ON THE EVENING of the 1st of September, Count Rastoptchin had come away from his interview with Kutuzov mortified1 and offended at not having been invited to the council of war, and at Kutuzov's having taken no notice of his offer to take part in the defence of the city, and astonished at the new view of things revealed to him in the camp, in which the tranquillity2 of the city and its patriotic4 fervour were treated as matters of quite secondary importance, if not altogether irrelevant5 and trivial. Mortified, offended, and astonished at all this, Count Rastoptchin had returned to Moscow. After supper, he lay down on a sofa without undressing, and at one o'clock was waked by a courier bringing him a letter from Kutuzov. The letter asked the count, since the troops were retreating to the Ryazan road behind Moscow, to send police officials to escort troops through the town. The letter told Rastoptchin nothing new. He had known that Moscow would be abandoned not merely since his interview the previous day with Kutuzov on the Poklonny Hill, but ever since the battle of Borodino; since when all the generals who had come to Moscow had with one voice declared that another battle was impossible, and with Rastoptchin's sanction government property had been removed every night, and half the inhabitants had left. But nevertheless the fact, communicated in the form of a simple note, with a command from Kutuzov, and received at night, breaking in on his first sleep, surprised and irritated the governor.
In later days, Count Rastoptchin, by way of explaining his action during this time, wrote several times in his notes that his two great aims at that time were to maintain tranquillity in Moscow, and to make the inhabitants go out of it. If this twofold aim is admitted, every act of Rastoptchin's appears irreproachable6. Why were not the holy relics7, the arms, the ammunition8, the powder, the stores of bread taken away? Why were thousands of the inhabitants deceived into a belief that Moscow would not be abandoned and so ruined? “To preserve the tranquillity of the city,” replies Count Rastoptchin's explanation. Why were heaps of useless papers out of the government offices and Leppich's balloon and other objects carried away? “To leave the town empty,” replies Count Rastoptchin's explanation. One has but to admit some menace to public tranquillity and every sort of action is justified9.
All the horrors of terrorism were based only on anxiety for public tranquillity.
What foundation was there for Count Rastoptchin's dread10 of popular disturbance11 in Moscow in 1812? What reason was there for assuming a disposition12 to revolution in the city? The inhabitants were leaving it; the retreating troops were filling Moscow. Why were the mob likely to riot in consequence?
Not in Moscow only, but everywhere else in Russia nothing like riots took place at the approach of the enemy. On the 1st and 2nd of September more than ten thousand people were left in Moscow, and except for the mob that gathered in the commander-in-chief's courtyard, attracted there by himself, nothing happened. It is obvious that there would have been even less ground for anticipating disturbances13 among the populace if, after the battle of Borodino, when the surrender of Moscow became a certainty, or at least a probability, Rastoptchin had taken steps for the removal of all the holy relics, of the powder, ammunition, and treasury14, and had told the people straight out that the town would be abandoned, instead of exciting the populace by posting up placards and distributing arms.
Rastoptchin, an impulsive15, sanguine16 man, who had always moved in the highest spheres of the administration, was a patriot3 in feeling, but had not the faintest notion of the character of the people he supposed himself to be governing. From the time when the enemy first entered Smolensk, Rastoptchin had in his own imagination been playing the part of leader of popular feeling—of the heart of Russia. He did not merely fancy—as every governing official always does fancy—that he was controlling the external acts of the inhabitants of Moscow, but fancied that he was shaping their mental attitude by means of his appeals and placards, written in that vulgar, slangy jargon17 which the people despise in their own class, and simply fail to understand when they hear it from persons of higher station. The picturesque18 figure of leader of the popular feeling was so much to Rastoptchin's taste, and he so lived in it, that the necessity of abandoning it, the necessity of surrendering Moscow with no heroic effect of any kind, took him quite unawares; the very ground he was standing19 on seemed slipping from under his feet, and he was utterly20 at a loss what to do. Though he knew it was coming, he could not till the last minute fully21 believe in the abandonment of Moscow, and did nothing towards it. The inhabitants left the city against his wishes. If the courts were removed, it was only due to the insistence22 of the officials, to which Rastoptchin reluctantly gave way. He was himself entirely23 absorbed by the role he had assumed. As is often the case with persons of heated imagination, he had known for a long while that Moscow would be abandoned; but he had known it only with his intellect, and refused with his whole soul to believe in it, and could not mentally adapt himself to the new position of affairs.
The whole course of his painstaking24 and vigorous activity—how far it was beneficial or had influence on the people is another question— aimed simply at awakening25 in the people the feeling he was himself possessed26 by—hatred27 of the French and confidence in himself.
But when the catastrophe28 had begun to take its true historic proportions; when to express hatred of the French in words was plainly insufficient29; when it was impossible to express that hatred even by a battle; when self-confidence was of no avail in regard to the one question before Moscow; when the whole population, as one man, abandoning their property, streamed out of Moscow, in this negative fashion giving proof of the strength of their patriotism;—then the part Rastoptchin had been playing suddenly became meaningless. He felt suddenly deserted30, weak, and absurd, with no ground to stand on.
On being waked out of his sleep to read Kutuzov's cold and peremptory31 note, Rastoptchin felt the more irritated the more he felt himself to blame. There was still left in Moscow all that was under his charge, all the government property which it was his duty to have removed to safety. There was no possibility of getting it all away. “Who is responsible for it? who has let it come to such a pass?” he wondered. “Of course, it's not my doing. I had everything in readiness; I held Moscow in my hand—like this! And see what they have brought things to! Scoundrels, traitors32!” he thought, not exactly defining who were these scoundrels and traitors, but feeling a necessity to hate these vaguely33 imagined traitors, who were to blame for the false and ludicrous position in which he found himself.
All that night Rastoptchin was giving instructions, for which people were continually coming to him from every part of Moscow. His subordinates had never seen the count so gloomy and irascible.
“Your excellency, they have come from the Estates Department, from the director for instructions.… From the Consistory, from the Senate, from the university, from the Foundling Hospital, the vicar has sent … he is inquiring … what orders are to be given about the fire brigade? The overseer of the prison … the superintendent34 of the mad-house …” all night long, without pause, messages were being brought to the count.
To all these inquiries35 he gave brief and wrathful replies, the drift of which was that his instructions were now not needed, that all his careful preparations had now been ruined by somebody, and that that somebody would have to take all responsibility for anything that might happen now.
“Oh, tell that blockhead,” he replied to the inquiry36 from the Estates Department, “to stay and keep guard over his deeds. Well, what nonsense are you asking about the fire brigade? There are horses, let them go off to Vladimir. Don't leave them for the French.”
“Your excellency, the superintendent of the madhouse has come; what are your commands?”
“My commands? Let them all go, that's all.… And let the madmen out into the town. When we have madmen in command of our armies, it seems it's God's will they should be free.”
To the inquiry about the convicts in the prison, the count shouted angrily to the overseer:
“What, do you want me to give you two battalions37 for a convoy38 for them, when we haven't any battalions at all? Let them all go, and that settles it!”
“Your excellency, there are political prisoners—Myeshkov, Vereshtchagin …”
“Vereshtchagin! He is not yet hanged?” cried Rastoptchin. “Send him to me.”
九月一日晚，同库图佐夫会面之后，拉斯托普钦伯爵感到伤心，认为受了凌辱，因为他未被邀请参加军事会议，库图佐夫对他所提出关于参加保卫古都的建议未予注意；同时，他还对大本营向他表示的一个新看法感到震惊，持这一看法，古都保持平静，古都的爱国热情等不仅是次要的，而且是全无必要的，微不足的，——为所有这一切伤心，受辱和震惊的拉斯托普钦伯爵回到了莫斯科。晚饭后，伯爵未脱衣服在沙发上就寝，十二点过后便被递交库图佐夫便函的信使唤醒了。便函称，由于部队要撤往莫斯科以东的梁赞公路，故问伯爵能否通融派出警宪官员引导部队通过城市，这一消息对拉斯托普钦已非新闻。不仅从昨天库图佐夫在波克隆山会面时算起，还要从波罗底诺战役算起——当时，所有会聚莫斯科的将军众口一词地说，不能再发起战役了；同时，在伯爵许可下，每晚都在运出公家的财产，居民也撤走一半——拉斯托普钦伯爵就已知道，莫斯科必将放弃；但是，以带有库图佐夫命令的便笺形式通知的、在夜间刚入睡时收到的这个消息，仍使伯爵惊讶和气愤。
后来，拉斯托普钦伯爵在解释这期间自己的行动时，多次在回忆录中写道，他当时有两项重要目标：de maintenir la tranquillité a Moscou et d'en faire partir les habitants．①如果认可这一双重目标，拉斯托普钦的任何行动都是无可非议的。为什么不运走莫斯科的圣物、武器、子弹、火药和粮食储备，为什么欺骗成千万居民，说不会放弃莫斯科，不会把它毁灭掉呢？为了保持都城的平静，拉斯托普钦伯爵如此解释说。为什么运走政府机关一捆捆无用的文件，列比赫气球和别的物品呢？为的是使它变成一座空城，拉斯托普钦伯爵如此解释说。只要假设有什么事威胁着民众的安定，一切行为都是说得过去的。
①保持莫斯科的平静，疏散居民。
恐怖措施的全部可怕之处，就是以关心民众的安定作为依据。
拉斯托普钦伯爵有什么根据为一八一二年莫斯科民众的安定而担心？设想城里有骚动趋势的理由是什么？居民走了，军队后撤时挤满了莫斯科。结果，民众便会暴动，这是为什么呢？
不仅在莫斯科，也在全俄各地，在敌人打进来时，都没有发生类似骚动的事件。九月一日和二日，一万多人还留在莫斯科，除了一群人奉总司令之召聚在他府邸院子里之外，什么事也未发生。假如波罗底诺战役之后莫斯科的放弃已势在必行，或至少有此可能；假如拉斯托普钦不是发放武器和传单以鼓动民众，而是采取措施运走所有圣物、火药、子弹和钱币，并同民众开诚宣布城市要放弃，显而易见，便更不要担心在民众中会发生骚乱。
拉斯托普钦虽然有爱国热情，却是暴躁易怒的一个人，他一直在高层政界活动，对于他自以为在治理着的民众，没有丝毫的了解。从敌人最初进占斯摩棱斯克时候起，拉斯托普钦就为自己设想了一个支配民情——俄罗斯之心——的角色。他不仅觉得（正如每一行政长官都这样觉得）他是在支配莫斯科居民的外在行为，而且还觉得他通过措词低下、告示和传单支配着他们的心情，其实写在上面的一派胡言，民众在自己范围内是瞧不起的，当它从上面传下来时，民众也不理解，对扮演民情支配者的角色，拉斯托普钦为此而自鸣得意，他习以为常地以至于必须退出角色，没有任何英勇表现，也必须放弃莫斯科，对他不啻是晴天霹雳，他突然失掉脚下他赖以站立的土地，茫然不知所措了。他虽然已经知道，但直到最后一分钟仍不能全心全意地相信莫斯科会放弃，所以，与此有关的事一件也没有作。居民的撤走，是违背他的意愿的。如果说搬走了一些机关，那也是应官员们的请求，伯爵不情愿地同意的。他本人只扮演那个他为自己弄到的角色。像常常发生在富有热情奔放的想象力的人身上那样，他早就知道莫斯科要被放弃，但他仅仅是靠推断才知道的，他不能用整个的心去相信，不能使想象去适应这一新情况。
他的整个活动，即竭尽全力的精力充沛的活动对民众（有多大用处、对民众有多大影响，则是另一问题），也就是致力于居民心中唤起他正体验着的情感——出于爱国主义而仇恨法国人，对自己怀有信心。
但当事件具有真正的历史的规模时，当不足以话语表示自己对法国人的仇恨时，当即使用战斗也不足以表示这种仇恨时，当自己对莫斯科问题的信心已经无用时，而全市居民一致抛弃财产、川流不息地离开莫斯科，以这一否定行为显示民情的全部威力时，——这时，拉斯托普钦选择的角色，突然变得毫无意义。他感到他本人突然间孤独、脆弱和可笑了，脚下没有土壤了。
从睡梦中被唤醒，接到库图佐夫冷冰冰的命令口吻的便笺，拉斯托普钦愈益觉得气愤，愈益感到自己不对了。所有托付他的东西还留在莫斯科，包括全部他应该运走的公家财产。全部运走已不可能了。
“这件事究竟是谁的错，谁造成的？”他想。“自然不是我。我把一切都准备好了，瞧，我把莫斯科掌握是牢牢的！瞧他们把事情闹到了什么地步！是些坏蛋，叛徒！”他想，虽然确定不了谁是坏蛋和叛徒，但他觉得必须仇恨这些坏蛋和叛徒，他们在使他处于虚伪可笑的境地，是有罪过的。
整个晚上，拉斯托普钦伯爵都在下达命令，听候命令的人来自莫斯科各处。近侍们从未见过伯爵如此阴郁和气急败坏。
“爵爷，领地注册局局长派人来请示……宗教法庭、枢密院、大学、孤儿院，副主教都派人来……问……关于消防队您有何指示？典狱官来了……精神病院监督来了……”整晚不停地向伯爵报告。
对所有这些问题，伯爵一概给予简略的愤怒的答复，以表示他的指示现在用不着了；他竭尽全力准备好的一切被某个人破坏了，而这个人将要对马上发生的一切承担全部责任。
“呶，告诉那个木头人，”他回答领地注册局里派来的人的请示，“他得留下来看管他的文件。喏，你干吗要问关于消防队的废话？有匹马嘛，让他们开到弗拉基米尔去。不是给法国人留下的。”
“爵爷，疯人院的监督来了，您有何指示？”
“有何指示吗？让他们都走，就这样……疯子嘛让他们都到城内去，放了就是了。我们这边是由疯子指挥军队，上帝就是这样安排的。”
对于蹲在监狱里的囚犯问题，伯爵呵斥典狱官：“怎么，派给你两营人护送吗？派不出！放掉他们就完事了！”
“爵爷，还有政治犯：梅什科夫，韦烈夏金呢。”
“韦列夏金！他还没被绞死吗？”拉斯托普钦喊道，“带他到我这儿来。”
收听单词发音 |
1
mortified
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| v.使受辱( mortify的过去式和过去分词 )；伤害（人的感情）；克制；抑制（肉体、情感等） | |
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tranquillity
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| n. 平静, 安静 | |
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patriot
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| n.爱国者，爱国主义者 | |
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patriotic
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| adj.爱国的，有爱国心的 | |
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irrelevant
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| adj.不恰当的，无关系的，不相干的 | |
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irreproachable
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| adj.不可指责的，无过失的 | |
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relics
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| [pl.］n.遗物，遗迹，遗产；遗体，尸骸 | |
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ammunition
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| n.军火，弹药 | |
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justified
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| a.正当的，有理的 | |
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dread
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| vt.担忧，忧虑；惧怕，不敢；n.担忧，畏惧 | |
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disturbance
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| n.动乱，骚动；打扰，干扰；(身心)失调 | |
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disposition
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| n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署 | |
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disturbances
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| n.骚乱( disturbance的名词复数 )；打扰；困扰；障碍 | |
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treasury
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| n.宝库；国库，金库；文库 | |
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impulsive
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| adj.冲动的，刺激的；有推动力的 | |
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sanguine
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| adj.充满希望的，乐观的，血红色的 | |
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jargon
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| n.术语，行话 | |
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picturesque
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| adj.美丽如画的，（语言）生动的，绘声绘色的 | |
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standing
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| n.持续，地位；adj.永久的，不动的，直立的，不流动的 | |
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utterly
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| adv.完全地，绝对地 | |
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fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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insistence
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| n.坚持；强调；坚决主张 | |
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entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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painstaking
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| adj.苦干的；艰苦的，费力的，刻苦的 | |
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awakening
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| n.觉醒，醒悟 adj.觉醒中的；唤醒的 | |
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possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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hatred
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| n.憎恶，憎恨，仇恨 | |
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catastrophe
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| n.大灾难，大祸 | |
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insufficient
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| adj.(for，of)不足的，不够的 | |
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deserted
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| adj.荒芜的，荒废的，无人的，被遗弃的 | |
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peremptory
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| adj.紧急的，专横的，断然的 | |
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traitors
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| 卖国贼( traitor的名词复数 )； 叛徒； 背叛者； 背信弃义的人 | |
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vaguely
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| adv.含糊地，暖昧地 | |
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superintendent
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| n.监督人，主管，总监；(英国)警务长 | |
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inquiries
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| n.调查( inquiry的名词复数 )；疑问；探究；打听 | |
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inquiry
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| n.打听，询问，调查，查问 | |
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battalions
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| n.（陆军的）一营（大约有一千兵士）( battalion的名词复数 )；协同作战的部队；军队；（组织在一起工作的）队伍 | |
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convoy
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| vt.护送，护卫，护航；n.护送；护送队 | |
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