(1) Now, therefore, that we have spoken of this fruit of life, it remaineth to speak of the husbandry that belongeth thereunto, without which part the former seemeth to be no better than a fair image or statue, which is beautiful to contemplate1, but is without life and motion; whereunto Aristotle himself subscribeth in these words: Necesse est scilicet de virtute dicere, et quid sit, et ex quibus gignatur. Inutile enum fere fuerit virtutem quidem nosse, acquirendae autem ejus modos et vias ignorare. Non enum de virtute tantum, qua specie sit, quaerendum est, sed et quomodo sui copiam faciat: utrumque enum volumeus, et rem ipsam nosse, et ejus compotes fieri: hoc autem ex voto non succedet, nisi sciamus et ex quibus et quomodo. In such full words and with such iteration doth he inculcate this part. So saith Cicero in great commendation of Cato the second, that he had applied2 himself to philosophy, Non ita disputandi causa, sed ita vivendi. And although the neglect of our times, wherein few men do hold any consultations3 touching4 the reformation of their life (as Seneca excellently saith, De partibus vitae quisque deliberat, de summa nemo), may make this part seem superfluous5; yet I must conclude with that aphorism6 of Hippocrates, Qui gravi morbo correpti dolores non sentiunt, iis mens aegrotat. They need medicine, not only to assuage7 the disease, but to awake the sense. And if it be said that the cure of men’s minds belongeth to sacred divinity, it is most true; but yet moral philosophy may be preferred unto her as a wise servant and humble8 handmaid. For as the Psalm9 saith, “That the eyes of the handmaid look perpetually towards the mistress,” and yet no doubt many things are left to the discretion10 of the handmaid to discern of the mistress’ will; so ought moral philosophy to give a constant attention to the doctrines12 of divinity, and yet so as it may yield of herself (within due limits) many sound and profitable directions.
(2) This part, therefore, because of the excellency thereof, I cannot but find exceeding strange that it is not reduced to written inquiry14; the rather, because it consisteth of much matter, wherein both speech and action is often conversant15; and such wherein the common talk of men (which is rare, but yet cometh sometimes to pass) is wiser than their books. It is reasonable, therefore, that we propound16 it in the more particularity, both for the worthiness17, and because we may acquit18 ourselves for reporting it deficient19, which seemeth almost incredible, and is otherwise conceived and presupposed by those themselves that have written. We will, therefore, enumerate20 some heads or points thereof, that it may appear the better what it is, and whether it be extant.
(3) First, therefore, in this, as in all things which are practical we ought to cast up our account, what is in our power, and what not; for the one may be dealt with by way of alteration21, but the other by way of application only. The husbandman cannot command neither the nature of the earth nor the seasons of the weather; no more can the physician the constitution of the patient nor the variety of accidents. So in the culture and cure of the mind of man, two things are without our command: points of Nature, and points of fortune. For to the basis of the one, and the conditions of the other, our work is limited and tied. In these things, therefore, it is left unto us to proceed by application
“Vincenda est omnis fertuna ferendo:”
and so likewise,
“Vincenda est omnis Natura ferendo.”
But when that we speak of suffering, we do not speak of a dull and neglected suffering, but of a wise and industrious22 suffering, which draweth and contriveth use and advantage out of that which seemeth adverse23 and contrary; which is that properly which we call accommodating or applying. Now the wisdom of application resteth principally in the exact and distinct knowledge of the precedent24 state or disposition25, unto which we do apply; for we cannot fit a garment except we first take measure of the body.
(4) So, then, the first article of this knowledge is to set down sound and true distributions and descriptions of the several characters and tempers of men’s natures and dispositions27, specially28 having regard to those differences which are most radical29 in being the fountains and causes of the rest, or most frequent in concurrence30 or commixture; wherein it is not the handling of a few of them in passage, the better to describe the mediocrities of virtues32, that can satisfy this intention. For if it deserve to be considered, that there are minds which are proportioned to great matters, and others to small (which Aristotle handleth, or ought to have bandied, by the name of magnanimity), doth it not deserve as well to be considered that there are minds proportioned to intend many matters, and others to few? So that some can divide themselves: others can perchance do exactly well, but it must be but in few things at once; and so there cometh to be a narrowness of mind, as well as a pusillanimity33. And again, that some minds are proportioned to that which may be dispatched at once, or within a short return of time; others to that which begins afar off, and is to be won with length of pursuit:—
“Jam tum tenditqus fovetque.”
So that there may be fitly said to be a longanimity, which is commonly also ascribed to God as a magnanimity. So further deserved it to be considered by Aristotle, “That there is a disposition in conversation (supposing it in things which do in no sort touch or concern a man’s self) to soothe34 and please, and a disposition contrary to contradict and cross;” and deserveth it not much better to be considered. “That there is a disposition, not in conversation or talk, but in matter of more serious nature (and supposing it still in things merely indifferent), to take pleasure in the good of another; and a disposition contrariwise, to take distaste at the good of another?” which is that properly which we call good nature or ill nature, benignity35 or malignity36; and, therefore, I cannot sufficiently37 marvel38 that this part of knowledge, touching the several characters of natures and dispositions, should be omitted both in morality and policy, considering it is of so great ministry39 and suppeditation to them both. A man shall find in the traditions of astrology some pretty and apt divisions of men’s natures, according to the predominances of the planets: lovers of quiet, lovers of action, lovers of victory, lovers of honour, lovers of pleasure, lovers of arts, lovers of change, and so forth40. A man shall find in the wisest sort of these relations which the Italians make touching conclaves41, the natures of the several cardinals42 handsomely and lively painted forth. A man shall meet with in every day’s conference the denominations43 of sensitive, dry, formal, real, humorous, certain, huomo di prima impressione, huomo di ultima impressione, and the like; and yet, nevertheless, this kind of observations wandereth in words, but is not fixed44 in inquiry. For the distinctions are found (many of them), but we conclude no precepts45 upon them: wherein our fault is the greater, because both history, poesy, and daily experience are as goodly fields where these observations grow; whereof we make a few posies to hold in our hands, but no man bringeth them to the confectionary that receipts might be made of them for use of life.
(5) Of much like kind are those impressions of Nature, which are imposed upon the mind by the sex, by the age, by the region, by health and sickness, by beauty and deformity, and the like, which are inherent and not extern; and again, those which are caused by extern fortune, as sovereignty, nobility, obscure birth, riches, want, magistracy, privateness, prosperity, adversity, constant fortune, variable fortune, rising per saltum, per gradus, and the like. And, therefore, we see that Plautus maketh it a wonder to see an old man beneficent, benignitas hujis ut adolescentuli est. Saint Paul concludeth that severity of discipline was to be used to the Cretans, increpa eos dure, upon the disposition of their country, Cretensus semper mendaces, malae bestiae, ventres. Sallust noteth that it is usual with kings to desire contradictories48: Sed plerumque regiae voluntates, ut vehementes sunt, sic mobiles, saepeque ipsae sibi advers. Tacitus observeth how rarely raising of the fortune mendeth the disposition: solus Vespasianus mutatus in melius. Pindarus maketh an observation, that great and sudden fortune for the most part defeateth men qui magnam felicitatem concoquere non possunt. So the Psalm showeth it is more easy to keep a measure in the enjoying of fortune, than in the increase of fortune; Divitiae si affluant, nolite cor apponere. These observations and the like I deny not but are touched a little by Aristotle as in passage in his Rhetorics, and are handled in some scattered49 discourses50; but they were never incorporate into moral philosophy, to which they do essentially51 appertain; as the knowledge of this diversity of grounds and moulds doth to agriculture, and the knowledge of the diversity of complexions53 and constitutions doth to the physician, except we mean to follow the indiscretion of empirics, which minister the same medicines to all patients.
(6) Another article of this knowledge is the inquiry touching the affections; for as in medicining of the body, it is in order first to know the divers52 complexions and constitutions; secondly54, the diseases; and lastly, the cures: so in medicining of the mind, after knowledge of the divers characters of men’s natures, it followeth in order to know the diseases and infirmities of the mind, which are no other than the perturbations and distempars of the affections. For as the ancient politiques in popular estates were wont55 to compare the people to the sea, and the orators56 to the winds; because as the sea would of itself be calm and quiet, if the winds did not move and trouble it; so the people would be peaceable and tractable57 if the seditious orators did not set them in working and agitation58: so it may be fitly said, that the mind in the nature thereof would be temperate59 and stayed, if the affections, as winds, did not put it into tumult60 and perturbation. And here again I find strange, as before, that Aristotle should have written divers volumes of Ethics61, and never handled the affections which is the principal subject thereof; and yet in his Rhetorics, where they are considered but collaterally62 and in a second degree (as they may be moved by speech), he findeth place for them, and handleth them well for the quantity; but where their true place is he pretermitteth them. For it is not his disputations about pleasure and pain that can satisfy this inquiry, no more than he that should generally handle the nature of light can be said to handle the nature of colours; for pleasure and pain are to the particular affections as light is to particular colours. Better travails63, I suppose, had the Stoics64 taken in this argument, as far as I can gather by that which we have at second hand. But yet it is like it was after their manner, rather in subtlety65 of definitions (which in a subject of this nature are but curiosities), than in active and ample descriptions and observations. So likewise I find some particular writings of an elegant nature, touching some of the affections: as of anger, of comfort upon adverse accidents, of tenderness of countenance66, and other. But the poets and writers of histories are the best doctors of this knowledge; where we may find painted forth, with great life, how affections are kindled67 and incited68; and how pacified69 and refrained; and how again contained from act and further degree; how they disclose themselves; how they work; how they vary; how they gather and fortify70: how they are enwrapped one within another; and how they do fight and encounter one with another; and other the like particularities. Amongst the which this last is of special use in moral and civil matters; how, I say, to set affection against affection, and to master one by another; even as we used to hunt beast with beast, and fly bird with bird, which otherwise percase we could not so easily recover: upon which foundation is erected71 that excellent use of praemium and paena, whereby civil states consist: employing the predominant affections of fear and hope, for the suppressing and bridling72 the rest. For as in the government of states it is sometimes necessary to bridle73 one faction74 with another, so it is in the government within.
(7) Now come we to those points which are within our own command, and have force and operation upon the mind, to affect the will and appetite, and to alter manners: wherein they ought to have handled custom, exercise, habit, education, example, imitation, emulation75, company, friends, praise, reproof76, exhortation77, fame, laws, books, studies: these as they have determinate use in moralities, from these the mind suffereth, and of these are such receipts and regiments79 compounded and described, as may serve to recover or preserve the health and good estate of the mind, as far as pertaineth to human medicine: of which number we will insist upon some one or two, as an example of the rest, because it were too long to prosecute80 all; and therefore we do resume custom and habit to speak of.
(8) The opinion of Aristotle seemeth to me a negligent81 opinion, that of those things which consist by Nature, nothing can be changed by custom; using for example, that if a stone be thrown ten thousand times up it will not learn to ascend82; and that by often seeing or hearing we do not learn to see or hear the better. For though this principle be true in things wherein Nature is peremptory83 (the reason whereof we cannot now stand to discuss), yet it is otherwise in things wherein Nature admitteth a latitude84. For he might see that a strait glove will come more easily on with use; and that a wand will by use bend otherwise than it grew; and that by use of the voice we speak louder and stronger; and that by use of enduring heat or cold we endure it the better, and the like: which latter sort have a nearer resemblance unto that subject of manners he handleth, than those instances which he allegeth. But allowing his conclusion, that virtues and vices85 consist in habit, he ought so much the more to have taught the manner of superinducing that habit: for there be many precepts of the wise ordering the exercises of the mind, as there is of ordering the exercises of the body, whereof we will recite a few.
(9) The first shall be, that we beware we take not at the first either too high a strain or too weak: for if too high, in a diffident nature you discourage, in a confident nature you breed an opinion of facility, and so a sloth86; and in all natures you breed a further expectation than can hold out, and so an insatisfaction in the end: if too weak, of the other side, you may not look to perform and overcome any great task.
(10) Another precept46 is to practise all things chiefly at two several times, the one when the mind is best disposed, the other when it is worst disposed; that by the one you may gain a great step, by the other you may work out the knots and stonds of the mind, and make the middle times the more easy and pleasant.
(11) Another precept is that which Aristotle mentioneth by the way, which is to bear ever towards the contrary extreme of that whereunto we are by nature inclined; like unto the rowing against the stream, or making a wand straight by bending him contrary to his natural crookedness87.
(12) Another precept is that the mind is brought to anything better, and with more sweetness and happiness, if that whereunto you pretend be not first in the intention, but tanquam aliud agendo, because of the natural hatred88 of the mind against necessity and constraint89. Many other axioms there are touching the managing of exercise and custom, which being so conducted doth prove indeed another nature; but, being governed by chance, doth commonly prove but an ape of Nature, and bringeth forth that which is lame90 and counterfeit91.
(13) So if we should handle books and studies, and what influence and operation they have upon manners, are there not divers precepts of great caution and direction appertaining thereunto? Did not one of the fathers in great indignation call poesy vinum daemonum, because it increaseth temptations, perturbations, and vain opinions? Is not the opinion of Aristotle worthy92 to be regarded, wherein he saith, “That young men are no fit auditors93 of moral philosophy, because they are not settled from the boiling heat of their affections, nor attempered with time and experience”? And doth it not hereof come, that those excellent books and discourses of the ancient writers (whereby they have persuaded unto virtue31 most effectually, by representing her in state and majesty94, and popular opinions against virtue in their parasites’ coats fit to be scorned and derided), are of so little effect towards honesty of life, because they are not read and revolved95 by men in their mature and settled years, but confined almost to boys and beginners? But is it not true also, that much less young men are fit auditors of matters of policy, till they have been thoroughly96 seasoned in religion and morality; lest their judgments97 be corrupted98, and made apt to think that there are no true differences of things, but according to utility and fortune, as the verse describes it, Prosperum et felix scelus virtus vocatur; and again, Ille crucem pretium sceleris tulit, hic diadema: which the poets do speak satirically and in indignation on virtue’s behalf; but books of policy do speak it seriously and positively99; for so it pleaseth Machiavel to say, “That if Caesar had been overthrown100, he would have been more odious101 than ever was Catiline;” as if there had been no difference, but in fortune, between a very fury of lust47 and blood, and the most excellent spirit (his ambition reserved) of the world? Again, is there not a caution likewise to be given of the doctrines of moralities themselves (some kinds of them), lest they make men too precise, arrogant102, incompatible103; as Cicero saith of Cato, In Marco Catone haec bona quae videmus divina et egregia, ipsius scitote esse propria; quae nonunquam requirimus ea sunt omnia non a natura, sed a magistro? Many other axioms and advices there are touching those proprieties104 and effects, which studies do infuse and instil105 into manners. And so, likewise, is there touching the use of all those other points, of company, fame, laws, and the rest, which we recited in the beginning in the doctrine11 of morality.
(14) But there is a kind of culture of the mind that seemeth yet more accurate and elaborate than the rest, and is built upon this ground; that the minds of all men are at some times in a state more perfect, and at other times in a state more depraved. The purpose, therefore, of this practice is to fix and cherish the good hours of the mind, and to obliterate106 and take forth the evil. The fixing of the good hath been practised by two means, vows107 or constant resolutions, and observances or exercises; which are not to be regarded so much in themselves, as because they keep the mind in continual obedience108. The obliteration109 of the evil hath been practised by two means, some kind of redemption or expiation110 of that which is past, and an inception111 or account de novo for the time to come. But this part seemeth sacred and religious, and justly; for all good moral philosophy (as was said) is but a handmaid to religion.
(15) Wherefore we will conclude with that last point, which is of all other means the most compendious112 and summary, and again, the most noble and effectual to the reducing of the mind unto virtue and good estate; which is, the electing and propounding113 unto a man’s self good and virtuous114 ends of his life, such as may be in a reasonable sort within his compass to attain115. For if these two things be supposed, that a man set before him honest and good ends, and again, that he be resolute116, constant, and true unto them; it will follow that he shall mould himself into all virtue at once. And this indeed is like the work of nature; whereas the other course is like the work of the hand. For as when a carver makes an image, he shapes only that part whereupon he worketh; as if he be upon the face, that part which shall be the body is but a rude stone still, till such times as he comes to it. But contrariwise when nature makes a flower or living creature, she formeth rudiments117 of all the parts at one time. So in obtaining virtue by habit, while a man practiseth temperance, he doth not profit much to fortitude118, nor the like but when he dedicateth and applieth himself to good ends, look, what virtue soever the pursuit and passage towards those ends doth commend unto him, he is invested of a precedent disposition to conform himself thereunto. Which state of mind Aristotle doth excellently express himself, that it ought not to be called virtuous, but divine. His words are these: Immanitati autem consentaneum est opponere eam, quae supra humanitatem est, heroicam sive divinam virtutem; and a little after, Nam ut ferae neque vitium neque virtus est, swic neque Dei: sed hic quidem status altius quiddam virtute est, ille aluid quiddam a vitio. And therefore we may see what celsitude of honour Plinius Secundus attributeth to Trajan in his funeral oration119, where he said, “That men needed to make no other prayers to the gods, but that they would continue as good lords to them as Trajan had been;” as if he had not been only an imitation of divine nature, but a pattern of it. But these be heathen and profane120 passages, having but a shadow of that divine state of mind, which religion and the holy faith doth conduct men unto, by imprinting121 upon their souls charity, which is excellently called the bond of perfection, because it comprehendeth and fasteneth all virtues together. And as it is elegantly said by Menander of vain love, which is but a false imitation of divine love, Amor melior Sophista loevo ad humanam vitam — that love teacheth a man to carry himself better than the sophist or preceptor; which he calleth left-handed, because, with all his rules and preceptions, he cannot form a man so dexterously122, nor with that facility to prize himself and govern himself, as love can do: so certainly, if a man’s mind be truly inflamed123 with charity, it doth work him suddenly into greater perfection than all the doctrine of morality can do, which is but a sophist in comparison of the other. Nay124, further, as Xenophon observed truly, that all other affections, though they raise the mind, yet they do it by distorting and uncomeliness of ecstasies125 or excesses; but only love doth exalt126 the mind, and nevertheless at the same instant doth settle and compose it: so in all other excellences127, though they advance nature, yet they are subject to excess. Only charity admitteth no excess. For so we see, aspiring128 to be like God in power, the angels transgressed130 and fell; Ascendam, et ero similis altissimo: by aspiring to be like God in knowledge, man transgressed and fell; Eritis sicut Dii, scientes bonum et malum: but by aspiring to a similitude of God in goodness or love, neither man nor angel ever transgressed, or shall transgress129. For unto that imitation we are called: Diligite inimicos vestros, benefacite eis qui oderunt vos, et orate pro13 persequentibus et calumniantibus vos, ut sitis filii Patris vestri qui in coelis est, qui solem suum oriri facit super bonos et malos, et pluit super justos et injustos. So in the first platform of the divine nature itself, the heathen religion speaketh thus, Optimus Maximus: and the sacred Scriptures132 thus, Miscericordia ejus super omnia opera ejus.
(16) Wherefore I do conclude this part of moral knowledge, concerning the culture and regiment78 of the mind; wherein if any man, considering the arts thereof which I have enumerated133, do judge that my labour is but to collect into an art or science that which hath been pretermitted by others, as matter of common sense and experience, he judgeth well. But as Philocrates sported with Demosthenes, “You may not marvel (Athenians) that Demosthenes and I do differ; for he drinketh water, and I drink wine;” and like as we read of an ancient parable134 of the two gates of sleep —
“Sunt geminae somni portae: quarum altera fertur Cornea, qua veris facilis datur exitus umbris: Altera candenti perfecta nitens elephanto, Sed falsa ad coelum mittunt insomnia135 manes:”
so if we put on sobriety and attention, we shall find it a sure maxim131 in knowledge, that the more pleasant liquor (“of wine”) is the more vaporous, and the braver gate (“of ivory”) sendeth forth the falser dreams.
(17) But we have now concluded that general part of human philosophy, which contemplateth man segregate136, and as he consisteth of body and spirit. Wherein we may further note, that there seemeth to be a relation or conformity137 between the good of the mind and the good of the body. For as we divided the good of the body into health, beauty, strength, and pleasure, so the good of the mind, inquired in rational and moral knowledges, tendeth to this, to make the mind sound, and without perturbation; beautiful, and graced with decency138; and strong and agile139 for all duties of life. These three, as in the body, so in the mind, seldom meet, and commonly sever26. For it is easy to observe, that many have strength of wit and courage, but have neither health from perturbations, nor any beauty or decency in their doings; some again have an elegancy and fineness of carriage which have neither soundness of honesty nor substance of sufficiency; and some again have honest and reformed minds, that can neither become themselves nor manage business; and sometimes two of them meet, and rarely all three. As for pleasure, we have likewise determined140 that the mind ought not to be reduced to stupid, but to retain pleasure; confined rather in the subject of it, than in the strength and vigour141 of it.
收听单词发音 |
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contemplate
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| vt.盘算，计议；周密考虑；注视，凝视 | |
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applied
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| adj.应用的；v.应用，适用 | |
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consultations
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| n.磋商（会议）( consultation的名词复数 )；商讨会；协商会；查找 | |
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touching
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| adj.动人的，使人感伤的 | |
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superfluous
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| adj.过多的，过剩的，多余的 | |
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aphorism
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| n.格言，警语 | |
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assuage
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| v.缓和，减轻，镇定 | |
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humble
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| adj.谦卑的，恭顺的；地位低下的；v.降低，贬低 | |
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psalm
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| n.赞美诗，圣诗 | |
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discretion
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| n.谨慎；随意处理 | |
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doctrine
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| n.教义；主义；学说 | |
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doctrines
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| n.教条( doctrine的名词复数 )；教义；学说；（政府政策的）正式声明 | |
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pro
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| n.赞成，赞成的意见，赞成者 | |
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inquiry
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| n.打听，询问，调查，查问 | |
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conversant
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| adj.亲近的，有交情的，熟悉的 | |
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propound
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| v.提出 | |
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worthiness
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| 价值，值得 | |
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acquit
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| vt.宣判无罪；(oneself)使(自己)表现出 | |
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deficient
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| adj.不足的，不充份的，有缺陷的 | |
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enumerate
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| v.列举，计算，枚举，数 | |
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alteration
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| n.变更，改变；蚀变 | |
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industrious
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| adj.勤劳的，刻苦的，奋发的 | |
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adverse
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| adj.不利的；有害的；敌对的，不友好的 | |
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precedent
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| n.先例，前例；惯例；adj.在前的，在先的 | |
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disposition
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| n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署 | |
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sever
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| v.切开，割开；断绝，中断 | |
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dispositions
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| 安排( disposition的名词复数 )； 倾向； （财产、金钱的）处置； 气质 | |
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specially
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| adv.特定地；特殊地；明确地 | |
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radical
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| n.激进份子，原子团，根号；adj.根本的，激进的，彻底的 | |
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concurrence
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| n.同意；并发 | |
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virtue
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| n.德行，美德；贞操；优点；功效，效力 | |
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virtues
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| 美德( virtue的名词复数 )； 德行； 优点； 长处 | |
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pusillanimity
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| n.无气力，胆怯 | |
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34
soothe
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| v.安慰；使平静；使减轻；缓和；奉承 | |
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35
benignity
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| n.仁慈 | |
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36
malignity
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| n.极度的恶意，恶毒；（病的）恶性 | |
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37
sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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38
marvel
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| vi.(at)惊叹vt.感到惊异；n.令人惊异的事 | |
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39
ministry
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| n.(政府的)部；牧师 | |
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40
forth
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| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
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41
conclaves
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| n.秘密会议，教皇选举会议，红衣主教团( conclave的名词复数 ) | |
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42
cardinals
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| 红衣主教( cardinal的名词复数 )； 红衣凤头鸟（见于北美，雄鸟为鲜红色）； 基数 | |
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43
denominations
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| n.宗派( denomination的名词复数 )；教派；面额；名称 | |
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44
fixed
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| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
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45
precepts
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| n.规诫，戒律，箴言( precept的名词复数 ) | |
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46
precept
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| n.戒律；格言 | |
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47
lust
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| n.性(淫)欲；渴(欲)望；vi.对…有强烈的欲望 | |
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48
contradictories
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| n.矛盾的，抵触的( contradictory的名词复数 ) | |
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49
scattered
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| adj.分散的，稀疏的；散步的；疏疏落落的 | |
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50
discourses
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| 论文( discourse的名词复数 )； 演说； 讲道； 话语 | |
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51
essentially
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| adv.本质上，实质上，基本上 | |
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52
divers
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| adj.不同的；种种的 | |
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53
complexions
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| 肤色( complexion的名词复数 )； 面色； 局面； 性质 | |
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54
secondly
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| adv.第二，其次 | |
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55
wont
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| adj.习惯于；v.习惯；n.习惯 | |
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56
orators
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| n.演说者，演讲家( orator的名词复数 ) | |
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57
tractable
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| adj.易驾驭的；温顺的 | |
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58
agitation
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| n.搅动；搅拌；鼓动，煽动 | |
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59
temperate
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| adj.温和的，温带的，自我克制的，不过分的 | |
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60
tumult
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| n.喧哗；激动，混乱；吵闹 | |
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61
ethics
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| n.伦理学；伦理观，道德标准 | |
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62
collaterally
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| 担保物； 旁系亲属 | |
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63
travails
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| n.艰苦劳动( travail的名词复数 )；辛勤努力；痛苦；分娩的阵痛 | |
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64
stoics
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| 禁欲主义者，恬淡寡欲的人，不以苦乐为意的人( stoic的名词复数 ) | |
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65
subtlety
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| n.微妙，敏锐，精巧；微妙之处，细微的区别 | |
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66
countenance
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| n.脸色，面容；面部表情；vt.支持，赞同 | |
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67
kindled
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| （使某物）燃烧，着火( kindle的过去式和过去分词 )； 激起（感情等）； 发亮，放光 | |
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68
incited
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| 刺激，激励，煽动( incite的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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69
pacified
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| 使（某人）安静( pacify的过去式和过去分词 )； 息怒； 抚慰； 在（有战争的地区、国家等）实现和平 | |
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70
fortify
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| v.强化防御，为…设防；加强，强化 | |
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71
ERECTED
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| adj. 直立的，竖立的，笔直的 vt. 使 ... 直立，建立 | |
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72
bridling
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| 给…套龙头( bridle的现在分词 )； 控制； 昂首表示轻蔑（或怨忿等）； 动怒，生气 | |
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73
bridle
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| n.笼头，束缚；vt.抑制，约束；动怒 | |
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74
faction
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| n.宗派，小集团；派别；派系斗争 | |
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75
emulation
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| n.竞争；仿效 | |
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76
reproof
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| n.斥责，责备 | |
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77
exhortation
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| n.劝告，规劝 | |
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78
regiment
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| n.团，多数，管理；v.组织，编成团，统制 | |
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79
regiments
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| （军队的）团( regiment的名词复数 )； 大量的人或物 | |
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80
prosecute
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| vt.告发；进行；vi.告发，起诉，作检察官 | |
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81
negligent
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| adj.疏忽的；玩忽的；粗心大意的 | |
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82
ascend
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| vi.渐渐上升，升高；vt.攀登，登上 | |
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83
peremptory
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| adj.紧急的，专横的，断然的 | |
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84
latitude
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| n.纬度，行动或言论的自由(范围)，(pl.)地区 | |
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85
vices
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| 缺陷( vice的名词复数 )； 恶习； 不道德行为； 台钳 | |
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86
sloth
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| n.[动]树懒；懒惰，懒散 | |
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87
crookedness
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| [医]弯曲 | |
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88
hatred
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| n.憎恶，憎恨，仇恨 | |
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89
constraint
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| n.(on)约束，限制；限制(或约束)性的事物 | |
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90
lame
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| adj.跛的，(辩解、论据等)无说服力的 | |
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91
counterfeit
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| vt.伪造，仿造；adj.伪造的，假冒的 | |
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92
worthy
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| adj.(of)值得的，配得上的；有价值的 | |
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93
auditors
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| n.审计员，稽核员( auditor的名词复数 )；（大学课程的）旁听生 | |
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94
majesty
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| n.雄伟，壮丽，庄严，威严；最高权威，王权 | |
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95
revolved
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| v.（使）旋转( revolve的过去式和过去分词 )；细想 | |
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96
thoroughly
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| adv.完全地，彻底地，十足地 | |
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97
judgments
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| 判断( judgment的名词复数 )； 鉴定； 评价； 审判 | |
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98
corrupted
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| （使）败坏( corrupt的过去式和过去分词 )； （使）腐化； 引起（计算机文件等的）错误； 破坏 | |
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99
positively
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| adv.明确地，断然，坚决地；实在，确实 | |
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100
overthrown
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| adj. 打翻的，推倒的，倾覆的 动词overthrow的过去分词 | |
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101
odious
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| adj.可憎的，讨厌的 | |
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102
arrogant
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| adj.傲慢的，自大的 | |
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103
incompatible
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| adj.不相容的，不协调的，不相配的 | |
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104
proprieties
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| n.礼仪，礼节；礼貌( propriety的名词复数 )；规矩；正当；合适 | |
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105
instil
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| v.逐渐灌输 | |
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106
obliterate
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| v.擦去，涂抹，去掉...痕迹，消失，除去 | |
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107
vows
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| 誓言( vow的名词复数 )； 郑重宣布，许愿 | |
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108
obedience
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| n.服从，顺从 | |
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109
obliteration
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| n.涂去，删除；管腔闭合 | |
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110
expiation
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| n.赎罪，补偿 | |
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111
inception
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| n.开端，开始，取得学位 | |
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112
compendious
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| adj.简要的，精简的 | |
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113
propounding
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| v.提出（问题、计划等）供考虑[讨论]，提议( propound的现在分词 ) | |
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114
virtuous
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| adj.有品德的，善良的，贞洁的，有效力的 | |
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115
attain
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| vt.达到，获得，完成 | |
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116
resolute
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| adj.坚决的，果敢的 | |
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117
rudiments
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| n.基础知识，入门 | |
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118
fortitude
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| n.坚忍不拔；刚毅 | |
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119
oration
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| n.演说，致辞，叙述法 | |
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120
profane
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| adj.亵神的，亵渎的；vt.亵渎，玷污 | |
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121
imprinting
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| n.胚教，铭记（动物生命早期即起作用的一种学习机能）；印记 | |
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122
dexterously
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| adv.巧妙地，敏捷地 | |
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123
inflamed
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| adj.发炎的，红肿的v.（使）变红，发怒，过热( inflame的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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124
nay
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| adv.不；n.反对票，投反对票者 | |
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125
ecstasies
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| 狂喜( ecstasy的名词复数 )； 出神； 入迷； 迷幻药 | |
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126
exalt
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| v.赞扬，歌颂，晋升，提升 | |
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127
excellences
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| n.卓越( excellence的名词复数 )；（只用于所修饰的名词后）杰出的；卓越的；出类拔萃的 | |
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128
aspiring
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| adj.有志气的；有抱负的；高耸的v.渴望；追求 | |
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129
transgress
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| vt.违反，逾越 | |
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130
transgressed
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| v.超越( transgress的过去式和过去分词 )；越过；违反；违背 | |
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131
maxim
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| n.格言，箴言 | |
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132
scriptures
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| 经文，圣典( scripture的名词复数 )； 经典 | |
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133
enumerated
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| v.列举，枚举，数( enumerate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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134
parable
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| n.寓言，比喻 | |
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135
insomnia
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| n.失眠，失眠症 | |
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136
segregate
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| adj.分离的，被隔离的；vt.使分离，使隔离 | |
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137
conformity
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| n.一致，遵从，顺从 | |
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138
decency
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| n.体面，得体，合宜，正派，庄重 | |
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139
agile
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| adj.敏捷的，灵活的 | |
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140
determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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141
vigour
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| （=vigor）n.智力，体力，精力 | |
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