The danger in such departures, even upon apparent necessity, if condoned5 or permitted by public judgment6 is in the establishment of precedents8 whereby greater and more dangerous infractions of organic law may be invited, tolerated, and justified9, till government takes on a form of absolutism in one form or another, fatal to free institutions, fatal to a government of law, and fatal to popular liberty.
On the other hand, a too ready resort to the power of impeachment10 as a remedial agent—the deposition11 of a public officer in the absence of proof of the most positive and convincing character of the impeachability of the offense12 alleged13, naturally tends to the other extreme, till public officers may become by common consent removable by impeachment upon insufficient14 though popular charges—even upon partisan15 differences and on sharply contested questions of public administration.
The power of impeachment and removal becomes, therefore, a two-edged sword, which must be handled with consummate16 judgment and skill, and resort thereto had only in the gravest emergencies and for causes so clearly manifest as to preclude17 the possibility of partisan divisions or partisan judgments18 thereon. Otherwise, too ready resort to impeachment must inevitably19 establish and bring into common use a new and dangerous remedy for the cure of assumed political ills which have their origin only in partisan differences as to methods of administration. It would become an engine of partisan intolerance for the punishment and ostracism20 of political opponents, under the operation of which the great office of Chief Magistrate21 must inevitably lose its dignity, and decline from its Constitutional rank as a co-ordinate department of the Government, and its occupant no longer the political head and Chief Executive of the Nation, except in name.
It was in that sense, and to a pointed22 degree, that in the impeachment and trial of Andrew Johnson the quality of coordination23 of the three great Departments of Government—the Executive, Legislative24, and Judicial25—was directly involved—the House of Representatives as prosecutor—the President as defendant—the Senate sitting as the trial court in which the Chief Justice represented the judicial department as presiding officer.
The anomaly of the situation was increased and its gravity intensified26, by the fact that the President pro2 tempore of the Senate, who stood first in the line of succession to the Presidency27 in case of conviction, was permitted, in a measure, indeed, forced by his pro-impeachment colleagues, on a partisan division of the Senate, to sit and vote as such President pro tempore for the impeachment and removal of the President whom he was to succeed.
These facts of condition attending and characterizing the trial of President Johnson, pointedly28 accentuate29 the danger to our composite form of government which the country then faced. That danger, as it had found frequent illustration in the debates in the House of Representatives on the several propositions for the President's impeachment preceding the bringing of the indictment30, lay in the claim of superiority of political function for the Legislative branch over the Executive. The quality of co-ordination of these departments was repeatedly and emphatically denied by conspicuous31 and influential32 members of that body during the initial proceedings34 of the impeachment movement, and even on the floor of the Senate by the managers of the impeachment. To illustrate35:
Mr. Bingham, in the House, Feb. 22nd, 1868, announced the extraordinary doctrine36 that "there is no power to review the action of Congress." Again, speaking of the action of the Senate on the 21st of February, on the President's message announcing the removal of Mr. Stanton, he said: "Neither the Supreme37 Court nor any other Court can question or review this judgment of the Senate."
The declaration was made by Messrs. Stevens and Boutwell in the House, that the Senate was its own judge of the validity of its own acts.
Mr. Butler, in his opening speech to the Senate, at the beginning of the trial, used this language:
A Constitutional tribunal solely38, you are bound by no law, either Statute39 or Common, which may limit your constitutional prerogative40. You consult no precedents save those of the law and custom of parliamentary bodies. You are a law unto yourselves, bound only by the natural principles of equity41 and justice, and salus populi suprema est lex.
Feb. 24, 1868, Mr. Stevens said in the House:
Neither the Executive nor the Judiciary had any right to interfere42 with it (Reconstruction) except so far as was necessary to control it by military rule until the sovereign power of the Nation had provided for its civil administration. NO POWER BUT CONGRESS HAD ANY RIGHT TO SAY WHETHER EVER, OR WHEN, they (the rebel States), should be admitted to the union as States and entitled to the privileges of the Constitution of the United States. * * * I trust that when we come to vote upon this question we shall remember that although it is the duty of the President to see that the laws be executed, THE SOVEREIGN POWER OF THE NATION RESTS IN CONGRESS.
Mr. Butler, the leading spirit of the impeachment enterprise, went so far as to make the revolutionary suggestion of the abrogation43 of the Presidential office in the event of final failure to convict the President—set out in the 8th Chapter.
Mr. Sumner insisted that in no judicial sense was the Senate a Court, and therefore not bound by the rules of judicial procedure:
If the Senate is a Court bound to judicial forms on the expulsion of the President, must it not be the same in the expulsion of a Senator? But nobody attributes to it any such strictures in the latter case. * * In the case of Blount, which is the first in our history, the expulsion was on the report of a committee declaring him guilty of a high misdemeanor. At least one Senator has been expelled on simple formal motion. Others have been expelled without any formal allegations or formal proofs. * * * The Constitution provides that "Each House shall determine its rules of proceeding33." The Senate on the expulsion of its own members has already done this practically and set an example of simplicity44. But it has the same power over its rules of proceeding on the expulsion of the President, and there can be no reason for simplicity in the one case not equally applicable in the other. Technicality is as little consonant45 with the one as with the other. Each has for its object the PUBLIC SAFETY. For this a Senator is expelled; for this, also, the President is expelled. Salus Populi Suprema Lex. The proceedings in each case must be in subordination to this rule."
Thus, Mr. Sumner would have removed the President by an ordinary concurrent47 resolution of Congress.
The purpose of all this was apparent—that the President was in effect, to be tried and judged before a Court of Public Opinion, and not before the Senate sitting as a High Court of Impeachment, but BY the Senate sitting in its legislative capacity—to create the impression in the minds of Senators that in this high judicial procedure they were still acting48 as a legislative body—simply as Senators, and not in a judicial capacity, as judges and jurors, and therefore not bound specifically by their oaths as such, to convict only for crime denounced by the law, or for manifest high political misdemeanors, but could take cognizance of and convict on alleged partisan offenses49 and allegations based on differences of opinion and partisan prejudices and partisan predilections—that it was not essential that the judgment of Senators should be confined to the specific allegations of the indictment, but that the whole range of alleged political and partisan misdemeanors and delinquencies could be taken into account in seeking a pretext50 for Mr. Johnson's conviction.
The superiority of the Legislative branch was thus openly advocated and insisted, and uncontroverted by any Republican supporting the impeachment. Mr. Johnson, according to these oft repeated declarations, was to be tried and convicted, not necessarily for any specific violation52 of law, or of the Constitution, but by prevailing53 public opinion—public clamor-in a word, on administrative54 differences subsisting55 between the President and the leaders of the dominant56 party in and out of Congress, and that public opinion, as concurrent developments fully57 establish, was industriously58 manufactured throughout the North, on the demand of leaders of the impeachment movement in the House, through the instrumentality of a partisan press and partisan public meetings, and in turn reflected back upon the Senate, in the form of resolutions denunciatory of the President and demanding his impeachment and removal.
That was in fact, and in a large sense, the incentive59 to the impeachment movement, and it was—not confined to a faction60, but characterized the dominant portion of the political party then in the ascendancy61 in and out of Congress.
In this state of facts lay largely the vice62 of the impeachment movement, and it illustrated63 to a startling degree the danger in the departure from established forms of judicial procedure in such cases.
It became apparent, long before the close, that it was but little if anything more than a partisan prosecution—and that fact became more generally and firmly fixed64, from day to day, as the trial approached conclusion.
In that state of facts, again, and in that sense, the impeachment of the President, was an assault upon the principle of coordination that underlies65 our political system and thus a menace to our established political forms, as, if successful, it would, logically, have been the practical destruction of the Executive Department—and, in view of previous legislation out of which the impeachment movement had to a degree arisen, and of declarations in the House and Senate quoted in this connection, the final and logical result of conviction would have been the absorption of the Executive functions of the Government by the Legislative Department, and the consequent declension of that Department to a mere66 bureau for the registration67 of the decrees of the Legislature.
Conscious of the natural tendency to infringement68 by a given Department of the Government upon the functions of its coordinates69, the framers of the Constitution wisely defined the respective spheres of the several departments, and those definitions constitute unmistakable admonition to each as to trespass70 by either upon the political territory of its coordinates.
As John C. Calhoun wrote, in the early days of the Republic:
"The Constitution has not only made a general delegation71 of the legislative power to one branch of the Government, of the executive to another, and of the judicial to the third, but it has specifically defined the general powers and duties of each of those departments. This is essential to peace and safety in any Government, and especially in one clothed only with specific power for national purposes and erected72 in the midst of numerous State Governments retaining exclusive control of their local concerns.* * * Were there no power to interpret, pronounce and execute the law, the Government would perish through its own imbecility, as was the case with the Articles of Confederation; or other powers must be assumed by the legislative body, to the destruction of liberty." Again, as was eloquently73 and forcefully said by Daniel Webster in the U. S. Senate in 1834:
"The first object of a free people is the preservation74 of their liberty, and liberty is only to be preserved by maintaining constitutional restraints and just division of political power. Nothing is more deceptive75 or more dangerous than the pretense76 of a desire to simplify government. The simplest governments are despotisms; the next simplest, limited monarchies77; but all republics, all governments of law, must impose numerous limitations and qualifications of authority and give many positive and many qualified78 rights. In other words, they must be subject to rule and regulation. This is the very essence of free political institutions. The spirit of liberty is, indeed, a bold and fearless spirit; but it is also a sharp-sighted spirit: it is a cautious, sagacious, discriminating79, far-seeing intelligence; it is jealous of encroachment80, jealous of power, jealous of man. It demands checks; it seeks for guards; it insists on securities; it entrenches81 itself behind strong defenses, and fortifies82 itself with all possible care against the assaults of ambition and passion. It does not trust the amiable83 weaknesses of human nature, and, therefore, it will not permit power to overstep its prescribed limits, though benevolence84, good intent, and patriotic purpose come along with it. Neither does it satisfy itself with flashy and temporary resistance to illegal authority. Far otherwise. It seeks for duration and permanence; it looks before and after; and, building on the experience of ages which are past, it labors85 diligently86 for the benefit of ages to come. This is the nature of constitutional liberty; and this is our liberty, if we will rightly understand and preserve it. Every free government is necessarily complicated, because all such governments establish restraints, as well on the power of government itself as on that of individuals. If we will abolish the distinction of branches, and have but one branch; if we will abolish jury trials, and leave all to the judge; if we will then ordain87 that the legislator shall himself be that judge; and if we will place the executive power in the same hands, we may readily simplify government. We may easily bring it to the simplest of all possible forms, a pure despotism. But a separation of departments, so far as practicable, and the preservation of clear lines of division between them, is the fundamental idea in the creation of all our constitutions; and, doubtless, the continuance of regulated liberty depends on maintaining these boundaries."
Each department is supreme within its own constitutionally prescribed limits, and the Supreme Court is made the umpire for the definition of the limits and the protection of the rights of all. Neither Congress, nor the Executive, are authorized88 to determine the constitutionality and therefore the validity of their acts, or the limits of their jurisdiction89 under the Constitution, but the Supreme Court is so authorized, and it is the umpire before which all differences in that regard must be determined90. It is the tribunal of last resort, save the people themselves, before whom both Senate and House, and the Executive, must bow, and its decision is final in the interpretation91 of the Constitution.
A due regard, therefore, for the interpretation of law and the division of powers thus established, constitutes the great safeguard upon which the harmonious92 and successful operation of our political system depends. On its religious observance rests, primarily, the preservation of our free institutions and the perpetuation93 of our peculiar94 system of popular government. That quality of co-ordination—of the equality of the several Departments as adjusted by the Organic Act—constitutes the balance wheel of our political system.
The logical effect of the doctrines95 promulgated96 by the House of Representatives in that regard, and re-echoed on the floor of the Senate, in the press and on the stump97 throughout the North, were therefore not only revolutionary, but destructive. To have removed the President upon accusations98 in reality based upon partisan and personal—not amounting even to substantial political differences—would have been the establishment of a precedent7 of the most dangerous character.
In a large sense, the American system of politics and of government was on trial, quite as much as was Andrew Johnson. The extreme element of American politics was in absolute control in the House of Representatives, and practically so, in the Senate. The impeachment and removal of the President on unsubstantiated, or even remotely doubtful charges, simply: because of a disagreement between himself and Congress as to the method of treating a great public emergency, would have introduced a new and destructive practice into our political system.
Logically, the introduction of such a practice on that occasion would have been construed100 as a precedent for the treatment of future public emergencies. Thus, it would have tended to disturb the now perfect adjustment of the balance of powers between the co-ordinate branches. That quality of absolute supremacy101 of the several departments in their respective spheres, or functions, and of co-ordination or equality in their relations to each other, established by the Constitution as a guarantee of the perpetuity of our political system, would have been endangered, and the result could not have been otherwise than disaster in the future.
Logically, the Presidency would in time have been degraded to the position of a mere department for the execution of the decrees of the legislative branch. Not illogically, the Supreme Court would have been the next object of attack, and the legislature have become, by this unconstitutional absorption of the powers of Government, the sole, controlling force—in short the Government.
That would, in time, by equally logical sequence, have been the natural, inevitable102 result—and the end. The wreckage103 of the Great Republic of the age would have been strown upon the sands of the political seashore—relics of the disregard of the checks and balances established by the wisdom of its framers, in the fundamental law—and all for the satisfaction of personal ambitions and the hates of factional animosities.
History affords too many illustrations of that tendency to decadence104 and disruption from disregard of the proper and necessary checks and balances in the distribution and equalization of the powers of government, to permit us to doubt what the final end would have been had the President been removed on the unsubstantiated accusation99 preferred by the House of Representatives, Our peculiar system of political government—a Democratic Republic—passed the danger point of its history in that hour.
It was indeed a narrow escape. The history of civilization records no precisely105 similar condition. The country then passed the most threatening period of its history—but passed it safely. The result was the highest possible testimonial to the strength and endurance of properly adjusted Democratic institutions that history records.
It emphasized not only the capacity of the American people for intelligent and orderly self-government, but also the strength and endurance of our popular forms. It was a profound surprise to those habituated to different political conditions. They had witnessed with astonishment106 the quiet disbandment of millions of men but as yesterday engaged in mortal strife—the vast armies as peacefully returning to former vocations107 as though from a great parade—and now, from a state of civil convulsion that in many another nation would have produced armed collision and public disorder108, they saw an entire people quietly accepting the verdict of the highest authoritive body of the land, and practically dismissing the subject from thought. It was a splendid world-wide tribute to the strength and endurance of our system of popular government.
Yet the conclusion must not be deduced that the power of impeachment is not a wise provision of our Constitution, nor in any sense inconsistent with our popular forms. Conditions may, and are not unlikely to arise, some day, when the exercise of the power to impeach and remove the President may be quite as essential to the preservation of our political system as it threatened to become in this instance destructive of that system. Should that day ever come, it is to be hoped that the remedy of impeachment, as established by the Constitution, may be as patriotically109, as fearlessly, and as unselfishly applied110 as it was on this occasion rejected.
SUPPLEMENT.
Copy of letter addressed to each of the members of the Cabinet present at the conversation between the President and General Grant on the 14th of January, 1868, and the answers thereto:
Sir:—The Chronicle of this morning contains a correspondence between the President and General Grant, reported from the War Department, in answer to a resolution of the House of Representatives. I beg to call your attention to that correspondence, and especially to that part of it which refers to the conversation between the President and General Grant, at the Cabinet meeting on Tuesday, the 14th of January, and to request you to state what was said in that conversation.
Very respectfully yours, Andrew Johnson.
Washington, D. C., February 5, 1868.
Sir:—-Your note of this date was handed to me this evening. My recollection of the conversation at the Cabinet meeting on Tuesday, the 14th of January, corresponds with your statement of it in the letter of the 31st ultimo, in the published correspondence. The three points specified112 in that letter, giving your recollection of the conversation, are correctly stated.
Very respectfully, Gideon Welles.
To the President.
Sir:—I have received your note of the 5th instant, calling my attention to the correspondence between yourself and General Grant, as published in the Chronicle of yesterday, especially to that part of it which relates to what occurred at the Cabinet meeting on Tuesday the 14th ultimo, and requesting me to state what was said in the conversation referred to.
I cannot undertake to state the precise language used, but I have no hesitation114 in saying that your account of that conversation, as given in your letter to General Grant under date of the 31st ultimo substantially and in all important particulars accords with my recollection of it.
With great respect, your obedient servant. Hugh McCulloch. To the President.
Post Office Department Washington, February 6, 1868.
Sir:—I am in receipt of your letter of the 5th of February, calling my attention to the correspondence published in the Chronicle between the President and General Grant, and especially to that part of it which refers to the conversation between the President and General Grant at the Cabinet meeting on Tuesday, the 14th of January, with a request that I state what was said in that conversation. In reply, I have the honor to state that I have read carefully the correspondence in question, and particularly the letter of the President to General Grant, dated January 31, 1868. The following extract from your letter of the 31st January to General Grant is, according to my recollection, a correct statement of the conversation that took place between the President and General Grant at the Cabinet meeting on the 14th of January last. In the presence of the Cabinet the President asked General Grant whether, "in conversation which took place after his appointment as Secretary of War ad interim115, he did not agree either to remain at the head of the War Department and abide116 any judicial proceedings that might follow the non-concurrence117 by the Senate in Mr. Stanton's suspension, or, should he wish not to become involved in such a controversy118, to put the President in the same position with respect to the office as he occupied previous to General Grant's appointment by returning it to the President in time to anticipate such action by the Senate." This General Grant admitted.
The President then asked General Grant if, at the conference on the preceding Saturday, he had not, to avoid misunderstanding, requested General Grant to state what he intended to do; and further, if in reply to that inquiry119 he (General Grant) had not referred to their former conversations, saying that from them the President understood his position, and that his (General Grant's) action would be consistent with the understanding which had been reached. To these questions General Grant replied in the affirmative.
The President asked General Grant if, at the conclusion of their interview on Saturday, it was not understood that they were to have another conference on Monday, before final action by the Senate in the case of Mr. Stanton.
General Grant replied that such was the understanding, but that he did not suppose the Senate would act so soon; that on Monday he had been engaged in a conference with General Sherman, and was occupied with "many little matters," and asked if General Sherman had not called on that day.
I take this mode of complying with the request contained in the President's letter to me, because my attention had been called to the subject before, when the conversation between the President and General Grant was under consideration.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant, Alexander W. Randall, Postmaster General. To the President.
Department of the Interior, Washington, D. C., February 6, 1868.
Sir:—I am in receipt of yours of yesterday, calling my attention to a correspondence between yourself and General Grant, published in the Chronicle newspaper, and especially to that part of said correspondence "which refers to the conversation between the President and General Grant at the Cabinet meeting on Tuesday, the 14th of January," and requesting me "to state what was said in that conversation."
In reply, I submit the following statement: At the Cabinet meeting on Tuesday, the 14th of January, 1868, General Grant appeared and took his accustomed seat at the board. When he had been reached in the order of business the President asked him, as usual, if he had anything to present?
In reply, the General, after referring to a note which he had that morning addressed to the President, inclosing a copy of the resolution of the Senate refusing to concur46 in the reasons for the suspension of Mr. Stanton, proceeded to say that he regarded his duties as Secretary of War ad interim terminated by that resolution, and that he could not lawfully120 exercise such duties for a moment after the adoption121 of the resolution by the Senate. That the resolution reached him last night, and that this morning he had gone to the War Department, entered the Secretary's room, bolted one door on the inside, locked the other on the outside, delivered the key to the Adjutant General, and proceeded to the headquarters of the Army, and addressed the note above mentioned to the President, informing him that he (General Grant) was no longer Secretary of War ad interim.
The President expressed great surprise at the course which General Grant had thought proper to pursue, and, addressing himself to the General, proceeded to say, in substance, that he had anticipated such action on the part of the Senate, and being very desirous to have the constitutionality of the Tenure122-of-Office bill tested, and his right to suspend or remove a member of the Cabinet decided123 by the judicial tribunals of the country, he had some time ago, and shortly after General Grant's appointment as Secretary of War ad interim, asked the General what his action would be in the event that the Senate should refuse to concur in the suspension of Mr. Stanton, and that the General had agreed either to remain at the head of the War Department till a decision could be obtained from the court or resign the office in the hands of the President before the case was acted upon by the Senate, so as to place the President in the same situation he occupied at the time of his (Grant's) appointment.
The President further said that the conversation was renewed on the preceding Sunday, at which time he asked the General what he intended to do if the Senate should undertake to reinstate Mr. Stanton; in reply to which the General referred to their former conversation upon the same subject, and said. "You understand my position, and my conduct will be conformable to that understanding:" that he (the General) then expressed a repugnance124 to being made a party to a judicial proceeding, saying that he would expose himself to fine and imprisonment125 by doing so, as his continuing to discharge the duties of Secretary of War ad interim, after the Senate should have refused to concur in the suspension of Mr. Stanton would be a violation of the Tenure-of-Office bill. That in reply to this he (the President) informed General Grant he had not suspended Mr. Stanton under the Tenure-of-Office bill, but by virtue126 of the powers conferred on him by the Constitution: and that, as to the fine and imprisonment, he (the President) would pay whatever fine was imposed and submit to whatever imprisonment might be adjudged against him (the General.) That they continued the conversation for some time, discussing the law at length, and that they finally separated without having reached a definite conclusion, and with the understanding that the General would see the President again on Monday.
In reply, General Grant admitted that the conversation had occurred, and said that at the first conversation he had given it as his opinion to the President that in the event of non-concurrence by the Senate in the action of the President in respect to the Secretary of War the question would have to be decided by the court; that Mr. Stanton would have to appeal to the court to reinstate him in office; that he would remain in till they could be displaced and the outs put in by legal proceeding; and that he then thought so, and had agreed that if he should change his mind he would notify the President in time to enable him to make another appointment, but that at the time of the first conversation he had not looked very closely into the law; that it had recently been discussed by the newspapers, and that this had induced him to examine it more carefully, and that he had come to the conclusion that if the Senate should refuse to concur in the suspension Mr. Stanton would thereby127 be reinstated, and that he (Grant) could not continue thereafter to act as Secretary of War ad interim, without subjecting himself to fine and imprisonment; and that he came over on Saturday to inform the President of this change in his views, and did so inform him, that the President replied that he had not suspended Mr Stanton under the Tenure-of-Office bill, but under the Constitution, and appointed him (Grant) by virtue of the authority derived128 from the Constitution, &c.; that they continued to discuss the matter some time, and finally he left without any conclusion having been reached, expecting to see the President again on Monday. He then proceeded to explain why he had not called on the President on Monday, saying that he had had a long interview with General Sherman; that various little matters had occupied his time till it was late, and that he did not think the Senate would act so soon, and asked, "did not General Sherman call on you on Monday?"
I do not know what passed between the President and General Grant on Saturday, except as I learned it from the conversation between them at the Cabinet meeting on Tuesday, and the foregoing is substantially what then occurred. The precise words used on the occasion are not, of course, given exactly in the order in which they were spoken, but the ideas expressed and the facts stated are faithfully preserved and presented. I have the honor to be, sir, with great respect, your obedient servant.
O. H. Browning.
The President.
Department of State, Washington, February 6, 1868.
Sir: The meeting to which you refer in your letter was a regular Cabinet meeting. While the members were assembling, and before the President had entered the Council Chamber129, General Grant, on coming in, said to me that he was in attendance there, not as a member of the Cabinet, but upon invitation, and I replied by the inquiry whether there was a change in the War Department. After the President had taken his seat business went on in the usual way of hearing matters submitted by the several secretaries. When the time came for the Secretary of War General Grant said that he was now there not as Secretary of War, but upon the President's invitation, that he had retired130 from the War Department. A Blight131 difference then appeared about the supposed invitation, General Grant saying that the officer who had borne his letter to the President that morning, announcing his retirement132 from the War Department, had told him that the President desired to see him at the Cabinet, to which the President answered, that when General Grant's communication was delivered to him the President simply replied that he supposed General Grant would be very soon at the Cabinet meeting. I regarded the conversation thus begun as an incidental one. It went on quite informally, and consisted of a statement, on your part, of your views in regard to the understanding of the tenure upon which General Grant had assented133 to hold the War Department ad interim, and of his replies by way of answer and explanation. It was respectful and courteous134 on both sides. Being in this conversational135 form, its details could only have been preserved by verbatim report. So far as I know, no such report was made at the time. I can give only the general effect of the conversation.
Certainly you stated that although you had reported the reasons for Mr. Stanton's suspension to the Senate, you nevertheless held that he would not be entitled to resume the office of Secretary of War, even if the Senate should disapprove136 of his suspension, and that you had proposed to have the question tested by judicial process, to be applied to the person who should be the incumbent137 of the Department, under your designation of Secretary of War ad interim in the place of Mr. Stanton. You contended that this was well understood between yourself and Gen. Grant; that when he entered the War Department as Secretary ad interim he expressed his concurrence in a belief that the question of Mr. Stanton's restoration would be a question for the courts; that in a subsequent conversation with General Grant you had adverted138 to the understanding thus had, and that General Grant expressed his concurrence in it: that at some conversation which had been previously139 held General Grant said he still adhered to the same construction of the law, but said if he should change his opinion he would give you seasonable notice of it, so that you should in any case, be placed in the same position in regard to the War Department that you were while General Grant held it ad interim. I did not understand General Grant as denying, nor as explicitly140 admitting, these statements in the form and full extent to which you made them. The admission of them was rather indirect and circumstantial, though I did not understand it to be an evasive one. He said that, reasoning from what occurred in the case of the police in Maryland, which he regarded as a parallel one, he was of opinion, and so assured you, that it would be his right and duty, under your instructions, to hold the War Office after the Senate should disapprove of Mr. Stanton's suspension until the question should be decided upon by the courts; that he remained until very recently of that opinion, and that on the Saturday before the Cabinet meeting a conversation was held between yourself and him in which the subject was generally discussed.
General Grant's statement was, that in that conversation he had stated to you the legal difficulties which might arise, involving fine and imprisonment under the civil tenure bill, and that he did not care to subject himself to those penalties; that you replied to this remark, that you regarded the civil tenure bill as unconstitutional, and did not think its penalties were to be feared, or that you would voluntarily assume them; and you insisted that General Grant should either retain the office until relieved by yourself according to what you claimed was the original understanding, between yourself and him, or, by seasonable notice of change of purpose on his part, put you in the same situation which you would be if he adhered. You claimed that General Grant finally said in that Saturday's conversation that you understood his views, and his proceedings thereafter would be consistent with what had been so understood. General Grant did not controvert51 nor can I say that he admitted this last statement. Certainly General Grant did not at any time in the Cabinet meeting insist that he had in the Saturday's conversation either distinctly or finally advised you of his determination to retire from the charge of the War Department otherwise than under your own subsequent direction. He acquiesced141 in your statement that the Saturday's conversation ended with an expectation that there would be a subsequent conference on the subject, which he, as well as yourself, supposed could seasonably take place on Monday.
You then alluded142 to the fact that General Grant did not call upon you on Monday, as you had expected from that conversation. General Grant admitted that it was his expectation or purpose to call upon you on Monday. General Grant assigned reasons for the omission143. He said he was in conference with General Sherman; that there were many little matters to be attended to. He had conversed144 upon the matter of the incumbency145 of the War Department with General Sherman, and he expected that General Sherman would call upon you on Monday. My own mind suggested a further explanation, but I do not remember whether it was mentioned or not-namely, that it was not supposed by General Grant on Monday that the Senate would decide the question so promptly146 as to anticipate further explanation between yourself and him if delayed beyond that day. General Grant made another explanation—that he was engaged on Sunday with General Sherman, and, I think, also on Monday, in regard to the War Department matter, with a hope, though he did not say in an effort, to procure147 an amicable148 settlement of the affair of Mr. Stanton, and he still hoped that it would be brought about.
I have the honor to be, with great respect, your obedient servant,
William H. Seward.
To the President.
The End
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impeach
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pro
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patriotic
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conscientious
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condoned
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| v.容忍，宽恕，原谅( condone的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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precedent
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| n.先例，前例；惯例；adj.在前的，在先的 | |
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precedents
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| 引用单元； 范例( precedent的名词复数 )； 先前出现的事例； 前例； 先例 | |
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9
justified
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| a.正当的，有理的 | |
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10
impeachment
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| n.弹劾；控告；怀疑 | |
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11
deposition
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| n.免职，罢官；作证；沉淀；沉淀物 | |
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12
offense
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| n.犯规，违法行为；冒犯，得罪 | |
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13
alleged
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| a.被指控的，嫌疑的 | |
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14
insufficient
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| adj.(for，of)不足的，不够的 | |
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15
partisan
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| adj.党派性的；游击队的；n.游击队员；党徒 | |
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16
consummate
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| adj.完美的；v.成婚；使完美 [反]baffle | |
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17
preclude
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| vt.阻止，排除，防止；妨碍 | |
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18
judgments
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| 判断( judgment的名词复数 )； 鉴定； 评价； 审判 | |
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19
inevitably
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| adv.不可避免地；必然发生地 | |
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20
ostracism
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| n.放逐；排斥 | |
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21
magistrate
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| n.地方行政官，地方法官，治安官 | |
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22
pointed
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| adj.尖的，直截了当的 | |
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23
coordination
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| n.协调，协作 | |
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24
legislative
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| n.立法机构，立法权；adj.立法的，有立法权的 | |
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25
judicial
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| adj.司法的，法庭的，审判的，明断的，公正的 | |
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26
intensified
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| v.（使）增强， （使）加剧( intensify的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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27
presidency
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| n.总统(校长，总经理)的职位(任期) | |
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28
pointedly
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| adv.尖地，明显地 | |
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29
accentuate
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| v.着重，强调 | |
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30
indictment
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| n.起诉；诉状 | |
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31
conspicuous
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| adj.明眼的，惹人注目的；炫耀的，摆阔气的 | |
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32
influential
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| adj.有影响的，有权势的 | |
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33
proceeding
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| n.行动，进行，(pl.)会议录，学报 | |
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34
proceedings
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| n.进程，过程，议程；诉讼(程序)；公报 | |
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35
illustrate
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| v.举例说明，阐明；图解，加插图 | |
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36
doctrine
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| n.教义；主义；学说 | |
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37
supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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38
solely
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| adv.仅仅，唯一地 | |
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39
statute
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| n.成文法，法令，法规；章程，规则，条例 | |
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40
prerogative
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| n.特权 | |
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41
equity
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| n.公正，公平，（无固定利息的）股票 | |
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42
interfere
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| v.(in)干涉，干预；(with)妨碍，打扰 | |
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43
abrogation
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| n.取消，废除 | |
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44
simplicity
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| n.简单，简易；朴素；直率，单纯 | |
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45
consonant
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| n.辅音；adj.[音]符合的 | |
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46
concur
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| v.同意，意见一致，互助，同时发生 | |
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47
concurrent
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| adj.同时发生的，一致的 | |
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48
acting
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| n.演戏，行为，假装；adj.代理的，临时的，演出用的 | |
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49
offenses
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| n.进攻( offense的名词复数 )；（球队的）前锋；进攻方法；攻势 | |
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50
pretext
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| n.借口，托词 | |
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51
controvert
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| v.否定；否认 | |
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52
violation
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| n.违反(行为)，违背(行为)，侵犯 | |
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53
prevailing
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| adj.盛行的；占优势的；主要的 | |
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54
administrative
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| adj.行政的，管理的 | |
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55
subsisting
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| v.（靠很少的钱或食物）维持生活，生存下去( subsist的现在分词 ) | |
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56
dominant
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| adj.支配的，统治的；占优势的；显性的；n.主因，要素，主要的人(或物)；显性基因 | |
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57
fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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58
industriously
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59
incentive
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| n.刺激；动力；鼓励；诱因；动机 | |
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60
faction
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| n.宗派，小集团；派别；派系斗争 | |
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61
ascendancy
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| n.统治权，支配力量 | |
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62
vice
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| n.坏事；恶习；[pl.]台钳，老虎钳；adj.副的 | |
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63
illustrated
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| adj. 有插图的，列举的 动词illustrate的过去式和过去分词 | |
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64
fixed
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| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
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65
underlies
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| v.位于或存在于（某物）之下( underlie的第三人称单数 )；构成…的基础（或起因），引起 | |
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66
mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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67
registration
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| n.登记，注册，挂号 | |
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68
infringement
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| n.违反；侵权 | |
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69
coordinates
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| n.相配之衣物；坐标( coordinate的名词复数 )；（颜色协调的）配套服装；[复数]女套服；同等重要的人（或物）v.使协调，使调和( coordinate的第三人称单数 )；协调；协同；成为同等 | |
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70
trespass
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| n./v.侵犯，闯入私人领地 | |
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71
delegation
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| n.代表团；派遣 | |
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72
ERECTED
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| adj. 直立的，竖立的，笔直的 vt. 使 ... 直立，建立 | |
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73
eloquently
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| adv. 雄辩地(有口才地, 富于表情地) | |
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74
preservation
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| n.保护，维护，保存，保留，保持 | |
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75
deceptive
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| adj.骗人的，造成假象的，靠不住的 | |
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76
pretense
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| n.矫饰，做作，借口 | |
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77
monarchies
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| n. 君主政体, 君主国, 君主政治 | |
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78
qualified
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|
| adj.合格的，有资格的，胜任的，有限制的 | |
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79
discriminating
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| a.有辨别能力的 | |
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80
encroachment
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| n.侵入，蚕食 | |
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81
entrenches
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|
| v.用壕沟围绕或保护…( entrench的第三人称单数 )；牢固地确立… | |
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82
fortifies
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| 筑防御工事于( fortify的第三人称单数 )； 筑堡于； 增强； 强化（食品） | |
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83
amiable
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|
| adj.和蔼可亲的，友善的，亲切的 | |
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84
benevolence
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| n.慈悲，捐助 | |
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85
labors
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|
| v.努力争取(for)( labor的第三人称单数 )；苦干；详细分析；（指引擎）缓慢而困难地运转 | |
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86
diligently
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|
| ad.industriously;carefully | |
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87
ordain
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| vi.颁发命令；vt.命令，授以圣职，注定，任命 | |
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88
authorized
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| a.委任的，许可的 | |
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89
jurisdiction
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|
| n.司法权，审判权，管辖权，控制权 | |
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90
determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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91
interpretation
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| n.解释，说明，描述；艺术处理 | |
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92
harmonious
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|
| adj.和睦的，调和的，和谐的，协调的 | |
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93
perpetuation
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| n.永存，不朽 | |
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94
peculiar
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| adj.古怪的，异常的；特殊的，特有的 | |
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95
doctrines
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|
| n.教条( doctrine的名词复数 )；教义；学说；（政府政策的）正式声明 | |
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96
promulgated
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|
| v.宣扬（某事物）( promulgate的过去式和过去分词 )；传播；公布；颁布（法令、新法律等） | |
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97
stump
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| n.残株，烟蒂，讲演台；v.砍断，蹒跚而走 | |
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98
accusations
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| n.指责( accusation的名词复数 )；指控；控告；（被告发、控告的）罪名 | |
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99
accusation
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| n.控告，指责，谴责 | |
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100
construed
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| v.解释（陈述、行为等）( construe的过去式和过去分词 )；翻译，作句法分析 | |
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101
supremacy
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| n.至上；至高权力 | |
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102
inevitable
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| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
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103
wreckage
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| n.（失事飞机等的）残骸，破坏，毁坏 | |
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104
decadence
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| n.衰落，颓废 | |
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105
precisely
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| adv.恰好，正好，精确地，细致地 | |
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106
astonishment
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| n.惊奇，惊异 | |
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107
vocations
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| n.（认为特别适合自己的）职业( vocation的名词复数 )；使命；神召；（认为某种工作或生活方式特别适合自己的）信心 | |
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108
disorder
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| n.紊乱，混乱；骚动，骚乱；疾病，失调 | |
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109
patriotically
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| 爱国地；忧国地 | |
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110
applied
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| adj.应用的；v.应用，适用 | |
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111
mansion
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| n.大厦，大楼；宅第 | |
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112
specified
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| adj.特定的 | |
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113
treasury
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| n.宝库；国库，金库；文库 | |
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114
hesitation
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| n.犹豫，踌躇 | |
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115
interim
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| adj.暂时的，临时的；n.间歇，过渡期间 | |
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116
abide
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| vi.遵守；坚持；vt.忍受 | |
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117
concurrence
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| n.同意；并发 | |
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118
controversy
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| n.争论，辩论，争吵 | |
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119
inquiry
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| n.打听，询问，调查，查问 | |
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120
lawfully
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| adv.守法地，合法地；合理地 | |
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121
adoption
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| n.采用，采纳，通过；收养 | |
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122
tenure
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| n.终身职位；任期；(土地)保有权，保有期 | |
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123
decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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124
repugnance
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| n.嫌恶 | |
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125
imprisonment
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| n.关押，监禁，坐牢 | |
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126
virtue
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| n.德行，美德；贞操；优点；功效，效力 | |
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127
thereby
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| adv.因此，从而 | |
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128
derived
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| vi.起源；由来；衍生；导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取 | |
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129
chamber
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| n.房间，寝室；会议厅；议院；会所 | |
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130
retired
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| adj.隐退的，退休的，退役的 | |
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131
blight
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| n.枯萎病；造成破坏的因素；vt.破坏，摧残 | |
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132
retirement
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| n.退休，退职 | |
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133
assented
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| 同意，赞成( assent的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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134
courteous
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| adj.彬彬有礼的，客气的 | |
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135
conversational
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| adj.对话的，会话的 | |
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136
disapprove
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| v.不赞成，不同意，不批准 | |
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137
incumbent
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| adj.成为责任的，有义务的；现任的，在职的 | |
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138
adverted
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| 引起注意（advert的过去式与过去分词形式） | |
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139
previously
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| adv.以前，先前（地） | |
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140
explicitly
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| ad.明确地，显然地 | |
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141
acquiesced
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| v.默认，默许( acquiesce的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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142
alluded
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| 提及，暗指( allude的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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143
omission
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| n.省略，删节；遗漏或省略的事物，冗长 | |
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144
conversed
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| v.交谈，谈话( converse的过去式 ) | |
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145
incumbency
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| n.职责，义务 | |
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146
promptly
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| adv.及时地，敏捷地 | |
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147
procure
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| vt.获得，取得，促成；vi.拉皮条 | |
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148
amicable
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| adj.和平的，友好的；友善的 | |
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