THE QUESTION of free will and necessity holds a position in history different from its place in other branches of knowledge, because in history, the question relates, not to the essential nature of the will of man, but to the representation of the manifestations1 of that will in the past and under certain conditions.
History, in regard to the solution of this question, stands to the other sciences in the position of an experimental science to speculative2 sciences.
The subject of history is not the will of man, but our representation of its action.
And so the insoluble mystery of the union of the two antinomies of freedom and necessity does not exist for history as it does for theology, ethics3, and philosophy. History deals with the representation of the life of man, in which the union of those two antinomies is accomplished4.
In actual life every historical event, every human action, is quite clearly and definitely understood, without a sense of the slightest contradiction in it, although every event is conceived of partly as free, and partly as necessary.
To solve the problem of combining freedom and necessity and the question what constitutes the essence of those two conceptions, the philosophy of history can and ought to go to work in a direction opposite to that taken by the other sciences. Instead of first defining the ideas of freedom and necessity in themselves, and then ranging the phenomena5 of life under those definitions, history must form the definition of the ideas of free will and necessity from the immense multitude of phenomena in her domain6 that are always dependent on those two elements.
Whatever presentation of the activity of one man or of several persons we examine, we always regard it as the product partly of that man or men's free will, partly of the laws of necessity.
Whether we are discussing the migrations7 of peoples and the inroads of barbarians8, or the government of Napoleon III., or the action of some man an hour ago in selecting one direction for his walk out of several, we see nothing contradictory9 in it. The proportion of freedom and necessity guiding the actions of those men is clearly defined for us.
Very often our conception of a greater or less degree of freedom differs according to the different points of view from which we regard the phenomenon.
But every human action is always alike conceived by us as a certain combination of free will and necessity.
In every action we investigate, we see a certain proportion of freedom and a certain proportion of necessity. And whatever action we investigate, the more necessity we see, the less freedom, and the more freedom, the less necessity.
The proportion of freedom to necessity is decreased or increased, according to the point of view from which the act is regarded; but there always remains10 an inverse11 ratio between them.
A drowning man clutching at another and drowning him, or a hungry mother starved by suckling her baby and stealing food, or a man trained to discipline who at the word of command kills a defenceless man, all seem less guilty—that is, less free and more subject to the law of necessity to one who knows the circumstances in which they are placed, and more free to one who did not know that the man was himself drowning, that the mother was starving, that the soldier was on duty, and so on. In the same way a man who has twenty years ago committed a murder and afterwards has gone on living calmly and innocently in society seems less guilty, and his acts seem more subject to the law of necessity, to one who looks at his act after the lapse13 of twenty years than to one looking at the same act the day after it was perpetrated. And just in the same way the act of a madman, a drunkard, or a man labouring under violent excitement seems less free and more inevitable14 to one who knows the mental condition of the man who performed the action, and more free and less inevitable to one who does not know it. In all such cases the conception of freedom is increased or diminished, and that of necessity correspondingly diminished or increased, according to the point of view from which the action is regarded. So that the more necessity is seen in it the less freedom. And vice15 versa.
Religion, the common-sense of humanity, the science of law, and history itself understand this relation between necessity and free will.
All cases, without exception, in which our conception of free will and necessity varies depend on three considerations:
1. The relation of the man committing the act to the external world.
2. His relation to time.
3. His relation to the causes leading to the act.
In the first case the variation depends on the degree to which we see the man's relation to the external world, on the more or less clear idea we form of the definite position occupied by the man in relation to everything co-existing with him. It is this class of considerations that makes it obvious to us that the drowning man is less free and more subject to necessity than a man standing16 on dry ground; and that makes the actions of a man living in close connection with other people in a thickly populated district, bound by ties of family, official duties, or business undertaking17, seem undoubtedly18 less free than those of a man living in solitude19 and seclusion20.
If we examine a man alone, apart from his relations to everything around him, every action of his seems free to us. But if we see any relation of his to anything surrounding, if we perceive any connection between him and anything else, a man speaking to him, a book read by him, the work he is employed in, even the air he breathes, or the light that falls on the objects around him, we perceive that every one of those circumstances has its influence on him, and controls at least one side of his activity. And the more we perceive of those influences, the smaller the idea we form of his freedom, and the greater our conception of the necessity to which he is subject.
2. The second cause of variation is due to the degree of distinctness with which the man's position in time is perceived, the clearness of the notion formed by us of the place the man's action fills in time. It is owing to this class of considerations that the fall of the first man, leading to the origin of the human race, seems to us obviously less free than the marriage of any one of our contemporaries. It is owing to this class of considerations that the life and acts of men who lived years ago cannot seem to me as free as the life of my contemporaries, the consequences of whose acts are still unknown to me.
The variation in our conception of free will in this connection depends on the interval21 of time that has elapsed between the action and our criticism of it.
If I examine an act I have committed a moment ago in approximately the same circumstances as I am placed in now, my act appears to me indubitably free. But if I examine an act I have committed a month ago, then being placed in other circumstances, I cannot help recognising that had not that act been committed, much that is good and agreeable, and even inevitable, resulting from that act, could not have taken place. If I reflect on a still more remote action, performed ten years or more ago, the consequences of my act are even plainer to me, and it will be difficult for me to conceive what would have happened if that action had not taken place. The further back I go in my reminiscences, or what is the same thing, the further forward in my criticism of them, the more doubtful becomes my view of the freedom of my action.
We find precisely22 the same ratio of variation in our views of the element of free will in the general affairs of men in history. A contemporary event we conceive of as undoubtedly the doing of all the men we know of concerned in it. But with a more remote event, we see its inevitable consequences, which prevent our conceiving of anything else as possible. And the further back we go in the examination of events, the less arbitrary they seem to us.
The Austro-Prussian war appears to us to be undoubtedly the result of the crafty23 acts of Bismarck and so on.
The Napoleonic wars, though more doubtful, appear to us the effect of the free will of the leading heroes of those wars. But in the Crusades we see an event, filling its definite place in history, without which the modern history of Europe is inconceivable, although to the chroniclers of the Crusades, those events appeared simply due to the will of a few persons. In the migrations of peoples it never occurs to any one now that the renewal24 of the European world depended on a caprice of Attila's. The more remote in history the subject of our observations, the more doubtful we feel of the free will of the persons concerned in the event, and the more obvious is the law of necessity in it.
3. The third element influencing our judgment25 is the degree to which we can apprehend26 that endless chain of causation demanded by the reason, in which every phenomenon comprehended, and so every act of man, must have its definite place, as a result of past and a cause of future acts.
This is the element that causes our acts and those of others to appear to us on one side more free the less we know of the physiological27, psychological, and historical laws deduced from observation, and the less thoroughly28 the physiological, psychological, or historical cause of the act has been investigated by us, and on the other hand the less simple the act observed and the less complex the character and mind of the man whose action we are examining.
When we have absolutely no understanding of the causes of an action—whether vicious or virtuous29 or simply non-moral—we ascribe a greater element of free will to it. In the case of a crime, we are more urgent in demanding punishment for the act; in the case of a virtuous act, we are warmer in our appreciation30 of its merits. In cases of no moral bearing, we recognise more individuality, originality31, and independence in it. But if only one of the innumerable causes of the act is known to us, we recognise a certain element of necessity, and are less ready to exact punishment for the crime, to acknowledge merit in the virtuous act, or freedom in the apparent originality. The fact that the criminal was reared in vicious surroundings softens32 his fault in our eyes. The self-sacrifice of a father, of a mother, or self-sacrifice with the possibility of reward is more comprehensible than gratuitous33 self-sacrifice, and so is regarded by us as less deserving of sympathy and less the work of free will. The founder34 of a sect35, of a party, or the inventor impresses us less when we understand how and by what the way was paved for his activity. If we have a large range of experiments, if our observation is continually directed to seeking correlations36 in men's actions between causes and effects, their actions will seem to us more necessary and less free, the more accurately37 we connect causes and effects. If the actions investigated are simple, and we have had a vast number of such actions under observation, our conception of their inevitability38 will be even more complete. The dishonest conduct of the son of a dishonest father, the misbehaviour of women, who have been led into certain surroundings, the relapse of the reformed drunkard into drunkenness, and so on, are instances of conduct which seem to us to be less free the better we understand their cause. If the man himself whose conduct we are examining is on the lowest stage of mental development, like a child, a mad-man, or a simpleton, then when we know the causes of the act and the simplicity39 of the character and intelligence, we see so great an element of necessity, and so little free will, that we can foretell40 the act that will follow, as soon as we know the cause bound to bring it forth41.
In all legislative42 codes the exoneration43 of crime or admission of mitigating44 circumstances rests only on those three classes of consideration. The guilt12 is conceived as greater or less according to the greater or lesser45 knowledge of the conditions in which the man judged is placed, the greater or less interval of time between the perpetration of the crime and the judgment of it, and the greater or less comprehension of the causes that led to the act.
在解决自由意志和必然性的问题上，历史比其他知识部门有一个优点：而这个问题对历史来说，不牵涉人类自由意志的实质，只牵涉这种意志在过去和一定条件下的表现。
在解决这个问题上，历史与其他科学的关系，就像实验科学与抽象科学的关系一样。
作为历史研究对象的不是人的意志本身，而是我们关于它的观念。
因此，历史不像神学、伦理学和哲学，它不存在自由意志和必然性相结合的无法解决的奥秘。历史考察人对生活的观念，这两种矛盾的结合已经在人对生活的观念中实现了。
每一历史事件，每一人类活动，在实际生活中都被了解得十分清楚、十分明确，没有任何矛盾的感觉，尽管每一事件都表现出一部分是自由的，一部分是必然的。
为解决自由和必然性怎样结合以及这两个概念的实质为何物的问题，历史哲学也可以、而且应当走一条与别的科学相反的道路。历史不宜先给自由意志和必然性这两个概念本身下定义，然后把生活现象列入那两个定义之中，历史应当以大量历史现象中归纳自由和必然性这两个概念的定义，而那些现象总是与自由和必然有关系的。
我们无论怎样考察关于许多人或者一个人的活动的观念，我们总是把这种活动理解为部分人的自由意志和部分必然性法则的产物。
无论我们所谈的是民族迁徙和野蛮人入侵，或是拿破仑三世的命令，或是某个人一个小时前从几个方向中选出一个散步的方向的这一行动，我们都看不出任何矛盾。对我们来说，指导这些人的行动的自由和必然性的限度是很明确的。
关于自由多寡的概念时常因我们观察现象的观点不同而各异；但是永远有共同的一面，人的每一行动，在我们看来，都是自由和必然性的一定的结合。在我们所考察的每一行动中，我们都看出一定成份的自由和一定成份的必然性。而且永远都是这样的：在任何行动中自由愈多，必然性就愈少；必然性愈多，自由就愈少。
自由与必然性的增减关系，视考察行动时所用的观点而定；但是两者的关系总是成反比的。
一个先足落水的人，抓住另一个人，那人也要淹死了；或者，一个因为哺育婴儿而疲惫不堪的、饥饿的母亲，偷了一些食物；或者，一个养成遵守纪律习惯的人，在服役期间，遵照长官命令，杀掉一个不能自卫的人——在知道那些人所处的条件的人看来，似乎罪过比较小，也就是自由比较小，属于必然性法则的成分比较多；而在不知道那个人自己就要淹死、那个母亲在挨饿、那个士兵在服役等等的人看来，自由就比较多。同样，一个人二十年前杀过人，从那以后就和平无害地生活在社会上，他的罪过似乎比较小；在二十年后来考察他的行为的人看来，他的行为似乎更属于必然性的法则范畴，而在他犯罪第二天来考察他的行动的人看来，他的行为比较自由。同样，一个疯狂的、醉酒的、或高度紧张的人的每一行动，在知道有那种行动的人的精神状态的人看来，似乎自由比较少，必然性比较多；而在不知道的人看来，就似乎自由比较多，必然性比较少。在所有这些情况中，自由的概念随着考察行动时所持的观点而增减，必然的概念也相应地或增或减。因此，必然性的成分愈多，自由观念的成分就愈少。反之亦然。
宗教、人类常识、法学和历史本身，都同样了解必然性和自由之间的这种关系。
我们关于自由和必然性观念的增减，一无例外地取决于以下三类根据：
一、完成行为的人与外部世界的关系，
二、他与时间的关系，
三、他与引起行动的原因的关系。
一、第一类根据是，我们或多或少地认识人类与外部世界的关系，或多或少地明了每个人在与他同时并存的一切事物的关系中所占的一定的地位。由这类根据可以看出，一个将要淹死的人比一个站在干地上的人更不自由，更多属于必然性；还可以看出，一个在人烟稠密的地区与别人有密切关系的人的行动，一个受家庭、职务、企业束缚的人的行动，比一个离群索居的人的行动，无疑地更不自由，更多地属于必然性。
如果我们只观察一个人，不管他与周围一切的关系，我们就觉得他的每一行动都是自由的。但是，如果我们只要看到他与周围一切的关系，假如我们看到他与不论何种事物的联系——与他说话的人、与他所读的书、与他所从事的劳动，以至与他周围的空气，与照在他周围的东西上的光线的联系，我们就看出，每件东西对他都有影响，至少支配他的行动的某一方面。于是，我们愈多地看到这些影响，关于他的自由的观念就越减弱，关于他受必然性支配的观念就越增强。
二、第二类根据是，人们或多或少地看出人与世界在时间上的关系，或多或少地明了那个人的行动在时间上所占的地位。由这类根据可以看出，使人类产生的那第一个人堕落，显然比现代人的结婚更不自由。由此还可以看出，在几世纪前，在时间上与我们有关联的人们的生活和活动，我觉得不像一个现代人的生活（我还不知道他的生活的后果）那么自由。
在这方面，关于或多或少的自由和必然性的逐步认识，取决于完成那一行动和我们判断它之间所经历的时间的长短。
假如我考察我在一分钟以前与我现在所处的环境几乎相同的环境下所完成的一次行动，我觉得我那次行动无疑是自由的。但是，假如我考察我在一个月前完成的一次行动，那么，因为是在不同的环境下完成的，我不得不承认，假如没有那次行动，从现在这次行动所产生的许多良好的，令人满意的，甚至是重大的结果也就不会有了。如果我回忆更远的十年或更多的时间以前的那一次行动，那么，我就觉得我现在这次行动产生的后果更为明显；我也觉得难以想象，假如没有那次行动，会是怎么样。我回忆得愈远，或者我对同一件事思考得愈深，我就愈加怀疑我的行动的自由。
在历史上，关于自由意志在人类公共事业中所起的作用，我们发现同样的信念的级数。我们觉得，现代的任何事件无疑都是一定的人们的行动；但是对于一桩比较遥远的事件，我们已经看到它的必然后果，除此而外，我们想象不出任何别的后果。我们回忆得愈远，我们就要觉得那些事件不是任意作出的。
我们觉得，奥普战争①无疑是俾斯麦狡狯以及其他诸如此类的事产生的后果。
拿破仑发动的战争，我们依然认为是英雄的意志所产生的结果，尽管我们对此有所怀疑；但是，我们已经把十字军东征看作占有一定地位的事件，没有这桩事件，欧洲的近代史就不堪想象，虽然在十字军的编年史家看来，这桩事件不过是某些人的意志的产物。至于涉及各民族的迁徙，今天已经没有人会认为欧洲的复兴取决于阿提拉②的任意作为。我们所观察的历史对象愈远，造成事件的那些人的自由意志就愈益可疑，必然性的法则也愈加明显。
①一八六六年的奥普战争，托尔斯泰于是年撰写这部小说。
②阿提拉是匈奴族首领（406～453），在他的时代，匈奴部族联盟极为强盛。
三、第三类根据是，我们对理性所必然要求的无穷无尽的因果关系的了解，而且为我们所理解的每一现象（因而也是人的每一次行动），作为以往的现象的结果和以后的现象的原因，应当有它的确定的地位。
依照这类根据，我们对那些由观察得来的支配人的生理法则、心理法则、历史法则认识得愈益清楚，我们对行动的生理原因、心理原因、历史原因就会了解的愈益正确，——这是一方面；另一方面，我们所观察的行动愈益简单；我们所研究的人物的性格和头脑以及他的行动就愈不复杂，因此我们觉得，我们的行动和别人的行动就愈益自由，就愈益不受必然性的支配。
当我们完全不了解一种行为的原因时——不论这是罪行还是善行，或者是一种无所谓善恶的行为，我们就认为这种行为的自由成份最大。假如是罪行，我们就最坚决地要求处罚它；假如是善行，我们就给予最高的评价。假如是无所谓善恶的行为，我们就承认它是最富于个性、独创性和自由的行为。不过，我们只要知道无数原因中的一个，我们就会看出一定成份的必然性，也就不那么坚持惩罚罪过，认为善行并不是了不起的功绩，对貌似独创的行为也认为并非那么自由了。一个犯人是在坏人中接受教育的，这就使得他的罪恶不那么严重了。父母为子女作出的自我牺牲，可能得到奖赏的自我牺牲，比无缘无故的自我牺牲更可理解，因而似乎不那么值得同情，自由的程度比较小。教派或政党的创立者或发明家，一旦我们知道他的行动是怎样准备起来的，用什么准备起来的，就不那么使我们惊异了。假如我们有许多经验，假如我们的观察不断地在人们的行动中寻求因果关系，那么，我们愈益准确地把因果联系起来，我们就愈益觉得他们的行动是必然的，是不自由的。如果我们考察简单的行动，并且有许多那一类的行动供观察，我们对那些行动的必然性观念一定更强了。一个不诚实的父亲的儿子的不诚实行为，一个落到坏人中间的女人的不正当行为，一个酒鬼的醉酒等等，我们愈益了解这些行为的原因，就愈益觉得这些行动是不自由的。如果我们考察智力低下的人的行为，例如，考察一个小孩、一个疯子、一个傻子的行为，那么，因为我们知道他们的行为的原因和性格与智力的简单，我们就会看出必然性成分很大，自由意志成分很小，甚至我们一旦知道造成那种行为的原因，我们就可以预言它的结果。
一切法典所承认的无责任能力和减罪的情事，仅仅依据这三点理由。责任的大小，要看我们对受审查的那个人所处的环境认识的多少，要看完成那行为和进行审查相距多少时间，还要看我们对行为的原因了解的程度而定。
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manifestations
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| n.表示，显示（manifestation的复数形式） | |
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speculative
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| adj.思索性的，暝想性的，推理的 | |
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ethics
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| n.伦理学；伦理观，道德标准 | |
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accomplished
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| adj.有才艺的；有造诣的；达到了的 | |
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phenomena
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| n.现象 | |
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domain
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| n.(活动等)领域，范围；领地，势力范围 | |
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migrations
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| n.迁移，移居( migration的名词复数 ) | |
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barbarians
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| n.野蛮人( barbarian的名词复数 )；外国人；粗野的人；无教养的人 | |
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contradictory
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| adj.反驳的，反对的，抗辩的；n.正反对，矛盾对立 | |
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remains
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| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
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inverse
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guilt
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| n.犯罪；内疚；过失，罪责 | |
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lapse
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| n.过失，流逝，失效，抛弃信仰，间隔；vi.堕落，停止，失效，流逝；vt.使失效 | |
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inevitable
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| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
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vice
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| n.坏事；恶习；[pl.]台钳，老虎钳；adj.副的 | |
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standing
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| n.持续，地位；adj.永久的，不动的，直立的，不流动的 | |
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undertaking
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| n.保证，许诺，事业 | |
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undoubtedly
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| adv.确实地，无疑地 | |
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solitude
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| n. 孤独; 独居,荒僻之地,幽静的地方 | |
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seclusion
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| n.隐遁，隔离 | |
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interval
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| n.间隔，间距；幕间休息，中场休息 | |
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precisely
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| adv.恰好，正好，精确地，细致地 | |
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crafty
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| adj.狡猾的，诡诈的 | |
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renewal
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| adj.(契约)延期，续订，更新，复活，重来 | |
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judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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apprehend
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| vt.理解，领悟，逮捕，拘捕，忧虑 | |
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physiological
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| adj.生理学的，生理学上的 | |
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thoroughly
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| adv.完全地，彻底地，十足地 | |
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virtuous
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| adj.有品德的，善良的，贞洁的，有效力的 | |
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appreciation
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| n.评价；欣赏；感谢；领会，理解；价格上涨 | |
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originality
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| n.创造力，独创性；新颖 | |
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softens
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| （使）变软( soften的第三人称单数 )； 缓解打击； 缓和； 安慰 | |
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gratuitous
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| adj.无偿的，免费的；无缘无故的，不必要的 | |
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Founder
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| n.创始者，缔造者 | |
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sect
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| n.派别，宗教，学派，派系 | |
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correlations
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| 相互的关系( correlation的名词复数 ) | |
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accurately
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| adv.准确地，精确地 | |
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inevitability
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| n.必然性 | |
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simplicity
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| n.简单，简易；朴素；直率，单纯 | |
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foretell
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| v.预言，预告，预示 | |
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forth
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| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
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legislative
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| n.立法机构，立法权；adj.立法的，有立法权的 | |
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exoneration
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| n.免罪，免除 | |
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mitigating
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| v.减轻，缓和( mitigate的现在分词 ) | |
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lesser
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| adj.次要的，较小的；adv.较小地，较少地 | |
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