THE ARMED FORCES of twelve different nationalities of Europe invade Russia. The Russian army and population fall back, avoiding a battle, to Smolensk, and from Smolensk to Borodino. The French army moves on to Moscow, its goal, with continually increasing impetus1. The impetus of its advance is increased as it approaches its goal, just as the velocity2 of a falling body increases as it gets nearer the earth. Behind them thousands of versts of famine-stricken, hostile country; before them some dozens of versts between them and their goal. Every soldier of Napoleon's army feels it, and the expedition advances of itself, by the force of its own impetus.
In the Russian troops the spirit of fury, of hatred3 of the foe4, burns more and more fiercely during their retreat; it gathers strength and concentration as they draw back. At Borodino the armies meet. Neither army is destroyed, but the Russian army, immediately after the conflict, retreats as inevitably5 as a ball rebounds6 after contact with another ball flying with greater impetus to meet it. And just as inevitably (though parting with its force in the contact) the ball of the invading army is carried for a space further by the energy, not yet fully7 spent, within it.
The Russians retreat one hundred and twenty versts beyond Moscow; the French reach Moscow and there halt. For five weeks after this there is not a single battle. The French do not move. Like a wild beast mortally wounded, bleeding and licking its wounds, for five weeks the French remain in Moscow, attempting nothing; and all at once, with nothing new to account for it, they flee back; they make a dash for the Kaluga road (after a victory, too, for they remained in possession of the field of battle at Maley Yaroslavets); and then, without a single serious engagement, fly more and more rapidly back to Smolensk, to Vilna, to the Berezina, and beyond it.
On the evening of the 26th of August, Kutuzov and the whole Russian army were convinced that the battle of Borodino was a victory. Kutuzov wrote to that effect to the Tsar. He ordered the troops to be in readiness for another battle, to complete the defeat of the enemy, not because he wanted to deceive any one, but because he knew that the enemy was vanquished8, as every one who had taken part in the battle knew it.
But all that evening and next day news was coming in of unheard-of losses, of the loss of one-half of the army, and another battle turned out to be physically9 impossible.
It was impossible to give battle when information had not yet come in, the wounded had not been removed, the ammunition10 stores had not been filled up, the slain11 had not been counted, new officers had not been appointed to replace the dead, and the men had had neither food nor sleep. And meanwhile, the very next morning after the battle, the French army of itself moved down upon the Russians, carried on by the force of its own impetus, accelerated now in inverse12 ratio to the square of the distance from its goal. Kutuzov's wish was to attack next day, and all the army shared this desire. But to make an attack it is not sufficient to desire to do so; there must also be a possibility of doing so, and this possibility there was not. It was impossible not to retreat one day's march, and then it was as impossible not to retreat a second and a third day's march, and finally, on the 1st of September, when the army reached Moscow, despite the force of the growing feeling in the troops, the force of circumstances compelled those troops to retreat beyond Moscow. And the troops retreated one more last day's march, and abandoned Moscow to the enemy.
Persons who are accustomed to suppose that plans of campaigns and of battles are made by generals in the same way as any of us sitting over a map in our study make plans of how we would have acted in such and such a position, will be perplexed13 by questions why Kutuzov, if he had to retreat, did not take this or that course, why he did not take up a position before Fili, why he did not at once retreat to the Kaluga road, leaving Moscow, and so on. Persons accustomed to think in this way forget, or do not know, the inevitable14 conditions which always limit the action of any commander-in-chief. The action of a commander-in-chief in the field has no sort of resemblance to the action we imagine to ourselves, sitting at our ease in our study, going over some campaign on the map with a certain given number of soldiers on each side, in a certain known locality, starting our plans from a certain moment. The general is never in the position of the beginning of any event, from which we always contemplate15 the event. The general is always in the very middle of a changing series of events, so that he is never at any moment in a position to deliberate on all the bearings of the event that is taking place. Imperceptibly, moment by moment, an event takes shape in all its bearings, and at every moment in that uninterrupted, consecutive16 shaping of events the commander-in-chief is in the centre of a most complex play of intrigues17, of cares, of dependence18 and of power, of projects, counsels, threats, and conceptions, with one thing depending on another, and is under the continual necessity of answering the immense number of mutually contradictory19 inquiries20 addressed to him.
We are, with perfect seriousness, told by those learned in military matters that Kutuzov ought to have marched his army towards the Kaluga road long before reaching Fili; that somebody did, indeed, suggest such a plan. But the commander of an army has before him, especially at a difficult moment, not one, but dozens of plans. And each of those plans, based on the rules of strategy and tactics, contradicts all the rest. The commander's duty would, one would suppose, be merely to select one out of those plans; but even this he cannot do. Time and events will not wait. It is suggested to him, let us suppose, on the 28th to move towards the Kaluga road, but at that moment an adjutant gallops21 up from Miloradovitch to inquire whether to join battle at once with the French or to retire. He must be given instructions at once, at the instant. And the order to retire hinders us from turning to the Kaluga road. And then after the adjutant comes the commissariat commissioner22 to inquire where the stores are to be taken, and the ambulance director to ask where the wounded are to be moved to, and a courier from Petersburg with a letter from the Tsar, not admitting the possibility of abandoning Moscow, and the commander's rival, who is trying to cut the ground from under his feet (and there are always more than one such) proposes a new project, diametrically opposed to the plan of marching upon the Kaluga road. The commander's own energies, too, require sleep and support. And a respectable general, who has been overlooked when decorations were bestowed23, presents a complaint, and the inhabitants of the district implore24 protection, and the officer sent to inspect the locality comes back with a report utterly25 unlike that of the officer sent on the same commission just previously26; and a spy, and a prisoner, and a general who has made a reconnaissance, all describe the position of the enemy's army quite differently. Persons who forget, or fail to comprehend, those inevitable conditions under which a commander has to act, present to us, for instance, the position of the troops at Fili, and assume that the commander-in-chief was quite free on the 1st of September to decide the question whether to abandon or to defend Moscow, though, with the position of the Russian army, only five versts from Moscow, there could no longer be any question on the subject. When was that question decided27? At Drissa, and at Smolensk, and most palpably of all on August the 24th at Shevardino, and on the 26th at Borodino, and every day and hour and minute of the retreat from Borodino to Fili.
操欧洲十二种语言的军队侵入了俄国。俄国军队和平民为避免其冲击而撤退至斯摩棱斯克，再由斯摩棱斯克撤至波罗底诺。法军以不断增涨的势头冲向莫斯科，冲向其运动的目的地。法军愈接近目的地，其势愈猛，如物体落地时的加速度一般。它后面是几千俄里饥饿的充满仇恨的国土；前面则距目的地只有几十俄里了。对此，拿破仑军队的每一士兵都感觉得到，入侵行动在不由自主地推进，勇往直前，全凭这一股冲力。
在俄军方面，愈往后撤，抗击敌人的士气便愈燃愈炽烈；士气因退却而振作和高涨起来，在彼罗底诺终于交火。任何一方的军队都没有溃败，而俄军一经交火便立即撤出战斗，其所以如此，正如一个球碰到另一个冲力更大的球向它冲来，必然要滚向一边去那样；而狂奔而来的袭击的球，也必然要滚出一片空间（虽然相撞时失去它全部力量）。
俄国人后退了一百二十俄里——撤离了莫斯科。法国人到了莫斯科停下来。以后，接连五周无战事。法国人没有推进。他们犹如受了致命伤的野兽，流着血，舔舐着伤口，五个星期呆在莫斯科毫无动静，突然，毫无缘由地向后逃跑；窜向卡卢日斯卡雅公路，同时，（在打了胜仗之后，因为小雅罗斯拉维茨城附近的战场对他们有利），一仗也不打地退得更快，退向斯摩棱斯克，退离斯摩棱斯克，逃至维尔纳，逃至别列济纳河，向更远的地方逃跑。
早在八月二十六日晚，库图佐夫和全军将士都相信：波罗底诺战役已获胜。库图佐夫亦曾如此禀报陛下。他发布命令准备新的一次战役以歼灭敌人，不是因为他想欺骗谁，而是因为他知道敌人已经失败，每一参加这次战役的人也都知道这一点。
然而，就在当晚及第二天接连不断传来闻所未闻的死亡消息，损失半数军队的消息，这样，新的战役因兵员不足而不可能进行。
·无·法·在·此·时进行一场战役，因为情报尚未收集起来，伤员没有收容，弹药没有补充，阵亡人数没有统计，接替阵亡者的新的军官没有任命，人员忍饥挨饿，睡眠不足。而与此同时，在交战的次日早晨，法国军队却以迅猛之势，以与距离军方似乎成反比的加速运动，直向俄军扑来。库图佐夫想在次日发起攻击，全军将士也都这样想。但是，为了进攻，光有愿望是不够的；须要有进攻的可能性，可是此时，不存在这种可能性。此时不能不撤退一天的行程，然后又同样不能不后撤另一天，以至第三天的行程，最后，在九月一日，当队伍临近莫斯科时，尽管士兵们情绪高昂到了极点，事物的力量却要求这批部队走向莫斯科以东。他们也就又后撤了一天，即最后一天的行程，把莫斯科让给了敌人。
有的人惯于认为，整个战争以至各战役的计划，都是由统帅这样制订的，即像我们每人一样，坐在办公室看地图，设想他如何如何指挥这场那场战役；对于这些人，各种问题就提出来啦：为什么库图佐夫撤退时的行动不如何如何；为什么他在撤至菲利前不稳住阵脚；为什么放弃莫斯科后他不立即撤至卡卢日斯卡雅公路等等。惯于这样想的人忘记了，或根本不知道主帅采取行动所必备之条件。一个统帅的行动丝毫不同于我们轻轻松松坐在办公室里所设想的行动，因为在办公室里，我们是在已知各方兵力已知地形的条件下分析地图上的战役，从某一已知环节开始设想的。总司令总是不具备一个事件的始发点的条件，我们却总是具备这样的条件来研究一件事件。总司令总是处于事件进程的中间段，因此，永远不能，连一分钟也不可能对事件进程的意义作通盘考虑。事件默然地一分一秒地展现其意义，而在事件连续不断展现着的每一关头，总司令都处于极其复杂的角逐、计谋，焦虑，互相牵制，权柄，行筹，忠告，威胁和欺瞒等等的中心，随时必须对向他提出的无穷无尽、时而相互矛盾的问题做出回答。
军事学家过分严肃地告诉我们，库图佐夫在退至菲利之前早就应该调动部队至卡卢日斯卡雅公路，甚至有人提出过这个方案。但在总司令面前，尤其是在困难时刻，方案总不止一个，而是几十个同时提出。而且每一个基于战略战术考虑的方案都互相矛盾。总司令要做的事似乎是选择一种方案就行了。可是他连这一点也办不到。事件和时间不等人啦。比方说，有人向他建议二十八日转移到卡卢日斯卡雅公路，而同一时刻从米洛拉多维奇处驰来一名副官，询问现在就同法国人交火呢，还是撤退了之。他必须就在此刻，在这一分钟内下达命令。而命令退却会打乱我们向卡卢日斯卡雅公路的转移，紧接副官之后，军需官来问粮秣往哪里运，军医官来问伤员往哪里送；彼得堡的信使又带来陛下的诏书，不允许有放弃莫斯科的可能，而总司令的政敌，那个阴谋陷害他的人（这样的人不止一个，而是好几个）却提出一个与向卡卢日斯卡雅公路转移截然相反的新方案；但总司令本身需要睡眠和补充营养；可又来了一名未获赏赐的资深将军诉苦；居民则来恳求保护；派去察看地形的军官带回的报告，与先前派去的军官的说法完全相反；侦察员、俘虏与执行侦察任务的将军对敌军位置的描述各不相同。那些习惯于误解或忘掉任何主帅的行动所必备的这些条件的人们，或许会向我们表明菲利地区部队可在位置及其情况，因而断定，总司令本来能够在九月一日毫不费力地作出放弃抑或保卫莫斯科的决定，事实上，在俄军距莫斯科五俄里的地方，这一问题已不能成立。这一问题何时得以解决呢？是在德里萨，在斯摩棱斯克。尤为明显地是二十四日在舍瓦尔金诺，二十六日在波罗底诺，是在从波罗底诺到菲利撤退时的每一天，每一小时和每一分钟就已经在解决这个问题。
收听单词发音 |
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impetus
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| n.推动，促进，刺激；推动力 | |
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velocity
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| n.速度，速率 | |
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hatred
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| n.憎恶，憎恨，仇恨 | |
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foe
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| n.敌人，仇敌 | |
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inevitably
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| adv.不可避免地；必然发生地 | |
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rebounds
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| 反弹球( rebound的名词复数 )； 回弹球； 抢断篮板球； 复兴 | |
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fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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vanquished
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| v.征服( vanquish的过去式和过去分词 )；战胜；克服；抑制 | |
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physically
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| adj.物质上，体格上，身体上，按自然规律 | |
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ammunition
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| n.军火，弹药 | |
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slain
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| 杀死，宰杀，杀戮( slay的过去分词 )； (slay的过去分词) | |
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inverse
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| adj.相反的，倒转的，反转的；n.相反之物；v.倒转 | |
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perplexed
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| adj.不知所措的 | |
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inevitable
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| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
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contemplate
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| vt.盘算，计议；周密考虑；注视，凝视 | |
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consecutive
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| adj.连续的，联贯的，始终一贯的 | |
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intrigues
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| n.密谋策划( intrigue的名词复数 )；神秘气氛；引人入胜的复杂情节v.搞阴谋诡计( intrigue的第三人称单数 )；激起…的好奇心 | |
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dependence
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| n.依靠，依赖；信任，信赖；隶属 | |
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contradictory
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| adj.反驳的，反对的，抗辩的；n.正反对，矛盾对立 | |
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inquiries
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| n.调查( inquiry的名词复数 )；疑问；探究；打听 | |
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gallops
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| （马等）奔驰，骑马奔驰( gallop的名词复数 ) | |
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commissioner
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| n.（政府厅、局、处等部门）专员，长官，委员 | |
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bestowed
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| 赠给，授予( bestow的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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implore
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| vt.乞求，恳求，哀求 | |
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utterly
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| adv.完全地，绝对地 | |
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previously
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| adv.以前，先前（地） | |
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decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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