Of the Kinds of Republics There Are, and of which was the Roman Republic
I want to place aside the discussion of those cities that had their beginning subject to others, and I will talk of those which have had their beginning far removed from any external servitude, but which [were] initially1 governed themselves through their own will, either as Republics or as Principalities; which have had [as diverse origins] diverse laws and institutions. For to some, at the beginning or very soon after, their laws were given to them by one [man] and all at one time, as those which were given to the Spartans2 by Lycurgus: Some have received them by chance, and at several times, according to events, as Rome did. So that a Republic can be called fortunate which by chance has a man so prudent3, who gives her laws so ordered that without having need of correcting them, she can live securely under them. And it is seen that Sparta observed hers [laws] for more than eight hundred years without changing them and without any dangerous disturbance4: and on the contrary that City has some degree of unhappiness which [not having fallen to a prudent lawmaker] is compelled to reorganize her laws by herself. And she also is more unhappy which has diverged5 more from her institutions; and that [Republic] is even further from them whose laws lead her away from perfect and true ends entirely6 outside of the right path; for to those who are in that condition it is almost impossible that by some incident they be set aright. Those others which do not have a perfect constitution, but had made a good beginning, are capable of becoming better, and can become perfect through the occurrence of events. It is very true, however, that they have never been reformed without danger, for the greater number of men never agree to a new law which contemplates7 a new order for the City, unless the necessity that needs be accomplished8 is shown to them: and as this necessity cannot arise without some peril9, it is an easy thing for the Republic to be ruined before it can be brought to a more perfect constitution. The Republic of Florence gives a proof of this, which because of the incident of Arezzo in [the year] one thousand five hundred and two [1502] was reorganized, [and] it was disorganized by that of Prato in [the year] one thousand five hundred and twelve [1512].
Wanting therefore to discourse10 on what were the institutions of the City of Rome and what events brought her to her perfection, I say, that some who have written of Republics say there are [one of] three States [governments] in them called by them Principality [Monarchy], of the Best [Aristocracy], and Popular [Democracy], and that those men who institute [laws] in a City ought to turn to one of these, according as it seems fit to them. Some others [and wiser according to the opinion of many] believe there are six kinds of Governments, of which those are very bad, and those are good in themselves, but may be so easily corrupted11 that they also become pernicious. Those that are good are three mentioned above: those that are bad, are three others which derive12 from those [first three], and each is so similar to them that they easily jump from one to the other, for the Principality easily becomes a tyranny, autocracy13 easily become State of the Few [oligarchies], and the Popular [Democracy] without difficulty is converted into a licentious14 one [anarchy]. So much so that an organizer of a Republic institutes one of those three States [governments] in a City, he institutes it for only a short time, because there is no remedy which can prevent them from degenerating15 into their opposite kind, because of the resemblance that virtu and vice16 have in this instance.
These variations in government among men are born by chance, for at the beginning of the world the inhabitants were few, [and] lived for a time dispersed17 and like beasts: later as the generations multiplied they gathered together, and in order to be able better to defend themselves they began to seek among themselves the one who was most robust18 and of greater courage, and made him their head and obeyed him. From this there arose the knowledge of honest and good things; differentiating19 them from the pernicious and evil; for seeing one man harm his benefactor20 there arose hate and compassion21 between men, censuring22 the ingrates and honoring those who were grateful, and believing also that these same injuries could be done to them, to avoid like evils they were led to make laws, and institute punishments for those who should contravene23 them; whence came the cognition of justice. Which thing later caused them to select a Prince, not seeking the most stalwart but he who was more prudent and more just. But afterwards when they began to make the Prince by succession and not by election, the heirs quickly degenerated24 from their fathers, and leaving off from works of virtu they believed that Princes should have nothing else to do than surpass others in sumptuousness25 and lasciviousness26 and in every other kind of delight. So that the Prince began to be hated, and because of this hate he began to fear, and passing therefore from fear to injury, a tyranny quickly arose. From this there arose the beginnings of the ruin and conspiracies27; and these conspiracies against the Prince were not made by weak and timid men, but by those who because of their generosity28, greatness of spirit, riches, and nobility above the others, could not endure the dishonest life of that prince.
The multitude therefore following the authority of these powerful ones armed itself against the Prince, and having destroyed him, they obeyed them as their liberators. And these holding the name of chief in hatred29, constituted a government by themselves, and in the beginning [having in mind the past tyranny] governed themselves according to the laws instituted by them, preferring every common usefulness to their conveniences, and governed and preserved private and public affairs with the greatest diligence. This administration later was handed down to their children, who not knowing the changeability of fortune [for] never having experienced bad [fortune], and not wanting to remain content with civil equality, they turned to avarice30, ambition, violation31 of women, caused that aristocratic government [of the Best] to become an oligarchic32 government [of the Few] regardless of all civil rights: so that in a short time the same thing happened to them as it did to the Tyrant33, for the multitude disgusted with their government, placed itself under the orders of whoever would in any way plan to attack those Governors, and thus there arose some one who, with the aid of the multitude, destroyed them. And the memory of the Prince and the injuries received from him being yet fresh [and] having destroyed the oligarchic state [of the Few], and not wanting to restore that of the Prince, the [people] turned to the Popular state [Democracy] and they organized that in such a way, that neither the powerful Few nor a Prince should have any authority. And because all States in the beginning receive some reverence34, this Popular State maintained itself for a short time, but not for long, especially when that generation that had organized it was extinguished, for they quickly came to that license35 where neither private men or public men were feared: this was such that every one living in his own way, a thousand injuries were inflicted36 every day: so that constrained37 by necessity either through the suggestion of some good man, or to escape from such license, they once again turn to a Principality; and from this step by step they return to that license both in the manner and for the causes mentioned [previously].
And this is the circle in which all the Republics are governed and will eventually be governed; but rarely do they return to the same [original] governments: for almost no Republic can have so long a life as to be able often to pass through these changes and remain on its feet. But it may well happen that in the troubles besetting38 a Republic always lacking counsel and strength, it will become subject to a neighboring state which may be better organized than itself: but assuming this does not happen, a Republic would be apt to revolve39 indefinitely among these governments. I say therefore that all the [previously] mentioned forms are inferior because of the brevity of the existence of those three that are good, and of the malignity40 of those three that are bad. So that those who make laws prudently41 having recognized the defects of each, [and] avoiding every one of these forms by itself alone, they selected one [form] that should partake of all, they judging it to be more firm and stable, because when there is in the same City [government] a Principality, an Aristocracy, and a Popular Government [Democracy], one watches the other.1
1 That is, an Executive, a House of Lords or Senate [originally sitting as a Judiciary], and a Commons or House of Representatives or Legislature each acting42 to check and balance the other.
Among those who have merited more praise for having similar constitutions is Lycurgus, who so established his laws in Sparta, that in giving parts to the King, the Aristocracy, and the People, made a state that endured more than eight hundred years, with great praise to himself and tranquillity43 to that City. The contrary happened to Solon who established the laws in Athens, [and] who by establishing only the Popular [Democratic] state, he gave it such a brief existence that before he died he saw arise the tyranny of Pisistratus: and although after forty years his [the tyrants] heirs were driven out and liberty returned to Athens, for the Popular state was restored according to the ordinances44 of Solon, it did not last more than a hundred years, yet in order that it be maintained many conventions were made by which the insolence45 of the nobles and the general licentiousness46 were suppressed, which had not been considered by Solon: none the less because he did not mix it [Popular state] with the power of the Principate and with that of the Aristocracy, Athens lived a very short time as compared to Sparta.
But let us come to Rome, which, notwithstanding that it did not have a Lycurgus who so established it in the beginning that she was not able to exist free for a long time, none the less so many were the incidents that arose in that City because of the disunion that existed between the Plebs and the Senate, so that what the legislator did not do, chance did. For, if Rome did not attain47 top fortune, it attained48 the second; if the first institutions were defective49, none the less they did not deviate50 from the straight path which would lead them to perfection, for Romulus and all the other Kings made many and good laws, all conforming to a free existence. But because their objective was to found a Kingdom and not a Republic, when that City became free she lacked many things that were necessary to be established in favor of liberty, which had not been established by those Kings. And although those Kings lost their Empire for the reasons and in the manner discussed, none the less those who drove them out quickly instituted two Consuls51 who should be in the place of the King, [and] so it happened that while the name [of King] was driven from Rome, the royal power was not; so that the Consuls and the Senate existed in forms mentioned above, that is the Principate and the Aristocracy. There remained only to make a place for Popular government for the reasons to be mentioned below, the people rose against them: so that in order not to lose everything, [the Nobility] was constrained to concede a part of its power to them, and on the other hand the Senate and the Consuls remained with so much authority that they were able to keep their rank in that Republic. And thus was born [the creation] of the Tribunes of the plebs,2 after which creation the government of that Republic came to be more stable, having a part of all those forms of government. And so favorable was fortune to them that although they passed from a Monarchial52 government and from an Aristocracy to one of the People [Democracy], by those same degrees and for the same reasons that were discussed above, none the less the Royal form was never entirely taken away to give authority to the Aristocracy, nor was all the authority of the Aristocrats53 diminished in order to give it to the People, but it remained shared [between the three] it made the Republic perfect: which perfection resulted from the disunion of the Plebs and the Senate, as we shall discuss at length in the next following chapters.
2 A judiciary.
收听单词发音 |
1
initially
|
|
| adv.最初，开始 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
2
spartans
|
|
| n.斯巴达（spartan的复数形式） | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
3
prudent
|
|
| adj.谨慎的，有远见的，精打细算的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
4
disturbance
|
|
| n.动乱，骚动；打扰，干扰；(身心)失调 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
5
diverged
|
|
| 分开( diverge的过去式和过去分词 )； 偏离； 分歧； 分道扬镳 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
6
entirely
|
|
| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
7
contemplates
|
|
| 深思，细想，仔细考虑( contemplate的第三人称单数 )； 注视，凝视； 考虑接受（发生某事的可能性）； 深思熟虑，沉思，苦思冥想 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
8
accomplished
|
|
| adj.有才艺的；有造诣的；达到了的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
9
peril
|
|
| n.(严重的)危险；危险的事物 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
10
discourse
|
|
| n.论文，演说；谈话；话语；vi.讲述，著述 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
11
corrupted
|
|
| （使）败坏( corrupt的过去式和过去分词 )； （使）腐化； 引起（计算机文件等的）错误； 破坏 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
12
derive
|
|
| v.取得；导出；引申；来自；源自；出自 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
13
autocracy
|
|
| n.独裁政治，独裁政府 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
14
licentious
|
|
| adj.放纵的，淫乱的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
15
degenerating
|
|
| 衰退，堕落，退化( degenerate的现在分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
16
vice
|
|
| n.坏事；恶习；[pl.]台钳，老虎钳；adj.副的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
17
dispersed
|
|
| adj. 被驱散的, 被分散的, 散布的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
18
robust
|
|
| adj.强壮的，强健的，粗野的，需要体力的，浓的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
19
differentiating
|
|
| [计] 微分的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
20
benefactor
|
|
| n. 恩人，行善的人，捐助人 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
21
compassion
|
|
| n.同情，怜悯 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
22
censuring
|
|
| v.指责，非难，谴责( censure的现在分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
23
contravene
|
|
| v.违反，违背，反驳，反对 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
24
degenerated
|
|
| 衰退，堕落，退化( degenerate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
25
sumptuousness
|
|
| 奢侈，豪华 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
26
lasciviousness
|
|
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
|
27
conspiracies
|
|
| n.阴谋，密谋( conspiracy的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
28
generosity
|
|
| n.大度，慷慨，慷慨的行为 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
29
hatred
|
|
| n.憎恶，憎恨，仇恨 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
30
avarice
|
|
| n.贪婪；贪心 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
31
violation
|
|
| n.违反(行为)，违背(行为)，侵犯 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
32
oligarchic
|
|
| adj.寡头政治的，主张寡头政治的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
33
tyrant
|
|
| n.暴君，专制的君主，残暴的人 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
34
reverence
|
|
| n.敬畏，尊敬，尊严；Reverence:对某些基督教神职人员的尊称；v.尊敬，敬畏，崇敬 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
35
license
|
|
| n.执照，许可证，特许；v.许可，特许 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
36
inflicted
|
|
| 把…强加给，使承受，遭受( inflict的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
37
constrained
|
|
| adj.束缚的,节制的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
38
besetting
|
|
| adj.不断攻击的v.困扰( beset的现在分词 )；不断围攻；镶；嵌 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
39
revolve
|
|
| vi.(使)旋转；循环出现 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
40
malignity
|
|
| n.极度的恶意，恶毒；（病的）恶性 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
41
prudently
|
|
| adv. 谨慎地，慎重地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
42
acting
|
|
| n.演戏，行为，假装；adj.代理的，临时的，演出用的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
43
tranquillity
|
|
| n. 平静, 安静 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
44
ordinances
|
|
| n.条例，法令( ordinance的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
45
insolence
|
|
| n.傲慢；无礼；厚颜；傲慢的态度 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
46
licentiousness
|
|
| n.放肆，无法无天 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
47
attain
|
|
| vt.达到，获得，完成 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
48
attained
|
|
| （通常经过努力）实现( attain的过去式和过去分词 )； 达到； 获得； 达到（某年龄、水平、状况） | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
49
defective
|
|
| adj.有毛病的，有问题的，有瑕疵的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
50
deviate
|
|
| v.(from)背离，偏离 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
51
consuls
|
|
| 领事( consul的名词复数 )； （古罗马共和国时期）执政官 （古罗马共和国及其军队的最高首长，同时共有两位，每年选举一次） | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
52
monarchial
|
|
| 国王的，帝王风度的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
53
aristocrats
|
|
| n.贵族( aristocrat的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
| 欢迎访问英文小说网 |