But precisely16 these characteristics of the general reader, rendering17 him incapable18 of assimilating ideas unless they are administered in a highly diluted19 form, make it a matter of rejoicing that there are clever, fair-minded men, who will write books for him—men very much above him in knowledge and ability, but not too remote from him in their habits of thinking, and who can thus prepare for him infusions20 of history and science that will leave some solidifying21 deposit, and save him from a fatal softening22 of the intellectual skeleton. Among such serviceable writers, Mr. Lecky’s “History of the Rise and Influence of the Spirit of Rationalism in Europe” entitles him to a high place. He has prepared himself for its production by an unusual amount of well-directed reading; he has chosen his facts and quotations23 with much judgment25; and he gives proof of those important moral qualifications, impartiality26, seriousness, and modesty27. This praise is chiefly applicable to the long chapter on the history of Magic and Witchcraft28, which opens the work, and to the two chapters on the antecedents and history of Persecution29, which occur, the one at the end of the first volume, the other at the beginning of the second. In these chapters Mr. Lecky has a narrower and better-traced path before him than in other portions of his work; he is more occupied with presenting a particular class of facts in their historical sequence, and in their relation to certain grand tide-marks of opinion, than with disquisition; and his writing is freer than elsewhere from an apparent confusedness of thought and an exuberance30 of approximative phrases, which can be serviceable in no other way than as diluents needful for the sort of reader we have just described.
The history of magic and witchcraft has been judiciously31 chosen by Mr. Lecky as the subject of his first section on the Declining Sense of the Miraculous32, because it is strikingly illustrative of a position with the truth of which he is strongly p. 259impressed, though he does not always treat of it with desirable clearness and precision, namely, that certain beliefs become obsolete33, not in consequence of direct arguments against them, but because of their incongruity34 with prevalent habits of thought. Here is his statement of the two “classes of influences” by which the mass of men, in what is called civilized35 society, get their beliefs gradually modified:
“If we ask why it is that the world has rejected what was once so universally and so intensely believed, why a narrative36 of an old woman who had been seen riding on a broomstick, or who was proved to have transformed herself into a wolf, and to have devoured37 the flocks of her neighbors, is deemed so entirely38 incredible, most persons would probably be unable to give a very definite answer to the question. It is not because we have examined the evidence and found it insufficient39, for the disbelief always precedes, when it does not prevent, examination. It is rather because the idea of absurdity40 is so strongly attached to such narratives41, that it is difficult even to consider them with gravity. Yet at one time no such improbability was felt, and hundreds of persons have been burnt simply on the two grounds I have mentioned.
“When so complete a change takes place in public opinion, it may be ascribed to one or other of two causes. It may be the result of a controversy which has conclusively43 settled the question, establishing to the satisfaction of all parties a clear preponderance of argument or fact in favor of one opinion, and making that opinion a truism which is accepted by all enlightened men, even though they have not themselves examined the evidence on which it rests. Thus, if any one in a company of ordinarily educated persons were to deny the motion of the earth, or the circulation of the blood, his statement would be received with derision, though it is probable that some of his audience would be unable to demonstrate the first truth, and that very few of them could give sufficient reasons for the second. They may not themselves be able to defend their position; but they are aware that, at certain known periods of history, controversies45 on those subjects took place, and that known writers then brought forward some definite arguments or experiments, which were ultimately accepted by the whole learned world as rigid46 and conclusive42 demonstrations47. It is possible, also, for as complete a change to be effected by what is called the spirit of the age. The general intellectual tendencies pervading48 the literature of a century profoundly modify the character of the public mind. They form a new tone and habit of thought. They alter the measure of probability. They create new attractions and new antipathies49, and they eventually cause as absolute a rejection50 of certain old opinions as could be produced by the most cogent51 and definite arguments.”
Mr. Lecky proceeds to some questionable52 views concerning the evidences of witchcraft, which seem to be irreconcilable53 even with his own remarks later on; but they lead him to the p. 260statement, thoroughly54 made out by his historical survey, that “movement was mainly silent, unargumentative, and insensible; that men came gradually to disbelieve in witchcraft, because they came gradually to look upon it as absurd; and that this new tone of thought appeared, first of all, in those who were least subject to theological influences, and soon spread through the educated laity55, and, last of all, took possession of the clergy56.”
We have rather painful proof that this “second class of influences,” with a vast number go hardly deeper than Fashion, and that witchcraft to many of us is absurd only on the same ground that our grandfathers’ gigs are absurd. It is felt preposterous57 to think of spiritual agencies in connection with ragged58 beldames soaring on broomsticks, in an age when it is known that mediums of communication with the invisible world are usually unctuous59 personages dressed in excellent broadcloth, who soar above the curtain-poles without any broomstick, and who are not given to unprofitable intrigues60. The enlightened imagination rejects the figure of a witch with her profile in dark relief against the moon and her broomstick cutting a constellation61. No undiscovered natural laws, no names of “respectable” witnesses, are invoked62 to make us feel our presumption63 in questioning the diabolic intimacies64 of that obsolete old woman, for it is known now that the undiscovered laws, and the witnesses qualified65 by the payment of income tax, are all in favor of a different conception—the image of a heavy gentleman in boots and black coat-tails foreshortened against the cornice. Yet no less a person than Sir Thomas Browne once wrote that those who denied there were witches, inasmuch as they thereby66 denied spirits also, were “obliquely and upon consequence a sort, not of infidels, but of atheists.” At present, doubtless, in certain circles, unbelievers in heavy gentlemen who float in the air by means of undiscovered laws are also taxed with atheism67; illiberal68 as it is not to admit that mere69 weakness of understanding may prevent one from seeing how that phenomenon is necessarily involved in the Divine origin of things. With still more remarkable parallelism, Sir Thomas Browne goes on: “Those that, to refute their incredulity, desire to see apparitions70, shall questionless never behold71 any, nor have the power to be so much as witches. The devil hath made them already in a heresy72 as capital as witchcraft, and to appear to them were but to convert them.” It would be difficult to see what has been changed here, but the p. 261mere drapery of circumstance, if it were not for this prominent difference between our own days and the days of witchcraft, that instead of torturing, drowning, or burning the innocent, we give hospitality and large pay to—the highly distinguished73 medium. At least we are safely rid of certain horrors; but if the multitude—that “farraginous concurrence74 of all conditions, tempers, sexes, and ages”—do not roll back even to a superstition75 that carries cruelty in its train, it is not because they possess a cultivated reason, but because they are pressed upon and held up by what we may call an external reason—the sum of conditions resulting from the laws of material growth, from changes produced by great historical collisions shattering the structures of ages and making new highways for events and ideas, and from the activities of higher minds no longer existing merely as opinions and teaching, but as institutions and organizations with which the interests, the affections, and the habits of the multitude are inextricably interwoven. No undiscovered laws accounting76 for small phenomena77 going forward under drawing-room tables are likely to affect the tremendous facts of the increase of population, the rejection of convicts by our colonies, the exhaustion78 of the soil by cotton plantations79, which urge even upon the foolish certain questions, certain claims, certain views concerning the scheme of the world, that can never again be silenced. If right reason is a right representation of the co-existence and sequences of things, here are co-existences and sequences that do not wait to be discovered, but press themselves upon us like bars of iron. No séances at a guinea a head for the sake of being pinched by “Mary Jane” can annihilate80 railways, steamships81, and electric telegraphs, which are demonstrating the interdependence of all human interests, and making self-interest a duct for sympathy. These things are part of the external Reason to which internal silliness has inevitably83 to accommodate itself.
Three points in the history of magic and witchcraft are well brought out by Mr. Lecky. First, that the cruelties connected with it did not begin until men’s minds had ceased to repose84 implicitly86 in a sacramental system which made them feel well armed against evil spirits; that is, until the eleventh century, when there came a sort of morning dream of doubt and heresy, bringing on the one side the terror of timid consciences, and on the other the terrorism of authority or zeal87 bent88 on checking the rising struggle. In that time of comparative mental repose, says Mr. Lecky,
p. 262“All those conceptions of diabolical89 presence; all that predisposition toward the miraculous, which acted so fearfully upon the imaginations of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, existed; but the implicit85 faith, the boundless91 and triumphant92 credulity with which the virtue of ecclesiastical rites93 was accepted, rendered them comparatively innocuous. If men had been a little less superstitious94, the effects of their superstition would have been much more terrible. It was firmly believed that any one who deviated95 from the strict line of orthodoxy must soon succumb96 beneath the power of Satan; but as there was no spirit of rebellion or doubt, this persuasion97 did not produce any extraordinary terrorism.”
The Church was disposed to confound heretical opinion with sorcery; false doctrine98 was especially the devil’s work, and it was a ready conclusion that a denier or innovator99 had held consultation100 with the father of lies. It is a saying of a zealous101 Catholic in the sixteenth century, quoted by Maury in his excellent work, “De la Magie”—“Crescit cum magia h?resis, cum h?resi magia.” Even those who doubted were terrified at their doubts, for trust is more easily undermined than terror. Fear is earlier born than hope, lays a stronger grasp on man’s system than any other passion, and remains102 master of a larger group of involuntary actions. A chief aspect of man’s moral development is the slow subduing103 of fear by the gradual growth of intelligence, and its suppression as a motive104 by the presence of impulses less animally selfish; so that in relation to invisible Power, fear at last ceases to exist, save in that interfusion with higher faculties105 which we call awe106.
Secondly107, Mr. Lecky shows clearly that dogmatic Protestantism, holding the vivid belief in Satanic agency to be an essential of piety108, would have felt it shame to be a whit109 behind Catholicism in severity against the devil’s servants. Luther’s sentiment was that he would not suffer a witch to live (he was not much more merciful to Jews); and, in spite of his fondness for children, believing a certain child to have been begotten110 by the devil, he recommended the parents to throw it into the river. The torch must be turned on the worst errors of heroic minds—not in irreverent ingratitude111, but for the sake of measuring our vast and various debt to all the influences which have concurred112, in the intervening ages, to make us recognize as detestable errors the honest convictions of men who, in mere individual capacity and moral force, were very much above us. Again, the Scotch113 Puritans, during the comparatively short period of their ascendency, surpassed all Christians114 before them in the elaborate ingenuity115 of the p. 263tortures they applied116 for the discovery of witchcraft and sorcery, and did their utmost to prove that if Scotch Calvinism was the true religion, the chief “note” of the true religion was cruelty. It is hardly an endurable task to read the story of their doings; thoroughly to imagine them as a past reality is already a sort of torture. One detail is enough, and it is a comparatively mild one. It was the regular profession of men called “prickers” to thrust long pins into the body of a suspected witch in order to detect the insensible spot which was the infallible sign of her guilt118. On a superficial view one would be in danger of saying that the main difference between the teachers who sanctioned these things and the much-despised ancestors who offered human victims inside a huge wicker idol119, was that they arrived at a more elaborate barbarity by a longer series of dependent propositions. We do not share Mr. Buckle’s opinion that a Scotch minister’s groans121 were a part of his deliberate plan for keeping the people in a state of terrified subjection; the ministers themselves held the belief they taught, and might well groan120 over it. What a blessing122 has a little false logic1 been to the world! Seeing that men are so slow to question their premises123, they must have made each other much more miserable124, if pity had not sometimes drawn125 tender conclusions not warranted by Major and Minor126; if there had not been people with an amiable127 imbecility of reasoning which enabled them at once to cling to hideous128 beliefs, and to be conscientiously129 inconsistent with them in their conduct. There is nothing like acute deductive reasoning for keeping a man in the dark: it might be called the technique of the intellect, and the concentration of the mind upon it corresponds to that predominance of technical skill in art which ends in degradation131 of the artist’s function, unless new inspiration and invention come to guide it.
And of this there is some good illustration furnished by that third node in the history of witchcraft, the beginning of its end, which is treated in an interesting manner by Mr. Lecky. It is worth noticing, that the most important defences of the belief in witchcraft, against the growing scepticism in the latter part of the sixteenth century and in the seventeenth, were the productions of men who in some departments were among the foremost thinkers of their time. One of them was Jean Bodin, the famous writer on government and jurisprudence, whose “Republic,” Hallam thinks, had an important influence in England, and furnished “a store of arguments and examples p. 264that were not lost on the thoughtful minds of our countrymen.” In some of his views he was original and bold; for example, he anticipated Montesquieu in attempting to appreciate the relations of government and climate. Hallam inclines to the opinion that he was a Jew, and attached Divine authority only to the Old Testament132. But this was enough to furnish him with his chief data for the existence of witches and for their capital punishment; and in the account of his “Republic,” given by Hallam, there is enough evidence that the sagacity which often enabled him to make fine use of his learning was also often entangled133 in it, to temper our surprise at finding a writer on political science of whom it could be said that, along with Montesquieu, he was “the most philosophical134 of those who had read so deeply, the most learned of those who had thought so much,” in the van of the forlorn hope to maintain the reality of witchcraft. It should be said that he was equally confident of the unreality of the Copernican hypothesis, on the ground that it was contrary to the tenets of the theologians and philosophers and to common-sense, and therefore subversive135 of the foundations of every science. Of his work on witchcraft, Mr. Lecky says:
“The ‘Démonomanie des Sorciers’ is chiefly an appeal to authority, which the author deemed on this subject so unanimous and so conclusive, that it was scarcely possible for any sane136 man to resist it. He appealed to the popular belief in all countries, in all ages, and in all religions. He cited the opinions of an immense multitude of the greatest writers of pagan antiquity137, and of the most illustrious of the Fathers. He showed how the laws of all nations recognized the existence of witchcraft; and he collected hundreds of cases which had been investigated before the tribunals of his own or of other countries. He relates with the most minute and circumstantial detail, and with the most unfaltering confidence, all the proceedings138 at the witches’ Sabbath, the methods which the witches employed in transporting themselves through the air, their transformations139, their carnal intercourse140 with the devil, their various means of injuring their enemies, the signs that lead to their detection, their confessions141 when condemned142, and their demeanor143 at the stake.”
Something must be allowed for a lawyer’s affection toward a belief which had furnished so many “cases.” Bodin’s work had been immediately prompted by the treatise144 “De Prestigiis D?nionum,” written by John Wier, a German physician, a treatise which is worth notice as an example of a transitional form of opinion for which many analogies may be found in the history both of religion and science. Wier p. 265believed in demons44, and in possession by demons, but his practice as a physician had convinced him that the so-called witches were patients and victims, that the devil took advantage of their diseased condition to delude145 them, and that there was no consent of an evil will on the part of the women. He argued that the word in Leviticus translated “witch” meant “poisoner,” and besought146 the princes of Europe to hinder the further spilling of innocent blood. These heresies147 of Wier threw Bodin into such a state of amazed indignation that if he had been an ancient Jew instead of a modern economical one, he would have rent his garments. “No one had ever heard of pardon being accorded to sorcerers;” and probably the reason why Charles IX. died young was because he had pardoned the sorcerer, Trios Echelles! We must remember that this was in 1581, when the great scientific movement of the Renaissance148 had hardly begun—when Galileo was a youth of seventeen, and Kepler a boy of ten.
But directly afterward149, on the other side, came Montaigne, whose sceptical acuteness could arrive at negatives without any apparatus150 of method. A certain keen narrowness of nature will secure a man from many absurd beliefs which the larger soul, vibrating to more manifold influences, would have a long struggle to part with. And so we find the charming, chatty Montaigne—in one of the brightest of his essays, “Des Boiteux,” where he declares that, from his own observation of witches and sorcerers, he should have recommended them to be treated with curative hellebore—stating in his own way a pregnant doctrine, since taught more gravely. It seems to him much less of a prodigy151 that men should lie, or that their imaginations should deceive them, than that a human body should be carried through the air on a broomstick, or up a chimney by some unknown spirit. He thinks it a sad business to persuade oneself that the test of truth lies in the multitude of believers—“en une prosse où les fols surpassent de tant les sages152 en nombre.” Ordinarily, he has observed, when men have something stated to them as a fact, they are more ready to explain it than to inquire whether it is real: “ils passent pardessus les propositions, mais ils examinent les conséquences; ils laissent les choses, et courent aux causes.” There is a sort of strong and generous ignorance which is as honorable and courageous153 as science—“ignorance pour laquelle concevoir il n’y a pas moins de science qu’à concevoir la science.” And à propos of the immense traditional evidence which weighed p. 266with such men as Bodin, he says—“As for the proofs and arguments founded on experience and facts, I do not pretend to unravel154 these. What end of a thread is there to lay hold of? I often cut them as Alexander did his knot. Après tout155, c’est mettre ses conjectures156 a bien haut prix, que d’en faire cuire un homme tout dif.”
Writing like this, when it finds eager readers, is a sign that the weather is changing; yet much later, namely, after 1665, when the Royal Society had been founded, our own Glanvil, the author of the “Scepsis Scientifica,” a work that was a remarkable advance toward the true definition of the limits of inquiry157, and that won him his election as fellow of the society, published an energetic vindication158 of the belief in witchcraft, of which Mr. Lecky gives the following sketch159:
“The ‘Sadducismus Triumphatus,’ which is probably the ablest book ever published in defence of the superstition, opens with a striking picture of the rapid progress of the scepticism in England. Everywhere, a disbelief in witchcraft was becoming fashionable in the upper classes; but it was a disbelief that arose entirely from a strong sense of its antecedent improbability. All who were opposed to the orthodox faith united in discrediting160 witchcraft. They laughed at it, as palpably absurd, as involving the most grotesque161 and ludicrous conceptions, as so essentially162 incredible that it would be a waste of time to examine it. This spirit had arisen since the Restoration, although the laws were still in force, and although little or no direct reasoning had been brought to bear upon the subject. In order to combat it, Glanvil proceeded to examine the general question of the credibility of the miraculous. He saw that the reason why witchcraft was ridiculed163 was, because it was a phase of the miraculous and the work of the devil; that the scepticism was chiefly due to those who disbelieved in miracles and the devil; and that the instances of witchcraft or possession in the Bible were invariably placed on a level with those that were tried in the law courts of England. That the evidence of the belief was overwhelming, he firmly believed; and this, indeed, was scarcely disputed; but, until the sense of à priori improbability was removed, no possible accumulation of facts would cause men to believe it. To that task he accordingly addressed himself. Anticipating the idea and almost the words of modern controversialists, he urged that there was such a thing as a credulity of unbelief; and that those who believed so strange a concurrence of delusions164, as was necessary on the supposition of the unreality of witchcraft, were far more credulous165 than those who accepted the belief. He made his very scepticism his principal weapon; and, analyzing166 with much acuteness the à priori objections, he showed that they rested upon an unwarrantable confidence in our knowledge of the laws of the spirit world; that they implied the existence of some strict analogy between the faculties of men and of spirits; and that, as such analogy most probably did not exist, no reasoning based on the p. 267supposition could dispense167 men from examining the evidence. He concluded with a large collection of cases, the evidence of which was, as he thought, incontestable.”
We have quoted this sketch because Glanvil’s argument against the à priori objection of absurdity is fatiguingly urged in relation to other alleged169 marvels170 which, to busy people seriously occupied with the difficulties of affairs, of science, or of art, seem as little worthy171 of examination as a?ronautic broomsticks. And also because we here see Glanvil, in combating an incredulity that does not happen to be his own, wielding172 that very argument of traditional evidence which he had made the subject of vigorous attack in his “Scepsis Scientifica.” But perhaps large minds have been peculiarly liable to this fluctuation174 concerning the sphere of tradition, because, while they have attacked its misapplications, they have been the more solicited175 by the vague sense that tradition is really the basis of our best life. Our sentiments may be called organized traditions; and a large part of our actions gather all their justification176, all their attraction and aroma177, from the memory of the life lived, of the actions done, before we were born. In the absence of any profound research into psychological functions or into the mysteries of inheritance, in the absence of any comprehensive view of man’s historical development and the dependence82 of one age on another, a mind at all rich in sensibilities must always have had an indefinite uneasiness in an undistinguishing attack on the coercive influence of tradition. And this may be the apology for the apparent inconsistency of Glanvil’s acute criticism on the one side, and his indignation at the “looser gentry,” who laughed at the evidences for witchcraft on the other. We have already taken up too much space with this subject of witchcraft, else we should be tempted178 to dwell on Sir Thomas Browne, who far surpassed Glanvil in magnificent incongruity of opinion, and whose works are the most remarkable combination existing, of witty179 sarcasm180 against ancient nonsense and modern obsequiousness181, with indications of a capacious credulity. After all, we may be sharing what seems to us the hardness of these men, who sat in their studies and argued at their ease about a belief that would be reckoned to have caused more misery182 and bloodshed than any other superstition, if there had been no such thing as persecution on the ground of religious opinion.
On this subject of Persecution, Mr. Lecky writes his best: with clearness of conception, with calm justice, bent on appreciating p. 268the necessary tendency of ideas, and with an appropriateness of illustration that could be supplied only by extensive and intelligent reading. Persecution, he shows, is not in any sense peculiar173 to the Catholic Church; it is a direct sequence of the doctrines183 that salvation184 is to be had only within the Church, and that erroneous belief is damnatory—doctrines held as fully90 by Protestant sects185 as by the Catholics; and in proportion to its power, Protestantism has been as persecuting186 as Catholicism. He maintains, in opposition187 to the favorite modern notion of persecution defeating its own object, that the Church, holding the dogma of exclusive salvation, was perfectly188 consequent, and really achieved its end of spreading one belief and quenching189 another, by calling in the aid of the civil arm. Who will say that governments, by their power over institutions and patronage190, as well as over punishment, have not power also over the interests and inclinations191 of men, and over most of those external conditions into which subjects are born, and which make them adopt the prevalent belief as a second nature? Hence, to a sincere believer in the doctrine of exclusive salvation, governments had it in their power to save men from perdition; and wherever the clergy were at the elbow of the civil arm, no matter whether they were Catholic or Protestant, persecution was the result. “Compel them to come in” was a rule that seemed sanctioned by mercy, and the horrible sufferings it led men to inflict192 seemed small to minds accustomed to contemplate193, as a perpetual source of motive, the eternal unmitigated miseries194 of a hell that was the inevitable195 destination of a majority among mankind.
It is a significant fact, noted196 by Mr. Lecky, that the only two leaders of the Reformation who advocated tolerance197 were Zuinglius and Socinus, both of them disbelievers in exclusive salvation. And in corroboration198 of other evidence that the chief triumphs of the Reformation were due to coercion199, he commends to the special attention of his readers the following quotation24 from a work attributed without question to the famous Protestant theologian, Jurieu, who had himself been hindered, as a Protestant, from exercising his professional functions in France, and was settled as pastor200 at Rotterdam. It should be remembered that Jurieu’s labors201 fell in the latter part of the seventeenth century and in the beginning of the eighteenth, and that he was the contemporary of Bayle, with whom he was in bitter controversial hostility202. He wrote, then, at p. 269a time when there was warm debate on the question of Toleration; and it was his great object to vindicate203 himself and his French fellow-Protestants from all laxity on this point.
“Peut on nier que le panganisme est tombé dans le monde par7 l’autorité des empereurs Romains? On peut assurer sans temerité que le paganisme seroit encore debout, et que les trois quarts de l’Europe seroient encore payens si Constantin et ses successeurs n’avaient employé leur autorité pour l’abolir. Mais, je vous prie, de quelles voies Dieu s’est il servi dans ces derniers siècles pour rétablir la veritable religion dans l’Occident? Les rois de Suède, ceux de Danemarck, ceux d’Angleterre, les magistrats souverains de Suisse, des Pa?s Bas, des villes livres d’Allemagne, les princes électeurs, et autres princes souverains de l’empire, n’ont ils pas emploié leur autorité pour abbattre le Papisme?”
Indeed, wherever the tremendous alternative of everlasting204 torments205 is believed in—believed in so that it becomes a motive determining the life—not only persecution, but every other form of severity and gloom are the legitimate206 consequences. There is much ready declamation207 in these days against the spirit of asceticism208 and against zeal for doctrinal conversion209; but surely the macerated form of a Saint Francis, the fierce denunciations of a Saint Dominic, the groans and prayerful wrestlings of the Puritan who seasoned his bread with tears and made all pleasurable sensation sin, are more in keeping with the contemplation of unending anguish210 as the destiny of a vast multitude whose nature we share, than the rubicund211 cheerfulness of some modern divines, who profess117 to unite a smiling liberalism with a well-bred and tacit but unshaken confidence in the reality of the bottomless pit. But, in fact, as Mr. Lecky maintains, that awful image, with its group of associated dogmas concerning the inherited curse, and the damnation of unbaptized infants, of heathens, and of heretics, has passed away from what he is fond of calling “the realizations” of Christendom. These things are no longer the objects of practical belief. They may be mourned for in encyclical letters; bishops212 may regret them; doctors of divinity may sign testimonials to the excellent character of these decayed beliefs; but for the mass of Christians they are no more influential213 than unrepealed but forgotten statutes214. And with these dogmas has melted away the strong basis for the defence of persecution. No man now writes eager vindications of himself and his colleagues from the suspicion of adhering to the principle of toleration. And this momentous215 change, it is Mr. Lecky’s object to show, is due to that concurrence of p. 270conditions which he has chosen to call “the advance of the Spirit of Rationalism.”
In other parts of his work, where he attempts to trace the action of the same conditions on the acceptance of miracles and on other chief phases of our historical development, Mr. Lecky has laid himself open to considerable criticism. The chapters on the “Miracles of the Church,” the ?sthetic, scientific, and moral development of Rationalism, the Secularization216 of Politics, and the Industrial History of Rationalism, embrace a wide range of diligently217 gathered facts; but they are nowhere illuminated218 by a sufficiently219 clear conception and statement of the agencies at work, or the mode of their action, in the gradual modification220 of opinion and of life. The writer frequently impresses us as being in a state of hesitation concerning his own standing-point, which may form a desirable stage in private meditation221 but not in published exposition. Certain epochs in theoretic conception, certain considerations, which should be fundamental to his survey, are introduced quite incidentally in a sentence or two, or in a note which seems to be an afterthought. Great writers and their ideas are touched upon too slightly and with too little discrimination, and important theories are sometimes characterized with a rashness which conscientious130 revision will correct. There is a fatiguing168 use of vague or shifting phrases, such as “modern civilization,” “spirit of the age,” “tone of thought,” “intellectual type of the age,” “bias of the imagination,” “habits of religious thought,” unbalanced by any precise definition; and the spirit of rationalism is sometimes treated of as if it lay outside the specific mental activities of which it is a generalized expression. Mr. Curdle’s famous definition of the dramatic unities222 as “a sort of a general oneness,” is not totally false; but such luminousness223 as it has could only be perceived by those who already knew what the unities were. Mr. Lecky has the advantage of being strongly impressed with the great part played by the emotions in the formation of opinion, and with the high complexity224 of the causes at work in social evolution; but he frequently writes as if he had never yet distinguished between the complexity of the conditions that produce prevalent states of mind and the inability of particular minds to give distinct reasons for the preferences or persuasions225 produced by those states. In brief, he does not discriminate226, or does not help his reader to discriminate, between objective complexity and subjective227 confusion. But the most muddle-headed p. 271gentleman who represents the spirit of the age by observing, as he settles his collar, that the development theory is quite “the thing” is a result of definite processes, if we could only trace them. “Mental attitudes,” and “predispositions,” however vague in consciousness, have not vague causes, any more than the “blind motions of the spring” in plants and animals.
The word “Rationalism” has the misfortune, shared by most words in this gray world, of being somewhat equivocal. This evil may be nearly overcome by careful preliminary definition; but Mr. Lecky does not supply this, and the original specific application of the word to a particular phase of biblical interpretation228 seems to have clung about his use of it with a misleading effect. Through some parts of his book he appears to regard the grand characteristic of modern thought and civilization, compared with ancient, as a radiation in the first instance from a change in religious conceptions. The supremely229 important fact, that the gradual reduction of all phenomena within the sphere of established law, which carries as a consequence the rejection of the miraculous, has its determining current in the development of physical science, seems to have engaged comparatively little of his attention; at least, he gives it no prominence230. The great conception of universal regular sequence, without partiality and without caprice—the conception which is the most potent231 force at work in the modification of our faith, and of the practical form given to our sentiments—could only grow out of that patient watching of external fact, and that silencing of preconceived notions, which are urged upon the mind by the problems of physical science.
There is not room here to explain and justify232 the impressions of dissatisfaction which have been briefly233 indicated, but a serious writer like Mr. Lecky will not find such suggestions altogether useless. The objections, even the misunderstandings, of a reader who is not careless or ill-disposed, may serve to stimulate234 an author’s vigilance over his thoughts as well as his style. It would be gratifying to see some future proof that Mr. Lecky has acquired juster views than are implied in the assertion that philosophers of the sensational235 school “can never rise to the conception of the disinterested;” and that he has freed himself from all temptation to that mingled236 laxity of statement and ill-pitched elevation237 of tone which are painfully present in the closing pages of his second volume.
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| n.(织物)质地；(材料)构造；结构；肌理 | |
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exquisite
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| adj.精美的；敏锐的；剧烈的，感觉强烈的 | |
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virtue
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| n.德行，美德；贞操；优点；功效，效力 | |
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5
vacillation
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| n.动摇；忧柔寡断 | |
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6
instructor
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| n.指导者，教员，教练 | |
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7
par
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| n.标准，票面价值，平均数量；adj.票面的，平常的，标准的 | |
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remarkable
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| adj.显著的，异常的，非凡的，值得注意的 | |
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controversy
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| n.争论，辩论，争吵 | |
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assents
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| 同意，赞同( assent的名词复数 ) | |
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blurred
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| v.（使）变模糊( blur的过去式和过去分词 )；（使）难以区分；模模糊糊；迷离 | |
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hesitation
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| n.犹豫，踌躇 | |
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13
radii
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| n.半径；半径（距离）( radius的名词复数 )；用半径度量的圆形面积；半径范围；桡骨 | |
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bigotry
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| n.偏见，偏执，持偏见的行为[态度]等 | |
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haziness
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| 有薄雾，模糊； 朦胧之性质或状态； 零能见度 | |
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16
precisely
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| adv.恰好，正好，精确地，细致地 | |
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17
rendering
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| n.表现，描写 | |
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18
incapable
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| adj.无能力的，不能做某事的 | |
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19
diluted
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| 无力的，冲淡的 | |
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20
infusions
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| n.沏或泡成的浸液（如茶等）( infusion的名词复数 )；注入，注入物 | |
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21
solidifying
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| （使）成为固体，（使）变硬，（使）变得坚固( solidify的现在分词 )； 使团结一致； 充实，巩固； 具体化 | |
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22
softening
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| 变软，软化 | |
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23
quotations
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| n.引用( quotation的名词复数 )；[商业]行情（报告）；（货物或股票的）市价；时价 | |
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24
quotation
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| n.引文，引语，语录；报价，牌价，行情 | |
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25
judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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26
impartiality
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| n. 公平, 无私, 不偏 | |
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modesty
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| n.谦逊，虚心，端庄，稳重，羞怯，朴素 | |
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28
witchcraft
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| n.魔法，巫术 | |
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29
persecution
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| n. 迫害,烦扰 | |
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30
exuberance
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| n.丰富；繁荣 | |
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31
judiciously
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| adv.明断地，明智而审慎地 | |
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32
miraculous
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| adj.像奇迹一样的，不可思议的 | |
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33
obsolete
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| adj.已废弃的，过时的 | |
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34
incongruity
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| n.不协调，不一致 | |
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35
civilized
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| a.有教养的，文雅的 | |
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36
narrative
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| n.叙述，故事；adj.叙事的，故事体的 | |
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37
devoured
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| 吞没( devour的过去式和过去分词 )； 耗尽； 津津有味地看； 狼吞虎咽地吃光 | |
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38
entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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39
insufficient
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| adj.(for，of)不足的，不够的 | |
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40
absurdity
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| n.荒谬，愚蠢；谬论 | |
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41
narratives
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| 记叙文( narrative的名词复数 )； 故事； 叙述； 叙述部分 | |
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42
conclusive
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| adj.最后的，结论的；确凿的，消除怀疑的 | |
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43
conclusively
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| adv.令人信服地，确凿地 | |
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44
demons
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| n.恶人( demon的名词复数 )；恶魔；精力过人的人；邪念 | |
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45
controversies
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| 争论 | |
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46
rigid
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| adj.严格的，死板的；刚硬的，僵硬的 | |
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47
demonstrations
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| 证明( demonstration的名词复数 )； 表明； 表达； 游行示威 | |
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48
pervading
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| v.遍及，弥漫( pervade的现在分词 ) | |
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49
antipathies
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| 反感( antipathy的名词复数 )； 引起反感的事物； 憎恶的对象； （在本性、倾向等方面的）不相容 | |
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50
rejection
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| n.拒绝，被拒，抛弃，被弃 | |
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51
cogent
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| adj.强有力的，有说服力的 | |
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52
questionable
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| adj.可疑的，有问题的 | |
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53
irreconcilable
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| adj.（指人）难和解的，势不两立的 | |
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54
thoroughly
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| adv.完全地，彻底地，十足地 | |
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55
laity
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| n.俗人；门外汉 | |
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56
clergy
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| n.[总称]牧师，神职人员 | |
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57
preposterous
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| adj.荒谬的，可笑的 | |
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58
ragged
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| adj.衣衫褴褛的，粗糙的，刺耳的 | |
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59
unctuous
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| adj.油腔滑调的，大胆的 | |
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60
intrigues
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| n.密谋策划( intrigue的名词复数 )；神秘气氛；引人入胜的复杂情节v.搞阴谋诡计( intrigue的第三人称单数 )；激起…的好奇心 | |
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61
constellation
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| n.星座n.灿烂的一群 | |
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62
invoked
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| v.援引( invoke的过去式和过去分词 )；行使（权利等）；祈求救助；恳求 | |
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63
presumption
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| n.推测，可能性，冒昧，放肆，[法律]推定 | |
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64
intimacies
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| 亲密( intimacy的名词复数 )； 密切； 亲昵的言行； 性行为 | |
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65
qualified
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| adj.合格的，有资格的，胜任的，有限制的 | |
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66
thereby
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| adv.因此，从而 | |
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67
atheism
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| n.无神论，不信神 | |
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68
illiberal
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| adj.气量狭小的，吝啬的 | |
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69
mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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70
apparitions
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| n.特异景象( apparition的名词复数 )；幽灵；鬼；（特异景象等的）出现 | |
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71
behold
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| v.看，注视，看到 | |
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72
heresy
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| n.异端邪说；异教 | |
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73
distinguished
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| adj.卓越的，杰出的，著名的 | |
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74
concurrence
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| n.同意；并发 | |
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75
superstition
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| n.迷信，迷信行为 | |
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76
accounting
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| n.会计，会计学，借贷对照表 | |
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77
phenomena
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| n.现象 | |
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78
exhaustion
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| n.耗尽枯竭，疲惫，筋疲力尽，竭尽，详尽无遗的论述 | |
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79
plantations
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| n.种植园，大农场( plantation的名词复数 ) | |
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80
annihilate
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| v.使无效；毁灭；取消 | |
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81
steamships
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| n.汽船，大轮船( steamship的名词复数 ) | |
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82
dependence
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| n.依靠，依赖；信任，信赖；隶属 | |
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83
inevitably
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| adv.不可避免地；必然发生地 | |
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84
repose
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| v.(使)休息；n.安息 | |
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85
implicit
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| a.暗示的，含蓄的，不明晰的，绝对的 | |
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86
implicitly
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| adv. 含蓄地, 暗中地, 毫不保留地 | |
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87
zeal
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| n.热心，热情，热忱 | |
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88
bent
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| n.爱好，癖好；adj.弯的；决心的，一心的 | |
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89
diabolical
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| adj.恶魔似的，凶暴的 | |
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90
fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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91
boundless
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| adj.无限的；无边无际的；巨大的 | |
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92
triumphant
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| adj.胜利的，成功的；狂欢的，喜悦的 | |
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93
rites
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| 仪式，典礼( rite的名词复数 ) | |
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94
superstitious
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| adj.迷信的 | |
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95
deviated
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| v.偏离，越轨( deviate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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96
succumb
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| v.屈服，屈从；死 | |
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97
persuasion
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| n.劝说；说服；持有某种信仰的宗派 | |
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98
doctrine
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| n.教义；主义；学说 | |
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99
innovator
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| n.改革者；创新者 | |
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100
consultation
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| n.咨询；商量；商议；会议 | |
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101
zealous
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| adj.狂热的，热心的 | |
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102
remains
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| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
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103
subduing
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| 征服( subdue的现在分词 )； 克制； 制服； 色变暗 | |
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104
motive
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| n.动机，目的；adv.发动的，运动的 | |
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105
faculties
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| n.能力( faculty的名词复数 )；全体教职员；技巧；院 | |
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106
awe
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| n.敬畏，惊惧；vt.使敬畏，使惊惧 | |
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107
secondly
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| adv.第二，其次 | |
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108
piety
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| n.虔诚，虔敬 | |
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109
whit
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| n.一点，丝毫 | |
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110
begotten
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| v.为…之生父( beget的过去分词 )；产生，引起 | |
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111
ingratitude
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| n.忘恩负义 | |
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112
concurred
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| 同意（concur的过去式与过去分词形式） | |
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113
scotch
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| n.伤口，刻痕；苏格兰威士忌酒；v.粉碎，消灭，阻止；adj.苏格兰(人)的 | |
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114
Christians
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| n.基督教徒( Christian的名词复数 ) | |
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115
ingenuity
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| n.别出心裁；善于发明创造 | |
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116
applied
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| adj.应用的；v.应用，适用 | |
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117
profess
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| v.声称，冒称，以...为业，正式接受入教，表明信仰 | |
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118
guilt
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| n.犯罪；内疚；过失，罪责 | |
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119
idol
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| n.偶像，红人，宠儿 | |
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120
groan
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| vi./n.呻吟，抱怨；(发出)呻吟般的声音 | |
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121
groans
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| n.呻吟，叹息( groan的名词复数 )；呻吟般的声音v.呻吟( groan的第三人称单数 )；发牢骚；抱怨；受苦 | |
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122
blessing
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| n.祈神赐福；祷告；祝福，祝愿 | |
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123
premises
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| n.建筑物，房屋 | |
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124
miserable
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| adj.悲惨的，痛苦的；可怜的，糟糕的 | |
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125
drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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126
minor
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| adj.较小(少)的，较次要的；n.辅修学科；vi.辅修 | |
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127
amiable
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| adj.和蔼可亲的，友善的，亲切的 | |
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128
hideous
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| adj.丑陋的，可憎的，可怕的，恐怖的 | |
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129
conscientiously
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| adv.凭良心地；认真地，负责尽职地；老老实实 | |
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130
conscientious
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| adj.审慎正直的，认真的，本着良心的 | |
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131
degradation
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| n.降级；低落；退化；陵削；降解；衰变 | |
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132
testament
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| n.遗嘱；证明 | |
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133
entangled
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| adj.卷入的；陷入的；被缠住的；缠在一起的v.使某人（某物/自己）缠绕，纠缠于（某物中），使某人（自己）陷入（困难或复杂的环境中）( entangle的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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134
philosophical
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| adj.哲学家的，哲学上的，达观的 | |
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subversive
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| adj.颠覆性的，破坏性的；n.破坏份子，危险份子 | |
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sane
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| adj.心智健全的，神志清醒的，明智的，稳健的 | |
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137
antiquity
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| n.古老；高龄；古物，古迹 | |
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138
proceedings
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| n.进程，过程，议程；诉讼(程序)；公报 | |
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139
transformations
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| n.变化( transformation的名词复数 )；转换；转换；变换 | |
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140
intercourse
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| n.性交；交流，交往，交际 | |
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141
confessions
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| n.承认( confession的名词复数 )；自首；声明；（向神父的）忏悔 | |
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142
condemned
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| adj. 被责难的, 被宣告有罪的 动词condemn的过去式和过去分词 | |
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143
demeanor
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| n.行为；风度 | |
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144
treatise
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| n.专著；(专题)论文 | |
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145
delude
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| vt.欺骗；哄骗 | |
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146
besought
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| v.恳求，乞求（某事物）( beseech的过去式和过去分词 )；(beseech的过去式与过去分词) | |
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147
heresies
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| n.异端邪说，异教( heresy的名词复数 ) | |
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148
renaissance
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| n.复活，复兴，文艺复兴 | |
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149
afterward
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| adv.后来；以后 | |
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150
apparatus
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| n.装置，器械；器具，设备 | |
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151
prodigy
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| n.惊人的事物，奇迹，神童，天才，预兆 | |
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152
sages
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| n.圣人( sage的名词复数 )；智者；哲人；鼠尾草（可用作调料） | |
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153
courageous
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| adj.勇敢的，有胆量的 | |
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154
unravel
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| v.弄清楚（秘密）；拆开，解开，松开 | |
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tout
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| v.推销，招徕；兜售；吹捧，劝诱 | |
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156
conjectures
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| 推测，猜想( conjecture的名词复数 ) | |
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157
inquiry
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| n.打听，询问，调查，查问 | |
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158
vindication
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| n.洗冤，证实 | |
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159
sketch
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| n.草图；梗概；素描；v.素描；概述 | |
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160
discrediting
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| 使不相信( discredit的现在分词 )； 使怀疑； 败坏…的名声； 拒绝相信 | |
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161
grotesque
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| adj.怪诞的，丑陋的；n.怪诞的图案，怪人（物） | |
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162
essentially
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| adv.本质上，实质上，基本上 | |
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163
ridiculed
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| v.嘲笑，嘲弄，奚落( ridicule的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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164
delusions
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| n.欺骗( delusion的名词复数 )；谬见；错觉；妄想 | |
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165
credulous
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| adj.轻信的，易信的 | |
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166
analyzing
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| v.分析；分析( analyze的现在分词 )；分解；解释；对…进行心理分析n.分析 | |
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167
dispense
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| vt.分配，分发；配(药)，发(药)；实施 | |
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168
fatiguing
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| a.使人劳累的 | |
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169
alleged
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| a.被指控的，嫌疑的 | |
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170
marvels
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| n.奇迹( marvel的名词复数 )；令人惊奇的事物（或事例）；不平凡的成果；成就v.惊奇，对…感到惊奇( marvel的第三人称单数 ) | |
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171
worthy
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| adj.(of)值得的，配得上的；有价值的 | |
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172
wielding
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| 手持着使用（武器、工具等）( wield的现在分词 )； 具有； 运用（权力）； 施加（影响） | |
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173
peculiar
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| adj.古怪的，异常的；特殊的，特有的 | |
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174
fluctuation
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| n.(物价的)波动，涨落；周期性变动；脉动 | |
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175
solicited
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| v.恳求( solicit的过去式和过去分词 )；（指娼妇）拉客；索求；征求 | |
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176
justification
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| n.正当的理由；辩解的理由 | |
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177
aroma
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| n.香气，芬芳，芳香 | |
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178
tempted
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| v.怂恿（某人）干不正当的事；冒…的险（tempt的过去分词） | |
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179
witty
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| adj.机智的，风趣的 | |
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180
sarcasm
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| n.讥讽，讽刺，嘲弄，反话 （adj.sarcastic） | |
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181
obsequiousness
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| 媚骨 | |
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182
misery
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| n.痛苦，苦恼，苦难；悲惨的境遇，贫苦 | |
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183
doctrines
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| n.教条( doctrine的名词复数 )；教义；学说；（政府政策的）正式声明 | |
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184
salvation
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| n.（尤指基督）救世，超度，拯救，解困 | |
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185
sects
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| n.宗派，教派( sect的名词复数 ) | |
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186
persecuting
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| （尤指宗教或政治信仰的）迫害(~sb. for sth.)( persecute的现在分词 )； 烦扰，困扰或骚扰某人 | |
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187
opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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188
perfectly
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| adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地 | |
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189
quenching
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| 淬火，熄 | |
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190
patronage
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| n.赞助，支援，援助；光顾，捧场 | |
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191
inclinations
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| 倾向( inclination的名词复数 )； 倾斜； 爱好； 斜坡 | |
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192
inflict
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| vt.(on)把…强加给，使遭受，使承担 | |
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193
contemplate
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| vt.盘算，计议；周密考虑；注视，凝视 | |
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194
miseries
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| n.痛苦( misery的名词复数 )；痛苦的事；穷困；常发牢骚的人 | |
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195
inevitable
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| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
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196
noted
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| adj.著名的，知名的 | |
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197
tolerance
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| n.宽容；容忍，忍受；耐药力；公差 | |
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198
corroboration
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| n.进一步的证实，进一步的证据 | |
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199
coercion
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| n.强制，高压统治 | |
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200
pastor
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| n.牧师，牧人 | |
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201
labors
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| v.努力争取(for)( labor的第三人称单数 )；苦干；详细分析；（指引擎）缓慢而困难地运转 | |
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202
hostility
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| n.敌对，敌意；抵制［pl.］交战，战争 | |
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203
vindicate
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| v.为…辩护或辩解，辩明；证明…正确 | |
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204
everlasting
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| adj.永恒的，持久的，无止境的 | |
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205
torments
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| （肉体或精神上的）折磨，痛苦( torment的名词复数 )； 造成痛苦的事物[人] | |
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206
legitimate
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| adj.合法的，合理的，合乎逻辑的；v.使合法 | |
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207
declamation
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| n. 雄辩，高调 | |
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208
asceticism
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| n.禁欲主义 | |
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209
conversion
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| n.转化，转换，转变 | |
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210
anguish
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| n.(尤指心灵上的)极度痛苦，烦恼 | |
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211
rubicund
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| adj.(脸色)红润的 | |
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212
bishops
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| （基督教某些教派管辖大教区的）主教( bishop的名词复数 )； （国际象棋的）象 | |
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213
influential
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| adj.有影响的，有权势的 | |
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214
statutes
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| 成文法( statute的名词复数 )； 法令； 法规； 章程 | |
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215
momentous
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| adj.重要的，重大的 | |
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216
secularization
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| n.凡俗化，还俗，把教育从宗教中分离 | |
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217
diligently
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| ad.industriously;carefully | |
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218
illuminated
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| adj.被照明的；受启迪的 | |
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219
sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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220
modification
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| n.修改，改进，缓和，减轻 | |
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221
meditation
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| n.熟虑，（尤指宗教的）默想，沉思，（pl.）冥想录 | |
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222
unities
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| n.统一体( unity的名词复数 )；（艺术等） 完整；（文学、戏剧） （情节、时间和地点的）统一性；团结一致 | |
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223
luminousness
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| 透光率 | |
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224
complexity
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| n.复杂(性)，复杂的事物 | |
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225
persuasions
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| n.劝说，说服（力）( persuasion的名词复数 )；信仰 | |
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226
discriminate
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| v.区别，辨别，区分；有区别地对待 | |
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227
subjective
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| a.主观(上)的，个人的 | |
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228
interpretation
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| n.解释，说明，描述；艺术处理 | |
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229
supremely
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| adv.无上地，崇高地 | |
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230
prominence
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| n.突出；显著；杰出；重要 | |
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231
potent
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| adj.强有力的，有权势的；有效力的 | |
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232
justify
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| vt.证明…正当(或有理)，为…辩护 | |
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233
briefly
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| adv.简单地，简短地 | |
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234
stimulate
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| vt.刺激，使兴奋；激励，使…振奋 | |
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235
sensational
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| adj.使人感动的，非常好的，轰动的，耸人听闻的 | |
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236
mingled
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| 混合，混入( mingle的过去式和过去分词 )； 混进，与…交往[联系] | |
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237
elevation
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| n.高度；海拔；高地；上升；提高 | |
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