ONE MIGHT have supposed that the historians, who ascribe the actions of the masses to the will of one man, would have found it impossible to explain the retreat of the French on their theory, considering that they did everything possible during this period of the campaign to bring about their own ruin, and that not a single movement of that rabble1 of men, from their turning into the Kaluga road up to the flight of the commander from his army, showed the slightest trace of design.
But no! Mountains of volumes have been written by historians upon this campaign, and in all of them we find accounts of Napoleon's masterly arrangements and deeply considered plans; of the strategy with which the soldiers were led, and the military genius showed by the marshals.
The retreat from Maley Yaroslavets, when nothing hindered Napoleon from passing through a country abundantly furnished with supplies, and the parallel road was open to him, along which Kutuzov afterwards pursued him—this wholly unnecessary return by a road through devastated2 country is explained to us as due to various sagacious considerations. Similar reasons are given us for Napoleon's retreat from Smolensk to Orsha. Then we have a description of his heroism3 at Krasnoe, when he is reported to have prepared to give battle, and to take the command, and coming forward with a birch stick in his hand, to have said:
“Long enough I have been an emperor, it is time now to be a general!”
Yet in spite of this, he runs away immediately afterwards, abandoning the divided army in the rear to the hazards of destiny.
Then we have descriptions of the greatness of some of the marshals, especially of Ney—a greatness of soul that culminated4 in his taking a circuitous5 route by the forests across the Dnieper, and fleeing without his flags, his artillery6, and nine-tenths of his men into Orsha.
And lastly, the final departure of the great Emperor from his heroic army is represented by the historians as something great—a stroke of genius.
Even that final act of running away—which in homely7 language would be described as the lowest depth of baseness, such as every child is taught to feel ashamed of—even that act finds justification8 in the language of the historians.
When it is impossible to stretch the elastic9 thread of historical argument further, when an action is plainly opposed to what all humanity is agreed in calling right and justice, the historians take refuge in the conception of greatness. Greatness would appear to exclude all possibility of applying standards of right and wrong. For the great man—nothing is wrong. There is no atrocity10 which could be made a ground for blaming a great man.
“C'est grand!” cry the historians; and at that word good and bad have ceased to be, and there are only “grand” and not “grand.” “Grand” is equivalent to good, and not “grand” to bad. To be grand is to their notions the characteristic of certain exceptional creatures, called by them heroes. And Napoleon, wrapping himself in his warm fur cloak and hurrying home away from men, who were not only his comrades, but (in his belief) brought there by his doing, feels que c'est grand; and his soul is content.
“Du sublime11 au ridicule12 il n'y a qu'un pas,” he says (he sees something grand in himself). And the whole world has gone on for fifty years repeating: Sublime! Grand! Napoleon the Great.
“Du sublime au ridicule il n'y a qu'un pas.”
And it never enters any one's head that to admit a greatness, immeasurable by the rule of right and wrong, is but to accept one's own nothingness and immeasurable littleness.
For us, with the rule of right and wrong given us by Christ, there is nothing for which we have no standard. And there is no greatness where there is not simplicity13, goodness, and truth.
法国人在整个溃逃过程中，做尽了他们所能够做的断送自己命运的一切事情，从转向卢日斯卡雅大道到主帅扔下自己的部队只身逃跑，这一群乌合之众的每一个行动，都没有丝毫意义。这样，我们可以说，在这一阶段的战役中，要把群众的行动归因于某个人意志的历史学家们，要按照他们的思想来描述这次大溃逃是绝对不可能了。其实不然，历史学家所写的关于这一战役的书籍可以堆积如山，对拿破仑的战略部署、深思熟虑的战略决策以及指挥军队作战的机动灵活，还有他的元帅们的军事天才，都作了淋漓尽致的描述。
从小雅罗斯拉维茨退却的时候，他可以通过一个物产丰富足以补充给养的地区，另外还有一条与此平行的道路可供选择，后来库图佐夫就是沿着这条道路追击他的，而他却完全没有必要走那条已经被破坏了的道路。而历史学家却认为这是具有种种深谋远虑的战略行动。他从斯摩棱斯克向奥尔沙溃退也同样被说成是经过深思熟虑的行动。然后，还描述了他在克拉斯诺耶的英雄行为。据说，他准备在那里部署一次战斗，由他亲自指挥，他手持一条桦木棍，不停来回走动着，说道：
“J'aiassezfaitl'empereur，ilesttempsdefairelegénéral．”①他说是说了，但是说完大话之后就立刻逃走，丢下了他身后早已溃不成军的队伍，让他们去听天由命罢了。
后来，人们向我们描述了元帅们灵魂的伟大，特别是内伊，他的灵魂之伟大就在于，他在夜间绕道穿过森林，偷偷地渡过了德聂伯河，他扔掉了军旗和九千名将士，狼狈向奥尔沙逃命。
①法语：我当皇帝已经当够了，现在该当一下将军了。
最后，历史学家告诉我们说，那位伟大的皇帝最后离开了英雄的军队，这也算是一桩伟大的天才的行动。甚至对这种最后逃走，在人的语言中被认作是最卑鄙、最无耻的行为，就连三岁小孩也会认为这是最可耻的行为，而这种行为在历史学家的语言中，竟然能够得到辩护。
每当历史提到这些富有弹性的线延伸得不能再延伸的时候，每当那种行为与人类称作善良，甚至称作正义，已明显相违背时，历史学家们就乞救“伟大”这个词的概念。好像是用“伟大”这个词可以排除衡量善良和丑恶的标准。“伟大的人物”没有邪恶的行为。谁是一个伟大的人物，谁就不用担心会因他的过失遭到谴责。
“C'estgrand！”①历史学家们说道，这时已经既没有所谓善良，也没有所谓丑恶，只有“grand”②和“Hegrand”③。Grand④就是善良，Hegrand⑤就是丑恶。按照历史学家的观点，grand是被他们称作英雄人物的这些特殊人物的特性。拿破仑穿着暖和的皮衣逃回老家，他不仅扔下那些等待死亡的伙伴（按照他的说法，是他把他们带领到那里去的，他觉得quec'estgrand⑥，因而他也就心安理得。
“Dusublime（他从自己身上看到sublime的东西）auridi－culeiln'yaqu'unpas，”⑦于是全世界五十年来不断地说：“Sub－lime！Grand！Naplléonlegrand！Dusublimeauridiculeiln'yaqu'unpas．”⑧可是，谁都不曾想一下，承认伟大，而不顾及善良和丑恶还有一个标准，这只能说明他自己的卑劣和无限的渺小罢了。
①法语：这是伟大的。
②法语：伟大的。
③法语：不伟大。
④法语：伟大。
⑤法语：不伟大。
⑥法语：他很伟大。
⑦法语：从崇高到可笑只有一步距离。
⑧法语：崇高！伟大！伟大的拿破仑！崇高到可笑只有一步距离。
对于我们来说，基督已赋予我们区别善良和丑恶的标准，这就没有不可衡量的东西。哪里没有纯朴、没有善良、没有真理，哪里就没有伟大。
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rabble
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devastated
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| v.彻底破坏( devastate的过去式和过去分词)；摧毁；毁灭；在感情上（精神上、财务上等）压垮adj.毁坏的；极为震惊的 | |
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heroism
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| n.大无畏精神，英勇 | |
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culminated
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| v.达到极点( culminate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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circuitous
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| adj.迂回的路的，迂曲的，绕行的 | |
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artillery
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| n.(军)火炮，大炮；炮兵(部队) | |
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homely
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| adj.家常的，简朴的；不漂亮的 | |
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justification
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| n.正当的理由；辩解的理由 | |
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elastic
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| n.橡皮圈，松紧带；adj.有弹性的；灵活的 | |
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atrocity
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| n.残暴，暴行 | |
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sublime
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| adj.崇高的，伟大的；极度的，不顾后果的 | |
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ridicule
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| v.讥讽，挖苦；n.嘲弄 | |
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simplicity
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| n.简单，简易；朴素；直率，单纯 | |
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