When Monjuich had been evacuated2, the position of Gerona was undoubtedly3 perilous4: of the two mountain summits which command the city one was now entirely5 in the hands of the French; for not only the great fort itself but several of the smaller works above the ravine of the Galligan—such as the fortified6 convent of San Daniel and the ruined tower of San Juan—had been lost. The front exposed to attack now consisted of the northern section of the old city wall, from the bastion of Santa Maria at the water’s edge, to the tower of La Gironella, which forms the north-eastern angle of the place, and lies further up the slope of the Capuchin heights than any other portion of the enceinte. The space between these two points was simply covered by a mediaeval wall set with small round towers: neither the towers nor the curtain between them had been built to hold artillery7. Indeed the only spots on this front where guns had been placed were (1) the comparatively modern bastion of Santa Maria, (2) a work erected8 under and about the Gironella, and called the ‘Redoubt of the Germans,’ and (3, 4) two parts of the wall called the platforms[41] of San Pedro and San Cristobal, which had been widened till they could carry a few heavy guns. On the rest of the enceinte, owing to its narrowness, nothing but wall-pieces and two-pounders could be mounted. The parts of the curtain most exposed to attack were the sections named Santa Lucia, San Pedro, San Cristobal, and Las Sarracinas, from churches or quarters which lay close behind them. With nothing but an antiquated9 wall, seven to nine feet thick, thirty feet high, and destitute10 of a ditch, it seemed that this side of Gerona was doomed11 to destruction within a few days.
But there were points in the position which rendered the[p. 38] attack more difficult than might have been expected. The first was that any approaches directed against this front would be exposed to a flanking fire from the forts on the Capuchin heights, especially from the Calvary and Chapter redoubts. The second was that the greater part of the weak sections of the wall were within a re-entering angle; for the tower of Santa Lucia and the ‘Redoubt of the Germans’ by the Gironella project, and the curtains between them are in a receding13 sweep of the enceinte. Attacks on these ill-fortified sections would be outflanked and enfiladed by the two stronger works. The only exposed part of the curtain was that called Santa Lucia, running from the tower of that name down to the bastion of Santa Maria. Lastly, the parallels which the French might construct from their base on Monjuich would have to be built on a down slope, overlooked by loftier ground, and when they reached the foot of the walls they would be in a sort of gulley or bottom, into which the defenders14 of the city could look down from above. The only point from which the north end of Gerona could be approached from flat ground and without disadvantages of slope, is the short front of less than 200 yards breadth between the foot of Monjuich and the bank of the Ter. Here, in the ruins of the suburb of Pedret, there was plenty of cover, a soil easy to work, and a level terrain15 as far as the foot of the Santa Maria bastion. The engineers of the besieging16 army selected three sections of wall as their objective. The first was the ‘Redoubt of the Germans’ and the tower of La Gironella, the highest and most commanding works in this part of the enceinte: once established in these, they could overlook and dominate the whole city. The other points of attack were chosen for the opposite reason—because they were intrinsically weak in themselves, not because they were important or dominating parts of the defences. The curtain of Santa Lucia in particular seemed to invite attack, as being in a salient angle, unprotected by flanking fire, and destitute of any artillery of its own.
Verdier, therefore, on the advice of his engineers, set to work to attack these points of the enceinte between La Gironella and Santa Maria. New batteries erected amid the ruins of Monjuich were levelled against them, in addition to such of the older[p. 39] batteries as could still be utilized18. On the front by Pedret also, where nothing had hitherto been done, works were prepared for guns to be directed against Santa Maria and Santa Lucia. Meanwhile a perpetual bombardment with shell was kept up, against the whole quarter of the town that lay behind the selected points of attack. Mortars19 were always playing, not only from the Monjuich heights but from two batteries erected on the so-called ‘Green Mound’ in the plain beyond the river Ter. Their effect was terrible: almost every house in the northern quarter of Gerona was unroofed or destroyed: the population had to take refuge in cellars, where, after a few days, they began to die fast—all the more so that food was just beginning to run short as August advanced. From the 14th to the 30th of that month Verdier’s attack was developing itself: by its last day four breaches21 had been established: one, about forty feet broad, in the curtain of St. Lucia, two close together in the works at La Gironella[42], the fourth and smallest in the platform of San Cristobal. But the approaches were still far from the foot of the wall, the fire of the outlying Spanish works, especially the Calvary fort, was unsubdued, and though the guns along the attacked front had all been silenced, the French artillery had paid dearly both in lives and in material for the advantage they had gained. Moreover sickness was making dreadful ravages23 in the ranks of the besieging army. The malarious24 pestilence25 on which the Spaniards had relied had appeared, after a sudden and heavy rainfall had raised the Ter and O?a beyond their banks, and inundated26 the whole plain of Salt. By malaria27, dysentery and sunstroke Verdier had lost 5,000 men, in addition to his casualties in the siege. Many of them were convalescents in the hospitals of Perpignan and Figueras, but it was hard to get them back to the front; the somatenes made the roads impassable for small detachments, and the officers on the line of communication, being very short of men, were given to detaining drafts that reached them on their way to Gerona[43]. Hence Verdier, including[p. 40] his artillerymen and sappers, had less than 10,000 men left for the siege, and these much discouraged by its interminable length, short of officers, and sickly. This was not enough to guard a periphery28 of six miles, and messengers were continually slipping in or out of Gerona, between the widely scattered29 camps of the French.
On August 31 a new phase of the siege began. In response to the constant appeals of Alvarez to the Catalan Junta30, and the consequent complaints of the Junta alike to the Captain-General Blake, and to the central government at Seville, something was at last about to be done to relieve Gerona. The supreme31 Central Junta, in reply to a formal representation of the Catalans dated August 16[44], had sent Blake 6,000,000 reals in cash, and a peremptory32 order to march on Gerona whatever the state of his army might be, authorizing33 him to call out all the somatenes of the province in his aid. The general, who had at last returned to Tarragona, obeyed, though entirely lacking confidence in his means of success; and on the thirty-first his advance guard was skirmishing with St. Cyr’s covering army on the heights to the south of the Ter.
Blake’s army, it will be remembered, had been completely routed at Belchite by Suchet on June 18. The wrecks34 of his Aragonese division had gradually rallied at Tortosa, those of his Valencian divisions at Morella: but even by the end of July he had only a few thousand men collected, and he had lost every gun of his artillery. For many weeks he could do nothing but press the Junta of Valencia to fill the depleted35 ranks of his regiments36 with recruits, to reconstitute his train, and to provide him with new cannon38. Aragon had been lost—nothing could be drawn39 from thence: Catalonia, distracted by Suchet’s demonstration40 on its western flank, did not do as much as might have been expected in its own defence. The Junta was inclined to favour the employment of miqueletes and[p. 41] somatenes, and to undervalue the troops of the line: it forgot that the irregulars, though they did admirable work in harassing41 the enemy, could not be relied upon to operate in large masses or strike a decisive blow. Still, the regiments at Tarragona, Lerida, and elsewhere had been somewhat recruited before August was out.
Blake’s field army was composed of some 14,000 men: there were five Valencian regiments—those which had been least mishandled in the campaign of Aragon—with the relics42 of six of the battalions44 which Reding had brought from Granada in 1808[45], two of Lazan’s old Aragonese corps45, and five or six of the regiments which had formed the original garrison46 of Catalonia. The battalions were very weak—it took twenty-four of them to make up 13,000 infantry47: of cavalry48 there were only four squadrons, of artillery only two batteries. Those of the rank and file who were not raw recruits were the vanquished49 of Molins de Rey and Valls, or of Maria and Belchite. They had no great confidence in Blake, and he had still less in them. Despite the orders received from Seville, which bade him risk all for the relief of Gerona, he was determined50 not to fight another pitched battle. The memories of Belchite were too recent to be forgotten. Though much obloquy51 has been poured upon his head for this resolve, he was probably wise in his decision. St. Cyr had still some 12,000 men in his covering army, who had taken no share in the siege: their morale52 was intact, and they had felt little fatigue53 or privation. They could be, and were in fact, reinforced by 4,000 men from Verdier’s force when the stress came. Blake, therefore, was, so far as regular troops went, outnumbered by the French, especially in cavalry and artillery. He could not trust in time of battle the miqueletes, of whom some 4,000 or 5,000 from the Ampurdam and Central Catalonia came to join him. He thought that it might be possible to elude54 or[p. 42] outflank St. Cyr, to lure55 him to divide his forces into scattered bodies by threatening many points at once, or, on the other hand, to induce him to concentrate on one short front, and so to leave some of the exits of Gerona open. But a battle with the united French army he would not risk under any conditions.
St. Cyr, however, was too wary56 for his opponent: he wanted to fight at all costs, and he was prepared to risk a disturbance57 of the siege operations, if he could catch Blake in the open and bring him to action. The moment that pressure on his outposts, by regular troops coming from the south, was reported, he drew together Souham’s and Pino’s divisions on the short line between San Dalmay on the right and Casa de Selva on the left, across the high road from Barcelona. At the same time he sent stringent59 orders to Verdier to abandon the unimportant sections of his line of investment, and to come to reinforce the field army at the head of his French division, which still counted 4,000 bayonets. Verdier accordingly marched to join his chief, leaving Lecchi’s Italians—now little more than 2,000 strong—to watch the west side of Gerona, and handing over the charge of the works on Monjuich, the new approaches, and the park at Pont Mayor, to the Westphalians. He abandoned all the outlying posts on the heights, even the convent of San Daniel, the village of Campdura, and the peak of Nuestra Se?ora de los Angeles. Only 4,600 infantry and 2,000 gunners and sappers were left facing the garrison: but Alvarez was too weak to drive off even such a small force.
On September 1 Blake ostentatiously displayed the heads of his columns in front of St. Cyr’s position; but while the French general was eagerly awaiting his attack, and preparing his counter-stroke, the Spaniard’s game was being played out in another quarter. While Rovira and Claros with their miqueletes made noisy demonstration from the north against the Westphalians, and threatened the park and the camp at Sarria, Blake had detached one of his divisions, that of Garcia Conde, some 4,000 strong, far to the left beyond St. Cyr’s flank: this corps had with it a convoy60 of more than a thousand mules61 laden62 with provisions, and a herd63 of cattle. It completely escaped the notice of the French, and marching from Amer at break of day came down into the plain of Salt at noon, far in[p. 43] the rear of St. Cyr’s army. Garcia Conde had the depleted Italian division of the siege corps in front of him: one of the brigadiers, the Pole Milosewitz, was in command that day, Lecchi being in hospital. This small force, which vainly believed itself covered from attack by St. Cyr’s corps, had kept no look-out to the rear, being wholly intent on watching the garrison. It was surprised by the Spanish column, cut into two halves, and routed. Garcia Conde entered the Mercadal in triumph with his convoy, and St. Cyr first learnt what had occurred when he saw the broken remnants of the Italians pouring into the rear of his own line at Fornells.
That night Gerona was free of enemies on its southern and eastern sides, and Alvarez communicated freely with Rovira’s and Claros’s irregulars, who had forced in the Westphalian division and compelled it to concentrate in Monjuich and the camp by the great park near Sarria. The garrison reoccupied the ruined convent of San Daniel by the Galligan, and placed a strong party in the hermitage on the peak of Nuestra Se?ora de los Angeles. It also destroyed all the advanced trenches65 on the slopes of Monjuich. On the next morning, however, it began to appreciate the fact that the siege had not been raised. St. Cyr sent back Verdier’s division to rejoin the Westphalians, and with them the wrecks of Lecchi’s routed battalions. He added to the force under Verdier half Pino’s Italian division—six fresh battalions. With these reinforcements the old siege-lines could be reoccupied, and the Spaniards were forced back from the points outside the walls which they had reoccupied on the night of September 1.
By sending away such a large proportion of the 16,000 men that he had concentrated for battle on the previous day, St. Cyr left himself only some 10,000 men for a general action with Blake, if the latter should resolve to fight. But the Spanish general, being without Garcia Conde’s division, had also no more than 10,000 men in line. Not only did he refuse to advance, but when St. Cyr, determined to fight at all costs, marched against him with offensive intentions, he hastily retreated as far as Hostalrich, two marches to the rear. There he broke up his army, which had exhausted66 all its provisions. St. Cyr did the same and for the same reasons; his men had to[p. 44] disperse67 in order to live. He says in his memoirs68 that if Blake had shown a bold front against him, and forced him to keep the covering army concentrated for two more days, the siege would have had to be raised. For the covering army had advanced against the Spaniards on September 2 with only two days’ rations58, it had exhausted its stores, and eaten up the country-side. On the fourth it would have had to retire, or to break up into small fractions, leaving the siege-corps unprotected. St. Cyr doubted whether the retreat would have ceased before Figueras was reached. But it is more probable that he would have merely fallen back to join Verdier, and to live for some days on the dép?ts of Pont Mayor and Sarria. He could have offered battle again under the walls of Gerona, with all his forces united. Blake might have got into close touch with Alvarez, and have thrown what convoys70 he pleased into the town; but as long as St. Cyr and Verdier with 22,000 men lay opposite him, he could not have risked any more. The situation, in short, would have been that which occurred in February 1811 under the walls of Badajoz, when Mortier faced Mendizabal, and would probably have ended in the same fashion, by the French attacking and driving off the relieving army. Blake, then, may be blamed somewhat for his excessive caution in giving way so rapidly before St. Cyr’s advance: but if we remember the quality of his troops and the inevitable71 result of a battle, it is hard to censure72 him overmuch.
Meanwhile Garcia Conde, whose movements were most happy and adroit73, reinforced the garrison of Gerona up to its original strength of 5,000 bayonets, by making over to Alvarez four whole battalions and some picked companies from other corps, and prepared to leave the town with the rest of his division and the vast drove of mules, whose burden had been discharged into the magazines. If he had dedicated74 his whole force to strengthening the garrison, the additional troops would have eaten up in a few days all the provisions that the convoy had brought in[46].[p. 45] Accordingly he started off at two a.m. on September 4 with some 1,200 men, by the upland path that leads past the hermitage of Los Angeles: St. Cyr had just placed Pino’s troops from the covering army to guard the heights to the south-east of Gerona, but Garcia Conde, warned by the peasants of their exact position, slipped between the posts and got off to Hostalrich with a loss of no more than fifty men[47].
Before he could consider his position safe, Verdier had to complete the lines of investment: this he did on September 5 by driving off the intermediate posts which Alvarez had thrown out from the Capuchin heights, to link the town with the garrison in the hermitage of Nuestra Se?ora de los Angeles. Mazzuchelli’s brigade stormed the hermitage itself on the following day, with a loss of about eighty men, and massacred the greater part of the garrison. On that same day, however, the French suffered a small disaster in another part of the environs. General Joba, who had been sent with three battalions to clear the road to Figueras from the bands of Claros and Rovira, was beaten and slain75 at San Gregorio by those chiefs. But the miqueletes afterwards retired77 to the mountains, and the road became intermittently78 passable, at least for large bodies of men.
It was not till September 11, however, that Verdier recom[p. 46]menced the actual siege, and bade his batteries open once more upon Gerona. The eleven days of respite79 since Blake interrupted the bombardment on September 1 had been invaluable80 to the garrison, who had cleared away the débris from the foot of the breaches, replaced the damaged artillery on the front of attack, and thrown up interior defences behind the shattered parts of the wall. They had also destroyed all the advanced trenches of the besiegers, which had to be reconstructed at much cost of life. In four days Verdier had recovered most of the lost ground, when he was surprised by a vigorous sally from the gate of San Pedro: the garrison, dashing out at three p.m., stormed the three nearest breaching81 batteries, spiked82 their guns, and filled in all the trenches which were advancing towards the foot of the walls. Four days’ work was thus undone83 in an hour, and it was only on September 19 that Verdier had reconstructed his works, and pushed forward so far towards his objective that he considered an assault possible. He then begged St. Cyr to lend him a brigade of fresh troops, pleading that the siege-corps was now so weak in numbers, and so demoralized by its losses, that he did not consider that the men would do themselves justice at a storm. The losses of officers had been fearful: one battalion43 was commanded by a lieutenant84, another had been reduced to fifty men; desertion was rampant85 among several of the foreign corps. Of 14,000 infantry[48] of the French, Westphalian, and Italian divisions less than 6,000 now remained. So far as mere69 siegecraft went, as he explained to St. Cyr, ‘the affair might be considered at an end. We have made four large practicable breaches, each of them sufficient to reduce the town. But the troops cannot be trusted.’ St. Cyr refused to lend a man for the assault, writing with polite irony86 that ‘every general has his own task: yours is to take Gerona with the resources placed at your disposal by the government for that object, and the officers named by the government to conduct the siege[49].’ He added that he considered, from its past[p. 47] conduct, that the morale of the siege-corps was rather good than bad. He should not, therefore, allow the covering army to join the assault; but he would lend the whole of Pino’s division to take charge of Monjuich and the camps, during the storm, and would make a demonstration against the Mercadal, to distract the enemy from the breaches. With this Verdier had to be content, and, after making two final protests, concentrated all his brigades save those of the Westphalian division, and composed with them four columns, amounting to some 3,000 men, directing one against each of the four breaches. That sent against the platform of San Cristobal was a mere demonstration of 150 men, but the other three were heavy masses: the Italians went against Santa Lucia, the French brigade against the southern breach20 in the ‘Redoubt of the Germans,’ the Berg troops against the northern one. A separate demonstration was made against the Calvary fort, whose unsubdued fire still flanked the breaches, in the hope that its defenders might be prevented from interfering87 in the main struggle.
Alvarez, who had noted88 the French columns marching from all quarters to take shelter, before the assault, in the trenches on the slopes of Monjuich and in front of Pedret, had fair warning of what was coming, and had done his best to provide against the danger. The less important parts of the enceinte had been put in charge of the citizens of the ‘Crusade,’ and the picked companies of every regiment37 had been told off the breaches. The Englishman, Ralph Marshall, was in charge of the curtain of Santa Lucia, William Nash, the Spanish-Irish colonel of Ultonia, commanded at the two breaches under La Gironella: Brigadier Fournas, the second-in-command of the garrison, had general supervision89 of the defences; he had previously90 taken charge of Monjuich during the great assault in August. Everything had been done to prepare a second line of resistance behind the breaches; barricades91 had been erected, houses loopholed, and a great many marksmen disposed on roofs and church towers, which looked down on the rear-side of the gaps in the wall.
At four o’clock in the afternoon of September 19 the three columns destined92 for the northern breaches descended93 from Monjuich on the side of San Daniel, crossed the Galligan, and[p. 48] plunged94 into the hollow at the foot of the ‘Redoubt of the Germans.’ At the same moment the fourth column started from the ruins of the tower of San Juan to attack the curtain of Santa Lucia. The diversion against the Calvary fort was made at the same moment, and beaten off in a few minutes, so that the fire of this work was not neutralized95 during the assault according to Verdier’s expectation. The main assault, nevertheless, was delivered with great energy, despite the flanking fire. At the two points of attack under La Gironella the stormers twice won, crossed, and descended from the breach, forcing their way into the ruined barracks behind. But they were mown down by the terrible musketry fire from the houses, and finally expelled with the bayonet. At the Santa Lucia curtain the Italians scaled the breach, but were brought up by a perpendicular97 drop of twelve feet behind it—the foot of the wall in this quarter chancing to be much higher than the level of the street below. They held the crest98 of the breach for some time, but were finally worsted in a long and furious exchange of fire with the Spaniards on the roofs and churches before them, and recoiled99. The few surviving officers rallied the stormers, and brought them up for a second assault, but at the end of two hours of hard fighting all were constrained100 to retire to their trenches. They had lost 624 killed and wounded, including three colonels (the only three surviving in the whole of Verdier’s corps) and thirty other officers. The Spanish loss had been 251, among them Colonel Marshall, who was mortally wounded at his post on the Santa Lucia front.
Map of the siege of Gerona
Enlarge SIEGE OF GERONA
Verdier accused his troops of cowardice101, which seems to have been unjust. St. Cyr wrote to the Minister of War to express his opinion that his subordinate was making an excuse to cover his own error, in judging that a town must fall merely because there were large breaches in its walls[50]. ‘The columns stopped for ninety minutes on the breaches under as heavy a fire as has ever been seen. There was some disorder102 at the end, but that is not astonishing in view of the heavy loss suffered before the[p. 49] retreat. I do not think that picked grenadiers would have done any better, and I am convinced that the assault failed because the obstacles to surmount103 were too great.’ The fact was that the Spaniards had fought with such admirable obstinacy104, and had so well arranged their inner defences, that it did not suffice that the breaches should have been perfectly105 practicable. At the northern assault the stormers actually penetrated106 into the buildings behind the gaps in the ruined wall, but could not get further forward[51]. In short, the history of the siege of Gerona gives a clear corroboration107 of the old military axiom that no town should ever surrender merely because it has been breached108, and justifies109 Napoleon’s order that every governor who capitulated without having stood at least one assault should be sent before a court martial110. It refutes the excuses of the too numerous commanders who have surrendered merely because there was a practicable breach in their walls, like Imaz at Badajoz in 1811. If all Spanish generals had been as wary and as resolute111 as Mariano Alvarez, the Peninsular War would have taken some unexpected turns. The moral of the defences of Tarifa, Burgos, and San Sebastian will be found to be the same as that of the defence of Gerona.
The effect of the repulse112 of September 19 on the besieging army was appalling113. Verdier, after writing three venomous letters to the Emperor, the War Minister, and Marshal Augereau[52], in which he accused St. Cyr of having deliberately114 sacrificed the good of the service to his personal resentments115, declared himself invalided116. He then went off to Perpignan, though permission to depart was expressly denied him by his superior: his divisional generals, Lecchi and Morio, had already preceded him to France. Disgust at the failure of the storm had the same effect on the rank and file: 1,200 men went to the hospital in the[p. 50] fortnight that followed the assault, till by October 1 the three divisions of the siege-corps numbered little more than 4,000 bayonets—just enough to hold Monjuich and the camps by the great dép?ts at Pont Mayor and Sarria. The store of ammunition117 in the park had been used up for the tremendous bombardment poured upon the breaches from the 15th to the 17th of September. A new supply was wanted from Perpignan, yet no troops could be detached to bring it forward, for the miqueletes were again active, and on September 13 had captured or destroyed near Bascara a convoy guarded by so many as 500 men.
St. Cyr, left in sole charge of the siege by Verdier’s departure, came to the conclusion that it was useless to proceed with the attack by means of trenches, batteries, and assaults, and frankly118 stated that he should starve the town out, but waste no further lives on active operations. He drew in the covering corps closer to Gerona, so that it could take a practical part in the investment, put the wrecks of Lecchi’s troops—of whom less than 1,000 survived—into Pino’s division, and sent the French brigade of Verdier’s old division to guard the line between Bascara and the Frontier. Thus the distinction between the siege-corps and the covering troops ceased to exist, and St. Cyr lay with some 16,000 men in a loose circle round Gerona, intent not on prosecuting119 advances against the walls, but only on preventing the introduction of further succours. He was aware that acute privations were already being suffered by the Spaniards: Garcia Conde’s convoy had brought in not much more than eight days’ provisions for the 5,000 men of the reinforced garrison and the 10,000 inhabitants who still survived. There was a considerable amount of flour still left in store, but little else: meat, salt and fresh, was all gone save horseflesh, for Alvarez had just begun to butcher his draught120 horses and those of his single squadron of cavalry. There was some small store of chocolate, tobacco, and coffee, but wine and aguardiente had run out, so had salt, oil, rice, and—what was most serious with autumn and winter approaching—wood and charcoal121. All the timbers of the houses destroyed by the bombardment had been promptly122 used up, either for fortification or for cooking[53].[p. 51] Medical stores were wholly unobtainable: the chief hospital had been burnt early in the siege, and the sick and wounded, laid in vaults123 or casemates for safety, died off like flies in the underground air. The seeds of pestilence were spread by the number of dead bodies of men and animals which were lying where they could not be reached, under the ruins of fallen houses. The spirit alike of garrison and troops still ran high: the repulse of the great assault of September 19, and the cessation of the bombardment for many days after had encouraged them. But they were beginning to murmur124 more and more bitterly against Blake: there was a general, if erroneous, opinion that he ought to have risked a battle, instead of merely throwing in provisions, on September 1. Alvarez himself shared this view, and wrote in vigorous terms to the Junta of Catalonia, to ask if his garrison was to perish slowly by famine.
Blake responded by a second effort, less happily planned than that of September 1. He called together his scattered divisions, now about 12,000 strong, and secretly concentrated them at La Bispal, between Gerona and the sea. He had again got together some 1,200 mules laden with foodstuffs125, and a large drove of sheep and oxen. Henry O’Donnell, an officer of the Ultonia regiment, who had been sent out by Alvarez, marched at the head of the convoy with 2,000 picked men; a division of 4,000 men under General Wimpfen followed close behind to cover its rear. Blake, with the rest, remained at La Bispal: he committed the egregious126 fault of omitting to threaten other[p. 52] parts of the line of investment, so as to draw off St. Cyr’s attention from the crucial point. He trusted to secrecy127 and sudden action, having succeeded in concentrating his army without being discovered by the French, who thought him still far away beyond Hostalrich. Thus it came to pass that though O’Donnell struck sharply in, defeated an Italian regiment near Castellar, and another three miles further on, and reached the Constable128 fort with the head of the convoy, yet the rest of Pino’s division and part of Souham’s concentrated upon his flank and rear, because they were not drawn off by alarms in other quarters. They broke in between O’Donnell and his supports, captured all the convoy save 170 mules, and destroyed the leading regiment of Wimpfen’s column, shooting also, according to the Spanish reports, many scores of the unarmed peasants who were driving the beasts of burden[54]. About 700 of Wimpfen’s men were taken prisoners, about 1,300 killed or wounded, for little quarter was given. The remnant recoiled upon Blake, who fell back to Hostalrich next day, September 27, without offering to fight. The amount of food which reached the garrison was trifling129, and Alvarez declared that he had no need for the additional mouths of O’Donnell’s four battalions, and refused to admit them into the city. They lay encamped under the Capuchin fort for some days, waiting for an opportunity to escape.
After having thus wrecked130 Blake’s second attempt to succour Gerona, and driven him from the neighbourhood, St. Cyr betook himself to Perpignan, in order, as he explained to the Minister of War[55], to hurry up provisions to the army at the front, and to compel the officers at the base to send forward some 3,000 or 4,000 convalescents fit to march, whose services had been persistently131 denied him[56]. Arrived there he heard that Augereau, whose gout had long disappeared, was perfectly fit to take the field, and could have done so long before if he had not preferred to shift on to other shoulders the responsibility for the siege of Gerona. He was, on October 1, at the baths of Molitg, ‘destroying the germs of his malady’ as he gravely wrote to[p. 53] Paris,—amusing himself, as St. Cyr maintains in his memoirs. Convinced that the siege had still a long time to run, and eager to do an ill turn to the officer who had intrigued132 to get his place, St. Cyr played on the Marshal precisely133 the same trick that Verdier had played on himself a fortnight before. He announced that he was indisposed, wrote to congratulate Augereau on his convalescence134, and to resign the command to his hands, and departed to his home, without waiting for an answer, or obtaining leave from Paris—a daring act, as Napoleon was enraged135, and might have treated him hardly. He was indeed put under arrest for a short time.
From the first to the eleventh of October Souham remained in charge of the army, but on the twelfth Augereau appeared and took command, bringing with him the mass of convalescents who had been lingering at Perpignan. Among them was Verdier, whose health became all that could be desired when St. Cyr had disappeared. The night following the Marshal’s arrival was disturbed by an exciting incident. Henry O’Donnell from his refuge on the Capuchin heights, had been watching for a fortnight for a good chance of escape. There was a dense136 fog on the night of the 12th-13th: taking advantage of it O’Donnell came down with his brigade, made a circuit round the town, crossed the O?a and struck straight away into the plain of Salt, which, being the most open and exposed, was also the least guarded section of the French lines of investment. He broke through the chain of vedettes almost without firing, and came rushing before dawn into Souham’s head-quarters camp on the heights of Aguaviva. The battalion sleeping there was scattered, and the general forced to fly in his shirt. O’Donnell swept off his riding-horses and baggage, as also some prisoners, and was out of reach in half an hour, before the rallying fractions of the French division came up to the rescue of their chief. By six o’clock the escaping column was in safety in the mountains by Santa Coloma, where it joined the miqueletes of Milans. For this daring exploit O’Donnell was made a major-general by the Supreme Junta. His departure was a great relief to Alvarez, who had to husband every mouthful of food, and had already put both the garrison and the townsfolk on half-rations of flour and horseflesh.
[p. 54]
Augereau was in every way inferior as an officer to St. Cyr. An old soldier of fortune risen from the ranks, he had little education or military science; his one virtue137 was headlong courage on the battlefield, yet when placed in supreme command he often hesitated, and showed hopeless indecision. He had been lucky enough to earn a great reputation as Napoleon’s second-in-command in the old campaigns of Italy in 1796-7. Since then he had made his fortune by becoming one of the Emperor’s most zealous138 tools and flatterers. He was reckoned a blind and reckless Bonapartist, ready to risk anything for his master, but spoilt his reputation for sincerity139 by deserting him at the first opportunity in 1814. He was inclined to a harsh interpretation140 of the laws of war, and enjoyed a doubtful reputation for financial integrity. Yet he was prone141 to ridiculous self-laudatory proclamations and manifestos, written in a bombastic142 strain which he vainly imagined to resemble his master’s thunders of the Bulletins. Scraps143 of his address to the citizens of Gerona may serve to display his fatuity—
‘Unhappy inhabitants—wretched victims immolated144 to the caprice and madness of ambitious men greedy for your blood—return to your senses, open your eyes, consider the ills which surround you! With what tranquillity145 do your leaders look upon the graves crammed146 with your corpses147! Are you not horror-struck at these cannibals, whose mirth bursts out in the midst of the human hecatomb, and who yet dare to lift their gory148 hands in prayer towards the throne of a God of Peace? They call themselves the apostles of Jesus Christ! Tremble, cruel and infamous149 men! The God who judges the actions of mortals is slow to condemn150, but his vengeance151 is terrible.... I warn you for the last time, inhabitants of Gerona, reflect while you still may! If you force me to throw aside my usual mildness, your ruin is inevitable. I shall be the first to groan152 at it, but the laws of war impose on me the dire12 necessity.... I am severe but just. Unhappy Gerona! if thy defenders persist in their obstinacy, thou shalt perish in blood and flame.
(Signed) Augereau.’
Stuff of this sort was not likely to have much effect on fanatics153 like Alvarez and his ‘Crusaders.’ If it is so wrong to cause the deaths of men—they had only to answer—Why has Bonaparte[p. 55] sent his legions into Spain? On the Marshal’s line of argument, that it is wrong to resist overwhelming force, it is apparently154 a sin before God for any man to attempt to defend his house and family against any bandit. There is much odious155 and hypocritical nonsense in some of Napoleon’s bulletins, where he grows tender on the miseries156 of the people he has conquered, but nothing to approach the maunderings of his copyist.
Augereau found the army about Gerona showing not more than 12,000 bayonets fit for the field—gunners and sappers excluded. The men were sick of the siege, and it would seem that the Marshal was forced, after inspecting the regiments and conferring with the generals, to acquiesce157 in St. Cyr’s decision that any further assaults would probably lead to more repulses158. He gave out that he was resolved to change the system on which the operations had hitherto been conducted, but the change amounted to nothing more than that he ordered a slow but steady bombardment to be kept up, and occasionally vexed159 the Spaniards by demonstrations160 against the more exposed points of the wall. It does not appear that either of these expedients161 had the least effect in shaking the morale of the garrison. It is true that during October and November the hearts of the Geronese were commencing to grow sick, but this was solely162 the result of starvation and dwindling163 numbers. As to the bombardment, they were now hardened to any amount of dropping fire: on October 28 they celebrated164 the feast of San Narciso, their patron, by a procession all round the town, which was under fire for the whole time of its progress, and paid no attention to the casualties which it cost them.
Meanwhile, when the second half of October had begun, Blake made the third and last of his attempts to throw succours into Gerona. It was even more feebly carried out than that of September 26, for the army employed was less numerous. Blake’s force had not received any reinforcement to make up for the men lost in the last affair, a fact that seems surprising, since Valencia ought now to have been able to send him the remainder of the regiments which had been reorganized since the disasters of June. But it would seem that José Caro, who was in command in that province, and the local Junta, made excuses for retaining as many men as possible, and cared little[p. 56] for the danger of Gerona, so long as the war was kept far from their own frontier. It was, at any rate, with no more than 10,000 or 12,000 men, the remains165 of his original force, that Blake once more came forward on October 18, and threatened the blockading army by demonstrations both from the side of La Bispal and that of Santa Coloma. He had again collected a considerable amount of food at Hostalrich, but had not yet formed a convoy: apparently he was waiting to discover the weakest point in the French lines before risking his mules and his stores, both of which were by now very hard to procure166. There followed a fortnight of confused skirmishing, without any battle, though Augereau tried with all his might to force on a general engagement. One of his Italian brigades was roughly handled near La Bispal on the twenty-first, and another repulsed167 near Santa Coloma on the twenty-sixth, but on each occasion, when the French reinforcements came up, Blake gave back and refused to fight. On November 1 the whole of Souham’s division marched on Santa Coloma, and forced Loygorri and Henry O’Donnell to evacuate1 it and retire to the mountains. Souham reported that he had inflicted168 a loss of 2,000 men on the Spaniards, at the cost of eleven killed and forty-three wounded on his own side! The real casualty list of the two Spanish divisions seems to have been somewhat over 100 men[57].
Nothing decisive had taken place up to November 7, when Augereau conceived the idea that he might make an end of Blake’s fruitless but vexatious demonstrations, by dealing169 a sudden blow at his magazines in Hostalrich. If these were destroyed it would cost the Spaniards much time to collect another store of provisions for Gerona. Accordingly Pino marched with three brigades to storm the town, which was protected only by a dilapidated mediaeval wall unfurnished with guns, though the castle which dominated it was a place of considerable strength, and proof against a coup170 de main. Only one of Blake’s divisions, that of Cuadrado, less than 2,000 strong, was in this quarter, and Augereau found employment for the others by sending some of Souham’s troops against them. The expedition succeeded: while Mazzuchelli’s brigade occupied the attention of Cuadrado,[p. 57] the rest of the Italians stormed Hostalrich, which was defended only by its own inhabitants and the small garrison of the castle. The Spaniards were driven up into that stronghold after a lively fight, and all the magazines fell into Pino’s hands and were burnt. At a cost of only thirty-five killed and sixty-four wounded the food, which Blake had collected with so much difficulty, was destroyed[58]. Thereupon the Spanish general gave up the attempt to succour Gerona, and withdrew to the plain of Vich, to recommence the Sisyphean task of getting together one more convoy. It was not destined to be of any use to Alvarez and his gallant171 garrison, for by the time that it was collected the siege had arrived at its final stage.
The Geronese were now reaching the end of their strength: for the first time since the investment began in May some of the defenders began to show signs of slackening. The heavy rains of October and the commencement of the cold season were reducing alike troops and inhabitants to a desperate condition. They had long used up all their fuel, and found the chill of winter intolerable in their cellars and casemates. Alvarez, though reduced to a state of physical prostration172 by dysentery and fever, was still steadfast173 in heart. But there was discontent brewing174 among some of his subordinates: it is notable, as showing the spirit of the time, that the malcontents were found among the professional soldiers, not among the citizens. Early in November several officers were found holding secret conferences, and drawing up an address to the local Junta, setting forth175 the desperate state of the city and the necessity for deposing176 the governor, who was represented as incapacitated for command by reason of his illness: it was apparently hinted that he was going mad, or was intermittently delirious[59]. Some of the wild sayings attributed to Alvarez during the later days of the siege might be quoted as a support for their representations. To a captain who asked to what point he was expected to retire, if he were driven from his post, it is said that he answered, ‘to the cemetery177.’ To another officer, the first who dared to say that[p. 58] capitulation was inevitable because of the exhaustion178 of the magazines, he replied, ‘When the last food is gone we will start eating the cowards, and we will begin with you.’ Though aware that their conspiracies179 were known, the malcontents did not desist from their efforts, and Alvarez made preparations for seizing and shooting the chiefs. But on the night of November 19 eight of them, including three lieutenant-colonels[60], warned by a traitor180 of their approaching fate, fled to Augereau’s camp. Their arrival was the most encouraging event for the French that had occurred since the commencement of the siege. They spoke181 freely of the exhaustion of the garrison, and said that Alvarez was mad and moribund182.
It was apparently this information concerning the desperate state of the garrison which induced Augereau to recommence active siege operations. He ordered up ammunition from Perpignan to fill the empty magazines, and when it arrived began to batter17 a new breach in the curtain of Santa Lucia. On December 2 Pino’s Italians stormed the suburb of La Marina, outside the southern end of the town, a quarter hitherto unassailed, and made a lodgement therein, as if to open a new point of attack. But this was only done to distract the enemy from the real design of the Marshal, which was nothing less than to cut off the forts on the Capuchin heights from Gerona by seizing the redoubts, those of the ‘Chapter’ and the ‘City,’ which covered the steep upward path from the walls to the group of works on the hilltop. At midnight on December 6 the voltigeur and grenadier companies of Pino’s division climbed the rough southern face of the Capuchin heights, and surprised and escaladed the ‘Redoubt of the City,’ putting the garrison to the sword. Next morning the batteries of the forts above and the city below opened a furious fire upon the lost redoubt, and Alvarez directed his last sally, sending out every man that he could collect to recover the work. This led to a long and bloody183 fight on the slopes, which ended most disastrously184 for the garrison. Not only was the sortie repulsed, but in the confusion the French carried the Calvary and Chapter redoubts, the other works which guarded the access from Gerona to the upper forts. On the afternoon[p. 59] of December 7 the communication with them was completely cut off, and as their garrisons185 possessed186 no separate magazines, and had been wont187 to receive their daily dole188 from the city, it was clear that they must be starved out. They had only food for forty-eight hours at the moment[61].
The excitement of the sally had drained away the governor’s last strength: he took to his bed that evening, was in delirium189 next day, and on the morning of the ninth received the last sacraments of the Church, the doctors having declared that his hours were numbered. His last conscious act was to protest against any proposal to surrender, before he handed over the command to the senior officer present, General Juliano Bolivar. Had Alvarez retained his senses, it is certain that an attempt would have been made to hold the town, even when the starving garrisons of the forts should have surrendered. But the moment that his stern hand was removed, his successor, Bolivar, called together a council of war, to which the members of the Junta, no less than the officers commanding corps, were invited. They voted that further resistance was impossible, and sent out Brigadier-General Fournas, the man who had so well defended Monjuich, to obtain terms from Augereau. On the morning of the tenth the Marshal received him, and dictated190 a simple surrender, without any of the favourable191 conditions which Fournas at first demanded. His only concession192 was that he offered to exchange the garrison for an equal number of the unhappy prisoners from Dupont’s army, now lying in misery193 on the pontoons at Cadiz, if the Supreme Junta concurred194. But the bargain was never ratified195, as the authorities at Seville were obdurate196.
On the morning of December 11 the survivors197 of the garrison marched out, and laid down their arms on the glacis of the Mercadal. Only 3,000 men came forth; these looked like living spectres, so pale, weak, and tattered198 that ‘the besiegers,’ as eye-witnesses observed, ‘felt ashamed to have been held at bay so long by dying men.’ There were 1,200 more lying in the[p. 60] hospitals. The rest of the 9,000 who had defended the place from May, or had entered with Garcia Conde in September, were dead. A detailed199 inspection200 of figures shows that of the 5,723 men of Alvarez’s original command only 2,008 survived, while of the 3,648 who had come later there were still 2,240 left: i. e. two-thirds of the old garrison and one-third of the succours had perished. The mortality by famine and disease far exceeded that by the sword: 800 men had died in the hospitals in October, and 1,300 in November, from mere exhaustion. The town was in a dreadful state: about 6,000 of the 14,000 inhabitants had perished, including nearly all the very young and the very old. 12,000 bombs and 8,000 shells had been thrown into the unhappy city: it presented a melancholy201 vista202 of houses roofless, or with one or two of the side-walls knocked in, of streets blocked by the fallen masonry203 of churches or towers, under which half-decayed corpses were partially204 buried. The open spaces were strewn with broken muskets205, bloody rags, wheels of disabled guns and carts, fragments of shells, and the bones of horses and mules whose flesh had been eaten. The stench was so dreadful that Augereau had to keep his troops out of the place, lest infection should be bred among them. In the magazines nothing was found save a little unground corn; all the other provisions had been exhausted. There were also 168 cannon, mostly disabled; about 10,000 lb. of powder, and a million musket96 cartridges206. The military chest handed over contained 562 reals—about 6l. sterling207.
Augereau behaved very harshly to the garrison: many feeble or diseased men were made to march to Perpignan and perished by the way. The priests and monks208 of the ‘Crusade’ were informed that they were combatants, and sent off with the soldiery. But the fate of the gallant Governor provokes especial indignation. Alvarez did not die of his fever: when he was somewhat recovered he was forwarded to Perpignan, and from thence to Narbonne, where he was kept for some time and seemed convalescent. Orders then came from Paris that he was to be sent back to Spain—apparently to be tried as a traitor, for it was alleged209 that in the spring of 1808 he had accepted the provisional government installed by Murat. He was separated from his aide-de-camp and servants, and passed on[p. 61] from dungeon210 to dungeon till he reached Figueras. The day after his arrival at that place he was found dead, on a barrow—the only bed granted him—in the dirty cellar where he had been placed. It is probable that he perished from natural causes, but many Spaniards believed that he had been murdered[62].
Great as the losses of the garrison of Gerona had been, they were far exceeded, both positively211 and proportionately, by those of the besieging army. The French official returns show that on June 15 the three divisions charged with the attack, those of Verdier, Morio, and Lecchi, had 14,456 bayonets, and the two divisions of the covering army, those of Souham and Pino, 15,732: there were 2,637 artillerymen and engineers over and above these figures. On December 31, twenty days after the surrender, and when the regiments had been joined by most of their convalescents, the three siege-divisions counted 6,343 men, the covering divisions 11,666, and the artillery and engineers, 2,390.
This shows a loss of over 13,000 men; but on examination the deficit212 is seen to be even larger, for two new battalions from France had just joined Verdier’s division in December, and their 1,000 bayonets should be deducted213 from his total. It would seem, then, that the capture of Gerona cost the 7th Corps about 14,000 men, as well as a whole campaigning season, from April to December. The attack on Catalonia had been brought to a complete standstill, and when Gerona fell the French occupied nothing but the ruined city, the fortresses214 of Rosas and Figueras hard by the frontier, and the isolated215 Barcelona, where Duhesme, with the 6,000 men of his division, had been lying quiescent216 all the summer and autumn. Such a force was too weak to make detachments to aid St. Cyr or Augereau, since 4,000 men at least were needed for the garrison of the citadel217 and the outlying forts, and it would have been hopeless for the small remainder to take the field. Duhesme only conducted[p. 62] one short incursion to Villafranca during the siege of Gerona. In the last months of the year Barcelona was again in a state of partial starvation: the food brought in by Cosmao’s convoy in the spring had been exhausted, while a second provision-fleet from Toulon, escorted by five men-of-war, had been completely destroyed in October. Admiral Martin surprised it off Cape64 Creus, drove ashore218 and burnt two line-of-battle ships and a frigate219, and captured most of the convoy. The rest took refuge in the harbour of Rosas, where Captain Halliwell attacked them with the boats of the squadron and burnt them all[63].
While Gerona was enduring its last month of starvation, those whose care it should have been to succour the place at all costs were indulging in a fruitless exchange of recriminations, and making preparations when it was all too late. Blake, after retiring to Vich on November 10, informed the Junta of Catalonia that he was helpless, unless more men could be found, and that they must find them. Why he did not rather insist that the Valencian reserves should be brought up, and risk stripping Tarragona and Lerida of their regular garrisons, it is hard to say. This at any rate would have been in his power. The Catalan Junta replied by summoning a congress at Manresa on November 20, to which representatives of every district of the principality were invited. The congress voted that a levy220 en masse of all the able-bodied men from seventeen to forty-five years of age should be called out[64], and authorized221 a loan of 10,000,000 reals for equipping them. They also wrote to Seville, not for the first time, to demand reinforcements from the Central Junta. But the battle of Oca?a had just been fought and lost, and Andalusia could not have spared a man, even if there had been time to transport troops to Tarragona. All that the Catalans received was honorary votes of approval for the gallant behaviour of the Geronese. The levy en masse was actually begun, but there was an insuperable difficulty in collecting and equipping the men in winter time, when days were short and roads were bad. The weeks passed by, and Gerona fell long before enough men had been got together to[p. 63] induce Blake to try a new offensive movement. Why was the congress not called in September rather than in November? Blake had always declared that he was too weak to risk a battle with the French for the raising of the siege, but till the last moment the Catalans contented222 themselves with arguing with him, and writing remonstrances223 to the Central Junta, instead of lending him the aid of their last levies224.
One or two points connected with this famous siege require a word of comment. It is quite clear that St. Cyr during its early stages did not try his honest best to help Verdier. During June and July his covering army was doing no good whatever at Vich: he pretended that he had placed it there in order to ward76 off possible attacks by Blake. But it was matter of public knowledge that Blake was far away in Aragon, engaged in his unhappy campaign against Suchet, and that Coupigny, left at Tarragona with a few thousand men, was not a serious danger. St. Cyr could have spared a whole division more for the siege operations, without risking anything. If he had done so, Gerona could have been approached on two sides instead of one, the Mercadal front might have been attacked, and the loose blockade, which was all that Verdier could keep up, for want of more men, might have been made effective. But St. Cyr all through his military career earned a reputation for callous225 selfishness and habitual226 leaving of his colleagues in the lurch227. On this occasion he was bitterly offended with Verdier, for giving himself the airs of an equal, and corresponding directly with the Emperor. There can be no doubt that he took a malicious228 pleasure in seeing his failures. It is hardly disguised in his clever and plausible229 Journal des Opérations de l’Armée de Catalogne en 1808-1809[65].
[p. 64]
Verdier, on the other hand, seems to have felt all through that he was being asked to perform a task almost impossible, when he was set to take Gerona with his own 14,000 men, unaided by the covering army. His only receipt for success was to try to hurry on the matter by delivering desperate blows. Both the assault on Monjuich on July 8 and that on the city on September 19 were premature230; there was some excuse for the former: Verdier had not yet realized how well Alvarez could fight. But the second seems unpardonable, after the warning received at Monjuich. If the general, as he declared before delivering his assault, mistrusted his own troops, he had no right to order a storm at all, considering his experience of the way in which the Spaniards had behaved in July. He acted on the fallacious theory that a practicable breach implies a town that can be taken, which is far from being the case if the garrison are both desperate and ingenious in defending themselves. The only way to deal with such a resolute and capable adversary231 was to proceed by the slow and regular methods of siegecraft, to sap right up to the ditch before delivering an assault, and batter everything to pieces before risking a man. This was how Monjuich was actually taken, after the storm had failed. Having neither established himself close under the walls, nor subdued22 the flanking fires from the Calvary and Chapter redoubts, nor ascertained232 how far the Spaniards had prepared inner defences for themselves, he had no right to attack at all.
As to Blake, even after making all possible allowances for the fact that he could not trust his troops—the half-rallied wrecks of Maria and Belchite—for a battle in the field, he must yet be pronounced guilty of feebleness and want of ingenuity233. If he could never bring up enough regulars to give him a chance of facing St. Cyr, the fault was largely his own: a more forcible[p. 65] general would have insisted that the Valencian reserves should march[66], and would have stripped Lerida and Tarragona of men: it could safely have been done, for neither Suchet nor Duhesme was showing any signs of threatening those points. He might have insisted that the Catalan Junta should call out the full levy of somatenes in September instead of in November. He might also have made a better use of the irregulars already in the field, the bands of Rovira, Milans, and Claros. These miqueletes did admirable service all through the siege, by harassing Verdier’s rear and cutting off his convoys, but they were not employed (as they should have been) in combination with the regulars, but allowed, as a rule, to go off on excursions of their own, which had no relation to the main objects of Blake’s strategy. The only occasion on which proper use was made of them was when, on September 1, they were set to threaten Verdier’s lines, while Garcia Conde’s convoy was approaching Gerona. It may be pleaded in the Spanish general’s defence that it was difficult to exact obedience234 from the chiefs: there was a distinct coolness between the regulars and the irregulars, which sometimes led to actual quarrels and conflicts when they met. But here again the reply is that more forcible captain-generals were able to control the miqueletes, and if Blake failed to do so, it was only one more sign of his inadequacy235. It is impossible to avoid the conclusion that he mismanaged matters, and that if in his second and third attempts to relieve Gerona he had repeated the tactics of his first, he would have had a far better chance of success. On September 1 only did he make any scientific attempt to distract the enemy’s attention and forces, and on that occasion he was successful. Summing things up, it may be said that he was not wrong to refuse battle with the troops that he had actually brought up to Gerona: they would undoubtedly have been[p. 66] routed if he had risked a general engagement. His fault was that he did not bring up larger forces, when it was in his power to do so, by the exercise of compulsion on the Catalan and Valencian Juntas236. But these bodies must share Blake’s responsibilities: they undoubtedly behaved in a slack and selfish fashion, and let Gerona perish, though it was keeping the war from their doors for a long eight months.
All the more credit is due to Alvarez, considering the way in which he was left unsuccoured, and fed with vain promises. A less constant soul would have abandoned the defence long before: the last two months of resistance were his sole work: if he had fallen sick in October instead of December, his subordinates would have yielded long before. But it is not merely for heroic obstinacy that he must be praised. Every detail of the defence shows that he was a most ingenious and provident237 general: nothing was left undone to make the work of the besiegers hard. Moreover, as Napier has observed, it is not the least of his titles to merit that he preserved a strict discipline, and exacted the possible maximum of work from soldier and civilian238 alike, without the use of any of those wholesale239 executions which disgraced the defence of Saragossa. His words were sometimes truculent240, but his acts were just and moderate. He never countenanced241 mob-law, as did Palafox, yet he was far better obeyed by the citizens, and got as good service from them as did the Aragonese commander. He showed that good organization is not incompatible242 with patriotic243 enthusiasm, and is far more effective in the hour of danger than reckless courage and blind self-sacrifice.
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evacuate
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| v.遣送；搬空；抽出；排泄；大(小)便 | |
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evacuated
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undoubtedly
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perilous
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entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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fortified
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artillery
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| n.(军)火炮，大炮；炮兵(部队) | |
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ERECTED
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| adj. 直立的，竖立的，笔直的 vt. 使 ... 直立，建立 | |
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antiquated
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destitute
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doomed
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dire
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| adj.可怕的，悲惨的，阴惨的，极端的 | |
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receding
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| v.逐渐远离( recede的现在分词 )；向后倾斜；自原处后退或避开别人的注视；尤指问题 | |
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defenders
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terrain
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besieging
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batter
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| v.接连重击；磨损；n.牛奶面糊；击球员 | |
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utilized
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mortars
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breach
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| n.违反，不履行；破裂；vt.冲破，攻破 | |
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breaches
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subdued
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ravages
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| 劫掠后的残迹，破坏的结果，毁坏后的残迹 | |
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24
malarious
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| （患）疟疾的，（有）瘴气的 | |
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25
pestilence
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| n.瘟疫 | |
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26
inundated
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| v.淹没( inundate的过去式和过去分词 )；（洪水般地）涌来；充满；给予或交予（太多事物）使难以应付 | |
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27
malaria
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| n.疟疾 | |
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28
periphery
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| n.(圆体的)外面；周围 | |
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29
scattered
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| adj.分散的，稀疏的；散步的；疏疏落落的 | |
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30
junta
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| n.团体；政务审议会 | |
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31
supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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32
peremptory
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| adj.紧急的，专横的，断然的 | |
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33
authorizing
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| 授权，批准，委托( authorize的现在分词 ) | |
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34
wrecks
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| n.沉船( wreck的名词复数 )；（事故中）遭严重毁坏的汽车（或飞机等）；（身体或精神上）受到严重损伤的人；状况非常糟糕的车辆（或建筑物等）v.毁坏[毁灭]某物( wreck的第三人称单数 )；使（船舶）失事，使遇难，使下沉 | |
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35
depleted
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| adj. 枯竭的, 废弃的 动词deplete的过去式和过去分词 | |
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36
regiments
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| （军队的）团( regiment的名词复数 )； 大量的人或物 | |
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37
regiment
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| n.团，多数，管理；v.组织，编成团，统制 | |
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38
cannon
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| n.大炮，火炮；飞机上的机关炮 | |
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39
drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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40
demonstration
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| n.表明，示范，论证，示威 | |
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41
harassing
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| v.侵扰，骚扰( harass的现在分词 )；不断攻击（敌人） | |
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42
relics
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| [pl.］n.遗物，遗迹，遗产；遗体，尸骸 | |
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43
battalion
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| n.营；部队；大队(的人) | |
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44
battalions
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| n.（陆军的）一营（大约有一千兵士）( battalion的名词复数 )；协同作战的部队；军队；（组织在一起工作的）队伍 | |
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45
corps
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| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
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46
garrison
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| n.卫戍部队；驻地，卫戍区；vt.派(兵)驻防 | |
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47
infantry
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| n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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48
cavalry
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| n.骑兵；轻装甲部队 | |
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49
vanquished
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| v.征服( vanquish的过去式和过去分词 )；战胜；克服；抑制 | |
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50
determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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51
obloquy
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| n.斥责，大骂 | |
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52
morale
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| n.道德准则，士气，斗志 | |
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53
fatigue
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| n.疲劳，劳累 | |
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54
elude
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| v.躲避，困惑 | |
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55
lure
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| n.吸引人的东西，诱惑物；vt.引诱，吸引 | |
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56
wary
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| adj.谨慎的，机警的，小心的 | |
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57
disturbance
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| n.动乱，骚动；打扰，干扰；(身心)失调 | |
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58
rations
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| 定量( ration的名词复数 )； 配给量； 正常量； 合理的量 | |
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59
stringent
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| adj.严厉的；令人信服的；银根紧的 | |
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60
convoy
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| vt.护送，护卫，护航；n.护送；护送队 | |
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61
mules
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| 骡( mule的名词复数 )； 拖鞋； 顽固的人； 越境运毒者 | |
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62
laden
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| adj.装满了的；充满了的；负了重担的；苦恼的 | |
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63
herd
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| n.兽群，牧群；vt.使集中，把…赶在一起 | |
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64
cape
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| n.海角，岬；披肩，短披风 | |
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65
trenches
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| 深沟，地沟( trench的名词复数 )； 战壕 | |
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66
exhausted
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| adj.极其疲惫的，精疲力尽的 | |
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67
disperse
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| vi.使分散；使消失；vt.分散；驱散 | |
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68
memoirs
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| n.回忆录；回忆录传( mem,自oir的名词复数) | |
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69
mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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70
convoys
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| n.（有护航的）船队( convoy的名词复数 )；车队；护航（队）；护送队 | |
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71
inevitable
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| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
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72
censure
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| v./n.责备；非难；责难 | |
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73
adroit
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| adj.熟练的，灵巧的 | |
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74
dedicated
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| adj.一心一意的；献身的；热诚的 | |
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75
slain
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| 杀死，宰杀，杀戮( slay的过去分词 )； (slay的过去分词) | |
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76
ward
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| n.守卫，监护，病房，行政区，由监护人或法院保护的人（尤指儿童）；vt.守护，躲开 | |
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77
retired
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|
| adj.隐退的，退休的，退役的 | |
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78
intermittently
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| adv.间歇地；断断续续 | |
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79
respite
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| n.休息，中止，暂缓 | |
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80
invaluable
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| adj.无价的，非常宝贵的，极为贵重的 | |
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81
breaching
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| 攻破( breach的过去式 )； 破坏，违反 | |
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82
spiked
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|
| adj.有穗的；成锥形的；有尖顶的 | |
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83
undone
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| a.未做完的，未完成的 | |
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84
lieutenant
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| n.陆军中尉，海军上尉；代理官员，副职官员 | |
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85
rampant
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| adj.(植物)蔓生的；狂暴的，无约束的 | |
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86
irony
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| n.反语，冷嘲；具有讽刺意味的事，嘲弄 | |
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87
interfering
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| adj. 妨碍的 动词interfere的现在分词 | |
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88
noted
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| adj.著名的，知名的 | |
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89
supervision
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| n.监督，管理 | |
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90
previously
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| adv.以前，先前（地） | |
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91
barricades
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| 路障，障碍物( barricade的名词复数 ) | |
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92
destined
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| adj.命中注定的；(for)以…为目的地的 | |
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93
descended
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| a.为...后裔的，出身于...的 | |
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94
plunged
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| v.颠簸( plunge的过去式和过去分词 )；暴跌；骤降；突降 | |
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95
neutralized
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| v.使失效( neutralize的过去式和过去分词 )；抵消；中和；使（一个国家）中立化 | |
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96
musket
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| n.滑膛枪 | |
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97
perpendicular
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| adj.垂直的，直立的；n.垂直线，垂直的位置 | |
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98
crest
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| n.顶点；饰章；羽冠；vt.达到顶点；vi.形成浪尖 | |
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99
recoiled
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| v.畏缩( recoil的过去式和过去分词 )；退缩；报应；返回 | |
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100
constrained
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| adj.束缚的,节制的 | |
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101
cowardice
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| n.胆小，怯懦 | |
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102
disorder
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| n.紊乱，混乱；骚动，骚乱；疾病，失调 | |
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103
surmount
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| vt.克服；置于…顶上 | |
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104
obstinacy
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| n.顽固；（病痛等）难治 | |
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105
perfectly
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| adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地 | |
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106
penetrated
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| adj. 击穿的，鞭辟入里的 动词penetrate的过去式和过去分词形式 | |
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107
corroboration
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| n.进一步的证实，进一步的证据 | |
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108
breached
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| 攻破( breach的现在分词 )； 破坏，违反 | |
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109
justifies
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| 证明…有理( justify的第三人称单数 )； 为…辩护； 对…作出解释； 为…辩解（或辩护） | |
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110
martial
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| adj.战争的，军事的，尚武的，威武的 | |
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111
resolute
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| adj.坚决的，果敢的 | |
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112
repulse
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| n.击退，拒绝；vt.逐退，击退，拒绝 | |
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113
appalling
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| adj.骇人听闻的，令人震惊的，可怕的 | |
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114
deliberately
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| adv.审慎地；蓄意地；故意地 | |
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115
resentments
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| （因受虐待而）愤恨，不满，怨恨( resentment的名词复数 ) | |
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116
invalided
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| 使伤残（invalid的过去式与过去分词形式） | |
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117
ammunition
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| n.军火，弹药 | |
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118
frankly
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| adv.坦白地，直率地；坦率地说 | |
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119
prosecuting
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| 检举、告发某人( prosecute的现在分词 )； 对某人提起公诉； 继续从事（某事物）； 担任控方律师 | |
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120
draught
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| n.拉，牵引，拖；一网（饮，吸，阵)；顿服药量，通风；v.起草，设计 | |
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121
charcoal
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| n.炭，木炭，生物炭 | |
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122
promptly
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| adv.及时地，敏捷地 | |
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123
vaults
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| n.拱顶( vault的名词复数 )；地下室；撑物跳高；墓穴 | |
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124
murmur
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| n.低语，低声的怨言；v.低语，低声而言 | |
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125
foodstuffs
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| 食物，食品( foodstuff的名词复数 ) | |
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126
egregious
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| adj.非常的，过分的 | |
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127
secrecy
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| n.秘密，保密，隐蔽 | |
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128
constable
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| n.(英国)警察，警官 | |
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129
trifling
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| adj.微不足道的；没什么价值的 | |
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130
wrecked
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| adj.失事的，遇难的 | |
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131
persistently
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| ad.坚持地；固执地 | |
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132
intrigued
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| adj.好奇的，被迷住了的v.搞阴谋诡计(intrigue的过去式)；激起…的兴趣或好奇心；“intrigue”的过去式和过去分词 | |
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133
precisely
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| adv.恰好，正好，精确地，细致地 | |
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134
convalescence
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| n.病后康复期 | |
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135
enraged
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| 使暴怒( enrage的过去式和过去分词 )； 歜； 激愤 | |
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136
dense
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| a.密集的，稠密的，浓密的；密度大的 | |
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137
virtue
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| n.德行，美德；贞操；优点；功效，效力 | |
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138
zealous
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| adj.狂热的，热心的 | |
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139
sincerity
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| n.真诚，诚意；真实 | |
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140
interpretation
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| n.解释，说明，描述；艺术处理 | |
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141
prone
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| adj.(to)易于…的，很可能…的；俯卧的 | |
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142
bombastic
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| adj.夸夸其谈的，言过其实的 | |
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143
scraps
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| 油渣 | |
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144
immolated
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| v.宰杀…作祭品( immolate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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145
tranquillity
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| n. 平静, 安静 | |
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146
crammed
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| adj.塞满的，挤满的；大口地吃；快速贪婪地吃v.把…塞满；填入；临时抱佛脚( cram的过去式) | |
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147
corpses
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| n.死尸，尸体( corpse的名词复数 ) | |
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148
gory
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| adj.流血的；残酷的 | |
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149
infamous
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| adj.声名狼藉的，臭名昭著的，邪恶的 | |
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150
condemn
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| vt.谴责，指责；宣判(罪犯)，判刑 | |
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151
vengeance
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| n.报复，报仇，复仇 | |
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152
groan
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| vi./n.呻吟，抱怨；(发出)呻吟般的声音 | |
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153
fanatics
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| 狂热者，入迷者( fanatic的名词复数 ) | |
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154
apparently
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| adv.显然地；表面上，似乎 | |
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155
odious
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| adj.可憎的，讨厌的 | |
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156
miseries
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| n.痛苦( misery的名词复数 )；痛苦的事；穷困；常发牢骚的人 | |
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157
acquiesce
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| vi.默许，顺从，同意 | |
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158
repulses
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| v.击退( repulse的第三人称单数 )；驳斥；拒绝 | |
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159
vexed
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| adj.争论不休的；（指问题等）棘手的；争论不休的问题；烦恼的v.使烦恼( vex的过去式和过去分词 )；使苦恼；使生气；详细讨论 | |
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160
demonstrations
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| 证明( demonstration的名词复数 )； 表明； 表达； 游行示威 | |
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161
expedients
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| n.应急有效的，权宜之计的( expedient的名词复数 ) | |
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162
solely
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| adv.仅仅，唯一地 | |
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163
dwindling
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| adj.逐渐减少的v.逐渐变少或变小( dwindle的现在分词 ) | |
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164
celebrated
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| adj.有名的，声誉卓著的 | |
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165
remains
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| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
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166
procure
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| vt.获得，取得，促成；vi.拉皮条 | |
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167
repulsed
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| v.击退( repulse的过去式和过去分词 )；驳斥；拒绝 | |
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168
inflicted
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| 把…强加给，使承受，遭受( inflict的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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169
dealing
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| n.经商方法，待人态度 | |
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170
coup
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| n.政变；突然而成功的行动 | |
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171
gallant
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| adj.英勇的，豪侠的；(向女人)献殷勤的 | |
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172
prostration
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| n. 平伏, 跪倒, 疲劳 | |
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173
steadfast
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| adj.固定的，不变的，不动摇的；忠实的；坚贞不移的 | |
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174
brewing
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| n. 酿造, 一次酿造的量 动词brew的现在分词形式 | |
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175
forth
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| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
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176
deposing
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| v.罢免( depose的现在分词 )；（在法庭上）宣誓作证 | |
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177
cemetery
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| n.坟墓，墓地，坟场 | |
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178
exhaustion
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| n.耗尽枯竭，疲惫，筋疲力尽，竭尽，详尽无遗的论述 | |
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179
conspiracies
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| n.阴谋，密谋( conspiracy的名词复数 ) | |
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180
traitor
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| n.叛徒，卖国贼 | |
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181
spoke
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| n.（车轮的）辐条；轮辐；破坏某人的计划；阻挠某人的行动 v.讲，谈（speak的过去式）；说；演说；从某种观点来说 | |
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182
moribund
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| adj.即将结束的，垂死的 | |
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183
bloody
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| adj.非常的的；流血的；残忍的；adv.很；vt.血染 | |
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184
disastrously
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| ad.灾难性地 | |
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185
garrisons
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| 守备部队，卫戍部队( garrison的名词复数 ) | |
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186
possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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187
wont
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| adj.习惯于；v.习惯；n.习惯 | |
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188
dole
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| n.救济，（失业）救济金；vt.（out）发放，发给 | |
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189
delirium
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| n. 神智昏迷,说胡话;极度兴奋 | |
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190
dictated
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| v.大声讲或读( dictate的过去式和过去分词 )；口授；支配；摆布 | |
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191
favourable
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| adj.赞成的，称赞的，有利的，良好的，顺利的 | |
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192
concession
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| n.让步，妥协；特许(权) | |
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193
misery
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| n.痛苦，苦恼，苦难；悲惨的境遇，贫苦 | |
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194
concurred
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| 同意（concur的过去式与过去分词形式） | |
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195
ratified
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| v.批准，签认（合约等）( ratify的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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196
obdurate
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| adj.固执的，顽固的 | |
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197
survivors
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| 幸存者，残存者，生还者( survivor的名词复数 ) | |
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198
tattered
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| adj.破旧的，衣衫破的 | |
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199
detailed
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| adj.详细的，详尽的，极注意细节的，完全的 | |
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200
inspection
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| n.检查，审查，检阅 | |
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201
melancholy
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| n.忧郁，愁思；adj.令人感伤（沮丧）的，忧郁的 | |
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202
vista
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| n.远景，深景，展望，回想 | |
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203
masonry
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| n.砖土建筑；砖石 | |
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204
partially
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| adv.部分地，从某些方面讲 | |
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205
muskets
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| n.火枪，（尤指）滑膛枪( musket的名词复数 ) | |
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206
cartridges
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| 子弹( cartridge的名词复数 )； （打印机的）墨盒； 录音带盒； （唱机的）唱头 | |
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207
sterling
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| adj.英币的(纯粹的，货真价实的)；n.英国货币(英镑) | |
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208
monks
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| n.修道士，僧侣( monk的名词复数 ) | |
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209
alleged
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| a.被指控的，嫌疑的 | |
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210
dungeon
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| n.地牢，土牢 | |
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211
positively
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| adv.明确地，断然，坚决地；实在，确实 | |
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212
deficit
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| n.亏空，亏损；赤字，逆差 | |
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213
deducted
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| v.扣除，减去( deduct的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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214
fortresses
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| 堡垒，要塞( fortress的名词复数 ) | |
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215
isolated
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| adj.与世隔绝的 | |
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216
quiescent
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| adj.静止的，不活动的，寂静的 | |
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217
citadel
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| n.城堡；堡垒；避难所 | |
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218
ashore
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| adv.在(向)岸上，上岸 | |
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219
frigate
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| n.护航舰，大型驱逐舰 | |
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220
levy
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| n.征收税或其他款项，征收额 | |
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221
authorized
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| a.委任的，许可的 | |
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222
contented
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| adj.满意的，安心的，知足的 | |
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223
remonstrances
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| n.抱怨，抗议( remonstrance的名词复数 ) | |
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224
levies
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| （部队）征兵( levy的名词复数 )； 募捐； 被征募的军队 | |
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225
callous
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| adj.无情的，冷淡的，硬结的，起老茧的 | |
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226
habitual
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| adj.习惯性的；通常的，惯常的 | |
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227
lurch
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| n.突然向前或旁边倒；v.蹒跚而行 | |
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228
malicious
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| adj.有恶意的，心怀恶意的 | |
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229
plausible
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| adj.似真实的，似乎有理的，似乎可信的 | |
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230
premature
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| adj.比预期时间早的；不成熟的，仓促的 | |
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231
adversary
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| adj.敌手，对手 | |
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232
ascertained
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| v.弄清，确定，查明( ascertain的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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233
ingenuity
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| n.别出心裁；善于发明创造 | |
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234
obedience
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| n.服从，顺从 | |
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235
inadequacy
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| n.无法胜任，信心不足 | |
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236
juntas
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| n.以武力政变上台的军阀( junta的名词复数 ) | |
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237
provident
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| adj.为将来做准备的，有先见之明的 | |
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238
civilian
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| adj.平民的，民用的，民众的 | |
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239
wholesale
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| n.批发；adv.以批发方式；vt.批发，成批出售 | |
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240
truculent
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| adj.野蛮的，粗野的 | |
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241
countenanced
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| v.支持，赞同，批准( countenance的过去式 ) | |
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242
incompatible
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| adj.不相容的，不协调的，不相配的 | |
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243
patriotic
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| adj.爱国的，有爱国心的 | |
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