Part 1 Chapter 7 Of the use of sophistical arguments, and hyp

The handling of sophistical and hypothetical arguments, and of those which derive¹ their conclusions from questioning, and in a word the handling of all such arguments, relates to the duties of life, though the many do not know this truth. For in every matter we inquire how the wise and good man shall discover the proper path and the proper method of dealing² with the matter. Let, then, people either say that the grave man will not descend³ into the contest of question and answer, or that, if he does descend into the contest, he will take no care about not conducting himself rashly or carelessly in questioning and answering. But if they do not allow either the one or the other of these things, they must admit that some inquiry⁴ ought to be made into those topics on which particularly questioning and answering are employed. For what is the end proposed in reasoning? To establish true propositions, to remove the false, to withhold⁵ assent⁶ from those which are not plain. Is it enough then to have learned only this? “It is enough,” a man may reply. Is it, then, also enough for a man, who would not make a mistake in the use of coined money, to have heard this precept⁷, that he should receive the genuine drachmae and reject the spurious? “It is not enough.” What, then, ought to be added to this precept? What else than the faculty⁸ which proves and distinguishes the genuine and the spurious drachmae? Consequently also in reasoning what has been said is not enough; but is it necessary that a man should acquire the faculty of examining and distinguishing the true and the false, and that which is not plain? “It is necessary.” Besides this, what is proposed in reasoning? “That you should accept what follows from that which you have properly granted.” Well, is it then enough in this case also to know this? It is not enough; but a man must learn how one thing is a consequence of other things, and when one thing follows from one thing, and when it follows from several collectively. Consider, then if it be not necessary that this power should also be acquired by him who purposes to conduct himself skillfully in reasoning, the power of demonstrating himself the several things which he has proposed, and the power of understanding the demonstrations¹⁰ of others, including of not being deceived by sophists, as if they were demonstrating. Therefore there has arisen among us the practice and exercise of conclusive¹¹ arguments and figures, and it has been shown to be necessary.

But in fact in some cases we have properly granted the premisses or assumptions, and there results from them something; and though it is not true, yet none the less it does result. What then ought I to do? Ought I to admit the falsehood? And how is that possible? Well, should I say that I did not properly grant that which we agreed upon? “But you are not allowed to do even this.” Shall I then say that the consequence does not arise through what has been conceded? “But neither is it allowed.” What then must be done in this case? Consider if it is not this: as to have borrowed is not enough to make a man still a debtor¹², but to this must be added the fact that he continues to owe the money and that the debt is not paid, so it is not enough to compel you to admit the inference that you have granted the premisses, but you must abide¹³ by what you have granted. Indeed, if the premisses continue to the end such as they were when they were granted, it is absolutely necessary for us to abide by what we have granted, and we must accept their consequences: but if the premisses do not remain such as they were when they were granted, it is absolutely necessary for us also to withdraw from what we granted, and from accepting what does not follow from the words in which our concessions¹⁴ were made. For the inference is now not our inference, nor does it result with our assent, since we have withdrawn¹⁵ from the premisses which we granted. We ought then both to examine such kind of premisses, and such change and variation of them, by which in the course of questioning or answering, or in making the syllogistic¹⁶ conclusion, or in any other such way, the premisses undergo variations, and give occasion to the foolish to be confounded, if they do not see what conclusions are. For what reason ought we to examine? In order that we may not in this matter be employed in an improper¹⁷ manner nor in a confused way.

And the same in hypotheses and hypothetical arguments; for it is necessary sometimes to demand the granting of some hypothesis as a kind of passage to the argument which follows. Must we then allow every hypothesis that is proposed, or not allow every one? And if not every one, which should we allow? And if a man has allowed an hypothesis, must he in every case abide by allowing it? or must he sometimes withdraw from it, but admit the consequences and not admit contradictions? Yes; but suppose that a man says, “If you admit the hypothesis of a possibility, I will draw you to an impossibility.” With such a person shall a man of sense refuse to enter into a contest, and avoid discussion and conversation with him? But what other man than the man of sense can use argumentation and is skillful in questioning and answering, and incapable¹⁸ of being cheated and deceived by false reasoning? And shall he enter into the contest, and yet not take care whether he shall engage in argument not rashly and not carelessly? And if he does not take care, how can he be such a man as we conceive him to be? But without some such exercise and preparation, can he maintain a continuous and consistent argument? Let them show this; and all these speculations¹⁹ become superfluous²⁰, and are absurd and inconsistent with our notion of a good and serious man.

Why are we still indolent and negligent²¹ and sluggish²², and why do we seek pretences²³ for not labouring and not being watchful²⁴ in cultivating our reason? “If then I shall make a mistake in these matters may I not have killed my father?” Slave, where was there a father in this matter that you could kill him? What, then, have you done? The only fault that was possible here is the fault which you have committed. This is the very remark which I made to Rufus when he blamed me for not having discovered the one thing omitted in a certain syllogism²⁵: “I suppose,” I said, “that I have burnt the Capitol.” “Slave,” he replied, “was the thing omitted here the Capitol?” Or are these the only crimes, to burn the Capitol and to kill your father? But for a man to use the appearances resented to him rashly and foolishly and carelessly, not to understand argument, nor demonstration⁹, nor sophism²⁶, nor, in a word, to see in questioning and answering what is consistent with that which we have granted or is not consistent; is there no error in this?

1 derive   

v.取得；导出；引申；来自；源自；出自

参考例句：

• We derive our sustenance from the land.我们从土地获取食物。
• We shall derive much benefit from reading good novels.我们将从优秀小说中获得很大好处。

2 dealing   

n.经商方法，待人态度

参考例句：

• This store has an excellent reputation for fair dealing.该商店因买卖公道而享有极高的声誉。
• His fair dealing earned our confidence.他的诚实的行为获得我们的信任。

3 descend   

vt./vi.传下来，下来，下降

参考例句：

• I hope the grace of God would descend on me.我期望上帝的恩惠。
• We're not going to descend to such methods.我们不会沦落到使用这种手段。

4 inquiry   

n.打听，询问，调查，查问

参考例句：

• Many parents have been pressing for an inquiry into the problem.许多家长迫切要求调查这个问题。
• The field of inquiry has narrowed down to five persons.调查的范围已经缩小到只剩5个人了。

5 withhold   

v.拒绝，不给；使停止，阻挡

参考例句：

• It was unscrupulous of their lawyer to withhold evidence.他们的律师隐瞒证据是不道德的。
• I couldn't withhold giving some loose to my indignation.我忍不住要发泄一点我的愤怒。

6 assent   

v.批准，认可；n.批准，认可

参考例句：

• I cannot assent to what you ask.我不能应允你的要求。
• The new bill passed by Parliament has received Royal Assent.议会所通过的新方案已获国王批准。

7 precept   

n.戒律；格言

参考例句：

• It occurs to me that example is always more efficacious than precept.我想到身教重于言教。
• The son had well profited by the precept and example of the father.老太爷的言传身教早已使他儿子获益无穷。

8 faculty   

n.才能；学院，系；(学院或系的)全体教学人员

参考例句：

• He has a great faculty for learning foreign languages.他有学习外语的天赋。
• He has the faculty of saying the right thing at the right time.他有在恰当的时候说恰当的话的才智。

9 demonstration   

n.表明，示范，论证，示威

参考例句：

• His new book is a demonstration of his patriotism.他写的新书是他的爱国精神的证明。
• He gave a demonstration of the new technique then and there.他当场表演了这种新的操作方法。

10 demonstrations   

证明( demonstration的名词复数 )； 表明； 表达； 游行示威

参考例句：

• Lectures will be interspersed with practical demonstrations. 讲课中将不时插入实际示范。
• The new military government has banned strikes and demonstrations. 新的军人政府禁止罢工和示威活动。

11 conclusive   

adj.最后的，结论的；确凿的，消除怀疑的

参考例句：

• They produced some fairly conclusive evidence.他们提供了一些相当确凿的证据。
• Franklin did not believe that the French tests were conclusive.富兰克林不相信这个法国人的实验是结论性的。

12 debtor   

n.借方，债务人

参考例句：

• He crowded the debtor for payment.他催逼负债人还债。
• The court granted me a lien on my debtor's property.法庭授予我对我债务人财产的留置权。

13 abide   

vi.遵守；坚持；vt.忍受

参考例句：

• You must abide by the results of your mistakes.你必须承担你的错误所造成的后果。
• If you join the club,you have to abide by its rules.如果你参加俱乐部，你就得遵守它的规章。

14 concessions   

n.（尤指由政府或雇主给予的）特许权( concession的名词复数 )；承认；减价；（在某地的）特许经营权

参考例句：

• The firm will be forced to make concessions if it wants to avoid a strike. 要想避免罢工，公司将不得不作出一些让步。
• The concessions did little to placate the students. 让步根本未能平息学生的愤怒。

15 withdrawn   

vt.收回；使退出；vi.撤退，退出

参考例句：

• Our force has been withdrawn from the danger area.我们的军队已从危险地区撤出。
• All foreign troops should be withdrawn to their own countries.一切外国军队都应撤回本国去。

16 syllogistic   

adj.三段论法的，演绎的，演绎性的

参考例句：

17 improper   

adj.不适当的，不合适的，不正确的，不合礼仪的

参考例句：

• Short trousers are improper at a dance.舞会上穿短裤不成体统。
• Laughing and joking are improper at a funeral.葬礼时大笑和开玩笑是不合适的。

18 incapable   

adj.无能力的，不能做某事的

参考例句：

• He would be incapable of committing such a cruel deed.他不会做出这么残忍的事。
• Computers are incapable of creative thought.计算机不会创造性地思维。

19 speculations   

n.投机买卖( speculation的名词复数 )；思考；投机活动；推断

参考例句：

• Your speculations were all quite close to the truth. 你的揣测都很接近于事实。 来自《现代英汉综合大词典》
• This possibility gives rise to interesting speculations. 这种可能性引起了有趣的推测。 来自《用法词典》

20 superfluous   

adj.过多的，过剩的，多余的

参考例句：

• She fined away superfluous matter in the design. 她删去了这图案中多余的东西。
• That request seemed superfluous when I wrote it.我这样写的时候觉得这个请求似乎是多此一举。

21 negligent   

adj.疏忽的；玩忽的；粗心大意的

参考例句：

• The committee heard that he had been negligent in his duty.委员会听说他玩忽职守。
• If the government is proved negligent,compensation will be payable.如果证明是政府的疏忽，就应支付赔偿。

22 sluggish   

adj.懒惰的，迟钝的，无精打采的

参考例句：

• This humid heat makes you feel rather sluggish.这种湿热的天气使人感到懒洋洋的。
• Circulation is much more sluggish in the feet than in the hands.脚部的循环比手部的循环缓慢得多。

23 pretences   

n.假装( pretence的名词复数 )；作假；自命；自称

参考例句：

• You've brought your old friends out here under false pretences. 你用虚假的名义把你的那些狐朋狗党带到这里来。 来自英汉文学 - 嘉莉妹妹
• There are no pretences about him. 他一点不虚伪。 来自辞典例句

24 watchful   

adj.注意的，警惕的

参考例句：

• The children played under the watchful eye of their father.孩子们在父亲的小心照看下玩耍。
• It is important that health organizations remain watchful.卫生组织保持警惕是极为重要的。

25 syllogism   

n.演绎法，三段论法

参考例句：

• The ramifications or the mystery of a syllogism can become a weariness and a bore.三段论证法的分歧或者神秘会变成一种无聊、一种麻烦。
• The unexpected bursts forth from the syllogism.三段论里常出岔子。

26 sophism   

n.诡辩

参考例句：

• Have done with your foolish sophism.结束你那愚蠢的诡辩。
• I wasn't taken in by his sophism.我没有被他的诡辩骗倒。