DECEMBER 1810-MARCH 1811
In the last pages of the third volume of this work we brought the history of the campaigns of Suchet and Macdonald in Aragon and Catalonia as far as December 12th, 1810, the day on which the Marshal came down to the lower Ebro at the head of the field-divisions of the 7th Corps1, in order to cover the long-delayed siege of Tortosa, which his colleague, the commander of the Army of Aragon, was about to take in hand.
For five months, ever since August 1810, as it will be remembered, Suchet had been waiting to commence the attack on Tortosa, which he was not strong enough to conduct with his own resources, since the besieger3 would have not only to execute his own operations, but to fend4 off at the same time all attempts by the Spanish armies of Catalonia and Valencia to relieve a fortress5 which was equally important to each of them. For Tortosa commanded the one land route by which Catalonia and Valencia were still able to communicate with each other; no other bridge on the Ebro was in Spanish hands. It was highly desirable to keep the line of defence in eastern Spain unbroken, and Tortosa lay at its narrowest and most dangerous point. The Emperor Napoleon attached an immense importance to its capture, and considered that after its fall, and that of Tarragona, the conquest of Valencia and the termination of the war on this side of the Peninsula would be at hand. Already in September 1810 he was looking forward to all these events as matters of the near future[290]. But though Tortosa was actually to be captured in January 1811, Tarragona in June, and Valencia in December, the long-foreseen consummation was never to come to pass. For two years more, down to the very end of[p. 228] the war, the indomitable Catalans were destined7 to maintain their independence, despite of all the successes of the French arms.
Tortosa was not quite so indispensable in reality as it looked on the map. For though it would have been a point of absolutely vital importance to the Spaniards, if they had been compelled to conduct all their operations by land, it must not be forgotten that the British command of the Mediterranean8 gave an alternative route for communication between north and south, which the French could never touch. Long after Tortosa had fallen, troops were repeatedly and easily transferred from Catalonia to Valencia, and vice9 versa, despite of the fact that Suchet had completely mastered all the land routes. Indeed it may be said that the sea passage from one to the other was always preferable to the route through Tortosa, for the country about both banks of the lower Ebro was rugged10, barren, and thinly peopled, and Tortosa itself—a decayed city of 10,000 inhabitants—was the only place in this region which presented resources of any kind for an army on the march. It is, moreover, twenty miles from the sea, and not a port; strange to say, there is no decent harbour at the mouth of the Ebro. Though the river is intermittently11 navigable for a good many miles in its lower course, its estuary12 has never been a point through which trade discharges itself to the sea. The commerce of southern Catalonia goes to Tarragona, sixty miles to the north of the Ebro mouth, that of Northern Valencia to Peniscola, thirty miles to its south. Tortosa, indeed, was more important to the French than to the Spaniards, since Napoleon’s armies were tied down to land routes, and, if ever they were to make a lodgement in Valencia, would find the possession of that city and its bridge absolutely necessary, if they were to keep in touch with the troops left in Catalonia.
At last, in December 1810, Macdonald had accomplished13 the preliminary duties which rendered it possible for him to move on Tortosa. He had revictualled Barcelona, so that it would be safe for some months from famine, and he had repaired the gap in the French lines in northern Catalonia, which had been caused by Henry O’Donnell’s daring expedition to La Bispal in the preceding September. Though the Spanish army had not been[p. 229] crushed, nor indeed seriously injured, it had been thrust aside for the moment: Macdonald had brought down three divisions, over 15,000 men, to Mora on the Ebro, some twenty-five miles to the north of Tortosa, and with them he was prepared to act as a covering force to the projected siege. He was strong enough to render any attempt at relief by the Catalan army impossible, for a force sufficient to beat him could not be collected by the enemy, unless they abandoned all their outlying posts; and this was practically impossible, for local feeling in the Principality was too strong to allow of the withdrawal14 of the smaller Spanish detachments from the various valleys and small towns which they covered. There was still the Valencian army to be considered; but Suchet considered that he could himself deal with that unfortunate and oft-defeated force; he had already proved its weakness at the series of engagements in August[291] in which he had so effectually scattered15 the levies16 of the dictator José Caro. One division would probably suffice to keep the Valencians at bay, while with two others the actual siege of Tortosa could be taken in hand. It was the Catalan army alone which had made Suchet anxious, and he was now to be relieved of all care on that side by Macdonald.
The preparations for the siege, it will be remembered, had long been in progress; ever since August magazines and material had been accumulating at Xerta. They had been brought down the Ebro from Mequinenza, whenever the water was high enough to allow of navigation—not without much difficulty, and occasional petty disasters when the Catalan miqueletes made a pounce17 upon an exposed convoy[292]. Fifty-two heavy guns were now lying ready at Xerta, with 30,000 rounds of ammunition18 for them, and 90,000 lb. more of powder. To set in motion the besieging19 army and this very large battering-train, it only required that the covering forces on each side of the Ebro should take up their positions. When Macdonald had brought up his troops to Mora, and undertaken to move them to Perello, the junction20 point of the two roads from Tortosa to Tarragona, nothing more remained to be settled. If the Catalan army should try to attack him it would certainly be beaten, being far too weak[p. 230] to face 15,000 French troops concentrated in one body. For the restraining of the Valencians, on the other side of the Ebro, General Musnier with 7,000 men was placed at Uldecona, twelve miles beyond Tortosa on the great road to the south.
These arrangements being made, Suchet crossed the Ebro at Xerta by his pontoon bridge on December 15th with twelve battalions21, and made a sweeping23 circular march to shut in Tortosa on the northern side, while five battalions more, under General Abbé, moved by the other bank to block the bridge-head, by which the city communicates with Valencia and the south. The operation was completed without resistance, save at the Col de Alba, where a post of 600 Catalans, placed to cover the road between Tortosa and the pass of Balaguer, was discovered. This small force was driven into Tortosa after a skirmish; two small convoys24 on their way from Tarragona by sea had to turn back, because the way into the city was closed.
The siege of Tortosa was remarkable25 for its swift progress and complete success—it can only be compared with Wellington’s capture of Ciudad Rodrigo, just a year later, in this respect. The Army of Aragon arrived in front of the city on December 16th—the surrender took place on January 2nd. At first sight the problem set before Suchet appeared by no means likely to receive such a rapid solution, for Tortosa as a fortress had many strong points. The city lies on and around the end of a spur of the Sierra de Alba, which runs down to the bank of the Ebro. This spur at its termination is many-headed: three ravines divide it into four separate hills, of which the highest is that crowned by the castle. The other three die down into undulations, and leave between them and the Ebro a comparatively flat space, on which the lower part of the town is built. Its higher quarters lie on the slopes where the various hills begin to rise from the level. The old enceinte of Tortosa had consisted of a mediaeval wall running across the hills and down the ravines between them, so as to enclose nothing but the inhabited parts of the city. But after a famous siege during the War of the Spanish Succession (1708), a number of outer works had been constructed to crown the culminating summit of each hill, and keep future besiegers at a distance, while part of the inner ancient fortifications had been transformed into a series of bastions, so far as the ground allowed.
[p. 231]The outer works were: (1) Starting from the river, on the extreme north-east front, a large hornwork called Las Tenazas[293], crowning the hill which lies most to the left, protecting the suburb of Remolinos, and commanding the flat ground as far as the river, from which it is only 400 yards distant. (2) A second hornwork covered the outer side of the castle hill: this was called El Bonete; there was a deep ravine on each side of it. (3) A sort of outer enceinte with three bastions (La Victoria, El Cristo, and Cruces) runs along the summit of the fourth hill, which is broader than the rest and expands into a plateau; the old town wall formed a second line in rear of this advanced front. (4) The last hill, that most towards the south-east, was crowned by a strong closed fort, named after the Duke of Orleans, the general who had captured the city for Philip V in the year 1708. Between the Orleans hill and the river there was no high ground; this was the only open front of the city which was approachable on a level without any natural hindrances27. Here the enceinte had no outer works; it consisted of two large bastions, San Pedro and San Juan, with a demi-lune named El Temple projecting between them. This last was a low work of no great strength: the curtain behind it, which joined San Pedro and San Juan, was a mere28 shell with no terrace or room for guns. The other (south-western) side of the city was sufficiently29 protected by the broad and swift river, 300 yards in width; behind it was only the ancient wall, but, as this was wholly inaccessible30, its weakness did not matter. In the middle of the river front, which was 1,200 yards long, was a gate leading to the great bridge of boats. This was protected on the further bank by a little tête-du-pont, built in the form of a ravelin and well armed with artillery31.
The garrison32 consisted, when the siege began, of 7,179 men, including 600 artillery and a weak battalion22 of Urban Guards. The regiments34 were drawn35 partly from the Catalonian and partly from the Valencian army, there being seven battalions from the former and four from the latter[294]. The governor was[p. 232] Major-General Lilli, Conde de Alacha, an old officer who had won some credit, two years back, by bringing off his small corps intact after the battle of Tudela, when he had been cut off by the French in the mountains[295]. Unfortunately it is impossible to argue that because an officer has made a skilful36 retreat he is a good fighting-man. Lilli, indeed, proved the reverse on this occasion—all that can be said in his defence is that he was old and in bad health. His conduct during the siege was vacillating and inexplicable37; he more than once declared that he would give over charge of the defence to the second in command, Brigadier-General Yriarte. But he would then appear again, and countermand38 all Yriarte’s orders. In the end he capitulated on his own account, against the wishes and without the knowledge of the brigadier.
The problem in poliorcetics set before Suchet and his engineers at Tortosa had some resemblance to that which was to confront Wellington at Badajoz a few months later. Given a town to besiege2 which is partly built on heights crowned by forts and partly in the flat, is it better to attack one of the forts, which if taken commands the whole town, or to start against the lower front? The latter will be easier to assail39, but after its fall the strongholds on the heights may hold out as independent fortresses40. Whereas if a dominating work on a high-lying hill is taken in hand, it may make a very hard and long resistance, but, if once it is captured, the whole city is overlooked by it and must surrender. The answer to the problem seems to be that all depends on the governor and the garrison; if he and they are weak, it will suffice to attack the easier front, for when the lower town has fallen the morale41 will be so shaken that they will surrender, without attempting to hold the upper works. But if they are active and obstinate42, it may be worth while to aim[p. 233] at the most commanding position, which, if captured, absolutely compels the capitulation of the whole place. Yet there remains43 the danger that the crucial fort may be so strong that no effort can take it from a determined44 defender45. This happened to Wellington at the two earlier sieges of Badajoz; the fall of San Cristobal would have brought about most inevitably46 the surrender of the city. But it proved too hard a nut to crack, in the time and with the means at the English general’s disposal. Suchet at Tortosa struck at the easiest front, taking the risk that he might have to conduct a second siege of the upper works (as he had to do at Tarragona, his next leaguer). When he had breached48 the weakest point, but before a storm had been tried, the imbecile governor capitulated.
The weak front of Tortosa was the bastion of San Pedro and the demi-lune of El Temple on its flank. They were not properly supported or flanked by any works on higher ground, for Fort Orleans (on the nearest hill) did not command all the flats in front of San Pedro, and moreover Suchet intended to give this fort so much business on its own account that its gunners would have little attention to spare for the attack on the lower ground to their right. There were two additional advantages: the soil in front of San Pedro was soft river mould, very easy to dig; and moreover this bastion could be enfiladed by batteries on the other side of the Ebro. Such batteries had nothing to fear, if properly constructed, from the guns of the little tête-du-pont; while on the river front of the city there were no cannon49 at all—they could not be mounted on the mediaeval walls.
On the 16th, 17th, and 18th Suchet was employed in bringing up his siege-guns, choosing the emplacements of his camps, and constructing flying-bridges across the river, both above and below the fortress. On the 19th active operations started, with the development of a false attack on Fort Orleans, whose attention it was necessary to distract. The construction of a first parallel against this work was begun with some ostentation50, and had to be carried out under a furious fire from its artillery. On the night of the 20th-21st the real business commenced: 2,300 men crept across the flat ground by the river opposite San Pedro, and threw up an entrenchment51 within 160 yards of its ditch. They were undiscovered and unopposed, for the night[p. 234] was dark and windy, and the Spaniards had no outposts beyond the walls, and kept bad watch. At dawn 500 paces of trench52 had been constructed, and a safe access to the parallel had been contrived53, by connecting one of its ends with a ravine which cuts across the flat a little to the rear, and whose bottom could not be searched by the guns of the place. The trench was sloped away on the right, so as not to be enfiladed by downward fire from Fort Orleans, which would have commanded it supposing it had been drawn exactly parallel to the front of San Pedro. This was a tremendously advantageous54 start; seldom has a besieger been able to begin his works at such a short distance from his objective.
Next morning the new trench became visible to the Spaniards, who turned all the artillery of the neighbouring front upon it, but to little effect, for the soil was soft and the French had dug deep. A sortie was made from the demi-lune of El Temple, but was driven off with loss. The only successful effort of the Spaniards on this day was that the guns of Fort Orleans succeeded in destroying part of the trenches55 of the false attack in front of them, and drove out the workers. This was of little consequence, as Suchet was not really aiming at the fort. On the 22nd and 23rd December the main attack was urged with a celerity that seemed appalling56 to the defenders57; despite of a heavy fire of musketry as well as of artillery, approaches were pushed forward from the first parallel, to within 80 yards of the bastion of San Pedro and 110 yards of the Temple demi-lune. The works opposite Fort Orleans were repaired and extended. On the 24th the two approaches in the plain were connected by a long trench, which formed the second parallel, only 60 yards from the walls. On the 25th new zigzags58, thrown out from this line, reached the glacis of San Pedro. The garrison made two sorties in the night to hinder this advance at all hazards, but failed, being driven off by the musketry from the second parallel without much difficulty: the force employed, 300 men, was too small. Meanwhile the artillery and sappers were constructing ten batteries, four—and these the largest—in the main frontal attack, but four others on the heights over against Fort Orleans, and two beyond the river, whose special purpose was to enfilade the front of San Pedro,[p. 235] and also to play upon the bridge of boats which joined the city to the tête-du-pont. The trenches on the heights before Fort Orleans were also strengthened, and a second parallel constructed in front of the first, at some loss of life; but it was necessary to keep the enemy on this front employed, or he would have interfered60 too much with the real attack in the plain.
All this had been accomplished before the French had fired a single gun; there is hardly another instance to be quoted of a siege in which the assailants got up to the glacis, and crowned the covered way, without any assistance from their artillery. It seems that the gunnery of the defence must have been exceptionally bad, and the sorties hitherto had been small and feeble—quite insufficient61 to interfere59 with, much less to destroy, the approaches. Noting batteries sketched62 out on several points and approaching completion, Yriarte saw that he must at all costs try to delay the opening of the adversary’s fire, and on the night of the 27th-28th made two sallies in considerable force—600 men came out of the Rastro gate, beyond Fort Orleans, to attack the upper trenches, as many more issued from San Pedro against the main attack. The first-named sortie was an entire failure—most of the men lay down and began to skirmish with the trench-guard before they had got near the works; a very few reached them, and were killed on the parapet. But the attack in the plain was a serious one, and pressed home. The lodgement in the covered way was captured and destroyed, and the Spaniards penetrated63 to the second parallel, and captured part of it for a time. They were finally driven out by a reserve of four battalions commanded by General Abbé, but not before they had done considerable damage. The besiegers had to spend the following day and night (28-29 December) in repairing the trenches and parapets, and getting a fresh lodgement in the covered way. On the morning of the latter day the ten siege-batteries opened simultaneously64 with 45 guns, and very soon gained a marked superiority over the fire of the defence. The cannon of Fort Orleans and the bastion of San Juan were silenced, as were also those of the Temple demi-lune and San Pedro. The bridge of boats was nearly destroyed. Next night, the Spanish fire being crushed, the third parallel was[p. 236] constructed on the very brink65 of the ditch of San Pedro, and within 25 yards of the wall of the bastion. The mortar66 batteries were employed in distributing a rain of projectiles67 in the streets behind the attacked front, to prevent the besieged68 from constructing defences and barricades69 on which they might fall back when the wall was breached. Though not altogether successful—for the Spaniards succeeded in building some traverses and in blocking and loopholing many houses—the bombardment caused many casualties, and cowed the population, who evacuated70 this quarter and sought refuge in the interior of the town. The interior of Fort Orleans was also shelled with some effect: its garrison retired71 to their bomb-proofs, and kept very quiet, making little attempt to repair the injuries to its outer wall, or to replace the injured cannon.
On the night of the 30th the French succeeded in getting down from the third parallel into the ditch of San Pedro, with the object of mining the scarp and blowing down sufficient debris72 to fill the ditch. Their first party was driven out again by the fire of two guns which had been brought up to enfilade the ditch from the extreme flank of the bastion. But on the following morning all the siege-batteries were turned on to these guns, and destroyed them. Meanwhile the Spaniards had abandoned the tête-du-pont, taking the men away by boat, and throwing the guns into the water, except three injured and spiked73 pieces. The ditch was occupied during the day (December 31st) and the miners got to work, so little incommoded by the fire of the defenders, who were hardly visible on the wall, that they lost only two men killed while establishing themselves in their dangerous position. Their most serious hindrance26 came from the good quality of the masonry74 which they were attacking—it was mediaeval work and as hard as iron. The decisive stroke at this point, however, was to be given by the artillery, and on the night of the 31st a battery for four 24-pounders was commenced in the third parallel—only 25 yards away from the ramparts of San Pedro. It had not yet opened when, at ten o’clock on the morning of January 1st, 1811, the governor hoisted75 the white flag, and sent a Colonel Veyan into Suchet’s camp, to treat for surrender. The proposals, however, were quite inadmissible, as Alacha only covenanted76 to evacuate[p. 237] Tortosa if it were not relieved in fifteen days, and demanded that the garrison should not be prisoners of war, but should be allowed to march to Tarragona with arms and baggage. Suchet refused to treat (as was natural) but was delighted with the aspect of affairs—a garrison which begins to parley77 before there is a practicable breach47 in its walls is obviously demoralized, and needs only a little further persuasion78 by the strong arm. He sent back with the Spanish parlementaire his own chief of the staff, Colonel Saint Cyr-Nugues, with orders to impress on the governor the futility79 of further demands such as those he had just made. He announced that he should storm the place next morning unless one of the upper forts were placed in his hands as a pledge of complete submission80. The governor therefore called and consulted a council of war: some of the officers and notables assembled voted that an attempt must be made to defend the breach, others that the garrison should retire into the castle and forts, and abandon the town as untenable. But there were some despairing voices raised: the representatives of the municipality spoke81 with terror of the bombardment of the last few days; some of the officers complained that their troops were completely demoralized, and were leaving their posts to hide in the town. Suchet’s proposals, nevertheless, were rejected.
Only a little more persuasion, however, was required to break down Alacha’s nerve. On the morning of the 2nd of January the 4-gun battery opposite San Pedro opened with the best effect; by the afternoon there was a breach 15 yards broad, and the miners reported that they had got deep enough into the lower walls to make an explosion profitable. The curtain at the back of the Temple demi-lune had also been much battered82, and was crumbling—but an assault here was not practicable, as the intervening work was still in the hands of the Spaniards. For a second time the governor hoisted the white flag, but Suchet ordered the fire to continue at the breach, and began to collect his storming columns in the shelter of the parallels, while his mortar batteries played on the town at large. He was afraid that the enemy was scheming for a suspension of arms, during which they would clandestinely83 repair and retrench84 the broken wall. The answer that he sent back, when a second parlementaire came out to him, was that he must have a simple[p. 238] and complete capitulation, and that one of the upper forts must be placed in his hands before he would allow the bombardment to cease.
Map of the siege of Tortosa
Enlarge TORTOSA
Alacha continued to keep the white flag flying on the citadel85 and to exchange messages with Suchet, while the fire was still going on at the breach of San Pedro, where Yriarte was doing his best to keep his men together, though he had his doubts as to the result of the threatened assault. Meanwhile the French general took an extraordinary resolution: gathering86 from the confused and wavering replies of the governor that the old man was at his wit’s end, and ready to yield to pressure, he came to the castle gate himself, with his staff and a company of grenadiers, and sent for the officer on guard—who did not order his men to fire because the white flag was flying, and messengers continually passing to and fro. Suchet told the astonished subaltern that hostilities87 were at an end, and that he must see the governor without delay. When Alacha came down to him, he assumed a peremptory88 tone, said that further resistance was criminal, that the assault was about to take place at once, and that the garrison would be put to the sword if resistance continued. He bade the governor ratify89 on the spot the terms of capitulation which had been sent in upon the previous afternoon. Utterly90 cowed, the old man obeyed at once, called for a pen, and signed the document upon the carriage of a gun. The company of grenadiers which had accompanied Suchet occupied the castle, and orders were sent down to the city to cease all resistance. The first notice that Yriarte got of what had happened was by hearing French drums beating in the streets behind him, as a column descended92 from the citadel to force the defenders of the breach to lay down their arms[296]. When they had withdrawn93, the storming column ran into the gap, and sacked the quarter adjoining, despite of the cries and[p. 239] remonstrances94 of their officers. They would not be cheated out of what they considered their lawful95 prey[297].
In this disgraceful way fell Tortosa, after only eighteen days of siege, twelve of open trenches, and four of bombardment. The French lost no more than 400 men, nearly half of them among the sappers and artillerymen[298], for the infantry96 only suffered in repelling97 the sorties. The Spaniards had about 1,400 killed and wounded, but as the garrison marched out only 3,974 strong and had started with 7,179, it is clear that there had been other wastage. During the last days of the siege the Urban Guard disappeared, and the commanders of the regular troops were complaining bitterly of desertion among their men. Indeed, from the governor downwards98, there seems to have been too much demoralization in all ranks. The second in command, Yriarte, and many other officers did their duty, but the defence was not what might have been expected from Catalans, with the example of Gerona before their eyes. From the start Suchet had the mastery, and largely owing to the mismanagement of his adversaries99; if (for example) they had kept proper watch, he would never have been able to start his first parallel at the distance of only 160 yards from the walls—this piece of luck saved him many days of work. But if the defence was unskilful, and anything rather than resolute100, the main responsibility falls on the governor, whose conduct was calculated to discourage even the most zealous101 subordinates. For he sometimes pleaded his age and infirmity, and declared that he handed over all responsibility to the second in command, shutting himself up in the castle for whole days at a time; but on other occasions he interfered in details, countermanded102 orders, and practically resumed charge of the defence. But to call a council of war, to receive its opinion in favour of protracted103 defence, and then to capitulate behind its back was worst of all. Such con[p. 240]duct was absolutely ignominious104, and it was not without reason that the Catalan Junta105 ordered him to be tried (in his absence) for cowardice106 and treason. He was condemned107 to death, and the sentence (grotesquely enough) carried out upon his effigy108, while he was safe in France, a prisoner on parole.
That nothing was done from outside to save Tortosa was mainly due to the rapidity of Suchet’s operations. The Junta of Catalonia was busily engaged in concerting measures for concentrating a relieving army, had sent to Cadiz for arms and (if possible) reinforcements, and had opened negotiations109 with the Valencians and with the irregular forces of Carbajal and Villa110 Campa in the Aragonese mountains. But who could calculate that the defence would last only eighteen days? Before any general scheme had been worked out the place had fallen[299]. The only organized force in the neighbourhood was the section of the Catalan army which lay in and about Tarragona. The responsibility here lay no longer with the active Henry O’Donnell, who had thrown up the command in December, and sailed to the Balearic Islands to give his gangrened wounds time to heal. General Yranzo, as the senior officer in the principality, ought to have taken over the charge of operations; but he called a council of war at Tarragona, and declared himself unwilling111 to assume the position that had fallen to him. He was unpopular, and the Catalans were holding violent meetings in favour of the Marquis of Campoverde, who enjoyed much local popularity at the moment. This ambitious officer finally obtained the interim112 command, owing to the abnegation of his seniors; but Tortosa had fallen before he was seated in the saddle, for he was finally recognized as chief only upon January 6th, four days after the capitulation.
But even a capable officer, enjoying undisputed control over all the Catalan forces, could have done little during the few days that the siege of Tortosa lasted. The covering army under Macdonald was too strong to be meddled113 with by the two divisions based on Tarragona. On the first day of the siege (as we have already seen) he marched from Mora with his 15,000 men: on the 18th he came up to Perello, where meet the two[p. 241] roads from Tortosa to the north, thus absolutely barring any attempt to approach the place. After some days he found it impossible to feed his troops in this rugged spot, and divided them, placing one division of 6,000 men under Frère on the Tarragona-Amposta road, in the direct rear of the besieging army, while with the other two he retired to Ginestar on the Ebro, twenty miles due north of Tortosa, from whence he could reinforce Suchet in a single march if the Spaniards made any movement. But no one came against him: the existence of his army in this quarter sufficed to paralyse the modest force then lying in the neighbourhood of Tarragona. Campoverde took one division to the Fort of Balaguer, covering the coast road, from which he observed Frère at a distance; while Yranzo with the other occupied Macdonald’s old head quarters at Momblanch. But they knew that they were too weak to risk an advance from these points, and while they remained quiet Tortosa fell. The only diversions carried out during the siege were in corners of Catalonia, where even a considerable success would have had no effect on the course of affairs on the lower Ebro. A French foraging114 party of 650 cavalry115 was cut up at Tarrega, near Lerida, on January 1, by a detachment from Momblanch. On December 25, a landing party from the British frigates116 on the Catalan station surprised the post of Palamos, and destroyed there two gunboats and eight transports which were coasting down from Cette towards Barcelona. But remaining on shore too long they were surprised by a French flying column, and driven back to their boats with a loss of over 200 men, including Captain Fane of the Cambrian, the officer in command.
On the news of the fall of Tortosa the Spanish divisions drew back towards Tarragona. Suchet left General Habert in charge of the captured city, dispersed117 Musnier’s troops to Morella, Alca?iz and Mequinenza, and left the Neapolitan brigade lent him by Macdonald at Mora. Harispe’s division escorted the Spanish prisoners to Saragossa, and was accompanied by Suchet himself, who had much to settle in Aragon before he took in hand the siege of Tarragona, the next task imposed upon him by the Emperor, who had informed him that ‘he would find his Marshal’s baton118 within its walls’. Before leaving the neighbourhood of Tortosa Suchet ordered four[p. 242] battalions of Habert’s division to execute a coup119 de main upon the little fort of San Felipe de Balaguer, on the coast defile120 of the Col de Balaguer so often mentioned of late. It was completely successful—after a short bombardment, part of the garrison escaped along the Tarragona road; the governor with ninety men surrendered [January 8, 1811]. The fort was a trifling121 work, but its strategic position was eminently122 important, as it blocks the only road along the sea from Tarragona to the regions of the Ebro mouth.
Macdonald, being no longer needed in the direction of Tortosa, resolved to return to Lerida, at the same time that Suchet went off to Saragossa. They were to meet again in the spring for the great enterprise against Tarragona. For reasons not easy to fathom123, the Marshal made his march to his base not by the direct road, but past Tarragona via Reus and Valls. Probably he was desirous of clearing the country-side of the outlying Spanish troops as a preliminary to the siege, and perhaps he had some idea of destroying any magazines that might lie in this direction. That he could have no serious intention of blockading Tarragona was shown by the fact that he had sent back all his cavalry, save one regiment33, and most of his guns, to Lerida. Since he had also lent his Neapolitan brigade to Suchet, his column was not much over 12,000 strong.
Macdonald was usually unlucky in his Catalonian campaigning; though he had won great reputation in mountain warfare124 against the Austrians in his early days, he does not seem to have been able to apply his knowledge of it to Spain. Marching from Ginestar by Falset, he reached and occupied the large town of Reus, only ten miles from Tarragona, on January 12th. From thence he set his army in motion for Valls on the 15th, marching across the front of the fortress, with which he clearly had no intention of interfering125. His vanguard was formed by the Italian division, which was followed at a distance of three miles by his three French brigades and his single regiment of cavalry. Meanwhile Campoverde, now in command at Tarragona, had detached General Sarsfield with a division of 3,000 foot and 800 horse—all that the Army of Catalonia possessed—to observe the march of the French, while he himself remained just outside Tarragona with the remainder of his troops—some 8,000 men.[p. 243] Sarsfield had taken post at Pla, some five miles north of Valls, which town he had evacuated on the approach of the enemy. When Macdonald’s leading brigade reached Valls, information was received that there was a Spanish force close in its front. Without waiting for orders from the Marshal, who had merely directed that Valls should be occupied, the commander of the vanguard, General Eugenio[300], resolved to bring the enemy to action. Marching with five Italian battalions and only thirty chasseurs—about 2,500 men in all—he ran headlong into Sarsfield’s forces drawn up in a well-masked position, the infantry occupying a ridge6, the 800 cavalry hidden in a wood to the left. Unable to estimate the enemy’s strength, and thinking that a brisk attack might drive them off the ground, Eugenio—a man of reckless courage—made a direct frontal charge against the enemy’s position in column of battalions. He was completely beaten, his brigade fell back still fighting, and he was himself mortally wounded. The recoiling126 mass was saved from annihilation by the arrival on the field of the other Italian brigade, that of Palombini, on which it rallied. But Sarsfield’s troops were determined to finish appropriately the day that they had begun so well. They fell on the newly formed line and broke it, the cavalry turning Palombini’s right and sweeping it away. The whole Italian division would have been annihilated127 but for the arrival of two squadrons of the 24th Dragoons under Colonel Delort, who charged the victorious128 cavalry, and, though hopelessly outnumbered, gave the Spaniards so much trouble that the routed infantry of Eugenio and Palombini escaped into Valls, without much further loss. Macdonald had refrained from bringing up the French brigades to help his vanguard, because he had discovered a column under Campoverde coming out of Tarragona to threaten his rear. This demonstration129 kept him occupied while the Italians were being cut up by Sarsfield, whose operations were extremely well managed and resolute. The Italian division and the dragoons lost 600 men including a few prisoners[301]—the Spaniards only 160.
[p. 244]Next day (January 16th) Macdonald was in order of battle at Valls, with two fronts, one facing towards Sarsfield and the north, the other towards Campoverde and Tarragona. But the Spaniards wisely refused to commit themselves to a general engagement, and Macdonald would not divide his army by marching to assail one or the other of the two hostile columns. In the night he retreated to Momblanch by a forced march, leaving the enemy encouraged by the results of the combat of the 15th, and no less by the fact that the Marshal had not tried to avenge130 his check by an attack on the following day. The French retired to Lerida unmolested, and the Duke of Tarentum began to make preparations for his approaching return to Tarragona in company with Suchet’s corps, as had been ordered by the Emperor. It is difficult to see that Macdonald gained anything by his curious flank march, and he certainly lost heavily in prestige. Campoverde, exultant131 at the good fortune of his first venture in arms, recovered from the despondency caused by the fall of Tortosa, and dreamed of making a great blow against the French by no less an achievement than the recapture of Barcelona.
Ever since the commencement of the war plots and conspiracies132 had been rife133 in that great city—it will be remembered that Duhesme had been forced to punish the most important of them by a series of executions[302]. Discontent was as keen as ever, and a knot of patriots134 had formed a scheme for opening to their friends without the gates of the fortress of Monjuich, which dominates the whole place. This was to be done by the assistance of a repentant135 ‘Juramentado,’ a Spanish commissary in the French service named Alcina, who had access to the stronghold, and imagined that he had corrupted136 the fort-major, a certain Captain Sunier, who for a great sum of money undertook to leave one of its posterns open on the night of March 19th. Campoverde, who loved plots and intrigues137, arranged to have his men ready outside the ditch on the appointed night. Unfortunately the officer who was supposed to be a traitor138 was only[p. 245] feigning139 discontent and treason, and kept informing Maurice Mathieu, the governor of Barcelona, of all the details of the plot. It was allowed to proceed, in order that a sharp blow might be inflicted140 on the Spaniards. Before the appointed night Campoverde suddenly marched the divisions of Sarsfield and Courten to the immediate141 vicinity of Barcelona, and sent forward from them a body of 800 grenadiers, who were to execute the actual coup de main. They were allowed to descend91 into the ditch of Monjuich, and to approach the postern, when the whole of the ramparts were lighted up with cressets and fire-balls, and a furious fire was opened upon them. The head of the column was blown to pieces, a hundred men were killed and wounded at the first volley, and four officers and many of the rank and file taken prisoners, before the remainder could scramble142 off in the darkness. The supports hurriedly retired, and the business was over—save that Maurice Mathieu caused the commissary Alcina to be shot in public next morning as a warning to traitors143. Such plots seldom succeed, but that they must not be too much disregarded as a source of danger was shown only a few weeks later, when Figueras, the second fortress of Catalonia, was successfully surprised by the Spaniards, as the result of a conspiracy144 exactly similar to that which failed at Barcelona[303].
The unfortunate affair at Monjuich was not the only sign of the revived activity of the Catalans under the leadership of Campoverde, a busy and active man, but (as subsequent events showed) one lacking both resolution and true strategic instinct. He was one of those who take many schemes in hand, but fail for want of determination at the critical moment, and was a very poor substitute for that hard fighter Henry O’Donnell, whose place he had been so eager to seize. On March 3rd he made a vain attack to recover the fort of San Felipe de Balaguer—marching with Courten’s division of 4,000 men he beat the French 117th out of Perello, where it was covering Tortosa, and laid siege to the fort. But General Habert came up with a force from the garrison to reinforce the 117th, and the attack had to be given up almost as soon as it was begun. More fruitful were some attacks of the somatenes of northern Catalonia on convoys passing between Gerona and Hostalrich. And[p. 246] Sarsfield, pushing forward to Cervera, usefully restrained the foraging of Macdonald’s cavalry in the region east of Lerida. But all this came to little, and Campoverde’s efforts seemed to have no very visible results, and certainly did nothing decisive to prevent Suchet and Macdonald from completing their preparations for the siege of Tarragona.
It was much the same in Aragon, where Villacampa and Carbajal were contending in the mountains of the south with the garrisons145 which held Daroca, Alca?iz, Teruel, and the other chief towns of this rugged and thinly peopled district. The fall of Tortosa had set free for the moment many troops of the 3rd Corps, and Suchet employed them in scouring146 the country between these posts, and endeavouring to clear away the partidas from their chief rallying-places. Flying columns under Generals Paris and Abbé marched up and down the sierras in the vile147 weather of February, expelled the insurrectionary Junta of Aragon from Cuenca, which was at that time its head quarters, and chased Carbajal to Moya, where the frontiers of Castile, Aragon, and Valencia meet. The Empecinado came over the mountains, from his usual beat in the Guadalajara country, to help the Aragonese, but had small success. Yet the net result of all this hunting was little. ‘This expedition,’ says Suchet himself, ‘which took two brigades over the border into Castile for twelve days, procured148 us a few hundred prisoners; a more useful thing was the destruction of some small manufactures of arms. But we were to see ten times, nay149 a hundred times more, these partisans150 appearing once again in the plains; they always surrounded us, were always dispersed rather than defeated, and never grew discouraged[304].’
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1
corps
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| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
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besiege
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| vt.包围，围攻，拥在...周围 | |
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besieger
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| n. 围攻者, 围攻军 | |
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fend
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| v.照料（自己），（自己）谋生，挡开，避开 | |
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fortress
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| n.堡垒，防御工事 | |
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ridge
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| n.山脊；鼻梁；分水岭 | |
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destined
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| adj.命中注定的；(for)以…为目的地的 | |
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Mediterranean
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| adj.地中海的；地中海沿岸的 | |
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vice
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| n.坏事；恶习；[pl.]台钳，老虎钳；adj.副的 | |
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rugged
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| adj.高低不平的，粗糙的，粗壮的，强健的 | |
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intermittently
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| adv.间歇地；断断续续 | |
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estuary
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| n.河口，江口 | |
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accomplished
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| adj.有才艺的；有造诣的；达到了的 | |
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withdrawal
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| n.取回，提款；撤退，撤军；收回，撤销 | |
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scattered
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| adj.分散的，稀疏的；散步的；疏疏落落的 | |
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levies
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| （部队）征兵( levy的名词复数 )； 募捐； 被征募的军队 | |
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pounce
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| n.猛扑；v.猛扑，突然袭击，欣然同意 | |
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ammunition
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| n.军火，弹药 | |
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besieging
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| 包围，围困，围攻( besiege的现在分词 ) | |
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junction
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| n.连接，接合；交叉点，接合处，枢纽站 | |
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battalions
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| n.（陆军的）一营（大约有一千兵士）( battalion的名词复数 )；协同作战的部队；军队；（组织在一起工作的）队伍 | |
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battalion
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| n.营；部队；大队(的人) | |
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sweeping
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| adj.范围广大的，一扫无遗的 | |
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convoys
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| n.（有护航的）船队( convoy的名词复数 )；车队；护航（队）；护送队 | |
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remarkable
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| adj.显著的，异常的，非凡的，值得注意的 | |
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hindrance
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| n.妨碍，障碍 | |
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hindrances
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| 阻碍者( hindrance的名词复数 )； 障碍物； 受到妨碍的状态 | |
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mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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inaccessible
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| adj.达不到的，难接近的 | |
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artillery
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| n.(军)火炮，大炮；炮兵(部队) | |
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garrison
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| n.卫戍部队；驻地，卫戍区；vt.派(兵)驻防 | |
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regiment
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| n.团，多数，管理；v.组织，编成团，统制 | |
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regiments
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| （军队的）团( regiment的名词复数 )； 大量的人或物 | |
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drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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skilful
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| (=skillful)adj.灵巧的，熟练的 | |
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inexplicable
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| adj.无法解释的，难理解的 | |
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countermand
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| v.撤回(命令)，取消(订货) | |
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assail
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| v.猛烈攻击，抨击，痛斥 | |
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fortresses
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| 堡垒，要塞( fortress的名词复数 ) | |
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41
morale
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| n.道德准则，士气，斗志 | |
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42
obstinate
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| adj.顽固的，倔强的，不易屈服的，较难治愈的 | |
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43
remains
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| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
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44
determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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45
defender
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| n.保卫者，拥护者，辩护人 | |
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46
inevitably
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| adv.不可避免地；必然发生地 | |
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breach
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| n.违反，不履行；破裂；vt.冲破，攻破 | |
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48
breached
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| 攻破( breach的现在分词 )； 破坏，违反 | |
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49
cannon
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| n.大炮，火炮；飞机上的机关炮 | |
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50
ostentation
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| n.夸耀，卖弄 | |
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51
entrenchment
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| n.壕沟，防御设施 | |
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52
trench
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| n./v.(挖)沟，(挖)战壕 | |
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53
contrived
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| adj.不自然的，做作的；虚构的 | |
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54
advantageous
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| adj.有利的；有帮助的 | |
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55
trenches
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| 深沟，地沟( trench的名词复数 )； 战壕 | |
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56
appalling
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| adj.骇人听闻的，令人震惊的，可怕的 | |
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defenders
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| n.防御者( defender的名词复数 )；守卫者；保护者；辩护者 | |
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58
zigzags
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| n.锯齿形的线条、小径等( zigzag的名词复数 )v.弯弯曲曲地走路，曲折地前进( zigzag的第三人称单数 ) | |
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59
interfere
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| v.(in)干涉，干预；(with)妨碍，打扰 | |
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interfered
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| v.干预( interfere的过去式和过去分词 )；调停；妨碍；干涉 | |
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61
insufficient
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| adj.(for，of)不足的，不够的 | |
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sketched
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| v.草拟（sketch的过去式与过去分词形式） | |
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penetrated
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| adj. 击穿的，鞭辟入里的 动词penetrate的过去式和过去分词形式 | |
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simultaneously
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| adv.同时发生地，同时进行地 | |
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65
brink
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| n.(悬崖、河流等的)边缘，边沿 | |
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66
mortar
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| n.灰浆，灰泥；迫击炮；v.把…用灰浆涂接合 | |
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projectiles
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| n.抛射体( projectile的名词复数 )；（炮弹、子弹等）射弹，（火箭等）自动推进的武器 | |
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68
besieged
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| 包围，围困，围攻( besiege的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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barricades
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| 路障，障碍物( barricade的名词复数 ) | |
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evacuated
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| 撤退者的 | |
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retired
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| adj.隐退的，退休的，退役的 | |
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72
debris
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| n.瓦砾堆，废墟，碎片 | |
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73
spiked
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| adj.有穗的；成锥形的；有尖顶的 | |
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masonry
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| n.砖土建筑；砖石 | |
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hoisted
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| 把…吊起，升起( hoist的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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covenanted
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| v.立约，立誓( covenant的过去分词 ) | |
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77
parley
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| n.谈判 | |
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78
persuasion
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| n.劝说；说服；持有某种信仰的宗派 | |
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futility
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| n.无用 | |
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80
submission
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| n.服从，投降；温顺，谦虚；提出 | |
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81
spoke
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| n.（车轮的）辐条；轮辐；破坏某人的计划；阻挠某人的行动 v.讲，谈（speak的过去式）；说；演说；从某种观点来说 | |
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82
battered
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| adj.磨损的；v.连续猛击；磨损 | |
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83
clandestinely
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| adv.秘密地，暗中地 | |
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84
retrench
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| v.节省，削减 | |
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85
citadel
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| n.城堡；堡垒；避难所 | |
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86
gathering
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| n.集会，聚会，聚集 | |
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hostilities
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| n.战争；敌意(hostility的复数)；敌对状态；战事 | |
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88
peremptory
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| adj.紧急的，专横的，断然的 | |
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89
ratify
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| v.批准，认可，追认 | |
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90
utterly
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| adv.完全地，绝对地 | |
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91
descend
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| vt./vi.传下来，下来，下降 | |
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92
descended
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| a.为...后裔的，出身于...的 | |
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93
withdrawn
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| vt.收回；使退出；vi.撤退，退出 | |
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94
remonstrances
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| n.抱怨，抗议( remonstrance的名词复数 ) | |
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95
lawful
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| adj.法律许可的，守法的，合法的 | |
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infantry
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| n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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97
repelling
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| v.击退( repel的现在分词 )；使厌恶；排斥；推开 | |
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downwards
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| adj./adv.向下的（地），下行的（地） | |
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99
adversaries
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| n.对手，敌手( adversary的名词复数 ) | |
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100
resolute
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| adj.坚决的，果敢的 | |
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101
zealous
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| adj.狂热的，热心的 | |
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102
countermanded
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| v.取消（命令），撤回( countermand的过去分词 ) | |
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103
protracted
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| adj.拖延的；延长的v.拖延“protract”的过去式和过去分词 | |
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104
ignominious
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| adj.可鄙的，不光彩的，耻辱的 | |
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junta
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| n.团体；政务审议会 | |
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106
cowardice
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| n.胆小，怯懦 | |
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107
condemned
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| adj. 被责难的, 被宣告有罪的 动词condemn的过去式和过去分词 | |
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108
effigy
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| n.肖像 | |
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109
negotiations
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| 协商( negotiation的名词复数 )； 谈判； 完成（难事）； 通过 | |
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110
villa
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| n.别墅，城郊小屋 | |
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111
unwilling
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| adj.不情愿的 | |
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112
interim
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| adj.暂时的，临时的；n.间歇，过渡期间 | |
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113
meddled
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| v.干涉，干预（他人事务）( meddle的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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114
foraging
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| v.搜寻（食物），尤指动物觅（食）( forage的现在分词 )；（尤指用手）搜寻（东西） | |
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115
cavalry
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| n.骑兵；轻装甲部队 | |
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frigates
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| n.快速军舰( frigate的名词复数 ) | |
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117
dispersed
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| adj. 被驱散的, 被分散的, 散布的 | |
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118
baton
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| n.乐队用指挥杖 | |
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119
coup
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| n.政变；突然而成功的行动 | |
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120
defile
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| v.弄污，弄脏；n.(山间)小道 | |
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121
trifling
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| adj.微不足道的；没什么价值的 | |
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eminently
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| adv.突出地；显著地；不寻常地 | |
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123
fathom
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| v.领悟，彻底了解 | |
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124
warfare
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| n.战争(状态)；斗争；冲突 | |
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interfering
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| adj. 妨碍的 动词interfere的现在分词 | |
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126
recoiling
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| v.畏缩( recoil的现在分词 )；退缩；报应；返回 | |
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127
annihilated
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| v.（彻底）消灭( annihilate的过去式和过去分词 )；使无效；废止；彻底击溃 | |
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128
victorious
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| adj.胜利的，得胜的 | |
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129
demonstration
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| n.表明，示范，论证，示威 | |
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130
avenge
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| v.为...复仇，为...报仇 | |
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131
exultant
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| adj.欢腾的，狂欢的，大喜的 | |
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132
conspiracies
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| n.阴谋，密谋( conspiracy的名词复数 ) | |
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133
rife
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| adj.(指坏事情)充斥的，流行的，普遍的 | |
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134
patriots
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| 爱国者，爱国主义者( patriot的名词复数 ) | |
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135
repentant
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| adj.对…感到悔恨的 | |
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136
corrupted
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| （使）败坏( corrupt的过去式和过去分词 )； （使）腐化； 引起（计算机文件等的）错误； 破坏 | |
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137
intrigues
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| n.密谋策划( intrigue的名词复数 )；神秘气氛；引人入胜的复杂情节v.搞阴谋诡计( intrigue的第三人称单数 )；激起…的好奇心 | |
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138
traitor
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| n.叛徒，卖国贼 | |
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139
feigning
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| 假装，伪装( feign的现在分词 )； 捏造（借口、理由等） | |
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140
inflicted
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| 把…强加给，使承受，遭受( inflict的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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141
immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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142
scramble
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| v.爬行，攀爬，杂乱蔓延，碎片，片段，废料 | |
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143
traitors
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| 卖国贼( traitor的名词复数 )； 叛徒； 背叛者； 背信弃义的人 | |
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144
conspiracy
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| n.阴谋，密谋，共谋 | |
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145
garrisons
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| 守备部队，卫戍部队( garrison的名词复数 ) | |
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146
scouring
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| 擦[洗]净，冲刷，洗涤 | |
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147
vile
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| adj.卑鄙的，可耻的，邪恶的；坏透的 | |
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148
procured
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| v.（努力）取得， （设法）获得( procure的过去式和过去分词 )；拉皮条 | |
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149
nay
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| adv.不；n.反对票，投反对票者 | |
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150
partisans
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| 游击队员( partisan的名词复数 )； 党人； 党羽； 帮伙 | |
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