admitting the troops of their allies into Cadiz. But the French were still far away, and there was no immediate prospect167 of their approach. The British expedition would be more usefully employed in Catalonia, or in some other theatre of war, than in Cadiz[41].’ By March 4, when this final answer was sent to Frere, the state of affairs had so much changed, that the representations made by the Junta were more or less correct. The imminent danger which had existed in January had passed away.
Accordingly, after lying idly for four weeks in their transports, and gazing with much unsatisfied curiosity on the white[p. 32] houses, the green shutters168, and the flat roofs of Cadiz, across the beautiful bay, Mackenzie’s regiments set sail again for Lisbon on March 6. As they ran out of the harbour, they met Sherbrooke’s belated convoy169, whose arrival had been delayed by fearful tempests in the Bay of Biscay. The whole force, 6,000 bayonets strong, was brought back to Portugal. It might have been of infinite service to Cradock if it had remained at Lisbon and had never been sent to Cadiz, and its presence might have induced him to adopt measures less timid and futile170 than those which (as we shall see) he had pursued during January and February[42].
But this unfortunate incident has detained us too long; we must return to the state of the Spanish armies at the end of the month of January. Beyond the levies of the Marquis Del Palacio at La Carolina, there was a long gap in the Spanish line of defence. The next force under arms was the army of Infantado, now engaged in its exhausting winter march from Cuenca to the Murcian border. After the rout27 of Ucles it was still 12,000 strong, though destitute of all supplies and not fit for immediate service. The Junta ordered it to march from Chinchilla to join Del Palacio’s force at the mouth of the Despe?a Perros, and so to strengthen the defences of Andalusia.[p. 33] This was done, and the two forces were safely united, so that when a few more new battalions had been brought up from Granada, 20,000 men were placed between Victor and Andalusia. The Junta removed Infantado from command, rightly judging that he had sacrificed Venegas at Ucles by his neglect to send orders and his sloth171 in coming up to join his subordinate. The charge of the force at La Carolina (still called ‘the Army of the Centre’) was made over to General Cartaojal.
Beyond Infantado’s depleted172 corps lay the army of Valencia. Its nucleus173 was the remains of the old division of Llamas and Roca, which had served with Casta?os at Tudela. The local Junta rapidly recruited this skeleton force from 1,500 up to 5,000 men[43]. They added to it several new regiments raised during the winter in Valencia and Murcia, and by February had 10,000 men available for succouring Aragon and Catalonia, though their quality left much to be desired.
A little further north Palafox was still holding out with splendid desperation in Saragossa, where he had shut himself up with the whole army of Aragon. His original 32,000 men were already much thinned by pestilence174 and the sword, but in January their spirit was yet unbroken, and though it was clear that they were doomed175 to final destruction, if they were not relieved from the outside, yet they were still doing excellent work in detaining in front of them the whole of the 3rd and 5th French Army Corps.
There yet remains to be described the strongest of all the Spanish armies, that of Catalonia. In addition to the original garrison of the province, and to its gallant176 miqueletes and somatenes, there had been gradually drafted into the principality (1) the greater part of the garrison of the Balearic Isles177, some 9,000 men; (2) Reding’s Granadan division which started from its home over 10,000 strong; (3) 2,500 men of Caraffa’s old division from Portugal; (4) the Marquis of Lazan’s Aragonese division from the side of Lerida, about 4,000 bayonets. Thus in all some 32,000 men in organized corps had been massed in Catalonia, and the somatenes added some 20,000 irregulars. Of course the Spanish strength in January did not reach these figures. Many men had been lost at the siege of Rosas and in[p. 34] the battles of Cardadeu and Molins de Rey: yet there were still 40,000 troops of one sort or another available; the spirit of the country was irritated rather than lowered by the late defeats; the French only occupied the ground that was within the actual circle of fire of their garrisons. If the Catalans had been content to avoid general engagements, and to maintain an incessant guerrilla warfare, they might have held their own. Though the enemy had a very capable commander in General St. Cyr, they had as yet accomplished178 nothing more than the capture of the antiquated179 fortress of Rosas, the relief of Barcelona, and the winning of two fruitless battles. Catalonia remained unsubdued till the very end of the struggle.
Reckoning up all their armies, the Junta had in the end of January some 135,000 men in arms,—a force insufficient180 to face the French in the open, for the latter (even after the departure of the Imperial Guard) had still nearly 300,000[44] sabres and bayonets south of the Pyrenees, but one quite capable of keeping up the national resistance if it were only conducted upon the proper lines. For, as Napoleon and his marshals had yet to learn, no Spanish district could be considered conquered unless a garrison was left in each of its towns, and flying columns kept in continual motion through the open country. Of the 288,000 French who now lay in Spain more than half were really wanted for garrison duty. A district like Galicia was capable of keeping 40,000 men employed: even the plains of Old Castile and Leon swallowed up whole divisions.
But, unfortunately for Spain, the mania181 for fighting pitched battles was still obsessing182 the minds of her generals. Within a few weeks three wholly unnecessary and disastrous183 engagements were to be risked, at Valls, Ciudad Real, and Medellin. Instead of playing a cautious defensive184 game, and harassing185 the French, the Spaniards persisted in futile attempts to face the enemy in general actions, for which their troops were wholly unsuited. The results were so deplorable that but for a second British intervention—Wellesley’s march to Talavera—Andalusia would have been in as great peril186 in July, 1809, as it had been in January.
[p. 35]
The Central Junta must take its share of the responsibility for this fact no less than the Spanish generals. It still persisted in its old error of refusing to appoint a single commander-in-chief, so that each army fought for its own hand, without any attempt to co-ordinate its actions with those of the others. Indeed several of the generals were at notorious enmity with their colleagues—notably Cuesta and Venegas. It was to no purpose that the Central Government displayed great energy in organizing men and collecting material, if, when the armies had been equipped and sent to the front, they were used piecemeal187, without any general strategical scheme, and led ere long to some miserable disaster, such as Ucles, or Medellin, or Oca?a. The Junta, the generals, and the nation were all alike possessed188 by the delusion189 that with energy and sufficient numbers they might on some happy morning achieve a second Baylen. But for such a consummation Duponts and Vedels are required, and when no such convenient adversaries190 were to be found, the attempt to encompass191 and beat a French army was certain to end in a catastrophe192.
The only Spanish fighters who were playing the proper game in 1809 were the Catalonian somatenes, and even they gave battle far too often, and did not adhere with a sufficient pertinacity193 to the harassing tactics of guerrilla warfare. General Arteche has collected in his fourth volume something like a dozen schemes for the expulsion of the French from Spain, which were laid before the Junta, or ventilated in print, during this year. It is interesting to see that only one of them advocates the true line of resistance—the avoiding of battles, the harassing of the enemy’s flanks and communications, and the employment of numerous flying bands instead of great masses[45]. Some of the other plans are the wild imaginings of ignorant fools—one wiseacre wished to run down the French columns with pikemen in a sort of Macedonian phalanx, another to arm one-sixth of the troops with hand-grenades! But the majority of the Junta’s self-constituted advisers194 thought that numbers were the only necessary thing, and proposed to save Spain by crushing the invaders with levies en masse of all persons between sixteen[p. 36] and fifty—one enthusiast195 makes the age-limit fourteen to seventy!
These were the views of the nation, and the generals and the Junta were but infected with the common delusion of all their compatriots. They would not see that courage and raw multitudes are almost helpless when opposed by equal courage combined with skill, long experience of war, superior tactics, and intelligent leading.
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1
junta
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| n.团体；政务审议会 | |
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entrap
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| v.以网或陷阱捕捉，使陷入圈套 | |
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fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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frustrated
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| adj.挫败的，失意的，泄气的v.使不成功( frustrate的过去式和过去分词 )；挫败；使受挫折；令人沮丧 | |
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mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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bullied
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| adj.被欺负了v.恐吓，威逼( bully的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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harangues
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| n.高谈阔论的长篇演讲( harangue的名词复数 )v.高谈阔论( harangue的第三人称单数 ) | |
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martial
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| adj.战争的，军事的，尚武的，威武的 | |
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assassinated
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| v.暗杀( assassinate的过去式和过去分词 )；中伤；诋毁；破坏 | |
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assassinations
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| n.暗杀( assassination的名词复数 ) | |
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extorted
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| v.敲诈( extort的过去式和过去分词 )；曲解 | |
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annex
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| vt.兼并，吞并；n.附属建筑物 | |
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monasteries
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| 修道院( monastery的名词复数 ) | |
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lengthy
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| adj.漫长的，冗长的 | |
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garrison
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| n.卫戍部队；驻地，卫戍区；vt.派(兵)驻防 | |
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sinister
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| adj.不吉利的，凶恶的，左边的 | |
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legacy
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| n.遗产，遗赠；先人(或过去)留下的东西 | |
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embark
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| vi.乘船，着手，从事，上飞机 | |
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Portuguese
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| n.葡萄牙人；葡萄牙语 | |
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levies
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| （部队）征兵( levy的名词复数 )； 募捐； 被征募的军队 | |
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21
stiffen
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| v.(使)硬，(使)变挺，(使)变僵硬 | |
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corps
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| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
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cavalry
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| n.骑兵；轻装甲部队 | |
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subdue
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| vt.制服，使顺从，征服；抑制，克制 | |
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subdued
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| adj. 屈服的，柔和的，减弱的 动词subdue的过去式和过去分词 | |
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contingency
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| n.意外事件，可能性 | |
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rout
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| n.溃退，溃败；v.击溃，打垮 | |
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laconic
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| adj.简洁的；精练的 | |
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incessant
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| adj.不停的，连续的 | |
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mischief
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| n.损害，伤害，危害；恶作剧，捣蛋，胡闹 | |
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incorrigible
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| adj.难以纠正的，屡教不改的 | |
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perversity
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| n.任性；刚愎自用 | |
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battalions
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| n.（陆军的）一营（大约有一千兵士）( battalion的名词复数 )；协同作战的部队；军队；（组织在一起工作的）队伍 | |
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battalion
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| n.营；部队；大队(的人) | |
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contingents
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| （志趣相投、尤指来自同一地方的）一组与会者( contingent的名词复数 )； 代表团； （军队的）分遣队； 小分队 | |
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deluded
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| v.欺骗，哄骗( delude的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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dictated
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| v.大声讲或读( dictate的过去式和过去分词 )；口授；支配；摆布 | |
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38
perfectly
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| adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地 | |
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39
hazardous
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| adj.(有)危险的，冒险的；碰运气的 | |
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40
pacify
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| vt.使(某人)平静(或息怒)；抚慰 | |
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41
vile
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| adj.卑鄙的，可耻的，邪恶的；坏透的 | |
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42
scanty
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| adj.缺乏的，仅有的，节省的，狭小的，不够的 | |
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43
minor
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| adj.较小(少)的，较次要的；n.辅修学科；vi.辅修 | |
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44
dealing
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| n.经商方法，待人态度 | |
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infinitely
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| adv.无限地，无穷地 | |
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46
warfare
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| n.战争(状态)；斗争；冲突 | |
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overtures
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| n.主动的表示，提议；（向某人做出的）友好表示、姿态或提议( overture的名词复数 )；（歌剧、芭蕾舞、音乐剧等的）序曲，前奏曲 | |
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48
submission
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| n.服从，投降；温顺，谦虚；提出 | |
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49
dispersed
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| adj. 被驱散的, 被分散的, 散布的 | |
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50
fortress
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| n.堡垒，防御工事 | |
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insurgents
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| n.起义，暴动，造反( insurgent的名词复数 ) | |
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cannon
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| n.大炮，火炮；飞机上的机关炮 | |
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propitious
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| adj.吉利的；顺利的 | |
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quiescent
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| adj.静止的，不活动的，寂静的 | |
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wont
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| adj.习惯于；v.习惯；n.习惯 | |
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garrisons
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| 守备部队，卫戍部队( garrison的名词复数 ) | |
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molested
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| v.骚扰( molest的过去式和过去分词 )；干扰；调戏；猥亵 | |
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countless
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| adj.无数的，多得不计其数的 | |
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ragged
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| adj.衣衫褴褛的，粗糙的，刺耳的 | |
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promptly
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| adv.及时地，敏捷地 | |
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fortified
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| adj. 加强的 | |
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milestone
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| n.里程碑；划时代的事件 | |
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forth
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| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
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inadequate
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| adj.(for,to)不充足的，不适当的 | |
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verge
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| n.边，边缘；v.接近，濒临 | |
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absurdity
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| n.荒谬，愚蠢；谬论 | |
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respite
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| n.休息，中止，暂缓 | |
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purely
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| adv.纯粹地，完全地 | |
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solely
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| adv.仅仅，唯一地 | |
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grandee
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| n.贵族；大公 | |
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unimpeachable
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| adj.无可指责的；adv.无可怀疑地 | |
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patriotism
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| n.爱国精神，爱国心，爱国主义 | |
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penetrated
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| adj. 击穿的，鞭辟入里的 动词penetrate的过去式和过去分词形式 | |
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juntas
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| n.以武力政变上台的军阀( junta的名词复数 ) | |
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supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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obedience
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| n.服从，顺从 | |
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salvation
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| n.（尤指基督）救世，超度，拯救，解困 | |
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favourable
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| adj.赞成的，称赞的，有利的，良好的，顺利的 | |
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provincial
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| adj.省的，地方的；n．外省人，乡下人 | |
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accruing
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| v.增加( accrue的现在分词 )；（通过自然增长）产生；获得；（使钱款、债务）积累 | |
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patriotic
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| adj.爱国的，有爱国心的 | |
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82
assessments
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| n.评估( assessment的名词复数 )；评价；（应偿付金额的）估定；（为征税对财产所作的）估价 | |
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83
consignment
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| n.寄售；发货；委托；交运货物 | |
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hesitation
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| n.犹豫，踌躇 | |
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copious
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| adj.丰富的，大量的 | |
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munition
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| n.军火；军需品；v.给某部门提供军火 | |
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arsenals
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| n.兵工厂，军火库( arsenal的名词复数 )；任何事物的集成 | |
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exhausted
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| adj.极其疲惫的，精疲力尽的 | |
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plumed
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| 饰有羽毛的 | |
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garb
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| n.服装，装束 | |
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91
consignments
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| n.托付货物( consignment的名词复数 )；托卖货物；寄售；托运 | |
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92
muskets
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| n.火枪，（尤指）滑膛枪( musket的名词复数 ) | |
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93
ammunition
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| n.军火，弹药 | |
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94
remains
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| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
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95
wrecks
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| n.沉船( wreck的名词复数 )；（事故中）遭严重毁坏的汽车（或飞机等）；（身体或精神上）受到严重损伤的人；状况非常糟糕的车辆（或建筑物等）v.毁坏[毁灭]某物( wreck的第三人称单数 )；使（船舶）失事，使遇难，使下沉 | |
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96
relics
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| [pl.］n.遗物，遗迹，遗产；遗体，尸骸 | |
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97
miserable
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| adj.悲惨的，痛苦的；可怜的，糟糕的 | |
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98
famished
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| adj.饥饿的 | |
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99
incapable
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| adj.无能力的，不能做某事的 | |
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100
exertion
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| n.尽力，努力 | |
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101
procure
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| vt.获得，取得，促成；vi.拉皮条 | |
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102
procured
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| v.（努力）取得， （设法）获得( procure的过去式和过去分词 )；拉皮条 | |
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103
militia
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| n.民兵，民兵组织 | |
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104
obstinate
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| adj.顽固的，倔强的，不易屈服的，较难治愈的 | |
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105
apparently
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| adv.显然地；表面上，似乎 | |
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106
idiotic
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| adj.白痴的 | |
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107
imputing
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| v.把（错误等）归咎于( impute的现在分词 ) | |
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108
regiment
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| n.团，多数，管理；v.组织，编成团，统制 | |
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109
regiments
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| （军队的）团( regiment的名词复数 )； 大量的人或物 | |
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110
retired
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| adj.隐退的，退休的，退役的 | |
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111
intoxicated
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| 喝醉的，极其兴奋的 | |
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112
fumes
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| n.(强烈而刺激的)气味，气体 | |
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113
spoke
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| n.（车轮的）辐条；轮辐；破坏某人的计划；阻挠某人的行动 v.讲，谈（speak的过去式）；说；演说；从某种观点来说 | |
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114
destitute
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| adj.缺乏的；穷困的 | |
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115
untoward
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| adj.不利的，不幸的，困难重重的 | |
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116
opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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117
essentially
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| adv.本质上，实质上，基本上 | |
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118
disposition
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| n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署 | |
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119
imminent
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| adj.即将发生的，临近的，逼近的 | |
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120
immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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121
honourable
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| adj.可敬的；荣誉的，光荣的 | |
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122
apprehended
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| 逮捕，拘押( apprehend的过去式和过去分词 )； 理解 | |
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123
reassuring
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| a.使人消除恐惧和疑虑的，使人放心的 | |
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124
invaders
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| 入侵者，侵略者，侵入物( invader的名词复数 ) | |
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rumours
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| n.传闻( rumour的名词复数 )；风闻；谣言；谣传 | |
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126
evacuate
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| v.遣送；搬空；抽出；排泄；大(小)便 | |
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127
presumptuous
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| adj.胆大妄为的，放肆的，冒昧的，冒失的 | |
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128
zeal
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| n.热心，热情，热忱 | |
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129
discretion
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| n.谨慎；随意处理 | |
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130
adjured
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| v.（以起誓或诅咒等形式）命令要求( adjure的过去式和过去分词 )；祈求；恳求 | |
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131
embarked
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| 乘船( embark的过去式和过去分词 )； 装载； 从事 | |
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132
precisely
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| adv.恰好，正好，精确地，细致地 | |
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133
inevitable
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| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
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134
garrisoned
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| 卫戍部队守备( garrison的过去式和过去分词 )； 派部队驻防 | |
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135
unwilling
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| adj.不情愿的 | |
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136
commissioner
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| n.（政府厅、局、处等部门）专员，长官，委员 | |
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137
unnaturally
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| adv.违反习俗地；不自然地；勉强地；不近人情地 | |
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138
incensed
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| 盛怒的 | |
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139
dilemma
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| n.困境，进退两难的局面 | |
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140
straightforward
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| adj.正直的，坦率的；易懂的，简单的 | |
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141
frankly
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| adv.坦白地，直率地；坦率地说 | |
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142
tortuous
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| adj.弯弯曲曲的，蜿蜒的 | |
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143
interpretations
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| n.解释( interpretation的名词复数 )；表演；演绎；理解 | |
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144
permanently
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| adv.永恒地，永久地，固定不变地 | |
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145
tumults
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| 吵闹( tumult的名词复数 )； 喧哗； 激动的吵闹声； 心烦意乱 | |
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146
malevolent
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| adj.有恶意的，恶毒的 | |
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147
motives
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| n.动机，目的( motive的名词复数 ) | |
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148
benevolent
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| adj.仁慈的，乐善好施的 | |
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149
decadence
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| n.衰落，颓废 | |
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150
peculiar
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| adj.古怪的，异常的；特殊的，特有的 | |
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151
gambling
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| n.赌博；投机 | |
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152
legislated
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| v.立法，制定法律( legislate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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153
imprisoned
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| 下狱，监禁( imprison的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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154
deliberately
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| adv.审慎地；蓄意地；故意地 | |
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155
slaying
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| 杀戮。 | |
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156
appreciable
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| adj.明显的，可见的，可估量的，可觉察的 | |
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157
besieged
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| 包围，围困，围攻( besiege的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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158
custody
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| n.监护，照看，羁押，拘留 | |
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159
friendliness
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| n.友谊，亲切，亲密 | |
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160
inviting
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| adj.诱人的，引人注目的 | |
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161
ashore
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| adv.在(向)岸上，上岸 | |
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162
justified
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| a.正当的，有理的 | |
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163
loyalty
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| n.忠诚，忠心 | |
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164
ministry
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| n.(政府的)部；牧师 | |
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165
generosity
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| n.大度，慷慨，慷慨的行为 | |
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166
censure
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| v./n.责备；非难；责难 | |
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167
prospect
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| n.前景，前途；景色，视野 | |
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168
shutters
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| 百叶窗( shutter的名词复数 )； （照相机的）快门 | |
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169
convoy
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| vt.护送，护卫，护航；n.护送；护送队 | |
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170
futile
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| adj.无效的，无用的，无希望的 | |
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171
sloth
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| n.[动]树懒；懒惰，懒散 | |
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172
depleted
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| adj. 枯竭的, 废弃的 动词deplete的过去式和过去分词 | |
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173
nucleus
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| n.核，核心，原子核 | |
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174
pestilence
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| n.瘟疫 | |
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175
doomed
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| 命定的 | |
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176
gallant
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| adj.英勇的，豪侠的；(向女人)献殷勤的 | |
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177
isles
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| 岛( isle的名词复数 ) | |
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178
accomplished
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| adj.有才艺的；有造诣的；达到了的 | |
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179
antiquated
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| adj.陈旧的，过时的 | |
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180
insufficient
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| adj.(for，of)不足的，不够的 | |
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181
mania
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| n.疯狂；躁狂症，狂热，癖好 | |
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182
obsessing
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| v.时刻困扰( obsess的现在分词 )；缠住；使痴迷；使迷恋 | |
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183
disastrous
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| adj.灾难性的，造成灾害的；极坏的，很糟的 | |
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184
defensive
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| adj.防御的；防卫的；防守的 | |
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185
harassing
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| v.侵扰，骚扰( harass的现在分词 )；不断攻击（敌人） | |
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186
peril
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| n.(严重的)危险；危险的事物 | |
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187
piecemeal
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| adj.零碎的；n.片，块；adv.逐渐地；v.弄成碎块 | |
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188
possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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189
delusion
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| n.谬见，欺骗，幻觉，迷惑 | |
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190
adversaries
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| n.对手，敌手( adversary的名词复数 ) | |
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191
encompass
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| vt.围绕，包围；包含，包括；完成 | |
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192
catastrophe
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| n.大灾难，大祸 | |
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193
pertinacity
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| n.执拗，顽固 | |
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194
advisers
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| 顾问，劝告者( adviser的名词复数 )； （指导大学新生学科问题等的）指导教授 | |
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195
enthusiast
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| n.热心人，热衷者 | |
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