(MARCH-JUNE 1809)
When, upon February 20, the plague-stricken remnant of the much-enduring garrison1 of Saragossa laid down their arms at the feet of Lannes, it seemed probable that the whole of North-Eastern Spain must fall a helpless prey2 to the invader3. The time had come when the 3rd and the 5th Corps4, freed from the long strain of the siege, were once more available for field-operations. For the last two months almost every dispatch that the Emperor or King Joseph wrote, had been filled with plans and projects that began with the words ‘When Saragossa shall have fallen.’ If only Palafox and his desperate bands were removed, it would be easy to trample5 down Aragon, to take Catalonia in the rear, and finally to march to the gates of Valencia, and end the struggle on the eastern coast.
Now at last the 30,000 men of Mortier and Junot could be turned to other tasks, and there seemed to be every reason to expect that they would suffice to carry out the Emperor’s designs. There was no army which could be opposed to them, for, only a few days after the capitulation of Saragossa, Reding had risked and lost the battle of Valls, and the wrecks6 of his host had taken refuge within the walls of Tarragona.
The only surviving Spanish force which was under arms in the valley of the Ebro consisted of the single division, not more than 4,000 strong, under the Marquis of Lazan. After his vain attempt to come to the rescue of Saragossa in the early days of February, Lazan had drawn7 back to Fraga and Monzon, forced to look on from afar at the last stage of his brother’s desperate resistance. In the rest of the kingdom of Aragon there were but two or three scattered8 battalions9 of new levies11[504], and some guerrilla bands under Perena and other chiefs.
[p. 407]
The mistaken policy which had led Joseph Palafox to shut up in Saragossa not only his own army but also the succours which he had procured12 from Valencia and Murcia, now bore its fruit. There was no force left which could take the field against the victorious13 army of Lannes. It seemed therefore that the war in Aragon must come to a speedy end: the French had but to advance and the whole kingdom must fall into their hands. The national cause, however, was not quite so desperate as might have been supposed. Here, as in other regions of Spain, it was ere long to be discovered that it was one thing to destroy a Spanish army, and another to hold down a Spanish province. A French corps that was irresistible14 when concentrated on the field of battle, became vulnerable when forced to divide itself into the number of small garrisons15 that were needed for the permanent retention16 of the territory that it had won. Though the capital of Aragon and its chief towns were to remain in the hands of the enemy for the next five years, yet there were always rugged17 corners of the land where the struggle was kept up and the invader baffled and held in check.
Yet immediately after the fall of Saragossa it seemed for a space that Aragon might settle down beneath the invader’s heel. Lannes, whose health was still bad, returned to France, but Mortier and Junot, who now once more resumed that joint19 responsibility that they had shared in December, went forth20 conquering and to conquer. They so divided their efforts that the 5th Corps operated for the most part to the north, and the 3rd Corps to the south of the Ebro, though occasionally their lines of operations crossed each other.
The kingdom of Aragon consists of three well-marked divisions. On each side of the Ebro there is a wide and fertile plain, generally some thirty miles broad. But to the north and the south of this rich valley lie range on range of rugged hills. Those on the north are the lower spurs of the Pyrenees: those to the south form part of the great central ganglion of the Sierras of Central Spain, which lies just where Aragon, Valencia, and New Castile meet.
The valley of the Ebro gave the French little trouble: it was not a region that could easily offer resistance, for it was destitute21 of all natural defences. Moreover, the flower of its manhood[p. 408] had been enrolled22 in the battalions which had perished at Saragossa, and few were left in the country-side who were capable of bearing arms—still fewer who possessed23 them. The plain of Central Aragon lay exhausted24 at the victor’s feet. It was otherwise with the mountains of the north and the south, which contain some of the most difficult ground in the whole of Spain. There the rough and sturdy hill-folk found every opportunity for resistance, and when once they had learnt by experience the limitations of the invader’s power, were able to keep up a petty warfare25 without an end. Partisans26 like Villacampa in the southern hills, and Mina in the Pyrenean valleys along the edge of Navarre, succeeded in maintaining themselves against every expedition that was sent against them. Always hunted, often brought to bay, they yet were never crushed or destroyed.
But in March 1809 the Aragonese had not yet recognized their own opportunities: the disaster of Saragossa had struck such a deep blow that apathy27 and despair seemed to have spread over the greater part of the kingdom. When Mortier and Junot, after giving their corps a short rest, began to spread movable columns abroad, there was at first no resistance. The inaccessible28 fortress29 of Jaca in the foot-hills of the Pyrenees surrendered at the first summons; its garrison was only 500 strong, yet it should have made some sort of defence against a force consisting of no more than a single regiment30 of Mortier’s corps, without artillery31. [March 21[505].] The fall of this place was important, as it commands the only pass in the Central Pyrenees which is anything better than mule-track. Though barely practicable for artillery or light vehicles, it was useful for communication between Saragossa and France, and gave the French army of Aragon a line of communication of its own, independent of the long and circuitous32 route by Tudela and Pampeluna.
[p. 409]
Other columns of Mortier’s corps marched against Monzon and Fraga, the chief towns in the valley of the Cinca. On their approach the Marquis of Lazan retired34 down the Ebro to Tortosa, and both towns were occupied without offering resistance. Another column marched against Mequinenza, the fortress at the junction35 of the Ebro and Segre: here, however, they met with opposition36; the place was only protected by antiquated37 sixteenth-century fortifications, but it twice refused to surrender, though on the second occasion Mortier himself appeared before its walls with a whole brigade. The Marshal did not besiege38 it, deferring39 this task till he should have got all of Eastern Aragon well in hand. At this same time he made an attempt to open communications with St. Cyr in Catalonia, sending a regiment of cavalry40 under Colonel Briche to strike across the mountains beyond the Segre in search of the 7th Corps. Briche executed half his mission, for by great good fortune combined with very rapid movement, he slipped between Lerida and Mequinenza, got down into the coast-plain and met Chabot’s division of St. Cyr’s army at Montblanch. When, however, he tried to return to Aragon, in order to convey to the Duke of Treviso the information as to the distribution of the 7th Corps, he was beset41 by the somatenes, who were now on the alert. So vigorously was he assailed42 that he was forced to turn back and seek refuge with Chabot. Thus Mortier gained none of the news that he sought, and very naturally came to the conclusion that his flying column had been captured or cut to pieces.
Meanwhile Junot and the 3rd Corps were operating south of the Ebro. The Duke of Abrantes sent one of his three divisions (that of Grandjean) against Caspe, Alca?iz, and the valleys of the Guadalope and Martin, while another (that of Musnier) moved out against the highlands of the south, and the mountain-towns of Daroca and Molina. Most of the battalions of his third division, that of Morlot, were still engaged in guarding on their way to France the prisoners of Saragossa.
Of the two expeditions which Junot sent out, that which entered the mountains effected little. It lost several small detachments, cut off by the local insurgents43, and though it ultimately penetrated44 as far as Molina, it was unable to hold[p. 410] the place. The whole population had fled, and after remaining there only six days, the French were forced to return to the plains by want of food. [March 22—April 10.] The Aragonese at once came back to their former position.
Grandjean, who had moved against Alca?iz, had at first more favourable45 fortune. He overran with great ease all the low-lying country south of the Ebro, and met with so little opposition that he resolved to push his advance even beyond the borders of Valencia. Accordingly he ascended46 the valley of the Bercantes, and appeared before Morella, the frontier town of that kingdom, on March 18. The place was strong, but there was only a very small garrison in charge of it[506], which retired after a slight skirmish, abandoning the fortress and a large store of food and equipment. If Grandjean could have held Morella, he would have secured for the French army a splendid base for further operations. But he had left many men behind him at Caspe and Alca?iz, and had but a few battalions in hand. He had gone too far forward to be safe, and when the Junta47 of Valencia sent against him the whole of the forces that they could collect—some 5,000 men under General Roca—he was compelled to evacuate48 Morella and to fall back on Alca?iz. [March 25.]
Mortier and Junot were concerting a joint movement for the completion of the conquest of Eastern Aragon, and an advance against Tortosa, when orders from Paris suddenly changed the whole face of affairs. The Emperor saw that war with Austria was inevitable49 and imminent50: disquieted51 as to the strength of the new enemy, he resolved to draw troops from Spain to reinforce the army of the Danube. The only corps which seemed to him available was that of Mortier, and on April 5 he ordered that the Duke of Treviso should concentrate his troops and draw back to Tudela and Logro?o. It might still prove to be unnecessary to remove the 5th Corps from the Peninsula; but at Logro?o it would be within four marches of France if the Emperor discovered that he had need of its services in the north. On the same day Napoleon removed Junot from his command, probably[p. 411] on account of the numerous complaints as to his conduct sent in by King Joseph. To replace him General Suchet, the commander of one of Mortier’s divisions, was directed to take charge of the 3rd Corps[507].
Ten days later the imperial mandate52 reached Saragossa, and on receiving it Mortier massed his troops and marched away to Tudela. We have already seen[508] that his corps was never withdrawn53 from Spain, but merely moved from Aragon to Old Castile. But its departure completely changed the balance of fortune on the Lower Ebro. The number of French troops in that direction was suddenly reduced by one half, and the 3rd Corps had to spread itself out to the north, in order to take over all the positions evacuated55 by Mortier. It was far too weak for the duty committed to its charge, and at this moment it had not even received back the brigade sent to guard the Saragossa prisoners, which (it will be remembered) had been called off and lent to Kellermann[509]. There were hardly 15,000 troops left in the whole kingdom of Aragon, and these were dispersed56 in small bodies, with the design of holding down as much ground as possible. The single division of Grandjean had to cover the whole line from Barbastro to Alca?iz—places seventy miles apart—with less than 5,000 bayonets. The second division, Musnier’s, with its head quarters at Saragossa, had to watch the mountains of Upper Aragon. Of the 3rd division, that of Morlot, the few battalions that were available were garrisoning57 Jaca and Tudela, on the borders of Navarre. No sooner had Mortier’s corps departed, than a series of small reverses occurred, the inevitable results of the attempt to hold down large districts with an inadequate58 force. Junot, who was still retained in command till his successor should arrive, seemed to lack the courage to draw in his exposed detachments: probably his heart was no longer in the business, since he was under sentence of recall. Yet he had six weeks of work before him, for by some mischance the dispatch nominating Suchet to take his place reached Saragossa after that general had marched off at the head of his old division of Mortier’s corps. Cross-communi[p. 412]cation being tardy59 and difficult, it failed to catch him up till he had reached Valladolid. Returning from thence with a slow-moving escort of infantry60, Suchet did not succeed in joining his corps till May 19. He found it in a desperate situation, for the last four weeks had seen an almost unbroken series of petty reverses, and it looked as if the whole of Aragon was about to slip out of the hands of the French. It was fortunate for the 3rd Corps that its new commander, though hitherto he had never been placed in a position of independent responsibility, proved to be a man of courage and resource—perhaps indeed the most capable of all the French generals who took part in the Peninsular War. A timid or unskilful leader might have lost Aragon, and imperilled the hold of King Joseph on Madrid. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that the entire French position in Spain would have been gravely compromised if during the last weeks of May the 3rd Corps had been under the charge of a less skilful61 and self-reliant commander.
In the month that elapsed before Suchet’s arrival the consequences of the withdrawal62 of the 5th Corps from the Lower Ebro were making themselves felt. The Aragonese were not slow to discover the decrease in the numbers of the invaders63, and to note the long distances that now intervened between post and post. The partisans who had retired into Catalonia, or had taken refuge in the mountains of the south and the north, began to descend64 into the plains and to fall upon the outlying French detachments. On May 6 Colonel Perena came out of Lerida, and beset the detachment of Grandjean’s division which held the town and fortress of Monzon, with a horde65 of peasants and some Catalan miqueletes. The governor, Solnicki, thereupon fell back to Barbastro, the head quarters of Habert’s brigade. That general considered that he was in duty bound to retake Monzon, and marched against it with six battalions and a regiment of cuirassiers. He tried to cross the Cinca, not opposite the town, but much lower down the stream, at the ferry of Pomar. [May 16.] But just as his vanguard[510] had[p. 413] established itself on the other bank, a sudden storm caused such a rising of the waters that its communication with the main body was completely cut off. Thereupon Habert marched northward66, and tried to force a passage at Monzon, so as to secure a line of retreat for his lost detachment. The bridge of that town however had been barricaded68, and the castle garrisoned69: Habert was held at bay, and the 1,000 men who had crossed at the ferry of Pomar were all cut off and forced to surrender. After marching for three days among the insurgents, and vainly endeavouring to force their way through the horde, they had to lay down their arms when their cartridges70 had all been exhausted. [May 19.] Only the cuirassiers escaped, by swimming the river when the flood had begun to abate71, and found their way back to Barbastro.
In consequence of this disaster the French lost their grip on the valley of the Cinca, for the insurgents, under Perena and the Catalan chief Baget, moved forward into the Sierra de Alcubierre and raised the whole country-side in their aid. Habert, fearing to be cut off from Saragossa, thereupon retired to Villafranca on the Ebro, and abandoned all North-Eastern Aragon[511].
Meanwhile the other brigade of Grandjean’s division, which still lay at Alca?iz, south of the Ebro, was also driven in by the Spaniards. Its commander Laval was attacked by a large force coming from Tortosa, and was forced to draw back to San Per and Hijar [May 18-19]. At the news of his retreat all the hill-country of Southern Aragon took arms, and the bands from Molina and the other mountain-cities extended their raids down the valley of the Huerta and almost to the gates of Saragossa.
The Spanish force which had seized Alca?iz was no mere54 body of armed peasants, but a small regular army. General[p. 414] Blake had just been given the post of commander-in-chief of all the forces of the Coronilla—the old kingdom of Aragon and its dependencies, Valencia and Catalonia. Burning to atone72 for his defeats at Zornoza and Espinosa by some brilliant feat73 of arms, he was doing his best to collect a new ‘Army of the Right.’ From Catalonia he could draw little or nothing: the troops which had fought under Reding at Valls were still cooped up in Tarragona, and unfit for field-service. But Blake had concentrated at Tortosa the division of the Marquis of Lazan—the sole surviving fraction of the old Army of Aragon—and the troops which he could draw from Valencia. These last consisted at this moment of no more than the reorganized division of Roca from the old ‘Army of the Centre.’ Its depleted74 cadres had been sent back by Infantado from Cuenca, and the Junta had shot into them a mass of recruits, who in a few weeks had raised the strength of the division from 1,500 to 5,000 bayonets. Other regiments76 were being raised in Valencia, but in the early weeks of May they were not yet ready for the field, though by June they gave Blake a reinforcement of nearly 12,000 men[512].[p. 415] Murcia could provide in May only one single battalion10 for Blake’s assistance: all its field army had perished at Saragossa. The total force of the new ‘Army of the Right’ when it advanced against Alca?iz was less than 10,000 men—the Valencians in its ranks outnumbered the Aragonese by four to three.
When Suchet therefore arrived at Saragossa on May 19, and took over the command of the 3rd Corps from the hands of Junot, the prospect77 seemed a gloomy one for the French. Their outlying detachments had been forced back to the neighbourhood of Saragossa: the central reserve (Musnier’s two brigades) was small: the third division (with the exception of one regiment) was still absent—one of its brigades was with Kellermann in Leon[513], and some detachments were scattered among the garrisons of Navarre. After the sick and the absent had been deducted78, Suchet found that he had not much more than 10,000 men under arms, though the nominal79 force of the 3rd Corps was still about 20,000 sabres and bayonets. Nor was it only in numbers that the Army of Aragon was weak: its morale80 also left much to be desired. The newly-formed regiments which composed more than half of the infantry[514] were in a deplorable condition, a natural consequence of the haste with which they had been organized and sent into the field. Having been originally composed of companies drawn from many quarters, they still showed a mixture of uniforms of different cut and colour, which gave them a motley appearance and, according to their commander, degraded them in their own eyes and lowered their self-respect[515]. They had not yet fully81 recovered from the physical and moral strain of the siege of Saragossa. Their pay was in arrear82, the military chest empty, the food procured from day to day by marauding. There was much grumbling83 among the officers, who complained that the[p. 416] promotions84 and rewards due for the capture of Saragossa had almost all been reserved for the 5th Corps. The guerrilla warfare of the last few weeks had disgusted the rank and file, who thought that Junot had been mismanaging them, and knew absolutely nothing of the successor who had just replaced him. The whole corps, says Suchet, was dejected and discontented[516].
Nevertheless there was no time to rest or reorganize these sullen86 battalions: the Spaniards were pressing in so close that it was necessary to attack them at all costs: the only other alternative would have been to abandon Saragossa. Such a step, though perhaps theoretically justifiable87 under the circumstances, would have ruined Suchet’s military career, and was far from his thoughts. Only two days after he had assumed the command of the corps, he marched out with Musnier’s division to join Laval’s troops at Hijar. [May 21.] He had sent orders to Habert to cross the Ebro and follow him as fast as he was able: but that general, who was still on the march from Barbastro to Villafranca, did not receive the dispatch in time, and failed to join his chief before the oncoming battle[517].
[p. 417]
On May 23, however, Suchet, with Musnier’s and Laval’s men, presented himself in front of Blake’s position at Alca?iz. He had fourteen battalions and five squadrons with him—a force in all of about 8,000 men, with eighteen guns[518]. He found the Spaniards ready and willing to fight. They were drawn up on a line of hills to the east of Alca?iz, covering that town and its bridge. Their position was good from a tactical point of view, but extremely dangerous when considered strategically: for Blake had been tempted88 by the strong ground into fighting with the river Guadalope at his back, and had no way of crossing it save by the single bridge of Alca?iz and a bad ford89. It was an exact reproduction of the deplorable order of battle that the Russians had adopted at Friedland in 1807, though not destined90 to lead to any such disaster. The northern and highest of the three hills occupied by the Spaniards, that called the Cerro de los Pueyos, was held by the Aragonese troops. On the central height, called the hill of Las Horcas, was placed the whole of the Spanish artillery—nineteen guns—guarded by three Valencian battalions: this part of the line was immediately in front of the bridge of Alca?iz, the sole line of retreat. The southern and lowest hill, that of La Perdiguera, was held by Roca and the rest of the Valencians, and flanked by the small body of cavalry—only 400 sabres—which Blake possessed[519].[p. 418] The whole army, not quite 9,000 strong, outnumbered the enemy by less than 800 bayonets, though in French narratives91 it is often stated at 12,000 or 15,000 men[520].
Suchet seems to have found some difficulty at first in making out the Spanish position—the hills hid from him the bridge and town of Alca?iz, whose position in rear of Blake’s centre was the dominant93 military fact of the situation. At any rate, he spent the whole morning in tentative movements, and only delivered his main stroke in the afternoon. He began by sending Laval’s brigade against the dominating hill on the right flank of the Spanish position. Two assaults were made upon the Cerro de los Pueyos, which Suchet in his autobiography94 calls feints, but which Blake considered so serious that he sent off to this flank two battalions from his left wing and the whole of his cavalry. Whether intended as mere demonstrations95 or as a real attack, these movements had no success, and were repelled96 by General Areizaga, the commander of the Aragonese, without much difficulty. The Spanish cavalry, however, was badly mauled by Suchet’s hussars when it tried to deliver a flank charge upon the enemy at the moment that he retired.
When all the fighting on the northern extremity97 of the line had died down, Suchet launched his main attack against Blake’s centre, hoping (as he says) to break the line, seize the bridge of Alca?iz, which lay just behind the hill of Las Horcas, and thus to capture the greater part of the Spanish wings, which would have no line of retreat. The attack was delivered by two of[p. 419] Musnier’s regiments[521] formed in columns of battalions, and acting98 in a single mass—a force of over 2,600 men. A column of this strength often succeeded in bursting through a Spanish line during the Peninsular War. But on this day Suchet was unlucky, or his troops did not display the usual élan of French infantry. They advanced steadily99 enough across the flat ground, and began to climb the hill, in spite of the rapid and accurate fire of the artillery which crowned its summit. But when the fire of musketry from the Spanish left began to beat upon their flank, and the guns opened with grape, the attacking columns came to a standstill at the line of a ditch cut in the slope. Their officers made every effort to carry them forward for the few hundred yards that separated them from the Spanish guns, but the mass wavered, surged helplessly for a few minutes under the heavy fire, and then dispersed and fled in disorder100. Suchet rallied them behind the five intact battalions which he still possessed, but refused to renew the attack, and drew off ere night. He himself had been wounded in the foot at the close of the action, and his troops had suffered heavily—their loss must have been at least 700 or 800 men[522]. Blake, who had lost no more than 300, did not attempt to pursue, fearing to expose his troops in the plain to the assaults of the French cavalry.
The morale of the 3rd Corps had been so much shaken by its unsuccessful début under its new commander, that a panic broke out after dark among Laval’s troops, who fled in all directions, on a false alarm that the Spanish cavalry had attacked and captured the rearguard. Next morning the army poured into San Per and Hijar in complete disorder, and some hours had to be spent in restoring discipline. Suchet discovered the man who had started the cry of sauve qui peut, and had him shot before the day was over[523].
[p. 420]
The French had expected to be pursued, and many critics have blamed Blake for not making the most of his victory and following the defeated enemy at full speed. The Spanish general, however, had good reasons for his quiescence101: he saw that Suchet’s force was almost as large as his own; he could not match the French in cavalry; and having noted102 the orderly fashion in which they had left the battle-field, he could not have guessed that during the night they would disband in panic. Moreover—and this was the most important point—he was expecting to receive in a few days reinforcements from Valencia which would more than double his numbers. Till they had come up he would not move, but contented85 himself with sending the news of Alca?iz all over Aragon and stimulating103 the activity of the insurgents. As he had hoped, the results of his victory were important—the French had to evacuate every outlying post that they possessed, and the whole of the open country passed into the hands of the patriots104. Perena and the insurgents of the north bank of the Ebro pressed close in to Saragossa: other bands threatened the high-road to Tudela: thousands of recruits flocked into Blake’s camp, but he was unfortunately unable to arm or utilize105 them.
Within a few days, however, he began to receive the promised reinforcements from Valencia—a number of fresh regiments from the rear, and drafts for the corps that were already with him[524]. He also used his authority as supreme106 commander in Catalonia to draw some reinforcements from that principality—three battalions of Reding’s Granadan troops and one of miqueletes: no more could be spared from in front of the active St. Cyr. Within three weeks after his victory of Alca?iz he had collected an army of 25,000 men, and considered himself strong enough to commence the march upon Saragossa. It was in his power to advance directly upon the city by the high-road along the[p. 421] Ebro, and to challenge Suchet to a battle outside its southern gates. He did not, however, make this move, but with a caution that he did not often display, kept to the mountains and marched by a side-road to Belchite [June 12]. Here he received news of Napoleon’s check at Essling, which had happened on the twenty-second of the preceding month; it was announced as a complete and crushing defeat of the Emperor, and encouraged the Spaniards in no small degree.
From Belchite Blake, still keeping to the mountains, pursued his march eastward107 to Villanueva in the valley of the Huerba. This move revealed his design; he was about to place himself in a position from which he could threaten Suchet’s lines of communication with Tudela and Logro?o, and so compel him either to abandon Saragossa without fighting, or to come out and attack the Spanish army among the hills. Blake, in short, was trying to man?uvre his enemy out of Saragossa, or to induce him to fight another offensive action such as that of Alca?iz had been. After the experience of May 25 he thought that he could trust his army to hold its ground, though he was not willing to risk an advance in the open, across the level plain in front of Saragossa.
Suchet meanwhile had concentrated his whole available force in that city and its immediate18 neighbourhood; he had drawn in every man save a single column of two battalions, which was lying at La Muela under General Fabre, with orders to keep back the insurgents of the southern mountains from making a dash at Alagon and cutting the high-road to Tudela. He had been writing letters to Madrid, couched in the most urgent terms, to beg for reinforcements. But just at this moment the Asturian expedition had drawn away to the north all the troops in Old Castile. King Joseph could do no more than promise that the two regiments from the 3rd Corps which had been lent to Kellermann should be summoned back, and directed to make forced marches on Saragossa. He could spare nothing save these six battalions, believing it impossible to deplete75 the garrison of Madrid, or to draw from Valladolid the single division of Mortier’s corps, which was at this moment the only solid force remaining in the valley of the Douro.
Suchet was inclined to believe that he might be attacked[p. 422] before this small reinforcement of 3,000 men could arrive, and feared that, with little more than 10,000 sabres and bayonets, he would risk defeat if he attacked Blake in the mountains. The conduct of his troops in and after the battle of Alca?iz had not tended to make him hopeful of the result of another action of the same kind. Nevertheless, when Blake came down into the valley of the Huerba, and began to threaten his communications, he resolved that he must fight once again; the alternative course, the evacuation of Saragossa and a retreat up the Ebro, would have been too humiliating. Suchet devoted108 the three weeks of respite109 which the slow advance of the enemy allowed him to the reorganization of his corps. He made strenuous110 exertions111 to clothe it, and to provide it with its arrears112 of pay. He inspected every regiment in person, sought out and remedied grievances113, displaced a number of unsatisfactory officers, and promoted many deserving individuals. He claims that the improvement in the morale of the troops during the three weeks when they lay encamped at Saragossa was enormous[525], and his statements may be verified in the narrative92 of one of his subordinates, who remarks that neither Moncey nor Junot had ever shown that keen personal interest in the corps which Suchet always displayed, and that the troops considered their new chief both more genial114 and more business-like than any general they had hitherto seen, and so resolved to do their best for him[526].
Forced to fight, but not by any means confident of victory, the French commander discharged on to Tudela and Pampeluna his sick, his heavy baggage, and his parks, before marching out to meet Blake upon June 14. The enemy, though still clinging to the skirts of the hills, had now moved so close to Saragossa that it was clear that he must be attacked at once, though Suchet would have preferred to wait a few days longer, till he should have rallied the brigade from Old Castile. These two regiments, under Colonel Robert, had now passed Tudela, and were expected to arrive on the fifteenth or sixteenth. But Blake had now descended115 the valley of the Huerba, and had pushed his outposts to within ten or twelve miles of Saragossa. He had reorganized his army[p. 423] into three divisions, one of which (mainly composed of Aragonese troops) was placed under General Areizaga, while Roca and the Marquis of Lazan headed the two others, in which the Valencian levies predominated. Of the total of 25,000 men which the muster-rolls showed, 20,000 were in line: the rest were detached or in hospital. There were about 1,000 untrustworthy cavalry and twenty-five guns.
In his final advance down the Huerba, Blake moved in two columns. Areizaga’s division kept to the right bank and halted at Botorrita, some sixteen miles from Saragossa. The Commander-in-chief, with the other two divisions, marched on the left bank, and pushing further forward than his lieutenant116, reached the village of Maria, twelve miles from the south-western front of the city. A distance of six or seven miles separated the two corps. Thus Blake had taken the strategical offensive, but was endeavouring to retain the tactical defensive117, by placing himself in a position where the enemy must attack him. But he seems to have made a grave mistake in keeping his columns so far apart, on different roads and with a river between them. It should have been his object to make sure that every man was on the field when the critical moment should arrive.
Already on the morning of the fourteenth the two armies came into contact. Musnier’s division met the Spanish vanguard, thrust it back some way, but then came upon Blake and the main body, and had to give ground. Suchet, on the same evening, established his head quarters at the Abbey of Santa Fé, and there dictated118 his orders for the battle of the following day. Having ascertained119 that Areizaga’s division was the weaker of the two Spanish columns, he left opposite it, on the Monte Torrero, a mile and a half outside Saragossa, only a single brigade—five battalions—under General Laval, who had now become the commander of the 1st Division, for Grandjean had been sent back to France. Protected by the line of the canal of Aragon, these 2,000 men[527] were to do their best to beat off any attack which Areizaga might make against the city, while the main bodies of both armies were engaged elsewhere. The charge[p. 424] of Saragossa itself was given over to Colonel Haxo, who had but a single battalion of infantry[528] and the sapper-companies of the army.
Having set aside these 3,000 men to guard his flank and rear, Suchet could only bring forward Musnier’s division, and the remaining brigade of Laval’s division (that of Habert), with two other battalions, for the main attack. But he retained with himself the whole of his cavalry and all his artillery, save one single battery left with the troops on Monte Torrero. This gave him fourteen battalions—about 7,500 infantry—800 horse, and twelve guns—less than 9,000 men in all—to commence the battle. But he was encouraged to risk an attack by the news that the brigade from Tudela was now close at hand, and could reach the field by noon with 3,000 bayonets more. It would seem that Suchet (though he does not say so in his Mémoires) held back during the morning hours, in order to allow this heavy reserve time to reach the fighting-ground.
Blake was in order of battle along the line of a rolling hill separated from the French lines by less than a mile. Behind his front were two other similar spurs of the Sierra de la Muela, each separated from the other by a steep ravine. On his right flank was the river Huerba, with level fields half a mile broad between the water’s edge and the commencement of the rising ground. The village of Maria lay to his right rear, some way up the stream. The Spaniards were drawn out in two lines, Roca’s division on the northernmost ridge67, Lazan’s in its rear on the second, while the cavalry filled the space between the hills and the river. Two battalions and half a battery were in reserve, in front of Maria. The rest of the artillery was placed in the intervals121 of the first line.
The French occupied a minor122 line of heights facing Blake’s front: Habert’s brigade held the left, near the river, having the two cavalry regiments of Wathier in support. Musnier’s division formed the centre and right: a squadron of Polish lancers was placed far out upon its flank. The only reserve consisted of the two stray battalions which did not belong[p. 425] either to Musnier or Habert—one of the 5th Léger, another of the 64th of the Line[529].
Blake’s army was slow in taking up its ground, while Suchet did not wish to move till the brigade from Tudela had got within supporting distance. Hence in the morning hours there was no serious collision. But at last the Spaniards took the initiative, and pushed a cautious advance against Suchet’s left, apparently123 with the object of worrying him into assuming the offensive rather than of delivering a serious attack. But the cloud of skirmishers sent against Habert’s front grew so thick and pushed so far forward, that at last the whole brigade was seriously engaged, and the artillery was obliged to open upon the swarm124 of Spanish tirailleurs. They fell back when the shells began to drop among them, and sought refuge by retiring nearer to their main body[530].
About midday the bickering125 died down on the French left, but shortly after the fire broke out with redoubled energy in another direction. Disappointed that he could not induce Suchet to attack him, Blake had at last resolved to take the offensive himself, and columns were seen descending126 from his extreme left wing, evidently with the intention of turning the French right. Having thus made up his mind to strike, the Spanish general should have sent prompt orders to his detached division under Areizaga, to bid it cross the Huerba with all possible[p. 426] speed, and hasten to join the main body before the engagement had grown hot. It could certainly have arrived in two hours, since it was but six or seven miles away. But Blake made no attempt to call in this body of 6,000 men (the best troops in his army) or to utilize it in any way. He only employed the two divisions that were under his hand on the hillsides above Maria.
The attack on the French right, made between one and two o’clock, precipitated127 matters. When Suchet saw the Spanish battalions beginning to descend from the ridge, he ordered his Polish lancers to charge them in flank, and attacked them in front with part of the 114th regiment and some voltigeur companies. The enemy was thrown back, and retired to rejoin his main body. Then, before they were fully rearranged in line of battle, the French general bade the whole of Musnier’s division advance, and storm the Spanish position. He was emboldened128 to press matters to an issue by the joyful129 news that the long-expected brigade from Tudela had passed Saragossa, and would be on the field in a couple of hours.
The eight battalions of the 114th, 115th, and the 1st of the Vistula crossed the valley and fell upon the Spanish line between two and three o’clock in the afternoon. Roca’s men met them with resolution, and the fighting was for some time indecisive. Along part of the front the French gained ground, but at other points they were beaten back, and to repair a severe check suffered by the 115th, Suchet had to engage half his reserve, the battalion of the 64th, and to draw into the fight the 2nd of the Vistula from Habert’s brigade upon the left. This movement restored the line, but nothing appreciable131 had been gained, when a violent hailstorm from the north suddenly swept down upon both armies, and hid them for half an hour from each other’s sight.
Map of the battle of Alca?iz
Enlarge BATTLE of ALCA?IZ
MAY 23RD 1809
Map of the battle of Maria
Enlarge BATTLE of MARIA
JUNE 15TH 1809
Before it was over, Suchet learnt that Robert and his brigade had arrived at the Abbey of Santa Fé, on his right rear. He therefore resolved to throw into the battle the wing of his army which he had hitherto held back,—Habert’s battalions and the cavalry. When the storm had passed over, they advanced against the Spanish right, in the low ground near the river. The three battalions[531] of infantry led the way, but when their [p. 427]fire had begun to take effect, Suchet bade his hussars and cuirassiers charge through the intervals of the front line. The troops here opposed to them consisted of 600 cavalry under General O’Donoju—the whole of the horsemen that Blake possessed, for the rest of his squadrons were with Areizaga, far away from the field.
The charge of Wathier’s two regiments proved decisive: the Spanish horse did not wait to cross sabres, but broke and fled from the field, exposing the flank of the battalions which lay next them in the line. The cuirassiers and hussars rolled up these unfortunate troops, and hunted them along the high-road as far as the outskirts132 of Maria; here they came upon and rode down the two battalions which Blake had left there as a last reserve, and captured the half-battery that accompanied them.
The Spanish right was annihilated133, and—what was worse—Blake had lost possession of the only road by which he could withdraw and join Areizaga. Meanwhile Habert’s battalions had not followed the cavalry in their charge, but had turned upon the exposed flank of the Spanish centre, and were attacking it in side and rear. It is greatly to Blake’s credit that his firmness did not give way in this distressing134 moment. He threw back his right, and sent up into line such of Lazan’s battalions from his rear line as had not yet been drawn into the fight. Thus he saved himself from utter disaster, and though losing ground all through the evening hours, kept his men together, and finally left the field in a solid mass, retiring over the hills and ravines to the southward. ‘The Spaniards,’ wrote an eye-witness, ‘went off the field in perfect order and with a good military bearing[532].’ But they had been forced to leave behind them all their guns save two, for they had no road, and could not drag the artillery up the rugged slopes by which they saved themselves. Blake also lost 1,000 killed, three or four times that number of wounded, and some hundreds of prisoners.[p. 428] The steadiness of the retreat is vouched135 for by the small number of flags captured by the French—only three out of the thirty-four that had been upon the field. Suchet, according to his own account, had lost no more than between 700 and 800 men.
When safe from pursuit the beaten army crossed the Huerba far above Maria, and rejoined Areizaga’s division at Botorrita on the right bank of that stream.
Next morning, to his surprise, Suchet learnt that the enemy was still in position at Botorrita and was showing a steady front. The victor did not march directly against Blake, as might have been expected, but ordered Laval, with the troops that had been guarding Saragossa, to turn the Spaniards’ right, while he himself man?uvred to get round their left. These cautious proceedings136 would seem to indicate that the French army had been more exhausted by the battle of the previous day than Suchet concedes. The turning movements failed, and Blake drew off undisturbed at nightfall, and retired on that same road to Belchite by which he had marched on Saragossa, in such high hopes, only four days back.
The battle of Maria had been on the whole very creditable to the Valencian troops. But the subsequent course of events was lamentable137. On the way to Belchite many of the raw levies began to disband themselves: the weather was bad, the road worse, and the consciousness of defeat had had time enough to sink into the minds of the soldiery. When Blake halted at Belchite, he found that he had only 12,000 men with him: deducting138 the losses of the fifteenth, there should have been at least 15,000 in line. Of artillery he possessed no more than nine guns, seven that had been with Areizaga, and two saved from Maria[533].
It can only be considered therefore a piece of mad presumption139 on the part of the Spanish general that he halted at Belchite and again offered battle to his pursuers. The position in front of that town was strong—far stronger than the ground at Maria. But the men were not the same; on June 15 they[p. 429] had fought with confidence, proud of their victory at Alca?iz and intending to enter Saragossa in triumph next day. On June 18 they were cowed and disheartened—they had already done their best and had failed: it seemed to them hopeless to try the fortunes of war again, and they were half beaten before a shot had been fired. The mere numerical odds140, too, were no longer in their favour: at Maria, Blake had 13,000 men to Suchet’s 9,000—if we count only the troops that fought, and neglect the 3,000 French who came up late in the day, and were never engaged. At Belchite, Blake had about 12,000 men, and Suchet rather more, for he had gathered in Laval’s and Robert’s brigades—full 5,000 bayonets, and could put into line 13,000 men, even if allowance be made for his losses in the late battle[534]. It is impossible to understand the temerity141 with which the Spanish general courted a disaster, by resolving to fight a second battle only three days after he had lost the first.
Blake’s centre was in front of Belchite, in comparatively low-lying ground, much cut up by olive groves142 and enclosures. His wings were drawn up on two gentle hills, called the Calvary and El Pueyo: the left was the weaker flank, the ridge there being open and exposed. It was on this wing therefore that Suchet directed his main effort; he sent against it the whole of Musnier’s division and a regiment of cavalry, while Habert’s brigade marched to turn the right: the centre was left unattacked. The moment that Musnier’s attack was well pronounced, the whole of the Spanish left wing gave way, and fell back on Belchite, to cover itself behind the walls and olive-groves. Before the French division could be re-formed for a second attack, an even more disgraceful rout33 occurred on the right wing. Habert’s brigade had just commenced to close in upon the Spaniards, when a chance shell exploded a caisson in rear of the battery in Blake’s right-centre. The fire communicated itself to the other powder-wagons143 which were standing144 near, and the whole group blew up with a terrific report. ‘This piece of luck threw the whole line into panic,’ writes an eye-witness, ‘the enemy thought that he was attacked in the[p. 430] rear. Every man shouted Treason! whole battalions threw down their arms and bolted. The disorder spread along the entire line, and we only had to run in upon them and seize what we could. If they had not closed the town-gates, which we found it difficult to batter120 in, I fancy that the whole Spanish army would have been captured or cut to pieces. But it took some time to break down the narrow grated door, and then a battalion stood at bay in the Market Place, and had to be ridden down by our Polish lancers before we could get on. Lastly, we had to pass through another gate to make our exit, and to cross the bridge over the Aguas in a narrow formation. This gave the Spaniards time to show a clean pair of heels, and they utilized145 the chance with their constitutional agility146. We took few prisoners, but got their nine guns, some twenty munition147 wagons, and the whole of their very considerable magazines. General Suchet wrote up a splendid account of the elaborate man?uvres that he made. But I believe that my tale is nearer to the facts, and that the order of battle which he published was composed après coup130. The whole affair did not last long enough for him to carry out the various dispositions148 which he details[535].’
The whole Spanish army was scattered to the winds. It was some days before the Aragonese and Catalans began to rally at Tortosa, and the Valencians at Morella. The total loss in the battle had not been large—Suchet says that only one regiment was actually surrounded and cut to pieces, and only one flag taken[536]. But of the 25,000 men who had formed the ‘Army of the Right’ on June 1, not 10,000 were available a month later, and these were in a state of demoralization which would have made it impossible to take them into action.
Suchet was therefore able to set himself at leisure to the task of reducing the plains of Aragon, whose control had passed out of his hands in May. He left Musnier’s division at Alca?iz to watch all that was left of Blake’s army, while he marched with the other two to overrun the central valley of the Ebro. On[p. 431] June 23 he seized Caspe and its long wooden bridge, and crossed the river. Next he occupied Fraga and Monzon, and left Habert[537] and the 3rd division to watch the valley of the Cinca. With the remaining division, that of Laval, he marched back to Saragossa [July 1], sweeping149 the open country clear of guerrilla bands. Then he sat down for a space in the Aragonese capital, to busy himself in administrative150 schemes for the governance of the kingdom, and in preparation for a systematic151 campaign against the numerous insurgents of the northern and southern mountains, who still remained under arms and seemed to have been little affected152 by the disasters of Maria and Belchite.
Thus ended Blake’s invasion of Aragon, an undertaking153 which promised well from the day of Alca?iz down to the battle of June 15. It miscarried mainly through the gross tactical error which the general made in dividing his army, and fighting at Maria with only two-thirds of his available force. His strategy down to the actual moment of battle seems to have been well-considered and prudent154. If he had put the Aragonese division of Areizaga in line between the river and the hill, instead of his handful of untrustworthy cavalry, it seems likely that a second Alca?iz might have been fought on the fatal fifteenth of June. For Suchet’s infantry attack had miscarried, and it was only the onslaught of his cavalry that won the day. Had that charge failed, Saragossa must have been evacuated that night, and the 3rd Corps would have been forced back on Navarre—to the entire dislocation of all other French operations in Spain. If King Joseph had received the news of the loss of Aragon in the same week in which he learnt that Soult and Ney had evacuated Galicia, and Kellermann the Asturias, he would probably have called back Victor and Sebastiani and abandoned Madrid. For a disaster in the valley of the Douro or the Ebro, as Napoleon once observed, is the most fatal blow of all to an invader based on the north, and makes central Spain untenable. While wondering at Blake’s errors, we must not forget to lay part of the blame at the door of his lieutenant Areizaga—the incapable155 man who afterwards lost the fatal fight of Oca?a.[p. 432] An officer of sound views, when left without orders, would have ‘marched to the cannon156’ and appeared on the field of Maria in the afternoon. Areizaga sat quiescent157, six miles from the battle-field, while the cannon were thundering in his ears from eleven in the morning till six in the afternoon!
As for Suchet, we see that he took a terrible risk, and came safely through the ordeal158. There were many reasons for evacuating159 Saragossa, when Blake came down the valley of the Huerba to cut the communications of the 3rd Corps. But an enterprising general just making his début in independent command, could not well take the responsibility of retreat without first trying the luck of battle. Fortune favoured the brave, and a splendid victory saved Saragossa and led to the reconquest of the lost plains of Aragon. Yet, with another cast of the dice160, Maria might have proved a defeat, and Suchet have gone down to history as a rash officer who imperilled the whole fate of the French army in Spain by trying to face over-great odds.
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1
garrison
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| n.卫戍部队；驻地，卫戍区；vt.派(兵)驻防 | |
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prey
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| n.被掠食者，牺牲者，掠食；v.捕食，掠夺，折磨 | |
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3
invader
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| n.侵略者，侵犯者，入侵者 | |
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corps
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| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
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5
trample
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| vt.踩，践踏；无视，伤害，侵犯 | |
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6
wrecks
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| n.沉船( wreck的名词复数 )；（事故中）遭严重毁坏的汽车（或飞机等）；（身体或精神上）受到严重损伤的人；状况非常糟糕的车辆（或建筑物等）v.毁坏[毁灭]某物( wreck的第三人称单数 )；使（船舶）失事，使遇难，使下沉 | |
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7
drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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scattered
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| adj.分散的，稀疏的；散步的；疏疏落落的 | |
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9
battalions
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| n.（陆军的）一营（大约有一千兵士）( battalion的名词复数 )；协同作战的部队；军队；（组织在一起工作的）队伍 | |
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10
battalion
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| n.营；部队；大队(的人) | |
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11
levies
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| （部队）征兵( levy的名词复数 )； 募捐； 被征募的军队 | |
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12
procured
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| v.（努力）取得， （设法）获得( procure的过去式和过去分词 )；拉皮条 | |
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13
victorious
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| adj.胜利的，得胜的 | |
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14
irresistible
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| adj.非常诱人的，无法拒绝的，无法抗拒的 | |
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15
garrisons
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| 守备部队，卫戍部队( garrison的名词复数 ) | |
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16
retention
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| n.保留，保持，保持力，记忆力 | |
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rugged
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| adj.高低不平的，粗糙的，粗壮的，强健的 | |
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immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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19
joint
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| adj.联合的，共同的；n.关节，接合处；v.连接，贴合 | |
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20
forth
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| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
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destitute
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| adj.缺乏的；穷困的 | |
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enrolled
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| adj.入学登记了的v.[亦作enrol]( enroll的过去式和过去分词 )；登记，招收，使入伍（或入会、入学等），参加，成为成员；记入名册；卷起，包起 | |
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23
possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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exhausted
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| adj.极其疲惫的，精疲力尽的 | |
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25
warfare
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| n.战争(状态)；斗争；冲突 | |
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partisans
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| 游击队员( partisan的名词复数 )； 党人； 党羽； 帮伙 | |
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apathy
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| n.漠不关心，无动于衷；冷淡 | |
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inaccessible
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| adj.达不到的，难接近的 | |
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fortress
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| n.堡垒，防御工事 | |
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regiment
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| n.团，多数，管理；v.组织，编成团，统制 | |
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31
artillery
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| n.(军)火炮，大炮；炮兵(部队) | |
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circuitous
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| adj.迂回的路的，迂曲的，绕行的 | |
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rout
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| n.溃退，溃败；v.击溃，打垮 | |
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retired
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| adj.隐退的，退休的，退役的 | |
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junction
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| n.连接，接合；交叉点，接合处，枢纽站 | |
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opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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antiquated
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| adj.陈旧的，过时的 | |
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besiege
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| vt.包围，围攻，拥在...周围 | |
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39
deferring
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| v.拖延，延缓，推迟( defer的现在分词 )；服从某人的意愿，遵从 | |
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40
cavalry
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| n.骑兵；轻装甲部队 | |
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41
beset
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| v.镶嵌；困扰，包围 | |
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42
assailed
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| v.攻击( assail的过去式和过去分词 )；困扰；质问；毅然应对 | |
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43
insurgents
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| n.起义，暴动，造反( insurgent的名词复数 ) | |
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44
penetrated
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| adj. 击穿的，鞭辟入里的 动词penetrate的过去式和过去分词形式 | |
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45
favourable
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| adj.赞成的，称赞的，有利的，良好的，顺利的 | |
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46
ascended
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| v.上升，攀登( ascend的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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47
junta
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| n.团体；政务审议会 | |
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48
evacuate
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| v.遣送；搬空；抽出；排泄；大(小)便 | |
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49
inevitable
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| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
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50
imminent
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| adj.即将发生的，临近的，逼近的 | |
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51
disquieted
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| v.使不安，使忧虑，使烦恼( disquiet的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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52
mandate
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| n.托管地；命令，指示 | |
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53
withdrawn
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| vt.收回；使退出；vi.撤退，退出 | |
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54
mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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55
evacuated
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| 撤退者的 | |
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56
dispersed
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| adj. 被驱散的, 被分散的, 散布的 | |
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57
garrisoning
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| 卫戍部队守备( garrison的现在分词 )； 派部队驻防 | |
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58
inadequate
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| adj.(for,to)不充足的，不适当的 | |
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59
tardy
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| adj.缓慢的，迟缓的 | |
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60
infantry
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| n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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61
skilful
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| (=skillful)adj.灵巧的，熟练的 | |
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62
withdrawal
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| n.取回，提款；撤退，撤军；收回，撤销 | |
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63
invaders
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| 入侵者，侵略者，侵入物( invader的名词复数 ) | |
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64
descend
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| vt./vi.传下来，下来，下降 | |
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65
horde
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| n.群众，一大群 | |
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66
northward
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| adv.向北；n.北方的地区 | |
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67
ridge
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| n.山脊；鼻梁；分水岭 | |
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68
barricaded
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| 设路障于，以障碍物阻塞( barricade的过去式和过去分词 )； 设路障[防御工事]保卫或固守 | |
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69
garrisoned
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| 卫戍部队守备( garrison的过去式和过去分词 )； 派部队驻防 | |
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70
cartridges
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| 子弹( cartridge的名词复数 )； （打印机的）墨盒； 录音带盒； （唱机的）唱头 | |
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71
abate
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| vi.(风势，疼痛等)减弱，减轻，减退 | |
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72
atone
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| v.赎罪，补偿 | |
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73
feat
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| n.功绩；武艺，技艺；adj.灵巧的，漂亮的，合适的 | |
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74
depleted
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| adj. 枯竭的, 废弃的 动词deplete的过去式和过去分词 | |
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75
deplete
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| v.弄空，排除，减轻，减少...体液，放去...的血 | |
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76
regiments
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| （军队的）团( regiment的名词复数 )； 大量的人或物 | |
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77
prospect
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| n.前景，前途；景色，视野 | |
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78
deducted
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| v.扣除，减去( deduct的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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79
nominal
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| adj.名义上的；(金额、租金)微不足道的 | |
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80
morale
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| n.道德准则，士气，斗志 | |
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81
fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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82
arrear
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| n.欠款 | |
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83
grumbling
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| adj. 喃喃鸣不平的, 出怨言的 | |
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84
promotions
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| 促进( promotion的名词复数 )； 提升； 推广； 宣传 | |
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85
contented
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| adj.满意的，安心的，知足的 | |
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86
sullen
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| adj.愠怒的，闷闷不乐的，(天气等)阴沉的 | |
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87
justifiable
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| adj.有理由的，无可非议的 | |
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88
tempted
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| v.怂恿（某人）干不正当的事；冒…的险（tempt的过去分词） | |
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89
Ford
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| n.浅滩，水浅可涉处；v.涉水，涉过 | |
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90
destined
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| adj.命中注定的；(for)以…为目的地的 | |
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91
narratives
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| 记叙文( narrative的名词复数 )； 故事； 叙述； 叙述部分 | |
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92
narrative
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| n.叙述，故事；adj.叙事的，故事体的 | |
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93
dominant
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| adj.支配的，统治的；占优势的；显性的；n.主因，要素，主要的人(或物)；显性基因 | |
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94
autobiography
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| n.自传 | |
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95
demonstrations
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| 证明( demonstration的名词复数 )； 表明； 表达； 游行示威 | |
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96
repelled
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| v.击退( repel的过去式和过去分词 )；使厌恶；排斥；推开 | |
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97
extremity
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| n.末端，尽头；尽力；终极；极度 | |
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98
acting
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| n.演戏，行为，假装；adj.代理的，临时的，演出用的 | |
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99
steadily
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| adv.稳定地；不变地；持续地 | |
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100
disorder
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| n.紊乱，混乱；骚动，骚乱；疾病，失调 | |
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101
quiescence
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| n.静止 | |
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102
noted
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| adj.著名的，知名的 | |
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103
stimulating
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| adj.有启发性的，能激发人思考的 | |
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104
patriots
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| 爱国者，爱国主义者( patriot的名词复数 ) | |
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105
utilize
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| vt.使用，利用 | |
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106
supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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107
eastward
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| adv.向东；adj.向东的；n.东方，东部 | |
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108
devoted
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| adj.忠诚的，忠实的，热心的，献身于...的 | |
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109
respite
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| n.休息，中止，暂缓 | |
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110
strenuous
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| adj.奋发的，使劲的；紧张的；热烈的，狂热的 | |
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111
exertions
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| n.努力( exertion的名词复数 )；费力；（能力、权力等的）运用；行使 | |
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112
arrears
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| n.到期未付之债，拖欠的款项；待做的工作 | |
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113
grievances
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| n.委屈( grievance的名词复数 )；苦衷；不满；牢骚 | |
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114
genial
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| adj.亲切的，和蔼的，愉快的，脾气好的 | |
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115
descended
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| a.为...后裔的，出身于...的 | |
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116
lieutenant
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| n.陆军中尉，海军上尉；代理官员，副职官员 | |
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117
defensive
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| adj.防御的；防卫的；防守的 | |
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118
dictated
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| v.大声讲或读( dictate的过去式和过去分词 )；口授；支配；摆布 | |
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119
ascertained
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| v.弄清，确定，查明( ascertain的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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120
batter
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| v.接连重击；磨损；n.牛奶面糊；击球员 | |
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121
intervals
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| n.[军事]间隔( interval的名词复数 )；间隔时间；[数学]区间；（戏剧、电影或音乐会的）幕间休息 | |
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122
minor
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| adj.较小(少)的，较次要的；n.辅修学科；vi.辅修 | |
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123
apparently
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| adv.显然地；表面上，似乎 | |
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124
swarm
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| n.(昆虫)等一大群；vi.成群飞舞；蜂拥而入 | |
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125
bickering
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| v.争吵( bicker的现在分词 )；口角；（水等）作潺潺声；闪烁 | |
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126
descending
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| n. 下行 adj. 下降的 | |
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127
precipitated
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| v.（突如其来地）使发生( precipitate的过去式和过去分词 )；促成；猛然摔下；使沉淀 | |
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128
emboldened
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| v.鼓励，使有胆量( embolden的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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129
joyful
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| adj.欢乐的，令人欢欣的 | |
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130
coup
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| n.政变；突然而成功的行动 | |
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131
appreciable
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| adj.明显的，可见的，可估量的，可觉察的 | |
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132
outskirts
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| n.郊外，郊区 | |
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133
annihilated
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| v.（彻底）消灭( annihilate的过去式和过去分词 )；使无效；废止；彻底击溃 | |
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134
distressing
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| a.使人痛苦的 | |
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135
vouched
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| v.保证( vouch的过去式和过去分词 )；担保；确定；确定地说 | |
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136
proceedings
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| n.进程，过程，议程；诉讼(程序)；公报 | |
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137
lamentable
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| adj.令人惋惜的，悔恨的 | |
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138
deducting
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| v.扣除，减去( deduct的现在分词 ) | |
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139
presumption
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| n.推测，可能性，冒昧，放肆，[法律]推定 | |
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140
odds
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| n.让步，机率，可能性，比率；胜败优劣之别 | |
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141
temerity
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| n.鲁莽，冒失 | |
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142
groves
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| 树丛，小树林( grove的名词复数 ) | |
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143
wagons
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| n.四轮的运货马车( wagon的名词复数 )；铁路货车；小手推车 | |
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144
standing
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| n.持续，地位；adj.永久的，不动的，直立的，不流动的 | |
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145
utilized
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| v.利用，使用( utilize的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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146
agility
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| n.敏捷，活泼 | |
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147
munition
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| n.军火；军需品；v.给某部门提供军火 | |
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148
dispositions
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| 安排( disposition的名词复数 )； 倾向； （财产、金钱的）处置； 气质 | |
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149
sweeping
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| adj.范围广大的，一扫无遗的 | |
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150
administrative
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| adj.行政的，管理的 | |
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151
systematic
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| adj.有系统的，有计划的，有方法的 | |
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152
affected
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| adj.不自然的，假装的 | |
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153
undertaking
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| n.保证，许诺，事业 | |
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154
prudent
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| adj.谨慎的，有远见的，精打细算的 | |
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155
incapable
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| adj.无能力的，不能做某事的 | |
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156
cannon
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| n.大炮，火炮；飞机上的机关炮 | |
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157
quiescent
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| adj.静止的，不活动的，寂静的 | |
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158
ordeal
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| n.苦难经历，（尤指对品格、耐力的）严峻考验 | |
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159
evacuating
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| 撤离，疏散( evacuate的现在分词 )； 排空（胃肠），排泄（粪便）； （从危险的地方）撤出，搬出，撤空 | |
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160
dice
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| n.骰子；vt.把（食物）切成小方块，冒险 | |
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