How Much the Soldiers in Our Times are Different from the Ancient Organization
The most important engagement ever fought in any war with any nation by the Roman People, was that which they had with the Latin people during the Consulate1 of Torquatus and of Decius. As every reason would have it, just as by the loss of the battle the Latins became slaves, so too the Romans would have been slaves if they had not won. And Titus Livius is of this opinion, because on both sides he makes the armies equal in organization, in virtu, in obstinacy2, and in numbers: the only difference he makes is that the Heads of the Roman army were of more virtu than those of the Latin army. It will also be seen that in the managing of this engagement, two incidents arose which had not arisen before, and that afterwards were rare examples; that of the two Consuls3, in order to uphold the courage of the soldiers and keep them obedient to their command and more deliberate in action, one killed himself and the other his son. The equality which Titus Livius says existed in these armies resulted from their having fought together a long time, having the same language, the same discipline, and the same arms: For they held to the same manner in the order of battle, and the organizations and Heads of the organization had the same names: Being of equal strength and of equal virtu, it was therefore necessary that something extraordinary should arise which would make one more firm and obstinate4 than the other; in which obstinacy victory (as was said at another time) was contained; for so long as that endured in the breasts of those who combatted, no army will ever turn its back. And as it endured more in the breasts of the Romans than in the Latins, partly chance and partly the virtu of the Consuls gave rise that Torquatus had to kill his son and Decius himself.
In demonstrating this equality of strength, T. Livius shows the whole organization that the Romans had in the armies and in battles. As he has explained this at length, I will not otherwise repeat it; but I will discuss only that which I judge to be notable, and that which, because it is neglected by all Captains of these times, has caused many disorders6 in armies and battles. I say, then, that from the text of Livius it is gathered that the Roman armies were composed of three principal divisions, which in Tuscan can be called Ranks, and they named the first Astati, the second Principi, the third Triari, and each of these had its cavalry7. In organizing a battle they put the Astati in front, directly behind in the second line they placed the Principi, and in the same manner in the third line they placed the Triari. The cavalry of all of these orders were placed to the right and the left of these three battalions8, the ranks of which cavalry, from their shape and place, they called Alae [Wings], because they seemed like two wings of that body. They arranged the first ranks of the Astati, which were in the front and serried9 in a way that it could strike or sustain [the attack of] the enemy. The second line of the Principi (as it was not the first in combat, but was bound to support the first line when it was struck or hurled10 back), they did not make straight, but maintained its order open [thin] and of a kind so that it could receive within itself the first line, without disordering itself, whenever, pushed by the enemy, it should be necessary for them to retreat. The third line of the Triari was arranged even more open than the second, in order to receive within itself, if need be, the first two lines of Principi, and Astati. These three ranks thus deployed11 kindled12 the battle, and if the Astati were forced or overcome, they retreated into the open ranks of the Principi, and the two ranks being united together into one body rekindled13 the battle: if these were also forced or rebuffed, they both retired14 into the open ranks of the Triari, and all these ranks becoming one body, renewed the fight; where, if they were overcome (for not having further reinforcements) they lost the engagement. And as every time that this last rank of Triari became engaged, the army was in danger, and gave rise to that proverb, The matter has come to the Triari, which in Tuscan usage means to say, we have put up the last resource.
The captains of our times, having abandoned entirely15 the organization and no longer observing the ancient discipline, have thus abandoned this part which is not of little importance: for whoever arranges [his army] so as to be able to reorganize three times in an engagement, must have fortune inimical to him three times in order to lose, and must have [pitted] against him a virtu three times as adept16 to overcome him. But whoever cannot maintain himself against the first onrush (as the Christian17 armies are today) can lose easily, for every disorder5, every half-way virtu, can take away the victory. And that which prevents our armies from being able to reorganize three times is to have lost the manner of receiving one rank into the other. Which arises because at present engagements are arranged with two defects: either their ranks are formed shoulder to shoulder, and make their battle line wide in front and thin in depth, which makes it very weak from having too few men in the depth of the ranks: or, in order to make it stronger, they reduce the ranks [in width of the front], in accordance as the Romans did; if the first rank is broken, there not being an arrangement to be received by the second, they will be entangled18 all together, and rout19 themselves; for if that front rank is pushed back, it will be hurled on the second; if the second rank wants to go forward, it is impeded20 by the first: Whence that the first being hurled upon the second, and the second on the third, there ensues so much confusion that the slightest accident often ruins an army.
In the battle at Ravenna, which was (according to our times) a very well-fought engagement, in which the Captain of the French forces, Monsignor De Foix, was killed, the Spanish and French armies were organized in one of the above mentioned methods, that is, that the one and the other army came with all its forces arranged shoulder to shoulder so as to have a wide front and little depth. And thus they always did when they had a large field as they had at Ravenna: for recognizing the disorder that is caused in retiring, when they put themselves all into one rank, they avoid it when they can by making the front wide, as has been said; but when the country is restricted, they remain in the disorder described above without thinking of a remedy. In similar disorder the cavalry rides through the enemy’s country, either for plunder21 or for some other purpose of war. And at Santo Regolo and elsewhere in the war against Pisa, where the Florentines were routed by the Pisans in the [time of the] war which existed between the Florentines and that City because of her rebellion, after the passage of Charles, King of France, into Italy; that ruin did not result from anything else than the friendly cavalry, which being in front and repulsed22 by the enemy, was thrown back into the Florentine infantry23 and broke it, whence all the remaining forces turned back: and Messer Criaco Del Borgo, Head of the Florentine infantry, has affirmed in my presence many times that he would never have been routed except for the cavalry of his friends. The Swiss who are masters of modern war, when they fought for the French, above all things they take care to put themselves on the side where the friendly cavalry, if it should be repulsed, will not be hurled back on them.
And although this thing would appear easy to understand and not easy to do, none the less there has not yet been found any of our contemporary Captains who have imitated the ancient order and corrected the modem24 one. And although they also divide their army into three parts, calling one part the Vanguard, the next the Battle Corps25, and the last the Rearguard, they do not serve themselves of it other than to command them in their quarters; but in using it, it is a rare thing (as was said above) that they do to unite them all in one body, so that they all share the same fortune: And as many, to excuse their ignorance, allege26 that the violence of the artillery27 will not allow the same arrangements that the ancients had to be used in these times, I want to discuss this matter in the following chapter, and to examine whether the artillery impedes28 them so that it is not possible to use the ancient virtu.
1 consulate | |
n.领事馆 | |
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2 obstinacy | |
n.顽固;(病痛等)难治 | |
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3 consuls | |
领事( consul的名词复数 ); (古罗马共和国时期)执政官 (古罗马共和国及其军队的最高首长,同时共有两位,每年选举一次) | |
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4 obstinate | |
adj.顽固的,倔强的,不易屈服的,较难治愈的 | |
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5 disorder | |
n.紊乱,混乱;骚动,骚乱;疾病,失调 | |
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6 disorders | |
n.混乱( disorder的名词复数 );凌乱;骚乱;(身心、机能)失调 | |
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7 cavalry | |
n.骑兵;轻装甲部队 | |
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8 battalions | |
n.(陆军的)一营(大约有一千兵士)( battalion的名词复数 );协同作战的部队;军队;(组织在一起工作的)队伍 | |
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9 serried | |
adj.拥挤的;密集的 | |
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10 hurled | |
v.猛投,用力掷( hurl的过去式和过去分词 );大声叫骂 | |
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11 deployed | |
(尤指军事行动)使展开( deploy的过去式和过去分词 ); 施展; 部署; 有效地利用 | |
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12 kindled | |
(使某物)燃烧,着火( kindle的过去式和过去分词 ); 激起(感情等); 发亮,放光 | |
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13 rekindled | |
v.使再燃( rekindle的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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14 retired | |
adj.隐退的,退休的,退役的 | |
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15 entirely | |
ad.全部地,完整地;完全地,彻底地 | |
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16 adept | |
adj.老练的,精通的 | |
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17 Christian | |
adj.基督教徒的;n.基督教徒 | |
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18 entangled | |
adj.卷入的;陷入的;被缠住的;缠在一起的v.使某人(某物/自己)缠绕,纠缠于(某物中),使某人(自己)陷入(困难或复杂的环境中)( entangle的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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19 rout | |
n.溃退,溃败;v.击溃,打垮 | |
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20 impeded | |
阻碍,妨碍,阻止( impede的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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21 plunder | |
vt.劫掠财物,掠夺;n.劫掠物,赃物;劫掠 | |
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22 repulsed | |
v.击退( repulse的过去式和过去分词 );驳斥;拒绝 | |
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23 infantry | |
n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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24 modem | |
n.调制解调器 | |
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25 corps | |
n.(通信等兵种的)部队;(同类作的)一组 | |
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26 allege | |
vt.宣称,申述,主张,断言 | |
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27 artillery | |
n.(军)火炮,大炮;炮兵(部队) | |
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28 impedes | |
阻碍,妨碍,阻止( impede的第三人称单数 ) | |
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