On the 19th of January, 1810, the unfortunate Areizaga began to receive from all quarters dispatches which left him no doubt that the fatal hour had arrived, and that the whole of his line, from Villamanrique on the east to Almaden on the west, was about to be assailed1 by the enemy. From every point on his front of 150 miles, his subordinates sent him in reports to the effect that strong hostile columns had come up, and had thrust in their outposts. Indeed, Zerain, from his remote cantonment on the extreme left, had announced that an overwhelming force, coming from the direction of Ciudad Real, had beaten him out of the town of Almaden as early as the 15th, and had compelled him to retire towards the south-west, leaving the direct road to Cordova uncovered. This was, of course, the corps3 of Victor, whose flanking movement was already threatening to cut the line of communication between La Carolina and Seville. But it would take some days for the 1st Corps to pass the rugged4 defiles6 of the Sierra de Los Pedroches, which lie between Almaden and the valley of the Guadalquivir. An even more pressing danger seemed to be foreshadowed from the less-remote right of the Spanish line, where Vigodet reported, from the pass of Villamanrique, that he had been driven in to his final fighting position at Montizon, by a French column marching up from Villanueva de los Infantes. In the centre, the enemy had advanced to Santa Cruz de la Mudela, where the roads to all the group of passes about the Despe?a-Perros branch off, but had not yet shown how many of them he intended to use. Areizaga could not determine whether some of the French movements were mere7 demonstrations8, or whether every one of them portended9 a real attack on the morrow. Zerain was too far off to be helped; but Vigodet’s demands for assistance were so pressing that the Commander-in-Chief sent off to his aid,[p. 129] on the night of the 19th, the one division which he had hitherto kept in reserve at La Carolina, the 4,000 bayonets of Castejon. This left him only three divisions—those of Zayas, Lacy, and Giron, not more than 9,000 men in all, to defend the high-road to Madrid and the subsidiary passes on its immediate10 flank.
Map of Andalusia
Enlarge ANDALUSIA,
to illustrate11 the Campaign of 1810.
As a matter of fact, the appearance of the French advanced guards implied a genuine attack at every possible point of access. King Joseph had resolved to carry the whole of the defiles by a simultaneous onslaught on the morning of the 20th. His policy seems to have been one of very doubtful wisdom, for it would have been as effective to pierce the Spanish line at one point as at four, and he could have concentrated an overwhelming force, and have been absolutely certain of success, if he had launched his main body at one objective, while demonstrating against the rest. He had preferred, however, to cut up his army into four columns, each of which assailed a different pass. Sebastiani, on the extreme French left, separated by a gap of twenty miles from the main column, was the enemy who had driven in Vigodet at the opening of the Villamanrique pass. He had with him the remains12 of his own 4th Corps—of which such a large proportion had been left behind in New Castile,—a body of about 10,000 men[130]. His orders were to force the defile5 in his front, and to descend13 into the plain in the rear of the Spanish centre, by way of Ubeda and Linares, so as to cut off the enemy’s retreat towards Murcia, and to envelop14 him if he should hold the Despe?a-Perros too long.
Next to Sebastiani in the French line was a column composed of Girard’s division of the 5th Corps, the King’s Guards, and the Spanish regiments15 in Joseph’s service[131]. It was nearly 14,000 strong, and advanced straight up the Madrid chaussée, aiming at the Despe?a-Perros and the Spanish centre. If the enemy should fight well, and if the flanking movements should[p. 130] fail, this column would have the hardest work before it: for, unlike the minor16 passes to east and west, the Despe?a-Perros becomes in its central length a narrow and precipitous defile, easily capable of defence. The Spaniards had run entrenchments across it, and had mined the road at more than one point. But its fatal weakness lay in the fact that the by-paths from the western passes descend into it to the rear of the point where these obstructions18 had been placed. If they were seized by the advancing French, the fortifications across the chaussée would prove a mere trap for the troops which held them.
Mortier, with Gazan’s division of the 5th Corps and Dessolles’ troops, about 15,000 strong, was told off to assail2 these flanking defiles on the Spanish left[132]. The two passes are the Puerto del Rey and the Puerto del Muradal. The former got its name from Alfonso VIII, who in 1212 had turned the position of the Almohad Sultan Mohammed-abu-Yakub by this route, and so forced him to the decisive battle of Navas de Tolosa, a few miles to the rear. In 1810 it was a tortuous19 and rough road, but practicable for artillery20: the slopes on either side of it, moreover, were not inaccessible21 to infantry22. A mile or two to its left, nearer the Despe?a-Perros, was the still rougher path of the Puerto del Muradal, which was practicable for infantry but not for guns. Between this defile and the entrenchments across the Madrid chaussée, the crest23 of the Sierra was accessible to troops advancing in loose order and prepared for a stiff climb: the Spanish engineers had therefore placed a large earthwork on its culminating point, known as the Collado de Valdeazores. Giron’s weak division of no more than 3,200 bayonets was entrusted24 with the defence both of the Puerto del Rey and the Puerto del Muradal. Those of Lacy and Zayas, about 5,000 in all, held the Despe?a-Perros and the entrenchments on each side of it. Areizaga lay behind them, with a reserve of 1,000 men at most—having sent off Castejon and his division to join Vigodet on the preceding night, he had no more with him than his personal guard, the ‘Batallón del General’, and some detached companies.
Mortier, like the good general that he was, did not confine[p. 131] his operations to an attack against the narrow fronts of the two passes, but assailed the rough hillside on each side of them, sending out whole battalions25 deployed27 as skirmishers to climb the slopes. Of Gazan’s division, one brigade marched against the Puerto del Muradal, but the other went up, in open order, on the space between the Puerto and the Spanish redoubt at the Collado de Valdeazores. Similarly, Dessolles attacked the Puerto del Rey with a few battalions, but sent the rest up the less formidable portions of the flanking slopes. Girard and the King’s Reserves, meanwhile, did not press their attack on the Despe?a-Perros, till the troops on their right had already begun to drive the enemy before them.
The results of these tactics might have been foreseen from the first: Giron’s 3,200 men, attacked by 15,000, were driven in at a pace that ever grew more rapid. They could not defend the passes, because the slopes on each side were turned by the enemy. Their line was broken in two or three places, and they fled in haste down the rear of the Sierra, to escape being captured by flanking detachments which were pushing on at full speed to head them off. The moment that the Despe?a-Perros was turned by Mortier’s movement, the troops occupying it had to retreat at headlong speed, just as Girard was commencing his attack on them. All did not retire with sufficient promptness: the battalion26 in a redoubt on the Collado de los Jardines, on the right flank of the high-road, was cut off and captured en masse. All the guns in the pass were taken, there being no time to get them away down the steep road in their rear. After two hours of scrambling28 rather than fighting, the main passages of the Sierra Morena were in the hands of the French. The mines on the high-road had been fired when the retreat was ordered, but did not wreck29 the chaussée in such a way as to prevent the enemy from pursuing. The losses of the Spaniards were no more than a few hundreds killed and wounded, and 500 prisoners; those of the French were less than 100 in all[133]. There had, in truth, been hardly the semblance30 of a battle.
[p. 132]
The full results of the disaster were only developed next day: the troops which had defended the central passes escaped, though in dreadful disorder31. But those further to their right were destined32 to a worse fate. While Mortier and the King were forcing the great defiles, Sebastiani had been fighting all day with Vigodet, in the defiles about Montizon and St. Esteban del Puerto. He had no such superiority in numbers over his enemy as had the King on the main field of operations[134], hence his progress was slower, and his victory, though complete, was not so prompt and crushing. Vigodet and his 6,000 men were dispersed34 by the afternoon, and fled down the valley of the Guadalen towards the plains, with Sebastiani’s cavalry35 in pursuit. Having fought much longer than Lacy and Giron, their losses were heavier than those of the central division—probably 1,000 killed, wounded, or taken. Shortly after, there appeared on the scene, moving along the steep hill-path from La Carolina, the Spanish division of Castejon, which had been sent off on the previous night to support Vigodet. It found the St. Esteban position in the possession of the French, and turned hastily back to rejoin Areizaga. But, while it had been on the march, the Commander-in-Chief and his army had been routed, and La Carolina was in the hands of the French. Castejon found himself enclosed between Sebastiani and the King, in a most perilous36 position. On the morning of the 21st, he tried to escape by the by-path to Linares, but on arriving near that place found that Mortier’s troops were already across his road. A brigade of Sebastiani’s corps was in hot pursuit in his rear, and Castejon, seeing himself thus enclosed, surrendered at Arquillos, with his whole intact division of over 4,000 men and ten guns.
Already, before the capture of this Spanish corps, the King and Sebastiani had joined hands, their reconnoitring parties having met in the valley of the Guadalen. On learning of the complete success of both columns, Joseph and Soult resolved to urge the pursuit in two separate directions. Sebastiani was told[p. 133] to push forward by way of Ubeda and Baeza to Jaen, while the main column marched by Baylen on Andujar and Cordova. It was hoped that news of Victor would soon be received: if all had gone well, he would have reached the Guadalquivir somewhere in the neighbourhood of Cordova, so as to be in the rear of any Spanish force that might have retreated from La Carolina in the direction of Seville.
As a matter of fact, however, both Vigodet and also Areizaga with the wreck of the troops from the central passes, had abandoned any hope of covering Seville, and had retreated southwards on Jaen. There was no force whatever left upon the Cordova road, and the King met no resistance upon the 22nd or the 23rd. On the latter day Sebastiani, arriving in front of Jaen, found the Spanish commander-in-chief with some 7,000 or 8,000 men prepared to defend the town. He attacked at once, and routed these dispirited troops, who made little or no show of resistance. Practically the whole force went to pieces: the French captured forty-six guns, mostly those of the reserve-park of the Army of Andalusia, which had been deposited in Jaen. Of the wrecks38 of that unhappy force, Areizaga carried off a small remnant to Guadix in the eastern mountains, near the borders of Murcia. Lacy, with another fraction, retired39 on Granada. But the large majority had left their colours, and dispersed to their homes.
King Joseph and Soult meanwhile, advancing unopposed along the high-road to Cordova and Seville, got into touch at Andujar with the advanced cavalry of Victor on the night of the 22nd of January. The march of the 1st Corps had been toilsome in the extreme, but almost unopposed save by the difficulties of the road. After driving Zerain’s little detachment out of Almaden on the 15th, they had hardly seen an enemy. Zerain and his colleague Copons had retired by the road towards Seville south-westward40. Victor, though he sent out flying parties of cavalry to threaten Benalcazar and Hinojosa, to his right, had really pushed further to the left, on the easternmost of the two rough passes which lead to Cordova. The day after leaving Almaden he had sent his artillery back to La Mancha, the dilapidated and abandoned road to which he had committed himself proving absolutely impracticable for anything that[p. 134] travelled on wheels. But he pushed on with his infantry and horsemen, and passing Santa Eufemia, Torrecampo and Villanueva de la Jara, came down into the plain of the Guadalquivir at Adamuz, fifteen miles to the east of Cordova, on January 21st, the day after Soult and King Joseph had forced the Despe?a Perros and the Puerto del Rey. Wishing to get into touch with them before attacking Cordova, he halted his infantry, but sent out his cavalry to the gates of that city on the one side, and on the other to Montoro and Andujar, where they met the vedettes of the main army on the evening of the 22nd. Thus the French host was once more concentrated: the march on Seville could be continued without delay. Victor now became the advanced guard: he entered Cordova, which opened its gates without resistance, on the 24th. There was no Spanish force in front of the French army, since Zerain and Copons had retired towards Seville by a road far to the west, while the wrecks of Areizaga’s army had been driven off in a south-easterly direction.
Soult and King Joseph, therefore, had leisure to plan out the remainder of their campaign without any disturbance41 from the enemy. On the 25th[135] they resolved to detach Sebastiani and his 10,000 men for the conquest of Granada, to leave Dessolles’ division at Cordova and Andujar, but to march on Seville in a single mass with the remaining 50,000 sabres and bayonets of the Army of Andalusia. The desire to seize the capital from which the Junta42 had so long defied him, seems to have mastered every other idea in the mind of the intrusive43 King. The rebel government should be captured, or at least forced to take refuge in Portugal or the sea. Then at last the provinces would submit, the regular armies would lay down their arms, the guerrillero bands would disperse33 to their homes, and he might reign44 as a real king, not as the mere tool of his imperious brother. The capture of Seville would be the last act but one of the drama: after that he would become the national monarch45 of a submissive people, and carry out all the schemes of vague benevolence46 on which his mind was wont47 to dwell in his more hopeful hours. That the resistance would continue, even if Seville were his own[p. 135] and the Junta were scattered48 and discredited50, he did not dream. And Seville, he knew, must fall; to defend it there could be, as he concluded, nothing but a half-armed mob, backed by the few thousand dispirited soldiers who had fled before Victor from the western section of the Sierra Morena. Even if the rebel capital made itself a second Saragossa, he had at his disposal an army double the strength of that which had reduced the obstinate51 Aragonese city.
In subsequent years critics, wise after the event, never tired of declaiming against the policy which Joseph and Soult approved on January 25, 1810. It was easy in 1811 or 1812 to point out that a division or two might have been spared from the victorious52 army to execute a march upon Cadiz, while the main force was dealing53 with Seville. The island-fortress, which was to defy the French during the next three years, might have been caught while it was still ungarrisoned and panic-stricken, if only the invaders55 had detached a column from Carmona, where the road from Cordova bifurcates56 to Seville on the right and Cadiz on the left. It is certain that, if any suggestion to that effect was made at the time, Soult, Mortier, and the other generals present at the council of war passed it over[136]. The fact was that Seville loomed57 large before the imaginations of them all: Cadiz seemed but a secondary affair at the moment. It appeared probable that the whole of the scattered forces of the enemy would mass themselves to defend the insurgent58 capital. On January 25th, when the original plan was drawn59 up, no one realized that there was a Spanish army approaching, whose presence in Andalusia had not yet become known, or that the general of that army[p. 136] would deliberately60 leave Seville to its fate, as incapable61 of defence and doomed62 to destruction, and hasten by forced marches to throw himself into the island-city which was destined to become the new capital of insurgent Spain. Unable to foresee such a development, Joseph wrote to his brother on January 27 that Seville would probably submit without fighting, and that he would then enter Cadiz ‘sans coup63 férir.’
Albuquerque’s operations, which ultimately turned out to be the most important section of the Andalusian campaign, need a word of explanation. It will be remembered that, early in January, he had assembled, at Don Benito and Medellin, the small field-force that he could command, after providing the garrison54 of Badajoz and leaving a detachment above Almaraz to watch the French 2nd Corps. It did not amount to more than 8,000 men, of which some 1,000 were cavalry. His position at Don Benito was intended to protect the flank of Zerain and Copons, who lay to his right, covering the passes that lead from Almaden on to Cordova. On January 15th he received from Zerain the news that he was about to be attacked at Almaden by a French column of at least 20,000 men. The Duke promptly64 began to march eastward65 to join his colleague, and reached Campanario on January 16th. Here he was met by the information that Zerain had been driven out of Almaden on the preceding day, and had drawn back by Benalcazar and Hinojosa on to the Seville road. Copons from Pozo Blanco was retiring in the same direction. The Duke thereupon concluded that his duty was to fall back by a route parallel to that of Victor’s advance, and to draw nearer to Seville, strengthening himself as he approached that city by Zerain’s and Copons’ small corps.
Accordingly he sent off three of his weakest battalions to strengthen the garrison of Badajoz, which was very small at the moment, directed his artillery (with a cavalry escort) to take the good but circuitous66 high-road to Seville by Merida, Los Santos, and Santa Olalla, and started off across the mountains with his infantry and 500 horse. Marching very rapidly, though the roads were bad and the days short, he moved by Zalamea and Maguilla to Guadalcanal, on the borders of Andalusia, which he reached on January 18th. Here he received from the Central[p. 137] Junta an absurd order, apparently67 based on the idea that he was still at Campanario, which bade him stop Victor’s advance, by falling on his flank and rear by the road to Agudo and Almaden. But since the marshal had seized Almaden on the 15th, and was known to have moved southward from thence, it was clear that he must now be more than half-way to Cordova: if the Army of Estremadura plunged69 back into the mountains to seek Agudo and Almaden, it would only reach them on the 22nd or 23rd, and Victor would be at the gates of Cordova on the 21st. The Junta’s order was so hopelessly impracticable that the Duke took upon himself to disobey it, and wrote in reply that he should move so as to place himself between Victor and Seville, and would cover the Andalusian capital ‘so far as was possible with the small force at his disposition70.’
Accordingly Albuquerque, instead of returning northward71 into the Estremaduran mountains, moved a stage further south, to El Pedroso, on the road from Guadalcanal to Seville, and sent orders to Copons and Zerain to join him with their small divisions. Two days later he received the order which should have been sent him on the 18th, instead of the insane directions that were actually given; by it he was directed to march on Seville with all speed. On the 23rd, therefore, he arrived at the ferry of Cantillana, twenty miles north of Seville: here he received news that his artillery and its escort had safely completed its round, and were about to cross the Guadalquivir at Rinconada, fifteen miles to the south. At Cantillana, however, the Duke got the last dispatch which the Central Junta ever issued; it was dated on the 23rd, a few hours before the members dispersed and fled. By this he was directed to march not on Seville but on Cordova, which at the moment the document came to hand—the morning of the 24th—had just been occupied by Victor.
That day Albuquerque crossed the Guadalquivir and occupied Carmona, where he was joined by his artillery, and by part of Copons’ division, but not (apparently) by Zerain’s, which had retired into Seville. He had now about 10,000 men, of whom 1,000 were horsemen, and 20 guns. From Carmona he threw out a cavalry screen on all sides: his vedettes on the 27th struck French cavalry at Ecija, and were driven in; they reported that[p. 138] the enemy was advancing in enormous force from Cordova—as was indeed the case. Meanwhile news had come up from Seville that the Junta had fled on the night of the 23rd-24th, that anarchy72 reigned73 in the city, and that a new revolutionary government had been installed. There was no longer any legitimate74 executive from which orders could be received. Albuquerque had to make up his mind whether he would retire into Seville, and put himself at the disposition of the mob and its leaders, or whether he should seek some safer base of operations. Without a moment’s hesitation75 he resolved to leave the Andalusian capital to itself, and to retire on Cadiz, which he knew to be ungarrisoned, yet to be absolutely impregnable if it were properly held. This wise resolution, it may be said without hesitation, saved the cause of Spain in the south. If Cadiz had been left unoccupied there would have been no further resistance in Andalusia.
But we must return to the operations of the French. On the 25th Victor had advanced from Cordova, taking the direct road to Seville via La Carlota and Ecija, while Mortier and the Royal Guard followed him at short intervals76. The Duke of Belluno occupied Ecija on the 27th and Carmona on the 28th. On these two days his advanced guard got into contact with Albuquerque’s cavalry screen, and learnt from prisoners that the Army of Estremadura, whose presence in Andalusia thus became known, was in front of them[137]. On reaching Carmona Victor obtained the still more important news that Albuquerque, after staying in that place for two days, had not retired into Seville, as might have been expected, but had marched southward to Utrera on the road to Cadiz, leaving the greater city uncovered. On the night of the 29th the leading division of Victor’s corps, the dragoons of Latour-Maubourg, appeared in front of Seville, and reported that works were being hastily thrown up around it on all sides[138], and that they had been fired[p. 139] on by masses of armed irregulars at every point where they had pushed forward vedettes towards its suburbs[139].
Seville was at this moment, and had been now for six days, in a state of chaos77. The Central Junta had absconded78 on the 23rd, taking along with it both its Executive Committee and the Ministers of State. The panic had begun on the 18th, when the news had come in that Victor’s corps had thrust Zerain out of Almaden three days before, and was marching on Cordova. It had grown worse two days later, when Areizaga reported that another French army was marching against the Despe?a-Perros. The Junta published a proclamation on the 20th, exhorting79 the Andalusians to have no fear, for Albuquerque had been directed to fall on Victor’s flank, and Del Parque with the Army of Castile was on the march to join him, so that the enemy would be forced to turn back to guard himself. Such orders were indeed sent, but any man of sense could see that they must arrive too late. If Victor was at Almaden on the 15th, he might be at Cordova on the 21st: if King Joseph was at the foot of the passes on the 19th, he might be across them on the 20th. What use, therefore, would be a summons sent to Albuquerque in Estremadura, or to Del Parque in the mountains between Bejar and Ciudad Rodrigo? The French would be in the valley of the Guadalquivir long before Del Parque had even received his orders to move. As a matter of fact, that general got his dispatch on January 24, the day that Victor entered Cordova, and even Albuquerque[p. 140] was informed of the Junta’s behests only on the 18th, when he reached Guadalcanal.
The obvious ineptitude80 which the Government had shown, and the imminent81 peril37 to which Seville was exposed, gave another chance to the local conspirators82, who had already twice prepared a pronunciamento against the Junta. On the 22nd riots broke out, and demagogues were preaching at every street corner the necessity for deposing83 these incapable rulers, and substituting for them a regency of true patriots84, and a Committee of Public Safety, which should show the energy in which the Junta had been so lacking. The people clamoured at the doors of the Arsenal85, asking for muskets87 and cannon88, they mustered89 outside the prisons where Palafox, Montijo, and other chiefs who had been arrested for their earlier plots, were still confined. Many of the members of the Junta left Seville on this and the following day, on the plausible90 pretext91 that it was necessary for them to betake themselves to Cadiz—which, by a decree of Jan. 13, had been designated as the meeting-place of the approaching National Cortes—in order to make preparations for the meeting of that august assembly. Indeed, the Junta had been directed to meet at Cadiz on February 1 for that purpose. The news that King Joseph had forced the passes of the Sierra Morena, which came to hand early on the 22nd, sufficed to make an end of any shadow of power which the Junta still possessed92. Next day those members who had hitherto stuck to their post, and the Ministers, left the town with elaborately contrived93 secrecy94. Seville fell into the hands of the mob, who, led by a Capuchin friar riding on a mule95 and brandishing96 a crucifix, burst open the prisons and the Arsenal, armed themselves, and nominated a new ‘Supreme National Junta.’ Its executive was to be composed of Palafox and Montijo, the Marquis of La Romana, General Eguia, and Francisco Saavedra, an aged97 and respectable person, who had been president of the old Junta of Seville, the original committee which had been suppressed by the Central Junta. He is said to have been used as a mere tool by Palafox and Montijo, and to have been disgusted by their acts. This new, and obviously illegal, Government issued decrees stigmatizing98 the fugitive99 ‘Centralists’ as cowards and traitors100, and claiming[p. 141] authority not only over Andalusia, but over all Spain. They ordered the calling out of the levy101 en masse, and issued commissions displacing generals and governors in all the provinces. One of these documents declared Del Parque removed from the command of the Army of the Left, and named La Romana as his successor. The marquis, glad to escape from the tumult102, rode off at once, presented himself at the head quarters of the Castilian army, and was recognized without difficulty as its chief—though his authority might well have been contested if any general had chosen to take up the cause of the discredited Central Junta.
But that unhappy body had no longer a single friend: its members were mobbed and arrested on their flight from Seville to Cadiz; its President the Archbishop of Laodicea, its Vice-President the Conde de Altamira, and the War Minister Cornel were seized at Xeres by a frantic104 mob, and would have been murdered, if General Casta?os, whom the Junta had treated so badly in December 1808, had not arrived in time to save their lives. Twenty-three members reached Cadiz, and there, by a proclamation dated January 29th, abdicated105 their authority, and nominated a Regency, to which they resigned their power, and the duty of receiving and welcoming the expected Cortes. The Regents were Casta?os, the Bishop103 of Orense, Admiral Esca?o, Saavedra—the president of the new and illegal Junta at Seville—and Fernandez de Leon, an American Treasury-official, who was to represent the Colonies[140]. It will be noted106 that the nominators were wise enough to refrain from appointing any of their own number to serve in the Regency.
Meanwhile, the duty of resisting the first shock of the French advance fell not on the Regency, but on the Revolutionary Government which had installed itself in power at Seville. These usurpers proved themselves quite as incapable as the men whom they had superseded108. When once in possession of power, Palafox and his friends had to count up their resources: they had at their disposal an armed mob of 20,000 men, and a mere handful of regular troops, consisting of the regiments which had served as the guards of the late Junta, and four or[p. 142] five isolated109 battalions from the division of Zerain, which had finally sought refuge in Seville. These troops seem to have been about 4,000 strong at the most[141]. There was an immense quantity of artillery from the arsenal; it had been dragged out to line the new earthworks, on which the populace was busily engaged, but not two hundred trained gunners existed to man the batteries. It was hoped that Albuquerque’s Estremaduran army would come to their aid, but—as we have already seen—the Duke deliberately refused to acknowledge the authority of the Seville Junta, and, instead of falling back upon the city, marched southwards to Utrera on the Cadiz road, leaving the great chaussée Ecija-Carmona-Seville open to the French.
On the 28th, the leaders of the Junta having taken stock of their position, and discovered its danger (for the lines which the people had thrown up would have required 50,000 men to man them, and not half that force was forthcoming even if every rioter armed with a musket86 was counted), copied in the most ignominious110 fashion the prudence111 or cowardice112 of the Central Junta, which they had so fiercely denounced five days before. Under the cover of the night Eguia, Montijo, Saavedra, and Palafox absconded from Seville without taking leave of their followers113. Saavedra fled to Cadiz, where it is surprising to find that he was made a member of the new Regency, Palafox to Albuquerque’s camp, Montijo to the southern mountains, where (as he announced) he was intending to collect an army of succour for Seville. When, therefore, on the next evening Latour-Maubourg’s dragoons appeared before the entrenchments of the city, there was no longer any responsible government to turn the ardour of the multitude to account. Nevertheless, mobs, headed by frantic friars, ran to the entrenchments, and discharged musketry and cannon-shot at every French vedette that showed itself.
On the afternoon of the 30th, Victor appeared to reinforce Latour-Maubourg’s cavalry, bringing with him the bulk of the[p. 143] infantry of the 1st Corps. The King, Soult, and Mortier were close behind[142]. On this day it had been settled at a Council-of-War held at Carmona that the whole of the army should march on Seville, leaving Cadiz alone for the present, and detaching only a brigade of cavalry to pursue the army of Albuquerque. On the next morning Victor received assurances, from persons who had escaped from the city, that it was doubtful whether he would be opposed, since the mob was panic-stricken at the flight of its leaders, and the senior military officers were convinced that resistance was impossible. Certain that the defence would be feeble, if any were offered, Soult gave orders that the 1st Corps should storm the lines on February 1st. But no military operations were necessary: on the evening of January 31st the corporation of Seville had sent out a deputation to negotiate for surrender. They offered to admit the enemy, if they were guaranteed security of life and property for all who should submit, and a promise that no extraordinary war-contribution should be levied114 on their city. To this the King, who was anxious to enter the place as a pacific conqueror115, without storm or bloodshed, gave an eager consent. While the civil authorities were treating with Victor, the small body of regular troops in Seville, under the Visconde de Gand, quietly left the place by the bridge leading to the western side of the Guadalquivir, and retreated in haste toward the Condado de Niebla and the borders of Portugal.
On the afternoon of February 1, Joseph entered Seville in triumph at the head of his Guard, and lodged116 himself in the Alcazar, the old residence of the Kings of Spain. He was welcomed by a deputation which comprised some persons of mark. The impression made on the citizens by the conduct of the two Juntas117, and the turbulence118 of the mob which had ruled during the last eight days, had been so deplorable that a considerable number of the Sevillians despaired of the national cause, and rushed to acknowledge the usurper107. Indeed, there were more ‘Josefinos’ found in this city than in any other[p. 144] corner of Spain. The ‘intrusive king’ released a number of political prisoners, whom the last Junta had arrested on suspicion of treason. Apparently this suspicion had been well grounded, as many of the captives, headed by the Swiss generals Preux and Reding[143], did homage119 to Joseph, and accepted office under him.
Encouraged by these defections to his cause, and by the fact that deputations had presented themselves from Cordova and Jaen to bespeak120 his protection, Joseph hastened to publish an absurd address to his army, couched in the magniloquent style which all French writers of proclamations at this time were wont to borrow from their Emperor. ‘The barriers placed by Nature between the North and the South of Spain have fallen. You have met with friends only beyond the Sierra Morena. Jaen, Cordova, Seville have flung open their gates.... The King of Spain desires that between the Pillars of Hercules a third pillar shall arise, to recall to posterity121, and to the navigators of both the new and the old world, the memory of the officers and men of that French army which drove back the English, saved thirty thousand Spaniards, pacified122 the ancient Baetica, and regained123 for France her natural allies.’ The rather puzzling passage concerning the ‘thirty thousand Spaniards saved’ refers to the prisoners of Oca?a and the Sierra Morena, whom the French, according to the King, ‘recognized as brethren led astray by the common enemy. You spared them, and I have received them as my children.’
Some elation124 in the King’s language was, perhaps, pardonable at the moment. The moral effect of the surrender of Seville was considerable in France, England, and the rest of Europe, though less in Spain than elsewhere. The tangible125 trophies126 of the conquest were enormous—the place had been the central arsenal of Spain, and the amount of artillery, ammunition127, and warlike equipment captured was very large. The cannon-foundry and other military factories were taken over in excellent condition, and kept the French army of Andalusia well supplied during the three years of its existence. Tobacco to the value, as it was said, of ￡1,000,000 was found in the great central magazine, and quinine, quicksilver, and other commodities of[p. 145] government monopoly to a considerable additional sum. Nothing had been done, since the news of the passage of the Sierra Morena had arrived, to destroy or remove all this valuable state property.
On the day following their entry into Seville, Joseph and Soult directed Victor to march in pursuit of Albuquerque, and to take possession of Cadiz. So complete had been the débacle of the Spanish armies since the Andalusian campaign began, that it seems to have been supposed that the Army of Estremadura would offer no serious resistance, even if it should succeed in throwing itself into Cadiz before it was overtaken. Marching with laudable expedition, the Duke of Belluno covered the eighty-three miles between Seville and Cadiz in four days, and presented himself in front of the place on the evening of February 5th. But Albuquerque, unmolested in his march from Utrera, had arrived on the 3rd, bringing with him not only his own troops and those of Copons, but several recruit-battalions picked up at Xeres, Lebrija, San Lucar, and Puerto Santa Maria, where they had been organizing. He had some 12,000 men in all, not counting the civic128 militia129 of Cadiz, which had hitherto been its sole garrison.
Cadiz, in the days when the practicable range of the heaviest artillery did not exceed 2,500 yards, was one of the strongest places in the world. The town lies on the extreme point of a long sandy peninsula, which runs out into the sea from the Isla de Leon, a large island separated from the mainland of Andalusia by the salt-water channel of the Rio Santi Petri, an arm of the sea varying from 300 to 400 yards in breadth, and flowing through marshes130 which make access to its banks very difficult. The Isla, protected by this enormous wet ditch, has a front towards the continent of about seven miles, from the naval131 arsenal of La Carraca at its north end to the Castle of Santi Petri at its south. Batteries had already been thrown up at all the commanding points, and Albuquerque had broken the only bridge, that of Zuazo, which crossed the marsh68 and the Rio. It would be impossible to pass the channel save by collecting great quantities of boats, and these would have to move under artillery fire. Venegas, the military governor of Cadiz, had already ordered all the vessels132, small and great, of[p. 146] the villages round the bay to be destroyed or brought across to the city. Moreover, there were a score of gunboats in the channel, manned from the Spanish fleet, which could be used to oppose any attempt to cross the Rio. Indeed, naval assistance to any amount was available for the defence of Cadiz: there were a dozen Spanish and four English line-of-battle ships in the harbour. All through the three long years while the French lay in front of the Isla, no attempt was ever made to throw a force in boats across the channel: the venture seemed too hazardous134.
If, however, Victor had, by some expedient135, succeeded in crossing the Rio, there were two lines of defence behind it, of far greater strength than that formed by this outer ditch of the Cadiz works. The triangular136 Isla de Leon forms with its apex137 a long sand-spit, which projects for four miles into the Atlantic. Half way along it the breadth of the spit is contracted to no more than 200 yards, and here there was a continuous entrenchment17 from water to water, called the Cortadura, or the battery of San Fernando, armed with many heavy guns. Supposing this isthmus138 to have been passed, there lies, two miles further along the sand-spit, the outer enceinte of Cadiz itself, with a front of not more than 400 yards in breadth, and deep water on either side.
Cadiz had been captured more than once in earlier wars, but always by an enemy who could attack from the sea. Neither the Isla de Leon nor the San Fernando line could be held against an attack supported by a fleet which came close in shore, and battered139 the works from flank and rear, or landed troops behind them. The sea, it may be remarked, is four fathoms140 deep to within a short distance (about 300 yards) of the shore, all along the south front of the Isla and the Isthmus, so that there was nothing to prevent a fleet coming close to the works. But against any naval attack Cadiz was, in 1810, absolutely secured by the predominance of the English fleet. There was no armed French vessel133 nearer than Bayonne or Barcelona, nor any possibility of bringing one round. All that was done by the besiegers in a three years’ leaguer was to build some gunboats in the northern inlets of the bay, and these they never dared to bring out into the open water.
[p. 147]
The real danger to Cadiz lay not from the sea side, nor on the Isla front, but from the inner side of the harbour and the east. Here a long spit of land runs out from beside the town of Puerto Real in the direction of Cadiz. It is called the Trocadero, from a village situated141 on its south-eastern side. At its extreme point is a fort named San José, while another fort, named San Luis, lies alongside of the other on a low mud-island. In advance of both, built right in the marsh, and surrounded by water at high-tide, was a third called Matagorda. These three forts were the outer defences of the harbour against a naval attack, and could cross fires with the town batteries and a castle called Puntales, which lies on the easternmost point of the isthmus, a mile from the battery of San Fernando. Matagorda is only 1,200 yards from Puntales, and 3,000 yards from the eastern point of the city of Cadiz. If the French took possession of it, and of the neighbouring San José and San Luis, they could bombard the Puntales castle and all the neighbouring section of the Isthmus, to the grave danger and discomfort142 of all who had to pass between the city and the Isla de Leon. They would also be able to annoy ships lying in all the eastern reaches of the great harbour. But before Victor arrived in front of Cadiz, San José, San Luis, and Matagorda were blown up, with the leave of the governor Venegas, by a detachment of seamen143 from the British fleet. There could, therefore, be no trouble from this direction, unless the enemy succeeded in restoring and rearming the three forts,—no easy task under the fire of the Puntales castle and the fleet. It was not till some months had passed that the struggle began for these ruined works, the only points from which the defence could be seriously incommoded.
On his first arrival Victor summoned the town, and received a prompt and angry answer of refusal from the governor and the local Junta. The marshal inspected the city’s outer defences, and was forced to report to the King at Seville that it seemed that nothing could be done against the place till he had brought up heavy artillery, and built himself boats. Joseph, unwilling144 to believe anything that contradicted the hopes of complete triumph that he had been nourishing ever since the passage of the Sierra Morena, came up to Puerto Santa Maria,[p. 148] on the bay of Cadiz, looked at the situation, did not find it reassuring145, and wrote to his imperial brother to propose that he should send out his Toulon fleet to attack the place on the sea side[144]. Napoleon, still smarting under the memory of how Admiral Martin had destroyed an important section of that fleet in the preceding October, ignored this proposal. He did not forget, though his brother had apparently done so, the fact that the British Mediterranean146 fleet was still in existence.
Thus the position in front of Cadiz assumed the shape which it was to maintain for months, and even for years. Victor’s corps could provide enough men to observe the whole shore of the bay, and to blockade the garrison. But the Spaniards recovered their courage when they saw the enemy reduced to inactivity, and began ere long to receive reinforcements. The first to arrive were 3,000 of the regular troops which had been at Seville. This corps, under the Visconde de Gand, had escaped westward after the capitulation, and, though pursued by a brigade of Mortier’s corps, reached Ayamonte, at the mouth of the Guadiana, and there took ship for Cadiz. Somewhat later there arrived some troops sent by Wellington. The Spaniards in their day of disaster had forgotten their old jealousy147 about Cadiz, and asked for aid. Wellington, though loath148 to spare a man from Portugal, sent them in the early days of February three British[145] and two Portuguese149 battalions from Lisbon, under General William Stewart. So promptly were these troops shipped and landed, that they arrived at Cadiz between the 10th and the 15th of February, to the number of about 3,500 bayonets[146]. Thus the town was placed in security from any coup de main on Victor’s part.
Map of Cadiz
Enlarge CADIZ
AND ITS ENVIRONS
The internal situation in Cadiz, however, left much to be desired. The town had elected a local Junta of defence, of which the governor Venegas was made President, and this body[p. 149] had frequent disputes with the new Regency, nominated by the Central Junta at the time of its abdication150, and also with Albuquerque, whom Venegas did not wish to recognize as his hierarchical superior. The local body could make a fair show of objections to recognizing the legitimacy151 of the Regency: the old Central Junta itself had a doubtful origin, and the government nominated by those of its members who had taken refuge in Cadiz could not claim a clear title. But to raise the point at this moment of crisis was factious152 and unpatriotic, and the conduct of the local Junta became merely absurd when it tried to arrogate153 to itself authority extending outside its own city, and to issue orders to the outlying provinces, or the colonies of America. Still worse, it refused to issue clothing and footgear to Albuquerque’s army, whose equipment had been worn out by the long march from Estremadura, or to subsidize the military hospitals, though it had a considerable stock both of money and of military stores at its disposition. At the end of February the Regency nominated Venegas Viceroy of Mexico, and having bought him off with this splendid piece of preferment, made Albuquerque his successor in the governorship of Cadiz. But even thus they did not succeed in getting proper control over the city, for the Junta refused to allow the Duke to place his head quarters within the walls, or to issue orders to the civic militia. A modus vivendi was only reached when the Regents made an ignominious pact154 with the local oligarchy155, by which the latter, in return for recognizing their legitimate authority, and undertaking156 to pay and feed the garrison, were granted the control of the port-revenues and other royal taxes of Cadiz, as well as of all the subsidies157 arriving from America. How the functions of government became still further complicated, when the members of the long-expected Cortes began to arrive, and to claim their rights as the sole legitimate representatives of the nation, must be told in another chapter[147].
Leaving matters at a deadlock158 in and about Cadiz, we must turn back to the operations of the French in the outlying parts[p. 150] of Andalusia. Sebastiani, it will be remembered, had taken Jaen on January 23rd. He was directed to march from thence on Granada and Malaga, to scatter49 the remains of Areizaga’s army, and to subdue159 the valleys of the Sierra Nevada and the long sea-coast below them. All this he accomplished160 with ease. On the 28th he routed at Alcala la Real a force composed of some of Areizaga’s fugitives161, which had been joined by Freire and all the cavalry of the Andalusian army. These regiments, which had been cantoned in the valley of the Guadalquivir, since they were useless in the passes, had been collected by Freire to the number of 2,000 sabres. They were routed and dispersed by Milhaud’s and Perreymond’s dragoons and chasseurs, losing over 500 men and the whole of their artillery. The survivors162 dispersed, and retired in small parties eastward, only rallying in the province of Murcia. That same evening Sebastiani pushed on towards Granada, and was met by a deputation of its magistrates163, who brought the keys of the city and a promise of submission164. The French vanguard entered it next day. Lacy, who had taken refuge there with the small remains of his division, retired to Guadix. Sebastiani levied a military contribution of 5,000,000 reals on the city, placed a garrison of 1,500 men in the Alhambra, and marched with a mixed force on Malaga, the only place in this quarter where organized resistance showed itself. Here the local magistrates had been deposed165 by a popular rising, and several thousand irregulars had been collected by a Colonel Abello, a Capuchin friar named Fernando Berrocal, and three brothers, notaries166, of the name of San Millan. They seized the passes of the Sierra de Alhama, and called all the hill-country to arms. Sebastiani, marching by Antequera, cleared the passes on February 5th, beat the half-armed insurgent bands outside the suburbs of Malaga, and stormed the town. He exacted a contribution of 12,000,000 reals, and hung the three San Millans and several other leading insurgents167. After this he extended his troops along the coast, and occupied Velez Malaga, Motril, and Almunecar. The roads and the towns were his, but many of the insurgents took to the hills, and maintained a guerrilla warfare168, which never ceased throughout the next three years. There were always bands on foot in the Alpujarras and the Sierra de Ronda,[p. 151] though the 4th Corps expended169 much energy in hunting them down.
Meanwhile Giron, Lacy, Freire, and the rest of the fugitive generals had retired eastward. They had now come under the orders of Blake, who superseded Areizaga and took over charge of 3,000 or 4,000 dispirited men at Guadix on January 30th. He retired at once within the borders of the kingdom of Murcia. Small parties and stragglers continued to come in for many weeks, and by March there were 10,000 foot and 1,500 horse collected—all in the worst state of equipment, and thoroughly170 demoralized by their late disasters.
We must now turn to the other end of Andalusia: King Joseph, when departing to inspect the outworks of Cadiz, had left Mortier in command in this quarter. The Marshal, after hunting the little force of the Visconde de Gand out of the Condado de Niebla, had been directed to deal a stroke at Badajoz. Accordingly, leaving a brigade in Seville and another in the Condado, he marched with one infantry division and his light cavalry into Estremadura. He reached Olivenza with 9,000 men, and summoned Badajoz on February 12th, but he had arrived too late. A considerable Spanish force was now before him, the old host of Del Parque, which the Central Junta had called down to the Guadiana when the original Army of Estremadura marched under Albuquerque to succour Andalusia. How Mortier and La Romana, the successor of Del Parque, dealt with each other in the months of the spring must be told in a later chapter[148].
The King, meanwhile, spent the months of February and March in a circular tour through Andalusia, where he affected171 to perceive nothing but friendly feeling among the inhabitants. He visited Ronda, Malaga, Granada, Jaen, celebrating Te Deums, and giving bull-fights and banquets. It is certain that a sufficient show of submission was made to nourish his happy illusions as to the finality of his conquest. Threats or bribes172 induced many notables to present themselves at his receptions, and it seems that a considerable portion of the Andalusians hoped to save themselves from the rapacity173 of the military authorities by professing174 an enthusiasm for the King. He, for[p. 152] his part, did his best to protect them—but he was soon gone, and the native officials whom he appointed were powerless against Sebastiani, the church plunderer175, and Soult, the judicious176 collector of works of art. ‘At the very moment when the King was lavishing177 assurances and promises,’ writes his devoted178 servant Miot, ‘and everywhere extolling179 the thorough disinterestedness180 of France, severe and crushing exactions were being laid on the provinces in our occupation. An iron hand was grinding them to the dust. The King was powerless to resist the open violation181 of the promises which he was daily giving[149].’
Open resistance, however, had ceased, save at Cadiz and in the inaccessible recesses182 of the Sierra Nevada. Andalusia had been subdued183 from end to end, and neither the King nor Soult yet realized that a lamentable184 strategic mistake had been made when 70,000 veteran troops had been pinned down to garrison the newly conquered realm, while Portugal and Wellington’s army remained untouched. In their conception, as in that of the Emperor, the conquest of Portugal was to be sufficiently185 provided for by the new reinforcements which were now pouring over the Ebro, to the number of over 100,000 sabres and bayonets.
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assailed
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| v.攻击( assail的过去式和过去分词 )；困扰；质问；毅然应对 | |
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assail
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| v.猛烈攻击，抨击，痛斥 | |
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corps
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| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
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rugged
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| adj.高低不平的，粗糙的，粗壮的，强健的 | |
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defile
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| v.弄污，弄脏；n.(山间)小道 | |
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defiles
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| v.玷污( defile的第三人称单数 )；污染；弄脏；纵列行进 | |
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mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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demonstrations
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| 证明( demonstration的名词复数 )； 表明； 表达； 游行示威 | |
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portended
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| v.预示( portend的过去式和过去分词 )；预兆；给…以警告；预告 | |
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immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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illustrate
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| v.举例说明，阐明；图解，加插图 | |
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remains
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| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
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descend
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| vt./vi.传下来，下来，下降 | |
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envelop
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| vt.包，封，遮盖；包围 | |
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regiments
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| （军队的）团( regiment的名词复数 )； 大量的人或物 | |
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minor
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| adj.较小(少)的，较次要的；n.辅修学科；vi.辅修 | |
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entrenchment
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| n.壕沟，防御设施 | |
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obstructions
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| n.障碍物( obstruction的名词复数 )；阻碍物；阻碍；阻挠 | |
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tortuous
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| adj.弯弯曲曲的，蜿蜒的 | |
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artillery
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| n.(军)火炮，大炮；炮兵(部队) | |
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inaccessible
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| adj.达不到的，难接近的 | |
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infantry
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| n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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crest
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| n.顶点；饰章；羽冠；vt.达到顶点；vi.形成浪尖 | |
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entrusted
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| v.委托，托付( entrust的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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battalions
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| n.（陆军的）一营（大约有一千兵士）( battalion的名词复数 )；协同作战的部队；军队；（组织在一起工作的）队伍 | |
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battalion
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| n.营；部队；大队(的人) | |
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deployed
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| （尤指军事行动）使展开( deploy的过去式和过去分词 )； 施展； 部署； 有效地利用 | |
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scrambling
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| v.快速爬行( scramble的现在分词 )；攀登；争夺；（军事飞机）紧急起飞 | |
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wreck
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| n.失事，遇难；沉船；vt.(船等)失事，遇难 | |
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semblance
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| n.外貌，外表 | |
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disorder
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| n.紊乱，混乱；骚动，骚乱；疾病，失调 | |
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destined
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| adj.命中注定的；(for)以…为目的地的 | |
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disperse
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| vi.使分散；使消失；vt.分散；驱散 | |
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dispersed
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| adj. 被驱散的, 被分散的, 散布的 | |
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cavalry
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| n.骑兵；轻装甲部队 | |
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perilous
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| adj.危险的，冒险的 | |
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peril
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| n.(严重的)危险；危险的事物 | |
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wrecks
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| n.沉船( wreck的名词复数 )；（事故中）遭严重毁坏的汽车（或飞机等）；（身体或精神上）受到严重损伤的人；状况非常糟糕的车辆（或建筑物等）v.毁坏[毁灭]某物( wreck的第三人称单数 )；使（船舶）失事，使遇难，使下沉 | |
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retired
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| adj.隐退的，退休的，退役的 | |
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westward
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| n.西方，西部；adj.西方的，向西的；adv.向西 | |
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disturbance
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| n.动乱，骚动；打扰，干扰；(身心)失调 | |
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junta
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| n.团体；政务审议会 | |
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intrusive
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| adj.打搅的；侵扰的 | |
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reign
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| n.统治时期，统治，支配，盛行；v.占优势 | |
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monarch
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| n.帝王，君主，最高统治者 | |
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benevolence
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| n.慈悲，捐助 | |
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wont
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| adj.习惯于；v.习惯；n.习惯 | |
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scattered
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| adj.分散的，稀疏的；散步的；疏疏落落的 | |
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49
scatter
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| vt.撒，驱散，散开；散布/播；vi.分散，消散 | |
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50
discredited
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| 不足信的，不名誉的 | |
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51
obstinate
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| adj.顽固的，倔强的，不易屈服的，较难治愈的 | |
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52
victorious
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| adj.胜利的，得胜的 | |
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53
dealing
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| n.经商方法，待人态度 | |
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54
garrison
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| n.卫戍部队；驻地，卫戍区；vt.派(兵)驻防 | |
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55
invaders
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| 入侵者，侵略者，侵入物( invader的名词复数 ) | |
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56
bifurcates
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| n.（指道路、河流、树枝等）分岔，分成两支( bifurcate的名词复数 )；使分枝，使分叉；分叉的v.（指道路、河流、树枝等）分岔，分成两支( bifurcate的第三人称单数 )；使分枝，使分叉 | |
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57
loomed
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| v.隐约出现，阴森地逼近( loom的过去式和过去分词 )；隐约出现，阴森地逼近 | |
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58
insurgent
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| adj.叛乱的，起事的；n.叛乱分子 | |
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59
drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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60
deliberately
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| adv.审慎地；蓄意地；故意地 | |
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61
incapable
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| adj.无能力的，不能做某事的 | |
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62
doomed
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| 命定的 | |
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63
coup
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| n.政变；突然而成功的行动 | |
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64
promptly
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| adv.及时地，敏捷地 | |
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65
eastward
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| adv.向东；adj.向东的；n.东方，东部 | |
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66
circuitous
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| adj.迂回的路的，迂曲的，绕行的 | |
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67
apparently
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| adv.显然地；表面上，似乎 | |
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68
marsh
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| n.沼泽，湿地 | |
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69
plunged
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| v.颠簸( plunge的过去式和过去分词 )；暴跌；骤降；突降 | |
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70
disposition
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| n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署 | |
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71
northward
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| adv.向北；n.北方的地区 | |
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72
anarchy
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| n.无政府状态；社会秩序混乱，无秩序 | |
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73
reigned
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| vi.当政，统治（reign的过去式形式） | |
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74
legitimate
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| adj.合法的，合理的，合乎逻辑的；v.使合法 | |
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75
hesitation
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| n.犹豫，踌躇 | |
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76
intervals
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| n.[军事]间隔( interval的名词复数 )；间隔时间；[数学]区间；（戏剧、电影或音乐会的）幕间休息 | |
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77
chaos
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| n.混乱，无秩序 | |
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78
absconded
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| v.（尤指逃避逮捕）潜逃，逃跑( abscond的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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79
exhorting
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| v.劝告，劝说( exhort的现在分词 ) | |
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80
ineptitude
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| n.不适当；愚笨，愚昧的言行 | |
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81
imminent
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| adj.即将发生的，临近的，逼近的 | |
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82
conspirators
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| n.共谋者，阴谋家( conspirator的名词复数 ) | |
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83
deposing
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| v.罢免( depose的现在分词 )；（在法庭上）宣誓作证 | |
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84
patriots
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| 爱国者，爱国主义者( patriot的名词复数 ) | |
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85
arsenal
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| n.兵工厂，军械库 | |
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86
musket
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| n.滑膛枪 | |
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87
muskets
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| n.火枪，（尤指）滑膛枪( musket的名词复数 ) | |
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88
cannon
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| n.大炮，火炮；飞机上的机关炮 | |
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89
mustered
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| v.集合，召集，集结（尤指部队）( muster的过去式和过去分词 )；（自他人处）搜集某事物；聚集；激发 | |
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90
plausible
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| adj.似真实的，似乎有理的，似乎可信的 | |
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91
pretext
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| n.借口，托词 | |
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92
possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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93
contrived
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| adj.不自然的，做作的；虚构的 | |
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94
secrecy
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| n.秘密，保密，隐蔽 | |
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95
mule
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| n.骡子，杂种，执拗的人 | |
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96
brandishing
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| v.挥舞( brandish的现在分词 )；炫耀 | |
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97
aged
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| adj.年老的，陈年的 | |
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98
stigmatizing
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| v.使受耻辱，指责，污辱( stigmatize的现在分词 ) | |
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99
fugitive
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| adj.逃亡的，易逝的；n.逃犯，逃亡者 | |
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100
traitors
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| 卖国贼( traitor的名词复数 )； 叛徒； 背叛者； 背信弃义的人 | |
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101
levy
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| n.征收税或其他款项，征收额 | |
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102
tumult
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| n.喧哗；激动，混乱；吵闹 | |
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103
bishop
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| n.主教，（国际象棋）象 | |
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104
frantic
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| adj.狂乱的，错乱的，激昂的 | |
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105
abdicated
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| 放弃（职责、权力等）( abdicate的过去式和过去分词 )； 退位，逊位 | |
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106
noted
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| adj.著名的，知名的 | |
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107
usurper
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| n. 篡夺者, 僭取者 | |
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108
superseded
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| [医]被代替的，废弃的 | |
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109
isolated
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| adj.与世隔绝的 | |
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110
ignominious
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| adj.可鄙的，不光彩的，耻辱的 | |
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111
prudence
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| n.谨慎，精明，节俭 | |
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112
cowardice
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| n.胆小，怯懦 | |
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113
followers
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| 追随者( follower的名词复数 )； 用户； 契据的附面； 从动件 | |
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114
levied
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| 征（兵）( levy的过去式和过去分词 )； 索取； 发动（战争）； 征税 | |
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115
conqueror
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| n.征服者，胜利者 | |
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116
lodged
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| v.存放( lodge的过去式和过去分词 )；暂住；埋入；（权利、权威等）归属 | |
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117
juntas
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| n.以武力政变上台的军阀( junta的名词复数 ) | |
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118
turbulence
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| n.喧嚣，狂暴，骚乱，湍流 | |
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119
homage
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| n.尊敬，敬意，崇敬 | |
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120
bespeak
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| v.预定；预先请求 | |
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121
posterity
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| n.后裔，子孙，后代 | |
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122
pacified
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| 使（某人）安静( pacify的过去式和过去分词 )； 息怒； 抚慰； 在（有战争的地区、国家等）实现和平 | |
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123
regained
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| 复得( regain的过去式和过去分词 )； 赢回； 重回； 复至某地 | |
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124
elation
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| n.兴高采烈，洋洋得意 | |
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125
tangible
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| adj.有形的，可触摸的，确凿的，实际的 | |
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126
trophies
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| n.（为竞赛获胜者颁发的）奖品( trophy的名词复数 )；奖杯；（尤指狩猎或战争中获得的）纪念品；（用于比赛或赛跑名称）奖 | |
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127
ammunition
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| n.军火，弹药 | |
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128
civic
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| adj.城市的，都市的，市民的，公民的 | |
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129
militia
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| n.民兵，民兵组织 | |
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130
marshes
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| n.沼泽，湿地( marsh的名词复数 ) | |
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131
naval
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| adj.海军的，军舰的，船的 | |
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132
vessels
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| n.血管( vessel的名词复数 )；船；容器；（具有特殊品质或接受特殊品质的）人 | |
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133
vessel
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| n.船舶；容器，器皿；管，导管，血管 | |
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134
hazardous
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| adj.(有)危险的，冒险的；碰运气的 | |
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135
expedient
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| adj.有用的，有利的；n.紧急的办法，权宜之计 | |
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136
triangular
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| adj.三角（形）的，三者间的 | |
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137
apex
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| n.顶点，最高点 | |
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138
isthmus
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| n.地峡 | |
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139
battered
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| adj.磨损的；v.连续猛击；磨损 | |
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140
fathoms
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| 英寻( fathom的名词复数 ) | |
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141
situated
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| adj.坐落在...的，处于某种境地的 | |
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142
discomfort
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| n.不舒服，不安，难过，困难，不方便 | |
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143
seamen
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| n.海员 | |
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144
unwilling
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| adj.不情愿的 | |
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145
reassuring
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| a.使人消除恐惧和疑虑的，使人放心的 | |
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146
Mediterranean
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| adj.地中海的；地中海沿岸的 | |
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147
jealousy
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| n.妒忌，嫉妒，猜忌 | |
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148
loath
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| adj.不愿意的；勉强的 | |
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149
Portuguese
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| n.葡萄牙人；葡萄牙语 | |
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150
abdication
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| n.辞职；退位 | |
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151
legitimacy
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| n.合法，正当 | |
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152
factious
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| adj.好搞宗派活动的，派系的，好争论的 | |
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153
arrogate
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| v.冒称具有...权利，霸占 | |
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154
pact
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| n.合同，条约，公约，协定 | |
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155
oligarchy
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| n.寡头政治 | |
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156
undertaking
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| n.保证，许诺，事业 | |
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157
subsidies
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| n.补贴，津贴，补助金( subsidy的名词复数 ) | |
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158
deadlock
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| n.僵局，僵持 | |
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159
subdue
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| vt.制服，使顺从，征服；抑制，克制 | |
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160
accomplished
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| adj.有才艺的；有造诣的；达到了的 | |
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161
fugitives
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| n.亡命者，逃命者( fugitive的名词复数 ) | |
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162
survivors
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| 幸存者，残存者，生还者( survivor的名词复数 ) | |
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163
magistrates
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| 地方法官，治安官( magistrate的名词复数 ) | |
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164
submission
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| n.服从，投降；温顺，谦虚；提出 | |
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165
deposed
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| v.罢免( depose的过去式和过去分词 )；（在法庭上）宣誓作证 | |
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166
notaries
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| n.公证人，公证员( notary的名词复数 ) | |
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167
insurgents
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| n.起义，暴动，造反( insurgent的名词复数 ) | |
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168
warfare
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| n.战争(状态)；斗争；冲突 | |
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169
expended
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| v.花费( expend的过去式和过去分词 )；使用（钱等）做某事；用光；耗尽 | |
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170
thoroughly
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| adv.完全地，彻底地，十足地 | |
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171
affected
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| adj.不自然的，假装的 | |
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172
bribes
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| n.贿赂( bribe的名词复数 )；向（某人）行贿，贿赂v.贿赂( bribe的第三人称单数 )；向（某人）行贿，贿赂 | |
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173
rapacity
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| n.贪婪，贪心，劫掠的欲望 | |
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174
professing
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| 声称( profess的现在分词 )； 宣称； 公开表明； 信奉 | |
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175
plunderer
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| 掠夺者 | |
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176
judicious
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| adj.明智的，明断的，能作出明智决定的 | |
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177
lavishing
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| v.过分给予，滥施( lavish的现在分词 ) | |
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178
devoted
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| adj.忠诚的，忠实的，热心的，献身于...的 | |
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179
extolling
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| v.赞美( extoll的现在分词 )；赞颂，赞扬，赞美( extol的现在分词 ) | |
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180
disinterestedness
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181
violation
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| n.违反(行为)，违背(行为)，侵犯 | |
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182
recesses
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| n.壁凹( recess的名词复数 )；（工作或业务活动的）中止或暂停期间；学校的课间休息；某物内部的凹形空间v.把某物放在墙壁的凹处( recess的第三人称单数 )；将（墙）做成凹形，在（墙）上做壁龛；休息，休会，休庭 | |
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183
subdued
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| adj. 屈服的，柔和的，减弱的 动词subdue的过去式和过去分词 | |
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184
lamentable
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| adj.令人惋惜的，悔恨的 | |
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185
sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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