Neither the precise object or the utility of a conference were then apparent, but the result was somewhat of a surprise to those who had, up to that time, been undoubtingly confident of the President's conviction. Comparatively few Senators had previously4 declared their position. Very few, if any of the Republican Senators had indicated a disposition5 to vote against any of the articles, but the silence of a number of them, and their refusal to commit themselves even to their associates, was a source of uneasiness in Senatorial Impeachment circles. Hence, possibly, the suggestion of a "conference."
It was taken for granted that every Democratic Senator would vote against the impeachment. But the idea was not to be entertained that the "no" votes would extend beyond the Democratic coterie6 of twelve. There were, however, anxious misgivings7 as to that. There was too much silence—too much of saying nothing when so little that might be said would go so far to relieve an oppressive anxiety.
So a session for "conference" was ordered and held, much to the surprise of gentlemen whose silence had become somewhat oppressive, and was becoming equally painful to those who wanted a conference. It savored8 of an attempt to "poll the Senate" in advance of judgment9. It was resolved at the session of May 7th, to hold a session for deliberation on the following Monday, May 11th. The most surprising development of that session was the weakness of the bill of indictment10 at the very point where it was apparently11 strongest—the first Article. Two conspicuous12 and influential13 Senators—Messrs. Sherman of Ohio, and Howe of Wisconsin—declared, and gave convincing reasons therefor, that they would not vote for the impeachment of Mr. Johnson on that Article.
In his remarks on this occasion, after giving a history of the enactment14 of the Tenure-of-Office law, the first section of which specifically excepts from its operation such members of Mr. Johnson's Cabinet as had been appointed by Mr. Lincoln and still remaining, though not recommissioned by Mr. Johnson, Mr. Sherman said:
I can only say as one of the Senate conferees, under the solemn obligations that now rest upon us in construing15 this Act, that I did not understand it to include members of the Cabinet not appointed by the President, and that it was with extreme reluctance16 and only to secure the passage of the bill that, in the face of the votes of the Senate I agreed to the report LIMITING AT ALL the power of the President to remove heads of Departments. * * * I stated explicitly17 that the Act as reported did not protect from removal the members of the Cabinet appointed by Mr. Lincoln, that President Johnson might remove them at his pleasure; and I named the Secretary of war as one that might be removed. * * * I could not conceive a case where the Senate would require the President to perform his great executive office upon the advice and through heads of Departments personally obnoxious18 to him, and whom he had not appointed, and, therefore, no such case was provided for. * * * Can I pronounce the President guilty of crime, and by that vote aid to remove him from his high office for doing what I declared and still believe he had a legal right to do. God forbid: * * * What the President did do in the removal of Mr. Stanton he did under a power which you repeatedly refused to take from the office of the President—a power that has been held by that officer since the formation of the Government, and is now limited only by the words of an Act, the literal construction of which does not include Mr. Stanton. * * * It follows, that as Mr. Stanton is not protected by the Tenure-of-Civil-Office Act, his removal rests upon the Act of 1789, and he according to the terms of that Act and of the commission held by him, and in compliance19 with the numerous precedents20 cited in this cause, was lawfully21 removed by the President, and his removal not being contrary to the provisions of the Act of March 2nd 1867, the 1st, 4th, 5th, and 6th Articles, based upon his removal, must fail.
On this point, Mr. Howe said:
If Mr. Stanton had been appointed during the present Presidential term. I should have no doubt he was within the security of the law. But I cannot find that, either in fact or in legal intendment, he was appointed during the present Presidential term. It is urged that he was appointed by Mr. Lincoln, and such is the fact. It is said that Mr. Lincoln's term is not yet expired. Such I believe to be the fact. But the language of the proviso is, that a Secretary shall hold not during the term of MAN by whom he is appointed, but during the TERM of the PRESIDENT by whom he may be appointed. Mr. Stanton was appointed by the President in 1862. The term of that President was limited by the Constitution. It expired on the 4th of March, 1865. That the same incumbent22 was re-elected for the next term is conceded, but I do not comprehend how that fact extended the former term.
Entertaining these views, and because the first Article of the Impeachment charges the order of removal as a violation23 of the Tenure-of-Office Act, I am constrained24 to hold the President not guilty upon that Article.
These declarations, coming from two gentlemen of distinction and influence in the party councils, both of whom had actively25 participated in framing the Tenure-of-Office Act, became at once the occasion of genuine and profound surprise, and it is unnecessary to say that they tended largely to strengthen the doubts entertained by others as to the sufficiency of all the other allegations of the indictment. They naturally and logically reasoned that the removal of Mr. Stanton, set out in the first Article, constituted, in effect, the essence of the indictment, and that all that followed, save the 10th Article was more in the nature of specifications27, or a bill of particulars, than otherwise—that if no impeachable29 offense30 were set out in the first Article, then none was committed, as that Article constituted the substructure of all the rest—its essence and logic26 running through and permeating31 practically all—and that without that Article, there was no coherence32 or force in any of them, and consequently nothing charged against the President that was impeachable, as he had not violated the Tenure-of-Office law, and was not charged with the violation of any other law.
That conference developed, further, that a large majority of the Articles of Impeachment were objectionable to and would not be supported by a number of Republican Senators.
Mr. Edmunds would not support the 4th, 8th, 9th, and 10th Articles, being "wholly unsustained by proof," but would support the 11th, though apparently doubtful of its efficiency.
Mr. Ferry could not support the 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 9th, or 10th Articles.
Mr. Howard declared that he would not support the 9th Article.
Mr. Morrill of Vermont, would not support the 4th, 6th, 9th, or 10th Articles, as they were unproven.
Mr. Morrill, of Maine, Mr. Yates, Mr. Harlan, and Mr. Stewart, would vote to convict on the Articles relating to the removal of Mr. Stanton—uncommitted on all others.
Mr. Fessenden, Mr. Fowler, Mr. Grimes, Mr. Henderson, Mr. Trumbull, and Mr. Van Winkle, each declared, at that conference, their opposition33 to the entire list of the Articles of Impeachment.
But eighteen Republicans committed themselves at that conference, for conviction, out of twenty-four who filed opinions. While it was taken for granted that the six Democrats34 who had failed to declare their position at that conference would oppose conviction, the position of the eighteen Republicans who had failed to declare themselves became at once a source of very grave concern in impeachment circles. Out of that list of eighteen uncommitted Republicans, but one vote was necessary to defeat the impeachment. This condition was still farther intensified35 by the fact that eight of the eleven Articles of Impeachment were already beaten in that conference, and practically by Republican committals, and among them the head and front and foundation of the indictment—the First Article—by Messrs. Sherman and Howe, two conspicuous Republican leaders.
A forecast of the vote based on these committals as to the several Articles, would be against the First Article, twelve Democrats and eight Republicans, one more than necessary for its defeat—the eight "not guilty" votes including Messrs. Sherman and Howe.
Against the Fourth Article—twelve Democrats and nine Republicans—including Messrs. Edmunds, Ferry, and Morrill of Vermont.
Against the Fifth Article—twelve Democrats and eight Republicans-including Messrs. Edmunds and Ferry.
Against the Sixth Article—twelve Democrats and nine Republicans-including Messrs. Ferry, Howe, and Morrill of Vermont.
Against the Seventh—Article-twelve Democrats and seven Republicans—including Mr. Ferry.
Against the Eighth Article—twelve Democrats and seven Republicans—including Mr. Edmunds.
Against the Ninth Article—twelve Democrats and twelve Republicans—including Messrs. Sherman, Edmunds, Ferry, Howe, Howard, and Morrill of Vermont.
Against the Tenth Article—twelve Democrats and ten Republicans—including Messrs. Edmunds, Sherman, Ferry, and Morrill of Vermont.
It is somewhat conspicuous that but three gentlemen—Messrs. Sumner, Pomeroy, and Tipton, in their arguments in the Conference, pronounced the President guilty on all the charges—though five others, Messrs. Wilson, Patterson of New Hampshire, Frelinghuysen, Cattell, and Williams, pronounced the President guilty on general principles, without specification28; and Messrs. Morrill of Maine, Yates and Stewart, guilty in the removal of Mr. Stanton, without further specification of charges.
As but one vote, in addition to the twelve Democratic and the six Republican votes pledged against conviction at the Conference, was necessary to defeat impeachment on the three remaining Articles—the 2nd, 3rd, and 11th—and as nearly a half of the Republicans of the Senate had failed to commit themselves, at least in any public way, the anxiety of the advocates of Impeachment became at once, and naturally, very grave. How many of the eighteen Republicans who had failed to declare themselves at that Conference might fail to sustain the Impeachment, became, therefore, a matter of active solicitude37 on all sides, especially in impeachment circles in and out of the Senate. Republican committals in the Conference had rendered absolutely certain the defeat of every Article of the Impeachment except the Second, Third, and Eleventh, and the addition of but a single vote from the eighteen uncommitted Republicans to the "No" side, would defeat them.
It was under this unfavorable condition of the Impeachment cause, that the Senate assembled on May 16th, 1868, for the purpose of taking final action on the indictment brought by the House of Representatives, the trial of which had occupied the most of the time of the Senate for the previous three months, and which had to a large degree engrossed38 the attention of the general public, to the interruption of legislation pending in the two Houses of Congress, and more or less to the embarrassment39 of the commercial activities of the country.
For the first time in the history of the government, practically eighty years, the President of the United States was at the bar of the Senate, by virtue40 of a constitutional warrant, on an accusation41 of the House of Representatives of high crimes and misdemeanors in office, and his conviction and expulsion from office demanded in the name of all the people. No event in the civil history of the country had ever before occurred to so arouse public antipathies42 and public indignation against any man-and these conditions found special vent36 in the City of Washington, as the Capitol of the Nation, as it had become during the trial the focal point of the politically dissatisfied element of the entire country. Its streets and all its places of gathering43 had swarmed44 for many weeks with representatives of every State of the union, demanding in a practically united voice the deposition45 of the President.
On numbers of occasions during the previous history of the Government there had been heated controversies46 between the Congress and the Executive, but never before characterized by the intensity47, not infrequently malevolence48, that had come to mark this and never before had a division between the Executive and the Congress reached a point at which a suggestion of his constitutional ostracism49 from office had been seriously entertained, much less attempted.
But it had now come. The active, intense interest of the country was aroused, and everywhere the division among the people was sharply defined and keen, though the numerical preponderance, it cannot be denied, was largely against the President and insistent50 upon his removal.
The dominant51 party of the country was aroused and active for the deposition of the President. Public meetings were held throughout the North and resolutions adopted and forwarded to Senators demanding that Mr. Johnson be promptly52 expelled from office by the Senate—and it had become apparent, long before the taking of the vote, that absolute, swift, and ignominious53 expulsion from office awaited every Republican Senator who should dare to disregard that demand.
Under these conditions it was but natural that during the trial, and especially as the close approached, the streets of Washington and the lobbies of the Capitol were thronged54 from day to day with interested spectators from every section of the union, or that Senators were beleaguered56 day and night, by interested constituents57, for some word of encouragement that a change was about to come of that day's proceeding58, and with threats of popular vengeance59 upon the failure of any Republican Senator to second that demand.
In view of this intensity of public interest it was as a matter of course that the coming of the day when the great controversy60 was expected to be brought to a close by the deposition of Mr. Johnson and the seating of a new incumbent in the Presidential chair, brought to the Capitol an additional throng55 which long before the hour for the assembling of the Senate filled all the available space in the vast building, to witness the culmination61 of the great political trial of the age.
Upon the closing of the hearing—even prior thereto, and again during the few days of recess62 that followed, the Senate had been carefully polled, and the prospective63 vote of every member from whom it was possible to procure64 a committal, ascertained65 and registered in many a private memoranda66. There were fifty-four members—all present. According to these memoranda, the vote would stand eighteen for acquittal, thirty-five for conviction—one less than the number required by the Constitution to convict. What that one vote would be, and could it be had, were anxious queries67, of one to another, especially among those who had set on foot the impeachment enterprise and staked their future control of the government upon its success. Given for conviction and upon sufficient proofs, the President MUST step down and out of his place, the highest and most honorable and honoring in dignity and sacredness of trust in the constitution of human government, a disgraced man and a political pariah68. If so cast upon insufficient69 proofs or from partisan70 considerations, the office of President of the United States would be degraded—cease to be a coordinate71 branch of the Government, and ever after subordinated to the legislative72 will. It would have practically revolutionized our splendid political fabric73 into a partisan Congressional autocracy74. Apolitical tragedy was imminent75.
On the other hand, that vote properly given for acquittal, would at once free the Presidential office from imputed76 dishonor and strengthen our triple organization and distribution of powers and responsibilities. It would preserve the even tenor77 and courses of administration, and effectively impress upon the world a conviction of the strength and grandeur78 of Republican institutions in the hands of a free and enlightened people.
The occasion was sublimely79 and intensely dramatic. The President of the United States was on trial. The Chief Justice of the Supreme80 Court was presiding over the deliberations of the Senate sitting for the trial of the great cause. The board of management conducting the prosecution81 brought by the House of Representatives was a body of able and illustrious politicians and statesmen. The President's counsel, comprising jurists among the most eminent82 of the country, had summed up for the defense83 and were awaiting final judgment. The Senate, transformed for the occasion into an extraordinary judicial84 tribunal, the highest known to our laws, the Senators at once judges and jurors with power to enforce testimony and sworn to hear all the facts bearing upon the case, was about to pronounce that judgment.
The organization of the court had been severely85 Democratic. There were none of the usual accompaniments of royalty86 or exclusivism considered essential under aristocratic forms to impress the people with the dignity and gravity of a great occasion. None of these were necessary, for every spectator was an intensely interested witness to the proceeding, who must bear each for himself, the public consequences of the verdict, whatever they might be, equally with every member of the court.
The venerable Chief Justice, who had so ably and impartially87 presided through the many tedious weeks of the trial now about to close, was in his place and called the Senate to order.
The impressive dignity of the occasion was such that there was little need of the admonition of the Chief Justice to abstention from conversation on the part of the audience during the proceeding. No one there present, whether friend or opponent of the President, could have failed to be impressed with the tremendous consequences of the possible result of the prosecution about to be reached. The balances were apparently at a poise88. It was plain that a single vote would be sufficient to turn the scales either way—to evict89 the President from his great office to go the balance of his life's journey with the brand of infamy90 upon his brow, or be relieved at once from the obloquy91 the inquisitors had sought to put upon him—and more than all else, to keep the honorable roll of American Presidents unsmirched before the world, despite the action of the House.
The first vote was on the Eleventh and last Article of the Impeachment. Senators voted in alphabetical92 order, and each arose and stood at his desk as his name was called by the Chief Clerk. To each the Chief Justice propounded93 the solemn interrogatory—"Mr. Senator—, how say you—is the respondent, Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, guilty or not guilty of a high misdemeanor as charged in this Article?"
Mr. Fessenden, of Maine, was the first of Republican Senators to vote "Not Guilty." He had long been a safe and trusted leader in the Senate, and had the unquestioning confidence of his partisan colleagues, while his long experience in public life, and his great ability as a legislator, and more especially his exalted94 personal character, had won for him the admiration95 of all his associates regardless of political affiliations96. Being the first of the dissenting97 Republicans to vote, the influence of his action was feared by the impeachers, and most strenuous98 efforts had been made to induce him to retract99 the position he had taken to vote against conviction. But being moved on this occasion, as he had always been on others, to act upon his own judgment and conviction, though foreseeing that this vote would probably end a long career of conspicuous public usefulness, there was no sign of hesitancy or weakness as he pronounced his verdict.
Mr. Fowler, of Tennessee, was the next Republican to vote "Not Guilty." He had entered the Senate but two years before, and was therefore one of the youngest Senators, with the promise of a life of political usefulness before him. Though from the same State as the President, they were at political variance100, and there was but little in common between them in other respects. A radical101 partisan in all measures where radical action seemed to be called for, he was for the time being sitting in a judicial capacity and under an oath to do justice to the accused according to the law and the evidence. As in his judgment the evidence did not sustain the charge against the President such was his verdict.
Mr. Grimes, of Iowa, was the third anti-impeaching Republican to vote. He had for many years been a conspicuous and deservedly influential member of the Senate. For some days prior to the taking of the vote he had been stricken with what afterwards proved a fatal illness. The scene presented as he rose to his feet supported on the arms of his colleagues, was grandly heroic, and one never before witnessed in a legislative chamber102. Though realizing the danger he thus incurred103, and conscious of the political doom104 that would follow his vote, and having little sympathy with the policies pursued by the President, he had permitted himself to be borne to the Senate chamber that he might contribute to save his country from what he deemed the stain of a partisan and unsustained impeachment of its Chief Magistrate105. Men often perform, in the excitement and glamour106 of battle, great deeds of valor107 and self sacrifice that live after them and link their names with the honorable history of great events, but to deliberately108 face at once inevitable109 political as well as physical death in the council hall, and in the absence of charging squadrons; and shot and shell, and of the glamor110 of military heroism111, is to illustrate112 the grandest phase of human courage and devotion to convictions. That was the part performed by Mr. Grimes on that occasion. His vote of "Not Guilty" was the last, the bravest, the grandest, and the most patriotic113 public act of his life.
Mr. Henderson of Missouri, was the fourth Republican Senator to vote against the impeachment. A gentleman of rare industry and ability, and a careful, conscientious114 legislator, he had been identified with the legislation of the time and had reached a position of deserved prominence115 and influence. But he was learned in the law, and regardful of his position as a just and discriminating116 judge. Though then a young man with a brilliant future before him, he had sworn to do justice to Andrew Johnson "according to the Constitution and law," and his verdict of "Not Guilty" was given with the same deliberate emphasis that characterized all his utterances117 on the floor of the Senate.
Mr. Ross, of Kansas, was the fifth Republican Senator to vote "Not Guilty." Representing an intensely Radical constituency—entering the Senate but a few months after the close of a three years enlistment118 in the union Army and not unnaturally119 imbued120 with the extreme partisan views and prejudices against Mr. Johnson then prevailing—his predilections121 were sharply against the President, and his vote was counted upon accordingly. But he had sworn to judge the defendant122 not by his political or personal prejudices, but by the facts elicited123 in the investigation124. In his judgment those facts did not sustain the charge.
Mr. Trumbull, of Illinois, was the sixth Republican Senator to vote against the Impeachment. He had been many years in the Senate. In all ways a safe legislator and counsellor, he had attained125 a position of conspicuous usefulness. But he did not belong to the legislative autocracy which then assumed to rule the two Houses of Congress. To him the Impeachment was a question of proof of charges brought, and not of party politics or policies. He was one of the great lawyers of the body, and believed that law was the essence of justice and not an engine of wrong, or an instrumentality for the satisfaction of partisan vengeance. He had no especial friendship for Mr. Johnson, but to him the differences between the President and Congress did not comprise an impeachable offense. A profound lawyer and clear headed politician and statesman, his known opposition naturally tended to strengthen his colleagues in that behalf.
Mr. Van Winkle, of West Virginia, was the seventh and last Republican Senator to vote against the Impeachment. Methodical and deliberate, he was not hasty in reaching the conclusion he did, but after giving the subject and the testimony most careful and thorough investigation, he was forced to the conclusion that the accusation brought by the House of Representatives had not been sustained, and had the courage of an American Senator to vote according to his conclusions.
The responses were as follows:
Guilty—Anthony, Cameron, Cattell, Cole, Chandler, Conkling, Conness, Corbett, Cragin, Drake, Edmunds, Ferry, Frelinghuysen, Harlan, Howard, Howe, Morgan, Morton, Morrill of Maine, Morrill of Vermont, Nye, Patterson of New Hampshire, Pomeroy, Ramsay, Sherman, Sprague, Stewart, Sumner, Tipton, Thayer, Wade126, Williams, Wilson, Willey, Yates.
Not Guilty—Bayard, Buckalew, Davis, Dixon, Doolittle, Fessenden, Fowler, Grimes, Henderson, Hendricks, Johnson, McCreery, Norton, Patterson of Tennessee, Ross, Saulsbury, Trumbull, Van Winkle, Vickers.
Not Guilty—19. Guilty—35—one vote less than a Constitutional majority.
点击收听单词发音
1 impeachment | |
n.弹劾;控告;怀疑 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
2 testimony | |
n.证词;见证,证明 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
3 pending | |
prep.直到,等待…期间;adj.待定的;迫近的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
4 previously | |
adv.以前,先前(地) | |
参考例句: |
|
|
5 disposition | |
n.性情,性格;意向,倾向;排列,部署 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
6 coterie | |
n.(有共同兴趣的)小团体,小圈子 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
7 misgivings | |
n.疑虑,担忧,害怕;疑虑,担心,恐惧( misgiving的名词复数 );疑惧 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
8 savored | |
v.意味,带有…的性质( savor的过去式和过去分词 );给…加调味品;使有风味;品尝 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
9 judgment | |
n.审判;判断力,识别力,看法,意见 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
10 indictment | |
n.起诉;诉状 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
11 apparently | |
adv.显然地;表面上,似乎 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
12 conspicuous | |
adj.明眼的,惹人注目的;炫耀的,摆阔气的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
13 influential | |
adj.有影响的,有权势的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
14 enactment | |
n.演出,担任…角色;制订,通过 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
15 construing | |
v.解释(陈述、行为等)( construe的现在分词 );翻译,作句法分析 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
16 reluctance | |
n.厌恶,讨厌,勉强,不情愿 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
17 explicitly | |
ad.明确地,显然地 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
18 obnoxious | |
adj.极恼人的,讨人厌的,可憎的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
19 compliance | |
n.顺从;服从;附和;屈从 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
20 precedents | |
引用单元; 范例( precedent的名词复数 ); 先前出现的事例; 前例; 先例 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
21 lawfully | |
adv.守法地,合法地;合理地 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
22 incumbent | |
adj.成为责任的,有义务的;现任的,在职的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
23 violation | |
n.违反(行为),违背(行为),侵犯 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
24 constrained | |
adj.束缚的,节制的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
25 actively | |
adv.积极地,勤奋地 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
26 logic | |
n.逻辑(学);逻辑性 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
27 specifications | |
n.规格;载明;详述;(产品等的)说明书;说明书( specification的名词复数 );详细的计划书;载明;详述 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
28 specification | |
n.详述;[常pl.]规格,说明书,规范 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
29 impeachable | |
adj.可控告的,可弹劾的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
30 offense | |
n.犯规,违法行为;冒犯,得罪 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
31 permeating | |
弥漫( permeate的现在分词 ); 遍布; 渗入; 渗透 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
32 coherence | |
n.紧凑;连贯;一致性 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
33 opposition | |
n.反对,敌对 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
34 democrats | |
n.民主主义者,民主人士( democrat的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句: |
|
|
35 intensified | |
v.(使)增强, (使)加剧( intensify的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句: |
|
|
36 vent | |
n.通风口,排放口;开衩;vt.表达,发泄 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
37 solicitude | |
n.焦虑 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
38 engrossed | |
adj.全神贯注的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
39 embarrassment | |
n.尴尬;使人为难的人(事物);障碍;窘迫 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
40 virtue | |
n.德行,美德;贞操;优点;功效,效力 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
41 accusation | |
n.控告,指责,谴责 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
42 antipathies | |
反感( antipathy的名词复数 ); 引起反感的事物; 憎恶的对象; (在本性、倾向等方面的)不相容 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
43 gathering | |
n.集会,聚会,聚集 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
44 swarmed | |
密集( swarm的过去式和过去分词 ); 云集; 成群地移动; 蜜蜂或其他飞行昆虫成群地飞来飞去 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
45 deposition | |
n.免职,罢官;作证;沉淀;沉淀物 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
46 controversies | |
争论 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
47 intensity | |
n.强烈,剧烈;强度;烈度 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
48 malevolence | |
n.恶意,狠毒 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
49 ostracism | |
n.放逐;排斥 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
50 insistent | |
adj.迫切的,坚持的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
51 dominant | |
adj.支配的,统治的;占优势的;显性的;n.主因,要素,主要的人(或物);显性基因 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
52 promptly | |
adv.及时地,敏捷地 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
53 ignominious | |
adj.可鄙的,不光彩的,耻辱的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
54 thronged | |
v.成群,挤满( throng的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句: |
|
|
55 throng | |
n.人群,群众;v.拥挤,群集 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
56 beleaguered | |
adj.受到围困[围攻]的;包围的v.围攻( beleaguer的过去式和过去分词);困扰;骚扰 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
57 constituents | |
n.选民( constituent的名词复数 );成分;构成部分;要素 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
58 proceeding | |
n.行动,进行,(pl.)会议录,学报 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
59 vengeance | |
n.报复,报仇,复仇 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
60 controversy | |
n.争论,辩论,争吵 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
61 culmination | |
n.顶点;最高潮 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
62 recess | |
n.短期休息,壁凹(墙上装架子,柜子等凹处) | |
参考例句: |
|
|
63 prospective | |
adj.预期的,未来的,前瞻性的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
64 procure | |
vt.获得,取得,促成;vi.拉皮条 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
65 ascertained | |
v.弄清,确定,查明( ascertain的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句: |
|
|
66 memoranda | |
n. 备忘录, 便条 名词memorandum的复数形式 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
67 queries | |
n.问题( query的名词复数 );疑问;询问;问号v.质疑,对…表示疑问( query的第三人称单数 );询问 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
68 pariah | |
n.被社会抛弃者 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
69 insufficient | |
adj.(for,of)不足的,不够的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
70 partisan | |
adj.党派性的;游击队的;n.游击队员;党徒 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
71 coordinate | |
adj.同等的,协调的;n.同等者;vt.协作,协调 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
72 legislative | |
n.立法机构,立法权;adj.立法的,有立法权的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
73 fabric | |
n.织物,织品,布;构造,结构,组织 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
74 autocracy | |
n.独裁政治,独裁政府 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
75 imminent | |
adj.即将发生的,临近的,逼近的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
76 imputed | |
v.把(错误等)归咎于( impute的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句: |
|
|
77 tenor | |
n.男高音(歌手),次中音(乐器),要旨,大意 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
78 grandeur | |
n.伟大,崇高,宏伟,庄严,豪华 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
79 sublimely | |
高尚地,卓越地 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
80 supreme | |
adj.极度的,最重要的;至高的,最高的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
81 prosecution | |
n.起诉,告发,检举,执行,经营 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
82 eminent | |
adj.显赫的,杰出的,有名的,优良的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
83 defense | |
n.防御,保卫;[pl.]防务工事;辩护,答辩 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
84 judicial | |
adj.司法的,法庭的,审判的,明断的,公正的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
85 severely | |
adv.严格地;严厉地;非常恶劣地 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
86 royalty | |
n.皇家,皇族 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
87 impartially | |
adv.公平地,无私地 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
88 poise | |
vt./vi. 平衡,保持平衡;n.泰然自若,自信 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
89 evict | |
vt.驱逐,赶出,撵走 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
90 infamy | |
n.声名狼藉,出丑,恶行 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
91 obloquy | |
n.斥责,大骂 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
92 alphabetical | |
adj.字母(表)的,依字母顺序的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
93 propounded | |
v.提出(问题、计划等)供考虑[讨论],提议( propound的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句: |
|
|
94 exalted | |
adj.(地位等)高的,崇高的;尊贵的,高尚的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
95 admiration | |
n.钦佩,赞美,羡慕 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
96 affiliations | |
n.联系( affiliation的名词复数 );附属机构;亲和性;接纳 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
97 dissenting | |
adj.不同意的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
98 strenuous | |
adj.奋发的,使劲的;紧张的;热烈的,狂热的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
99 retract | |
vt.缩回,撤回收回,取消 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
100 variance | |
n.矛盾,不同 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
101 radical | |
n.激进份子,原子团,根号;adj.根本的,激进的,彻底的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
102 chamber | |
n.房间,寝室;会议厅;议院;会所 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
103 incurred | |
[医]招致的,遭受的; incur的过去式 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
104 doom | |
n.厄运,劫数;v.注定,命定 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
105 magistrate | |
n.地方行政官,地方法官,治安官 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
106 glamour | |
n.魔力,魅力;vt.迷住 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
107 valor | |
n.勇气,英勇 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
108 deliberately | |
adv.审慎地;蓄意地;故意地 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
109 inevitable | |
adj.不可避免的,必然发生的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
110 glamor | |
n.魅力,吸引力 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
111 heroism | |
n.大无畏精神,英勇 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
112 illustrate | |
v.举例说明,阐明;图解,加插图 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
113 patriotic | |
adj.爱国的,有爱国心的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
114 conscientious | |
adj.审慎正直的,认真的,本着良心的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
115 prominence | |
n.突出;显著;杰出;重要 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
116 discriminating | |
a.有辨别能力的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
117 utterances | |
n.发声( utterance的名词复数 );说话方式;语调;言论 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
118 enlistment | |
n.应征入伍,获得,取得 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
119 unnaturally | |
adv.违反习俗地;不自然地;勉强地;不近人情地 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
120 imbued | |
v.使(某人/某事)充满或激起(感情等)( imbue的过去式和过去分词 );使充满;灌输;激发(强烈感情或品质等) | |
参考例句: |
|
|
121 predilections | |
n.偏爱,偏好,嗜好( predilection的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句: |
|
|
122 defendant | |
n.被告;adj.处于被告地位的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
123 elicited | |
引出,探出( elicit的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句: |
|
|
124 investigation | |
n.调查,调查研究 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
125 attained | |
(通常经过努力)实现( attain的过去式和过去分词 ); 达到; 获得; 达到(某年龄、水平、状况) | |
参考例句: |
|
|
126 wade | |
v.跋涉,涉水;n.跋涉 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
欢迎访问英文小说网 |