The opinion of the philosophers, perhaps, seems to some to be a paradox1; but still let us examine as well as we can, if it is true that it is possible to do everything both with caution and with confidence. For caution seems to be in a manner contrary to confidence, and contraries are in no way consistent. That which seems to many to be a paradox in the matter under consideration in my opinion is of this kind: if we asserted that we ought to employ caution and in the same things, men might justly accuse us of bringing together things which cannot be united. But now where is the difficulty in what is said? for if these things are true, which have been often said and often proved, that the nature of good is in the use of appearances, and the nature of evil likewise, and that things independent of our will do not admit either the nature of evil nor of good, what paradox do the philosophers assert if they say that where things are not dependent on the will, there you should employ confidence, but where they are dependent on the will, there you should employ caution? For if the bad consists in a bad exercise of the will, caution ought only to be used where things are dependent on the will. But if things independent of the will and not in our power are nothing to us, with respect to these we must employ confidence; and thus we shall both be cautious and confident, and indeed confident because of our caution. For by employing caution toward things which are really bad, it will result that we shall have confidence with respect to things which are not so.
We are then in the condition of deer; when they flee from the huntsmen’s feathers in fright, whither do they turn and in what do they seek refuge as safe? They turn to the nets, and thus they perish by confounding things which are objects of fear with things that they ought not to fear. Thus we also act: in what cases do we fear? In things which are independent of the will. In what cases, on the contrary, do we behave with confidence, as if there were no danger? In things dependent on the will. To be deceived then, or to act rashly, or shamelessly or with base desire to seek something, does not concern us at all, if we only hit the mark in things which are independent of our will. But where there is death, or exile or pain or infamy2, there we attempt or examine to run away, there we are struck with terror. Therefore, as we may expect it to happen with those who err3 in the greatest matters, we convert natural confidence into audacity4, desperation, rashness, shamelessness; and we convert natural caution and modesty5 into cowardice6 and meanness, which are full of fear and confusion. For if a man should transfer caution to those things in which the will may be exercised and the acts of the will, he will immediately, by willing to be cautious, have also the power of avoiding what he chooses: but if he transfer it to the things which are not in his power and will, and attempt to avoid the things which are in the power of others, he will of necessity fear, he will be unstable7, he will be disturbed. For death or pain is not formidable, but the fear of pain or death. For this reason we commend the poet who said
Not death is evil, but a shameful8 death.
Confidence then ought to be employed against death, and caution against the fear of death. But now we do the contrary, and employ against death the attempt to escape; and to our opinion about it we employ carelessness, rashness and indifference9. These things Socrates properly used to call “tragic masks”; for as to children masks appear terrible and fearful from inexperience, we also are affected10 in like manner by events for no other reason than children are by masks. For what is a child? Ignorance. What is a child? Want of knowledge. For when a child knows these things, he is in no way inferior to us. What is death? A “tragic mask.” Turn it and examine it. See, it does not bite. The poor body must be separated from the spirit either now or later, as it was separated from it before. Why, then, are you troubled, if it be separated now? for if it is not separated now, it will be separated afterward11. Why? That the period of the universe may be completed, for it has need of the present, and of the future, and of the past. What is pain? A mask. Turn it and examine it. The poor flesh is moved roughly, then, on the contrary, smoothly12. If this does not satisfy you, the door is open: if it does, bear. For the door ought to be open for all occasions; and so we have no trouble.
What then is the fruit of these opinions? It is that which ought to he the most noble and the most becoming to those who are really educated, release from perturbation, release from fear, freedom. For in these matters we must not believe the many, who say that free persons only ought to be educated, but we should rather believe the philosophers, who say that the educated only are free. “How is this?” In this manner. Is freedom anything else than the power of living as we choose? “Nothing else.” Tell me then, ye men, do you wish to live in error? “We do not.” No one then who lives in error is free. Do you wish to live in fear? Do you wish to live in sorrow? Do you wish to live in perturbation? “By no means.” No one, then, who is in a state of fear or sorrow or perturbation is free; but whoever is delivered from sorrows and fears and perturbations, he is at the same time also delivered from servitude. How then can we continue to believe you, most dear legislators, when you say, “We only allow free persons to be educated?” For philosophers say we allow none to be free except the educated; that is, God does not allow it. “When then a man has turned round before the praetor his own slave, has he done nothing?” He has done something. “What?” He has turned round his own slave before the praetor. “Has he done nothing, more?” Yes: he is also bound to pay for him the tax called the twentieth. “Well then, is not the man who has gone through this ceremony become free?” No more than he is become free from perturbations. Have you who are able to turn round others no master? is not money your master, or a girl or a boy, or some tyrant13, or some friend of the tyrant? why do you tremble then when you are going off to any trial of this kind? It is for this reason that I often say: Study and hold in readiness these principles by which you may determine what those things are with reference to which you ought to have confidence, and those things with reference to which you ought to be cautious: courageous14 in that which does not depend on your will; cautious in that which does depend on it.
“Well have I not read to you, and do you not know what I was doing?” In what? “In my little dissertations15.” Show me how you are with respect to desire and aversion; and show if you do not fail in getting what you wish, me and if you do not fall into the things which you would avoid: but as to these long and laboured sentences, you will take them and blot16 them out.
“What then did not Socrates write?” And who wrote so much? But how? As he could not always have at hand one to argue against his principles or to be argued against in turn, he used to argue with and examine himself, and he was always treating at least some one subject in a practical way. These are the things which a philosopher writes. But little dissertations and that method, which I speak of, he leaves to others, to the stupid, or to those happy men who being free from perturbations have leisure, or to such as are too foolish to reckon consequences.
And will you now, when the opportunity invites, go and display those things which you possess, and recite them, and make an idle show, and say, “See how I make dialogues?” Do not so, my man: but rather say: “See how I am not disappointed of that which I desire. See how I do not fall into that which I would avoid. Set death before me, and you will see. Set before me pain, prison, disgrace and condemnation17.” This is the proper display of a young man who is come out of the schools. But leave the rest to others, and let no one ever hear you say a word about these things; and if any man commends you for them, do not allow it; but think that you are nobody and know nothing. Only show that you know this, how never to be disappointed in your desire and how never to fall into that which you would avoid. Let others labour at forensic18 causes, problems and syllogisms: do you labour at thinking about death, chains, the rack, exile; and do all this with confidence and reliance on him who has called you to these sufferings, who has judged you worthy19 of the place in which, being stationed, you will show what things the rational governing power can do when it takes its stand against the forces which are not within the power of our will. And thus this paradox will no longer appear either impossible or a paradox, that a man ought to be at the same time cautious and courageous: courageous toward the things which do not depend on the will, and cautious in things which are within the power of the will.
1 paradox | |
n.似乎矛盾却正确的说法;自相矛盾的人(物) | |
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2 infamy | |
n.声名狼藉,出丑,恶行 | |
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3 err | |
vi.犯错误,出差错 | |
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4 audacity | |
n.大胆,卤莽,无礼 | |
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5 modesty | |
n.谦逊,虚心,端庄,稳重,羞怯,朴素 | |
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6 cowardice | |
n.胆小,怯懦 | |
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7 unstable | |
adj.不稳定的,易变的 | |
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8 shameful | |
adj.可耻的,不道德的 | |
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9 indifference | |
n.不感兴趣,不关心,冷淡,不在乎 | |
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10 affected | |
adj.不自然的,假装的 | |
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11 afterward | |
adv.后来;以后 | |
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12 smoothly | |
adv.平滑地,顺利地,流利地,流畅地 | |
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13 tyrant | |
n.暴君,专制的君主,残暴的人 | |
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14 courageous | |
adj.勇敢的,有胆量的 | |
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15 dissertations | |
专题论文,学位论文( dissertation的名词复数 ) | |
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16 blot | |
vt.弄脏(用吸墨纸)吸干;n.污点,污渍 | |
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17 condemnation | |
n.谴责; 定罪 | |
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18 forensic | |
adj.法庭的,雄辩的 | |
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19 worthy | |
adj.(of)值得的,配得上的;有价值的 | |
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