B.C. 362. This answer was duly reported to the general assembly of the Arcadians, and throughout the several states of the league. Consequently the Mantineans, along with those of the Arcadians who had the interests of Peloponnesus at heart, as also the Eleians and the Achaeans, came to the conclusion that the policy of the Thebans was plain. They wished Peloponnesus to be reduced to such an extremity1 of weakness that it might fall an easy prey2 into their hands who were minded to enslave it. “Why else,” they asked, “should they wish us to fight, except that we may tear each other to pieces, and both sides be driven to look to them for support? or why, when we tell them that we have no need of them at present, do they insist on preparing for a foreign campaign? Is it not plain that these preparations are for an expedition which will do us some mischief3?”
In this mood they sent to Athens,740 calling on the Athenians for military aid. Ambassadors also went to Lacedaemon on behalf of the Eparitoi, summoning the Lacedaemonians, if they wished to give a helping4 hand, to put a stop to the proceedings5 of any power approaching to enslave Peloponnesus. As regards the headship, they came to an arrangement at once, on the principle that each of the allied6 states should exercise the generalship within its own territory.
While these matters were in progress, Epaminondas was prosecuting7 his march at the head of all the Boeotians, with the Euboeans, and a large body of Thessalians, furnished both by Alexander741 and by his opponents. The Phocians were not represented. Their special agreement only required them to render assistance in case of an attack on Thebes; to assist in a hostile expedition against others was not in the bond. Epaminondas, however, reflected that inside Peloponnesus itself they might count upon the Argives and the Messenians, with that section of the Arcadians which shared their views. These latter were the men of Tegea and Megalopolis8, of Asea and Pallantium, with any townships which owing to their small size or their position in the midst of these larger cities were forced to follow their lead.
Epaminondas advanced with rapid strides; but on reaching Nemea he slackened speed, hoping to catch the Athenians as they passed, and reflecting on the magnitude of such an achievement, whether in stimulating9 the courage of his own allies, or in plunging10 his foes12 into despondency; since, to state the matter concisely13, any blow to Athens would be a gain to Thebes. But during his pause at Nemea those who shared the opposite policy had time to converge14 on Mantinea. Presently the news reached Epaminondas that the Athenians had abandoned the idea of marching by land, and were preparing to bring their supports to Arcadia by sea through Lacedaemon. This being so, he abandoned his base of Nemea and pushed on to Tegea.
That the strategy of the Theban general was fortunate I will not pretend to assert, but in the particular combination of prudence15 and daring which stamps these exploits, I look upon him as consummate16. In the first place, I cannot but admire the sagacity which led him to form his camp within the walls of Tegea, where he was in greater security that he would have been if entrenched17 outside, and where his future movements were more completely concealed18 from the enemy. Again, the means to collect material and furnish himself with other necessaries were readier to his hand inside the city; while, thirdly, he was able to keep an eye on the movements of his opponents marching outside, and to watch their successful dispositions19 as well as their mistakes. More than this: in spite of his sense of superiority to his antagonists21, over and over again, when he saw them gaining some advantage in position, he refused to be drawn22 out to attack them. It was only when he saw plainly that no city was going to give him its adhesion, and that time was slipping by, that he made up his mind that a blow must be struck, failing which, he had nothing to expect save a vast ingloriousness, in place of his former fame.742 He had ascertained23 that his antagonists held a strong position round Mantinea, and that they had sent to fetch Agesilaus and the whole Lacedaemonian army. He was further aware that Agesilaus had commenced his advance and was already at Pellene.743 Accordingly he passed the word of command744 to his troops to take their evening meal, put himself at their head and advanced straight upon Sparta. Had it not been for the arrival (by some providential chance) of a Cretan, who brought the news to Agesilaus of the enemy’s advance, he would have captured the city of Sparta like a nest of young birds absolutely bereft24 of its natural defenders25. As it was, Agesilaus, being forewarned, had time to return to the city before the Thebans came, and here the Spartans26 made distribution of their scanty27 force and maintained watch and ward28, albeit29 few enough in numbers, since the whole of their cavalry30 were away in Arcadia, and so was their foreign brigade, and so were three out of their twelve regiments31.745
Arrived within the city of Sparta,746 Epaminondas abstained32 from gaining an entry at a point where his troops would have to fight on level ground and under attack from the houses above; where also their large numbers would give them no superiority over the small numbers of the foemen. But, singling out a position which he conceived would give him the advantage, he occupied it and began his advance against the city upon a downward instead of an upward incline.
With regard to what subsequently took place, two possible explanations suggest themselves: either it was miraculous33, or it may be maintained that there is no resisting the fury of desperation. Archidamus, advancing at the head of but a hundred men, and crossing the one thing which might have been expected to form an obstacle to the enemy,747 began marching uphill against his antagonists. At this crisis these fire-breathing warriors34, these victorious35 heroes of Leuctra,748 with their superiority at every point, aided, moreover, by the advantage of their position, did not withstand the attack of Archidamus and those with him, but swerved36 in flight.
The vanguard of Epaminondas’s troops were cut down; when, however, flushed with the glory of their victory, the citizens followed up their pursuit beyond the right point, they in turn were cut down — so plainly was the demarking line of victory drawn by the finger of God. So then Archidamus set up a trophy37 to note the limit of his success, and gave back those who had there fallen of the enemy under a truce38. Epaminondas, on his side, reflecting that the Arcadians must already be hastening to the relief of Lacedaemon, and being unwilling39 to engage them in conjunction with the whole of the Lacedaemonian force, especially now that the star of Sparta’s fortune shone, whilst theirs had suffered some eclipse, turned and marched back the way he came with all speed possible into Tegea. There he gave his heavy infantry40 pause and refreshment41, but his cavalry he sent on to Mantinea; he begged them to “have courage and hold on,” instructing them that in all likelihood they would find the flocks and herds42 of the Mantineans and the entire population itself outside their walls, especially as it was the moment for carrying the corn. So they set off.
The Athenian cavalry, started from Eleusis, had made their evening meal at the Isthmus43, and passing through Cleonae, as chance befell, had arrived at Mantinea and had encamped within the walls in the houses. As soon as the enemy were seen galloping44 up with evidently hostile intent, the Mantineans fell to praying the Athenian knights45 to lend them all the succour they could, and they showed them all their cattle outside, and all their labourers, and among them were many children and graybeards who were free-born citizens. The Athenians were touched by this appeal, and, though they had not yet broken fast, neither the men themselves nor their horses, went out eagerly to the rescue. And here we must needs pause to admire the valour of these men also. The enemy whom they had to cope with far outnumbered them, as was plain to see, and the former misadventure of the cavalry in Corinth was not forgotten.749 But none of these things entered into their calculations now — nor yet the fact that they were on the point of engaging Thebans and Thessalians, the finest cavalry in the world by all repute. The only thing they thought of was the shame and the dishonour46, if, being there, they did not lend a helping hand to their allies. In this mood, so soon as they caught sight of the enemy, they fell with a crash upon him in passionate47 longing48 to recover the old ancestral glory. Nor did they fight in vain — the blows they struck enabled the Mantineans to recover all their property outside, but among those who dealt them died some brave heroes;750 brave heroes also, it is evident, were those whom they slew49, since on either side the weapons wielded50 were not so short but that they could lunge at one another with effect. The dead bodies of their own men they refused to abandon; and there were some of the enemy’s slain51 whom they restored to him under a flag of truce.
The thoughts now working in the mind of Epaminondas were such as these: that within a few days he would be forced to retire, as the period of the campaign was drawing to a close; if it ended in his leaving in the lurch52 those allies whom he came out to assist, they would be besieged53 by their antagonists. What a blow would that be to his own fair fame, already somewhat tarnished54! Had he not been defeated in Lacedaemon, with a large body of heavy infantry, by a handful of men? defeated again at Mantinea, in the cavalry engagement, and himself the main cause finally of a coalition55 between five great powers — that is to say, the Lacedaemonians, the Arcadians, the Achaeans, the Eleians, and the Athenians? On all grounds it seemed to him impossible to steal past without a battle. And the more so as he computed56 the alternatives of victory or death. If the former were his fortune, it would resolve all his perplexities; if death, his end would be noble. How glorious a thing to die in the endeavour to leave behind him, as his last legacy57 to his fatherland, the empire of Peloponnesus! That such thoughts should pass through his brain strikes me as by no means wonderful, as these are thoughts distinctive58 to all men of high ambition. Far more wonderful to my mind was the pitch of perfection to which he had brought his army. There was no labour which his troops would shrink from, either by night or by day; there was no danger they would flinch59 from; and, with the scantiest60 provisions, their discipline never failed them.
And so, when he gave his last orders to them to prepare for impending61 battle, they obeyed with alacrity62. He gave the word; the cavalry fell to whitening their helmets, the heavy infantry of the Arcadians began inscribing63 their clubs as the crest64 on their shields,751 as though they were Thebans, and all were engaged in sharpening their lances and swords and polishing their heavy shields. When the preparations were complete and he had led them out, his next movement is worthy65 of attention. First, as was natural, he paid heed66 to their formation, and in so doing seemed to give clear evidence that he intended battle; but no sooner was the army drawn up in the formation which he preferred, than he advanced, not by the shortest route to meet the enemy, but towards the westward-lying mountains which face Tegea, and by this movement created in the enemy an expectation that he would not do battle on that day. In keeping with this expectation, as soon as he arrived at the mountain-region, he extended his phalanx in long line and piled arms under the high cliffs; and to all appearance he was there encamping. The effect of this manouvre on the enemy in general was to relax the prepared bent67 of their souls for battle, and to weaken their tactical arrangements. Presently, however, wheeling his regiments (which were marching in column) to the front, with the effect of strengthening the beak-like752 attack which he proposed to lead himself, at the same instant he gave the order, “Shoulder arms, forward,” and led the way, the troops following.
When the enemy saw them so unexpectedly approaching, not one of them was able to maintain tranquility: some began running to their divisions, some fell into line, some might be seen bitting and bridling68 their horses, some donning their cuirasses, and one and all were like men about to receive rather than to inflict69 a blow. He, the while, with steady impetus70 pushed forward his armament, like a ship-of-war prow71 forward. Wherever he brought his solid wedge to bear, he meant to cleave72 through the opposing mass, and crumble73 his adversary’s host to pieces. With this design he prepared to throw the brunt of the fighting on the strongest half of his army, while he kept the weaker portion of it in the background, knowing certainly that if worsted it would only cause discouragement to his own division and add force to the foe11. The cavalry on the side of his opponents were disposed like an ordinary phalanx of heavy infantry, regular in depth and unsupported by foot-soldiers interspersed74 among the horses.753 Epaminondas again differed in strengthening the attacking point of his cavalry, besides which he interspersed footmen between their lines in the belief that, when he had once cut through the cavalry, he would have wrested75 victory from the antagonist20 along his whole line; so hard is it to find troops who will care to keep their own ground when once they see any of their own side flying. Lastly, to prevent any attempt on the part of the Athenians, who were on the enemy’s left wing, to bring up their reliefs in support of the portion next them, he posted bodies of cavalry and heavy infantry on certain hillocks in front of them, intending to create in their minds an apprehension76 that, in case they offered such assistance, they would be attacked on their own rear by these detachments. Such was the plan of encounter which he formed and executed; nor was he cheated in his hopes. He had so much the mastery at his point of attack that he caused the whole of the enemy’s troops to take flight.
But after he himself had fallen, the rest of the Thebans were not able any longer to turn their victory rightly to account. Though the main battle line of their opponents had given way, not a single man afterwards did the victorious hoplites slay77, not an inch forward did they advance from the ground on which the collision took place. Though the cavalry had fled before them, there was no pursuit; not a man, horseman or hoplite, did the conquering cavalry cut down; but, like men who have suffered a defeat, as if panic-stricken754 they slipped back through the ranks of the fleeing foemen. Only the footmen fighting amongst the cavalry and the light infantry, who had together shared in the victory of the cavalry, found their way round to the left wing as masters of the field, but it cost them dear; here they encountered the Athenians, and most of them were cut down.
The effective result of these achievements was the very opposite of that which the world at large anticipated. Here, where well-nigh the whole of Hellas was met together in one field, and the combatants stood rank against rank confronted, there was no one doubted that, in the event of battle, the conquerors78 would this day rule; and that those who lost would be their subjects. But God so ordered it that both belligerents79 alike set up trophies80 as claiming victory, and neither interfered81 with the other in the act. Both parties alike gave back their enemy’s dead under a truce, and in right of victory; both alike, in symbol of defeat, under a truce took back their dead. And though both claimed to have won the day, neither could show that he had thereby82 gained any accession of territory, or state, or empire, or was better situated83 than before the battle. Uncertainty84 and confusion, indeed, had gained ground, being tenfold greater throughout the length and breadth of Hellas after the battle than before.
At this point I lay aside my pen: the sequel of the story may haply commend itself755 to another.
收听单词发音 |
1
extremity
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| n.末端，尽头；尽力；终极；极度 | |
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prey
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| n.被掠食者，牺牲者，掠食；v.捕食，掠夺，折磨 | |
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mischief
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| n.损害，伤害，危害；恶作剧，捣蛋，胡闹 | |
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helping
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| n.食物的一份&adj.帮助人的，辅助的 | |
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proceedings
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| n.进程，过程，议程；诉讼(程序)；公报 | |
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allied
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| adj.协约国的；同盟国的 | |
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prosecuting
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| 检举、告发某人( prosecute的现在分词 )； 对某人提起公诉； 继续从事（某事物）； 担任控方律师 | |
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megalopolis
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| n.特大城市 | |
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stimulating
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| adj.有启发性的，能激发人思考的 | |
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plunging
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| adj.跳进的，突进的v.颠簸( plunge的现在分词 )；暴跌；骤降；突降 | |
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foe
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| n.敌人，仇敌 | |
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foes
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| 敌人，仇敌( foe的名词复数 ) | |
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concisely
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| adv.简明地 | |
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converge
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| vi.会合；聚集，集中；(思想、观点等)趋近 | |
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prudence
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| n.谨慎，精明，节俭 | |
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consummate
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| adj.完美的；v.成婚；使完美 [反]baffle | |
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entrenched
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| adj.确立的，不容易改的(风俗习惯) | |
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concealed
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| a.隐藏的，隐蔽的 | |
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dispositions
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| 安排( disposition的名词复数 )； 倾向； （财产、金钱的）处置； 气质 | |
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antagonist
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| n.敌人，对抗者，对手 | |
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antagonists
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| 对立[对抗] 者，对手，敌手( antagonist的名词复数 )； 对抗肌； 对抗药 | |
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drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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ascertained
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| v.弄清，确定，查明( ascertain的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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bereft
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| adj.被剥夺的 | |
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defenders
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| n.防御者( defender的名词复数 )；守卫者；保护者；辩护者 | |
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spartans
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| n.斯巴达（spartan的复数形式） | |
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scanty
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| adj.缺乏的，仅有的，节省的，狭小的，不够的 | |
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ward
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| n.守卫，监护，病房，行政区，由监护人或法院保护的人（尤指儿童）；vt.守护，躲开 | |
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albeit
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| conj.即使；纵使；虽然 | |
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cavalry
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| n.骑兵；轻装甲部队 | |
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regiments
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| （军队的）团( regiment的名词复数 )； 大量的人或物 | |
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abstained
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| v.戒（尤指酒），戒除( abstain的过去式和过去分词 )；弃权（不投票） | |
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miraculous
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| adj.像奇迹一样的，不可思议的 | |
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warriors
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| 武士，勇士，战士( warrior的名词复数 ) | |
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victorious
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| adj.胜利的，得胜的 | |
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swerved
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| v.（使）改变方向，改变目的( swerve的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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trophy
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| n.优胜旗，奖品，奖杯，战胜品，纪念品 | |
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truce
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| n.休战，(争执，烦恼等的)缓和；v.以停战结束 | |
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unwilling
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| adj.不情愿的 | |
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40
infantry
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| n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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41
refreshment
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| n.恢复，精神爽快，提神之事物；（复数）refreshments:点心，茶点 | |
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42
herds
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| 兽群( herd的名词复数 )； 牧群； 人群； 群众 | |
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isthmus
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| n.地峡 | |
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galloping
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| adj. 飞驰的, 急性的 动词gallop的现在分词形式 | |
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knights
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| 骑士； （中古时代的）武士( knight的名词复数 )； 骑士； 爵士； （国际象棋中）马 | |
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46
dishonour
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| n./vt.拒付（支票、汇票、票据等）；vt.凌辱，使丢脸；n.不名誉，耻辱，不光彩 | |
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47
passionate
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| adj.热情的，热烈的，激昂的，易动情的，易怒的，性情暴躁的 | |
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48
longing
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| n.（for）渴望 | |
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49
slew
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| v.（使）旋转；n.大量，许多 | |
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50
wielded
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| 手持着使用（武器、工具等）( wield的过去式和过去分词 )； 具有； 运用（权力）； 施加（影响） | |
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51
slain
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| 杀死，宰杀，杀戮( slay的过去分词 )； (slay的过去分词) | |
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52
lurch
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| n.突然向前或旁边倒；v.蹒跚而行 | |
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besieged
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| 包围，围困，围攻( besiege的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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tarnished
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| （通常指金属）（使）失去光泽，（使）变灰暗( tarnish的过去式和过去分词 )； 玷污，败坏 | |
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55
coalition
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| n.结合体，同盟，结合，联合 | |
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56
computed
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| adj.[医]计算的，使用计算机的v.计算，估算( compute的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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57
legacy
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| n.遗产，遗赠；先人(或过去)留下的东西 | |
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distinctive
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| adj.特别的，有特色的，与众不同的 | |
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flinch
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| v.畏缩，退缩 | |
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60
scantiest
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| adj.（大小或数量）不足的，勉强够的( scanty的最高级 ) | |
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impending
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| a.imminent, about to come or happen | |
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62
alacrity
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| n.敏捷，轻快，乐意 | |
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63
inscribing
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| v.写，刻( inscribe的现在分词 ) | |
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64
crest
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| n.顶点；饰章；羽冠；vt.达到顶点；vi.形成浪尖 | |
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worthy
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| adj.(of)值得的，配得上的；有价值的 | |
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66
heed
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| v.注意，留意；n.注意，留心 | |
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67
bent
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| n.爱好，癖好；adj.弯的；决心的，一心的 | |
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68
bridling
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| 给…套龙头( bridle的现在分词 )； 控制； 昂首表示轻蔑（或怨忿等）； 动怒，生气 | |
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69
inflict
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| vt.(on)把…强加给，使遭受，使承担 | |
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70
impetus
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| n.推动，促进，刺激；推动力 | |
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71
prow
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| n.(飞机)机头，船头 | |
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72
cleave
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| v．(clave；cleaved)粘着，粘住；坚持；依恋 | |
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73
crumble
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| vi.碎裂，崩溃；vt.弄碎，摧毁 | |
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74
interspersed
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| adj.[医]散开的；点缀的v.intersperse的过去式和过去分词 | |
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75
wrested
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| （用力）拧( wrest的过去式和过去分词 )； 费力取得； （从…）攫取； （ 从… ） 强行取去… | |
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76
apprehension
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| n.理解，领悟；逮捕，拘捕；忧虑 | |
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77
slay
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| v.杀死，宰杀，杀戮 | |
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78
conquerors
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| 征服者，占领者( conqueror的名词复数 ) | |
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belligerents
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| n.交战的一方（指国家、集团或个人）( belligerent的名词复数 ) | |
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80
trophies
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| n.（为竞赛获胜者颁发的）奖品( trophy的名词复数 )；奖杯；（尤指狩猎或战争中获得的）纪念品；（用于比赛或赛跑名称）奖 | |
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81
interfered
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| v.干预( interfere的过去式和过去分词 )；调停；妨碍；干涉 | |
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82
thereby
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| adv.因此，从而 | |
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83
situated
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| adj.坐落在...的，处于某种境地的 | |
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84
uncertainty
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| n.易变，靠不住，不确知，不确定的事物 | |
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