The Dictatorial1 Authority Did Good and not Harm to the Roman Republic; and that the Authority which Citizens Take Away, not Those are Given them by Free Suffrage2, are Pernicious to civil Society
Those Romans who introduced into that City the method of creating a Dictator have been condemned3 by some writers, as something that was in time the cause of tyranny in Rome; alleging4 that the first tyrant5 who existed in that City commanded her under this title of Dictator, saying if it had not been for this, Caesar could not under any public [title] have imposed his tyranny. Which thing was not well examined by those who held this opinion and was believed beyond all reason. For it was not the name or the rank of Dictator that placed Rome in servitude, but it was the authority taken by the Citizens to perpetuate6 themselves in the Empire [government]: and if the title of Dictator did not exist in Rome, they would have taken another; for it is power that easily acquires a name, not a name power. And it is seen that the Dictatorship while it was given according to public orders and not by individual authority, always did good to the City. For it is the Magistrates8 who are made and the authority that is given by irregular means that do injury to Republics, not those that come in the regular way. As is seen ensued in Rome where in so much passage of time no Dictator did anything that was not good for the Republic. For which there are very evident reasons: First, because if a Citizen would want to [offend and ] take up authority in an irregular manner, it must happen that he have many qualities which he can never have in an uncorrupted Republic, for he needs to be very rich and to have many adherents9 and partisans10, which he cannot have where the laws are observed: and even if he should have them, such men are so formidable that free suffrage would not support them. In addition to this, a Dictator was made for a [limited] time and not in perpetuity, and only to remove the cause for which he was created; and his authority extended only in being able to decide by himself the ways of meeting that urgent peril11, [and] to do things without consultation13, and to punish anyone without appeal; but he could do nothing to diminish [the power] of the State, such as would have been the taking away of authority from the Senate or the people, to destroy the ancient institutions of the City and the making of new ones. So that taking together the short time of the Dictatorship and the limited authority that he had, and the Roman People uncorrupted, it was impossible that he should exceed his limits and harm the City: but from experience it is seen that it [City] always benefited by him.
And truly, among the other Roman institutions, this is one that merits to be considered and counted among those which were the cause of the greatness of so great an Empire: For without a similar institution, the Cities would have avoided such extraordinary hazards only with difficulty; for the customary orders of the Republic move to slowly (no council or Magistrate7 being able by himself to do anything, but in many cases having to act together) that the assembling together of opinions takes so much time; and remedies are most dangerous when they have to apply to some situation which cannot await time. And therefore Republics ought to have a similar method among their institutions. And the Venetian Republic (which among modern Republics is excellent) has reserved authority to a small group [few] of citizens so that in urgent necessities they can decide on all matters without wider consultation. For when a similar method is lacking in a Republic, either observing the institutions [strictly] will ruin her, or in order not to ruin her, it will be necessary to break them. And in a Republic, it should never happen that it be governed by extraordinary methods. For although the extraordinary method would do well at that time, none the less the example does evil, for if a usage is established of breaking institutions for good objectives, then under that pretext14 they will be broken for evil ones. So that no Republic will be perfect, unless it has provided for everything with laws, and provided a remedy for every incident, and fixed15 the method of governing it. And therefore concluding I say, that those Republics which in urgent perils16 do not have resort either to a Dictatorship or a similar authority, will always be ruined in grave incidents. And it is to be noted17 in this new institution how the method of electing him was wisely provided by the Romans. For the creation of a Dictator being of some discredit18 to the Consuls19, as the Chiefs of the City had to come to the same obedience20 as others, [and] wanting that the authority for such election should remain in the consuls, believing that if an incident should arise that Rome would have need of this Regal power, by doing this voluntarily by themselves [Consuls], it would reflect on them less. For the wounds and every other evil that men inflict21 on themselves spontaneously and by choice, pain less in the long run than do those that are inflicted22 by others. In later times, however, the Romans, in place of a Dictator, used to give such authority to the Consul12, in these words: Let the Consuls see that the Republic suffers no detriment23. But to return to our subject, I conclude, that the neighbors of Rome seeking to oppress her, caused her to institute methods not only enabling her to defend herself, but enabling her with more strength, better counsels, and greater authority to attack them.
1 dictatorial | |
adj. 独裁的,专断的 | |
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2 suffrage | |
n.投票,选举权,参政权 | |
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3 condemned | |
adj. 被责难的, 被宣告有罪的 动词condemn的过去式和过去分词 | |
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4 alleging | |
断言,宣称,辩解( allege的现在分词 ) | |
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5 tyrant | |
n.暴君,专制的君主,残暴的人 | |
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6 perpetuate | |
v.使永存,使永记不忘 | |
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7 magistrate | |
n.地方行政官,地方法官,治安官 | |
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8 magistrates | |
地方法官,治安官( magistrate的名词复数 ) | |
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9 adherents | |
n.支持者,拥护者( adherent的名词复数 );党羽;徒子徒孙 | |
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10 partisans | |
游击队员( partisan的名词复数 ); 党人; 党羽; 帮伙 | |
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11 peril | |
n.(严重的)危险;危险的事物 | |
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12 consul | |
n.领事;执政官 | |
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13 consultation | |
n.咨询;商量;商议;会议 | |
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14 pretext | |
n.借口,托词 | |
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15 fixed | |
adj.固定的,不变的,准备好的;(计算机)固定的 | |
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16 perils | |
极大危险( peril的名词复数 ); 危险的事(或环境) | |
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17 noted | |
adj.著名的,知名的 | |
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18 discredit | |
vt.使不可置信;n.丧失信义;不信,怀疑 | |
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19 consuls | |
领事( consul的名词复数 ); (古罗马共和国时期)执政官 (古罗马共和国及其军队的最高首长,同时共有两位,每年选举一次) | |
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20 obedience | |
n.服从,顺从 | |
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21 inflict | |
vt.(on)把…强加给,使遭受,使承担 | |
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22 inflicted | |
把…强加给,使承受,遭受( inflict的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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23 detriment | |
n.损害;损害物,造成损害的根源 | |
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