NAPOLEON enters Moscow after the brilliant victory de la Moskowa: there can be no doubt of the victory, since the French are left in possession of the field of battle. The Russians retreat and leave Moscow—well stocked with provisions, arms, implements1, and countless2 riches—in the hands of Napoleon. The Russian army, of one-half the strength of the French, during the course of a whole month makes no effort to attack. Napoleon's position is most brilliant. One would have supposed that no great genius was needed with an army of double the strength to fall upon the Russian forces and destroy them, to negotiate an advantageous3 peace; or, in case of negotiations4 being refused, to make a menacing march upon Petersburg, or even, in case of failure in this, to return to Smolensk or to Vilna, or to remain in Moscow, to retain, in short, the brilliant position in which the French army now found themselves. To do all this it was only necessary to take the simplest and easiest measures: to keep the soldiers from pillage5, to prepare winter clothes (of which there was a supply in Moscow amply sufficient for the whole army), and regularly to collect the provisions, of which the supply in Moscow was, on the showing of the French historians, sufficient to feed the whole army for six months. Napoleon, the greatest of all military geniuses, with absolute power, as historians assert, over the army, did nothing of all this.
Far from doing anything of the sort, he used his power to select out of all the various courses open to him the stupidest and most pernicious of all. Of all the different things Napoleon might have done—spending the winter in Moscow, going to Petersburg, going to Nizhni-Novgorod, going back a little more to the north or to the south, by the road Kutuzov afterwards took—no course one can imagine could have been more ruinous for his army (as the sequel proved) than the one Napoleon actually did adopt; that is, the course of staying in Moscow till October, letting the troops plunder6 the town, then in hesitation7 leaving a garrison8 behind, marching out of Moscow, going to meet Kutuzov and not giving battle, turning to the right and going as far as Maley Yaroslavets, again refusing to risk a battle, and finally retreating, not by the road Kutuzov had taken, but by Mozhaisk and the Smolensk route through devastated9 country. Let the most skilful10 tacticians, supposing that Napoleon's object was the destruction of his army, try and devise a series of actions which could, apart from any measures that might be taken by the Russian forces, have ensured with such certainty the complete destruction of the whole French army as the course taken by Napoleon.
This the genius Napoleon did. But to say that Napoleon ruined his army because he wanted to do so, or because he was very stupid, would be just as unjust as to say that Napoleon got his troops to Moscow because he wanted to, and because he was very clever and a great genius.
In both cases his personal activity, having no more force than the personal activity of every soldier, was merely coincidental with the laws by which the event was determined11.
Quite falsely (and simply because the sequel did not justify12 Napoleon's actions) do historians represent Napoleon's faculties13 as flagging at Moscow. Just as before, and afterwards in the year 1813, he used all his powers and faculties to do the best for himself and his army, Napoleon's activity at this time was no less marvellous than in Egypt, in Italy, in Austria, and in Prussia. We do not know with any certainty how real was the genius of Napoleon in Egypt, where forty centuries looked down upon his greatness, because all his great exploits there are recounted to us by none but Frenchmen. We cannot judge with certainty of his genius in Austria and Prussia, as the accounts of his doings there must be drawn14 from French and German sources. And the unaccountable surrender of corps15 of soldiers without a battle, and of fortresses16 without a siege, must dispose Germans to postulate17 Napoleon's genius as the unique explanation of the war as it was waged in Germany. But we have, thank God, no need to plead his genius to cloak our shame. We have paid for the right to look facts simply and squarely in the face, and that right we will not give up.
His activity in Moscow was as marvellous and as full of genius as anywhere else. Command upon command and plan upon plan was continually being issued by him from the time he entered Moscow to the time he left it. The absence of the citizens and of a deputation, and even the burning of Moscow, did not daunt18 him. He did not lose sight of the welfare of his army, nor of the doings of the enemy, nor of the welfare of the people of Russia, nor of the conduct of affairs at Paris, nor of diplomatic negotiations as to the terms of peace.
拿破仑在莫斯科河获得辉煌的胜利之后，进入了莫斯科；胜利是无庸置疑的。因为战场在法国人手中。俄国人撤退了，放弃了首都。莫斯科城的丰富的粮草、武器、装备和数不尽的财富，全都在拿破仑手中。只有法国军队一半数量的俄国军队，在整整的一个月中不曾有过一次进攻的尝试。拿破仑的境况最为辉煌。要是以两倍的兵力攻击并歼灭俄军残部，要是提出有利的讲和条件，一旦讲和被拒绝，就进军威胁彼得堡，甚至万一受挫，就返回斯摩棱斯克或维尔纳，或者就留在莫斯科，总之，要保持法国军队当时所处的那种辉煌境况，似乎用不着什么特殊的天才就可以做到。为了做到这一点，只需要做一件最简单、最容易的事情，那就是禁止军队抢劫，准备冬季服装（在莫斯科能得到足够全军用的冬装），用正当的方法征集粮草，据法国的历史学家说，莫斯科有足够军全食用半年多的粮食。可是拿破仑，这个历史学家誉为天才中最伟大的天才，掌握全军大权的人，竟然没有做任何一件事情。
他不仅不去做这一类事情中的任何一件事情，而且正相反，他把他的权力却用在从摆在他面前可供他选择的所有道路中，选择了一条比所有道路都更加愚蠢和更为有害的道路。可供拿破仑选择的道路有：在莫科斯过冬，向彼得堡进军，向下诺夫哥罗德进军，向北或者向南（库图佐夫后来所走的那条路）撤退，可是，再也想不出比拿破仑做的更愚蠢、更有害的事了，那就是，在莫斯科停留到十月底，任由部队抢劫这个城市，后来，又动摇不定是否留下守备队，就退出了莫斯科，接近了库图佐夫，却不进行战斗，接着转向右方，走近小雅罗斯拉维茨，又失掉了试行突破的机会，不走库图佐夫走的那条大路，而沿着被破坏了的斯摩棱斯克大路向莫扎伊斯克退却，结果证明，再也想不出比这更愚蠢、对军队更有害的事情了。就是最有经验的战略家，即便假定拿破仑的目的是要毁灭掉他的军队，也想不出另外一系列的行动，像拿破仑所做的那样，确定无疑地、与俄国军队采取任何措施都无关地，彻底毁灭整个法国军队。
天才的拿破仑却做到了这一点。但是，说拿破仑毁掉了自己的军队，是因为他想那样做，或者说他太愚笨，如同说拿破仑把军队带到莫斯科，是因为他想那样做，或者说因为他很聪明和有天才，都同样地不公平。
在这种或那种情况下，他个人的行动并不比任何一个士兵的行动更有力。只不过他个人的行动符合现象在形成过程中所遵循的某些规律罢了。
历史学家十分荒谬地告诉我们说（仅仅因为结果未能证实拿破仑的行动是对的），拿破仑的天才在莫斯科衰退了。其实，他像先前像后来，像一九一三年完全一样，竭尽他全部聪明才智和力量为他自己、为他的军队谋求最大的利益。拿破仑在这一时期的行动令人惊叹，并不比他在埃及、意大利和普鲁士等地有所逊色。我们不能知道拿破仑在埃及（那里有四千年的历史注视着他的伟大）的实际的天才达到何种程度，因为只有法国人才向我们描述他的这些伟大功勋。我们也难以准确无误地判断他在奥地利和在普鲁士的天才，因为有关他在那里的活动的报导，我们要从法国和德国的文献中去查找；整个兵团未经战斗就不可思议地投降当了俘虏，要塞还没有被包围就一个个陷落，这一切使德国人不能不承认他的天才，为那场在德国进行的战争作出唯一的解释。但是我们，感谢上帝，没有理由为了遮掩自己的耻辱，而承认他的天才。我们为了要有直截了当看问题的权利，我们已经为此而付出了代价，我们也就决不会放弃这种权利。
他在莫斯科的行动，就如同在所有的地方一样，令人叹为观止，显示了他的天才。自从他进入莫斯科到他撤退出莫斯科的这段时间里，他发出了一个接一个的命令，制定了一个又一个的各种计划。莫斯科的居民都跑光了，没有代表团前来见他，甚至连莫斯科大火，都没有使他惊慌失措。他并没有忽略他的军队的利益，也没有忽略敌人方面的活动，也没有忽略俄国人民的利益，也没有忽略巴黎方面的政务，也没有忽略关于即将缔结和约的外交方面的考虑。
收听单词发音 |
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implements
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| n.工具( implement的名词复数 )；家具；手段；[法律]履行（契约等）v.实现( implement的第三人称单数 )；执行；贯彻；使生效 | |
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countless
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| adj.无数的，多得不计其数的 | |
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advantageous
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| adj.有利的；有帮助的 | |
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negotiations
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| 协商( negotiation的名词复数 )； 谈判； 完成（难事）； 通过 | |
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pillage
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| v.抢劫；掠夺；n.抢劫，掠夺；掠夺物 | |
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plunder
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| vt.劫掠财物，掠夺；n.劫掠物，赃物；劫掠 | |
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hesitation
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| n.犹豫，踌躇 | |
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garrison
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| n.卫戍部队；驻地，卫戍区；vt.派(兵)驻防 | |
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devastated
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| v.彻底破坏( devastate的过去式和过去分词)；摧毁；毁灭；在感情上（精神上、财务上等）压垮adj.毁坏的；极为震惊的 | |
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skilful
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| (=skillful)adj.灵巧的，熟练的 | |
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determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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justify
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| vt.证明…正当(或有理)，为…辩护 | |
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faculties
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| n.能力( faculty的名词复数 )；全体教职员；技巧；院 | |
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drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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corps
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| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
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fortresses
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| 堡垒，要塞( fortress的名词复数 ) | |
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postulate
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| n.假定，基本条件；vt.要求，假定 | |
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daunt
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| vt.使胆怯，使气馁 | |
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