WHEN SOME EVENT takes place, men express their opinions and desires in regard to the event, and as the event proceeds from the combined action of many men, some one of the opinions or desires expressed is certain to be at least approximately fulfilled. When one of the opinions expressed is fulfilled, that opinion is connected with the event as the command preceding it.
Men are dragging a log. Every man expresses his opinion as to how and where to drag it. The men drag the log off; and it turns out that it has been done just as one of them advised. He gave the command then. This is commanding and power in its primitive1 aspect.
The man who did most work with his arms could think least what he was doing, reflect least what might come of the common action, and so command least. The man who commanded most could obviously, from his greater verbal activity, act less vigorously with his arms. In a larger assembly of men, combining their energies to one end, the class of those persons who take the less direct share in the common work the more their energy is turned to command, is still more sharply defined.
When a man acts alone, he always carries within him a certain series of considerations, that have, as he supposes, directed his past conduct, and that serve to justify2 to him his present action, and to lead him to make projects for his future activity.
Assemblies of men act in the same way, only leaving to those who do not take direct part in the action to invent considerations, justifications3, and projects concerning their combined activity.
For causes, known or unknown to us, the French begin to chop and hack5 at each other. And to match the event, it is accompanied by its justification4 in the expressed wills of certain men, who declare it essential for the good of France, for the cause of freedom, of equality. Men cease slaughtering6 one another, and that event is accompanied by the justification of the necessity of centralisation of power, of resistance to Europe, and so on. Men march from west to east, killing7 their fellow-creatures, and this event is accompanied by phrases about the glory of France, the baseness of England, and so on. History teaches us that those justifications for the event are devoid8 of all common-sense, that they are inconsistent with one another, as, for instance, the murder of a man as a result of the declaration of his rights, and the murder of millions in Russia for the abasement9 of England. But those justifications have an incontestable value in their own day.
They remove moral responsibility from those men who produce the events. At the time they do the work of brooms, that go in front to clear the rails for the train: they clear the path of men's moral responsibility. Apart from those justifications, no solution could be found for the most obvious question that occurs to one at once on examining any historical event; that is, How did millions of men come to combine to commit crimes, murders, wars, and so on?
Under the existing complex forms of political social life in Europe, can any event be imagined which would not have been prescribed, decreed, commanded by some sovereigns, ministers, parliaments, or newspapers? Is there any sort of combined action which could not find justification in political unity10, or in patriotism11, or in the balance of power, or in civilisation12? So that every event that occurs inevitably13 coincides with some expressed desire, and receiving justification, is regarded as the result of the will of one or more persons.
Whichever way the ship steers14 its course, there will always be seen ahead of it the flow of the waves it cleaves15. To the men in the ship the movement of those waves will be the only motion perceptible.
It is only by watching closely, moment by moment, the movement of that flow, and comparing it with the movement of the ship, that we are convinced that every moment that flowing by of the waves is due to the forward movement of the ship, and that we have been led into error by the fact that we are ourselves moving too.
We see the same thing, watching moment by moment the movement of historical personages (that is, restoring the inevitable16 condition under which all action takes place—the condition of the continuity of motion in time), and not losing sight of the necessary connection of historical figures with the masses.
Whatever happens, it always appears that that was foreseen and decreed. Whichever way the ship turns, the waves gurgle in front of it, and neither guiding nor accelerating its movement, will seem to us at a distance to be moving arbitrarily and guiding the course of the ship.
Examining only those expressions of the will of historical characters which related to events as commands, historians have assumed that the events were dependent on the commands. Examining the events themselves, and that connection in which the historical characters stand with the masses, we have found that historical characters and their commands are dependent on the events. An incontestable proof of this deduction17 is to be found in the fact that, however many commands may be given, the event does not take place if there is no other cause to produce it. But as soon as an event does take place—whatever it may be—out of the number of all the expressions of the will of different persons, there are always some which, from their meaning and time of utterance18, are related to the events as commands.
Having reached this conclusion, we can directly and positively19 answer these two essential questions of history:—
1. What is power?
2. What force produces the movements of peoples?
1. Power is a relation of a certain person to other persons, in which that person takes the less direct share in an act, the more he expresses opinions, theories, and justifications of the combined action.
2. The movement of peoples is not produced by the exercise of power; nor by intellectual activity, nor even by a combination of the two, as historians have supposed; but by the activity of all the men taking part in the event, who are always combined in such a way that those who take most direct part in the action take the smallest share in responsibility for it, and vice20 versa.
In its moral aspect the cause of the event is conceived of as power; in its physical aspect as those who were subject to that power. But since moral activity is inconceivable apart from physical, the cause of the event is found in neither the one nor the other, but in the conjunction of the two.
Or, in other words, the conception of cause is not applicable to the phenomenon we are examining.
In our final analysis we are brought to the circle of infinity21, to that utmost limit, to which the human intellect is brought in every department of thought, if it is not merely playing with its subject. Electricity produces heat; heat produces electricity. Atoms are attracted; atoms are repelled22.
Speaking of the mutual23 relations of heat and of electricity and of atoms, we cannot say why it is so, and we say it is so because it is unthinkable otherwise; because it must be so; because it is a law. The same thing applies also to historical phenomena24. Why does a war or a revolution come to pass? We do not know. We only know that to bring either result to pass, men form themselves into a certain combination in which all take part; and we say that this is so because it is unthinkable otherwise; because it is a law.
一桩事件发生时，人们对那桩事件表示自己的意见和愿望，因为事件是许多人的集体行动产生的，这些表示出来的意见或愿望中必然有一个实现了，或者差不多实现了。当其中一个意见得以实现的时候，在我们的脑子里，这个意见作为事先发出的命令与事件联系起来。
许多人拖一根木头。每个人都发表意见：怎样拖和往哪里拖。他们把木头拖走了，事后表明，这件事是照他们之中的一个人的话做的。他发了命令。这就是命令和权力的原始形态。
那个较多地用手干活的人，就会较少地想他所做的事，也不能考虑共同行动会导致什么结果，不能发号施令。那个较多地从事指挥的人，由于他是动嘴，显然较少地动手了。当一个比较大的群体共赴一个目标的时候，那些越少直接参加共同活动，越多从事发号施令的人的等级就更分明了。
一个人独立工作的时候，他总有他认为指导他的过去行动、为他现在的行动辩护、指导他计划将来行动的一些想法。
群体也是这样，让那些不直接参与行动的人为他们的集体行动进行考虑、辩护和拟议。
由于我们知道的或不知道的理由，法国人开始互相淹死，互相屠杀。于是与那个事件相应，用人们的意志为那一事件辩解说：其所以有此必要，是为了法国的利益，为了自由，为了平等。人们停止互相残杀，于是对这一事件加以辩解：为了权力统一，抵抗欧洲，等等这是很有必要的。人们自西而东去残杀他们的同类，伴随这一事件而来的是法国的光荣、英国的卑下等说法。历史告诉我们，为这些事件所作的辩解没有任何共同的思想，都是互相矛盾的、例如说杀人是由于承认他的权力，在俄国杀掉成百万人是为了羞辱英国。但是这些辩解在当时却具有必要的意义。
这些辩解是为了消除那些制造事件的人们的道德责任。这些暂时的目的犹如清扫前面轨道的刷子，也是为人们的道德责任清道的。没有这些辩解，就无法回答在考察每一历史事件时所遇到的最简单的问题：千百万人集体犯罪、打仗、杀人等等。
现时在欧洲的国务活动和社会生活的复杂形式下，任何不由那些君主、大臣、国会，或报纸发出指示和命令的事件是可以想象的吗？有什么集体行动不能从国家统一、爱国主义、欧洲均势，或文明上找到辩解的呢？因此，每次发生的事件必然符合某种愿望，而且得到辩解，表现为一个人或几个人的意志的产物。
一艘船不论朝哪个方向驶行，在它面前总可以看到被它所划开的波浪。对船上的人来说，这些波浪的流动是唯一看得见的运动。
只有每时每刻仔细观察那些波浪的运动，并且把波浪的运动跟船的运动加以比较，我们才会明白，波浪每时每刻的运动都是由于船的运动引起的，因为我们不觉得自己在运动，所以产生了错觉。
假如我们每时每刻注视历史人物的运动（就是恢复所发生一切的必要条件——运动在时间上的连续性），不疏忽历史人物和群众的必要联系，我们就会看见同样的情况。
船朝一个方向开动的时候，它前面有同样的波浪，当它常常改变方向的时候，它前面的波浪也跟着常常改变方向。但是不管它怎样转变航向，它的运动总伴随着波浪。
不管发生什么事件，人们总觉得那就是他们所预料的事情，奉命办理的事情。不管船开到什么地方去，那波浪总在它前面汹涌澎湃，然而它既不指导也不加强它的运动，从远处看，我们觉得那波浪的水花不仅自己移动，而且也指导着船的运动。
史学家们只考察历史人物的意志表现——它与命令的方式和事件有关系，于是便认为事件是以命令为转移的。但是，一考察事件本身和包括历史人物在内的群众之间的关系，我们就发现历史人物以及他们的命令以事件为转移的。这个结论的不可争辩的证据是，无论发出多少命令，假如没有别的原因，事件是不会发生的；但是，一旦事件发生了——不管它是什么事件，总可以从不同的人们所不断表现出来的各种意志中，找出一些在意义和时间上是以命令的方式与事件有关系的意志表现。
得出这个结论后，我们就可以直接而肯定地回答两个重大的历史问题了。
一、权力是什么？
二、是什么力量造成民族的运动？
一、权力是一个名人与别的人们之间的关系，在这种关系中，这个人对正在进行的集体行动愈多地发表意见、预言和辩护，他就愈少地参与行动。
二、各民族的运动不是由权力引起的，不是由智力活动引起的，甚至也不是如史学家们所想的那样，由两者的联合引起的，而是由所有参与事件的人的活动引起的，那些人总是这样联合起来的：直接参与事件最多的人，所负的责任最少；直接参与事件最少的人，所负的责任最大。
从精神方面来看，权力是事件发生的原因；从物质方面来看，服从权力的那些人是造成事件的原因。但是，因为没有物质的活动，精神的活动就不可思议，所以，引起事件的原因既不在前者，也不在后者，而是在两者的联合方面。
或者，换而言之，原因的概念对我们所考察的现象是不适用的。
我们分析到最后，就可以达到无限的循环，达到人类智慧在一切思维领域内达到的极限，假如智慧不对它所研究的对象采取玩弄的态度的话。电生热，热生电。原子互相吸引，原子互相排斥。
谈到热、电或原子的最简单的作用，我们不能说为什么会发生这些作用，我们说，这些现象的自然属性就是这样，这是他们的法则。历史事件也是一样。战争或革命为什么会发生？我们不知道；我们只知道，为了进行某种行动，人们组成一定的集体，他们都参加了那个集体；我们说，人的天性就是这样，这是一种法则。
收听单词发音 |
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primitive
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| adj.原始的；简单的；n.原(始)人，原始事物 | |
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justify
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| vt.证明…正当(或有理)，为…辩护 | |
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justifications
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| 正当的理由，辩解的理由( justification的名词复数 ) | |
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justification
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| n.正当的理由；辩解的理由 | |
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hack
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| n.劈，砍，出租马车；v.劈，砍，干咳 | |
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slaughtering
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| v.屠杀，杀戮，屠宰( slaughter的现在分词 ) | |
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killing
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| n.巨额利润；突然赚大钱，发大财 | |
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devoid
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| adj.全无的，缺乏的 | |
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abasement
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| n.滥用 | |
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unity
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| n.团结，联合，统一；和睦，协调 | |
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patriotism
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| n.爱国精神，爱国心，爱国主义 | |
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civilisation
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| n.文明，文化，开化，教化 | |
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13
inevitably
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| adv.不可避免地；必然发生地 | |
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steers
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| n.阉公牛，肉用公牛( steer的名词复数 )v.驾驶( steer的第三人称单数 )；操纵；控制；引导 | |
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cleaves
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| v.劈开，剁开，割开( cleave的第三人称单数 ) | |
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inevitable
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| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
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deduction
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| n.减除，扣除，减除额；推论，推理，演绎 | |
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utterance
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| n.用言语表达，话语，言语 | |
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positively
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| adv.明确地，断然，坚决地；实在，确实 | |
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vice
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| n.坏事；恶习；[pl.]台钳，老虎钳；adj.副的 | |
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infinity
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| n.无限，无穷，大量 | |
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repelled
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| v.击退( repel的过去式和过去分词 )；使厌恶；排斥；推开 | |
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mutual
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| adj.相互的，彼此的；共同的，共有的 | |
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phenomena
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| n.现象 | |
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