I scruple1 not to allow, said CLEANTHES, that I have been apt to suspect the frequent repetition of the word infinite, which we meet with in all theological writers, to savour more of panegyric2 than of philosophy; and that any purposes of reasoning, and even of religion, would be better served, were we to rest contented3 with more accurate and more moderate expressions. The terms, admirable, excellent, superlatively great, wise, and holy; these sufficiently4 fill the imaginations of men; and any thing beyond, besides that it leads into absurdities5, has no influence on the affections or sentiments. Thus, in the present subject, if we abandon all human analogy, as seems your intention, DEMEA, I am afraid we abandon all religion, and retain no conception of the great object of our adoration6. If we preserve human analogy, we must for ever find it impossible to reconcile any mixture of evil in the universe with infinite attributes; much less can we ever prove the latter from the former. But supposing the Author of Nature to be finitely perfect, though far exceeding mankind, a satisfactory account may then be given of natural and moral evil, and every untoward7 phenomenon be explained and adjusted. A less evil may then be chosen, in order to avoid a greater; inconveniences be submitted to, in order to reach a desirable end; and in a word, benevolence8, regulated by wisdom, and limited by necessity, may produce just such a world as the present. You, PHILO, who are so prompt at starting views, and reflections, and analogies, I would gladly hear, at length, without interruption, your opinion of this new theory; and if it deserve our attention, we may afterwards, at more leisure, reduce it into form.
My sentiments, replied PHILO, are not worth being made a mystery of; and therefore, without any ceremony, I shall deliver what occurs to me with regard to the present subject. It must, I think, be allowed, that if a very limited intelligence, whom we shall suppose utterly9 unacquainted with the universe, were assured, that it were the production of a very good, wise, and powerful Being, however finite, he would, from his conjectures10, form beforehand a different notion of it from what we find it to be by experience; nor would he ever imagine, merely from these attributes of the cause, of which he is informed, that the effect could be so full of vice13 and misery14 and disorder15, as it appears in this life. Supposing now, that this person were brought into the world, still assured that it was the workmanship of such a sublime16 and benevolent17 Being; he might, perhaps, be surprised at the disappointment; but would never retract18 his former belief, if founded on any very solid argument; since such a limited intelligence must be sensible of his own blindness and ignorance, and must allow, that there may be many solutions of those phenomena19, which will for ever escape his comprehension. But supposing, which is the real case with regard to man, that this creature is not antecedently convinced of a supreme20 intelligence, benevolent, and powerful, but is left to gather such a belief from the appearances of things; this entirely21 alters the case, nor will he ever find any reason for such a conclusion. He may be fully22 convinced of the narrow limits of his understanding; but this will not help him in forming an inference concerning the goodness of superior powers, since he must form that inference from what he knows, not from what he is ignorant of. The more you exaggerate his weakness and ignorance, the more diffident you render him, and give him the greater suspicion that such subjects are beyond the reach of his faculties23. You are obliged, therefore, to reason with him merely from the known phenomena, and to drop every arbitrary supposition or conjecture11.
Did I show you a house or palace, where there was not one apartment convenient or agreeable; where the windows, doors, fires, passages, stairs, and the whole economy of the building, were the source of noise, confusion, fatigue24, darkness, and the extremes of heat and cold; you would certainly blame the contrivance, without any further examination. The architect would in vain display his subtlety25, and prove to you, that if this door or that window were altered, greater ills would ensue. What he says may be strictly26 true: The alteration27 of one particular, while the other parts of the building remain, may only augment28 the inconveniences. But still you would assert in general, that, if the architect had had skill and good intentions, he might have formed such a plan of the whole, and might have adjusted the parts in such a manner, as would have remedied all or most of these inconveniences. His ignorance, or even your own ignorance of such a plan, will never convince you of the impossibility of it. If you find any inconveniences and deformities in the building, you will always, without entering into any detail, condemn29 the architect.
In short, I repeat the question: Is the world, considered in general, and as it appears to us in this life, different from what a man, or such a limited being, would, beforehand, expect from a very powerful, wise, and benevolent Deity30? It must be strange prejudice to assert the contrary. And from thence I conclude, that however consistent the world may be, allowing certain suppositions and conjectures, with the idea of such a Deity, it can never afford us an inference concerning his existence. The consistence is not absolutely denied, only the inference. Conjectures, especially where infinity31 is excluded from the Divine attributes, may perhaps be sufficient to prove a consistence, but can never be foundations for any inference.
There seem to be four circumstances, on which depend all, or the greatest part of the ills, that molest32 sensible creatures; and it is not impossible but all these circumstances may be necessary and unavoidable. We know so little beyond common life, or even of common life, that, with regard to the economy of a universe, there is no conjecture, however wild, which may not be just; nor any one, however plausible33, which may not be erroneous. All that belongs to human understanding, in this deep ignorance and obscurity, is to be sceptical, or at least cautious, and not to admit of any hypothesis whatever, much less of any which is supported by no appearance of probability. Now, this I assert to be the case with regard to all the causes of evil, and the circumstances on which it depends. None of them appear to human reason in the least degree necessary or unavoidable; nor can we suppose them such, without the utmost license34 of imagination.
The first circumstance which introduces evil, is that contrivance or economy of the animal creation, by which pains, as well as pleasures, are employed to excite all creatures to action, and make them vigilant35 in the great work of self-preservation36. Now pleasure alone, in its various degrees, seems to human understanding sufficient for this purpose. All animals might be constantly in a state of enjoyment37: but when urged by any of the necessities of nature, such as thirst, hunger, weariness; instead of pain, they might feel a diminution38 of pleasure, by which they might be prompted to seek that object which is necessary to their subsistence. Men pursue pleasure as eagerly as they avoid pain; at least they might have been so constituted. It seems, therefore, plainly possible to carry on the business of life without any pain. Why then is any animal ever rendered susceptible39 of such a sensation? If animals can be free from it an hour, they might enjoy a perpetual exemption41 from it; and it required as particular a contrivance of their organs to produce that feeling, as to endow them with sight, hearing, or any of the senses. Shall we conjecture, that such a contrivance was necessary, without any appearance of reason? and shall we build on that conjecture as on the most certain truth?
But a capacity of pain would not alone produce pain, were it not for the second circumstance, viz. the conducting of the world by general laws; and this seems nowise necessary to a very perfect Being. It is true, if everything were conducted by particular volitions, the course of nature would be perpetually broken, and no man could employ his reason in the conduct of life. But might not other particular volitions remedy this inconvenience? In short, might not the Deity exterminate42 all ill, wherever it were to be found; and produce all good, without any preparation, or long progress of causes and effects?
Besides, we must consider, that, according to the present economy of the world, the course of nature, though supposed exactly regular, yet to us appears not so, and many events are uncertain, and many disappoint our expectations. Health and sickness, calm and tempest, with an infinite number of other accidents, whose causes are unknown and variable, have a great influence both on the fortunes of particular persons and on the prosperity of public societies; and indeed all human life, in a manner, depends on such accidents. A being, therefore, who knows the secret springs of the universe, might easily, by particular volitions, turn all these accidents to the good of mankind, and render the whole world happy, without discovering himself in any operation. A fleet, whose purposes were salutary to society, might always meet with a fair wind. Good princes enjoy sound health and long life. Persons born to power and authority, be framed with good tempers and virtuous43 dispositions44. A few such events as these, regularly and wisely conducted, would change the face of the world; and yet would no more seem to disturb the course of nature, or confound human conduct, than the present economy of things, where the causes are secret, and variable, and compounded. Some small touches given to CALIGULA's brain in his infancy46, might have converted him into a TRAJAN. One wave, a little higher than the rest, by burying CAESAR and his fortune in the bottom of the ocean, might have restored liberty to a considerable part of mankind. There may, for aught we know, be good reasons why Providence47 interposes not in this manner; but they are unknown to us; and though the mere12 supposition, that such reasons exist, may be sufficient to save the conclusion concerning the Divine attributes, yet surely it can never be sufficient to establish that conclusion.
If every thing in the universe be conducted by general laws, and if animals be rendered susceptible of pain, it scarcely seems possible but some ill must arise in the various shocks of matter, and the various concurrence48 and opposition49 of general laws; but this ill would be very rare, were it not for the third circumstance, which I proposed to mention, viz. the great frugality50 with which all powers and faculties are distributed to every particular being. So well adjusted are the organs and capacities of all animals, and so well fitted to their preservation, that, as far as history or tradition reaches, there appears not to be any single species which has yet been extinguished in the universe. Every animal has the requisite51 endowments; but these endowments are bestowed53 with so scrupulous54 an economy, that any considerable diminution must entirely destroy the creature. Wherever one power is increased, there is a proportional abatement55 in the others. Animals which excel in swiftness are commonly defective56 in force. Those which possess both are either imperfect in some of their senses, or are oppressed with the most craving57 wants. The human species, whose chief excellency is reason and sagacity, is of all others the most necessitous, and the most deficient58 in bodily advantages; without clothes, without arms, without food, without lodging59, without any convenience of life, except what they owe to their own skill and industry. In short, nature seems to have formed an exact calculation of the necessities of her creatures; and, like a rigid60 master, has afforded them little more powers or endowments than what are strictly sufficient to supply those necessities. An indulgent parent would have bestowed a large stock, in order to guard against accidents, and secure the happiness and welfare of the creature in the most unfortunate concurrence of circumstances. Every course of life would not have been so surrounded with precipices61, that the least departure from the true path, by mistake or necessity, must involve us in misery and ruin. Some reserve, some fund, would have been provided to ensure happiness; nor would the powers and the necessities have been adjusted with so rigid an economy. The Author of Nature is inconceivably powerful: his force is supposed great, if not altogether inexhaustible: nor is there any reason, as far as we can judge, to make him observe this strict frugality in his dealings with his creatures. It would have been better, were his power extremely limited, to have created fewer animals, and to have endowed these with more faculties for their happiness and preservation. A builder is never esteemed62 prudent63, who undertakes a plan beyond what his stock will enable him to finish.
In order to cure most of the ills of human life, I require not that man should have the wings of the eagle, the swiftness of the stag, the force of the ox, the arms of the lion, the scales of the crocodile or rhinoceros64; much less do I demand the sagacity of an angel or cherubim. I am contented to take an increase in one single power or faculty65 of his soul. Let him be endowed with a greater propensity66 to industry and labour; a more vigorous spring and activity of mind; a more constant bent67 to business and application. Let the whole species possess naturally an equal diligence with that which many individuals are able to attain68 by habit and reflection; and the most beneficial consequences, without any allay69 of ill, is the immediate70 and necessary result of this endowment. Almost all the moral, as well as natural evils of human life, arise from idleness; and were our species, by the original constitution of their frame, exempt40 from this vice or infirmity, the perfect cultivation71 of land, the improvement of arts and manufactures, the exact execution of every office and duty, immediately follow; and men at once may fully reach that state of society, which is so imperfectly attained72 by the best regulated government. But as industry is a power, and the most valuable of any, Nature seems determined73, suitably to her usual maxims74, to bestow52 it on men with a very sparing hand; and rather to punish him severely75 for his deficiency in it, than to reward him for his attainments76. She has so contrived77 his frame, that nothing but the most violent necessity can oblige him to labour; and she employs all his other wants to overcome, at least in part, the want of diligence, and to endow him with some share of a faculty of which she has thought fit naturally to bereave78 him. Here our demands may be allowed very humble79, and therefore the more reasonable. If we required the endowments of superior penetration80 and judgement, of a more delicate taste of beauty, of a nicer sensibility to benevolence and friendship; we might be told, that we impiously pretend to break the order of Nature; that we want to exalt81 ourselves into a higher rank of being; that the presents which we require, not being suitable to our state and condition, would only be pernicious to us. But it is hard; I dare to repeat it, it is hard, that being placed in a world so full of wants and necessities, where almost every being and element is either our foe82 or refuses its assistance . . . we should also have our own temper to struggle with, and should be deprived of that faculty which can alone fence against these multiplied evils.
The fourth circumstance, whence arises the misery and ill of the universe, is the inaccurate83 workmanship of all the springs and principles of the great machine of nature. It must be acknowledged, that there are few parts of the universe, which seem not to serve some purpose, and whose removal would not produce a visible defect and disorder in the whole. The parts hang all together; nor can one be touched without affecting the rest, in a greater or less degree. But at the same time, it must be observed, that none of these parts or principles, however useful, are so accurately84 adjusted, as to keep precisely85 within those bounds in which their utility consists; but they are, all of them, apt, on every occasion, to run into the one extreme or the other. One would imagine, that this grand production had not received the last hand of the maker86; so little finished is every part, and so coarse are the strokes with which it is executed. Thus, the winds are requisite to convey the vapours along the surface of the globe, and to assist men in navigation: but how oft, rising up to tempests and hurricanes, do they become pernicious? Rains are necessary to nourish all the plants and animals of the earth: but how often are they defective? how often excessive? Heat is requisite to all life and vegetation; but is not always found in the due proportion. On the mixture and secretion87 of the humours and juices of the body depend the health and prosperity of the animal: but the parts perform not regularly their proper function. What more useful than all the passions of the mind, ambition, vanity, love, anger? But how oft do they break their bounds, and cause the greatest convulsions in society? There is nothing so advantageous88 in the universe, but what frequently becomes pernicious, by its excess or defect; nor has Nature guarded, with the requisite accuracy, against all disorder or confusion. The irregularity is never perhaps so great as to destroy any species; but is often sufficient to involve the individuals in ruin and misery.
On the concurrence, then, of these four circumstances, does all or the greatest part of natural evil depend. Were all living creatures incapable89 of pain, or were the world administered by particular volitions, evil never could have found access into the universe: and were animals endowed with a large stock of powers and faculties, beyond what strict necessity requires; or were the several springs and principles of the universe so accurately framed as to preserve always the just temperament90 and medium; there must have been very little ill in comparison of what we feel at present. What then shall we pronounce on this occasion? Shall we say that these circumstances are not necessary, and that they might easily have been altered in the contrivance of the universe? This decision seems too presumptuous91 for creatures so blind and ignorant. Let us be more modest in our conclusions. Let us allow, that, if the goodness of the Deity (I mean a goodness like the human) could be established on any tolerable reasons a priori, these phenomena, however untoward, would not be sufficient to subvert92 that principle; but might easily, in some unknown manner, be reconcilable to it. But let us still assert, that as this goodness is not antecedently established, but must be inferred from the phenomena, there can be no grounds for such an inference, while there are so many ills in the universe, and while these ills might so easily have been remedied, as far as human understanding can be allowed to judge on such a subject. I am Sceptic enough to allow, that the bad appearances, notwithstanding all my reasonings, may be compatible with such attributes as you suppose; but surely they can never prove these attributes. Such a conclusion cannot result from Scepticism, but must arise from the phenomena, and from our confidence in the reasonings which we deduce from these phenomena.
Look round this universe. What an immense profusion93 of beings, animated94 and organised, sensible and active! You admire this prodigious95 variety and fecundity96. But inspect a little more narrowly these living existences, the only beings worth regarding. How hostile and destructive to each other! How insufficient97 all of them for their own happiness! How contemptible98 or odious99 to the spectator! The whole presents nothing but the idea of a blind Nature, impregnated by a great vivifying principle, and pouring forth100 from her lap, without discernment or parental101 care, her maimed and abortive102 children!
Here the MANICHAEAN system occurs as a proper hypothesis to solve the difficulty: and no doubt, in some respects, it is very specious103, and has more probability than the common hypothesis, by giving a plausible account of the strange mixture of good and ill which appears in life. But if we consider, on the other hand, the perfect uniformity and agreement of the parts of the universe, we shall not discover in it any marks of the combat of a malevolent104 with a benevolent being. There is indeed an opposition of pains and pleasures in the feelings of sensible creatures: but are not all the operations of Nature carried on by an opposition of principles, of hot and cold, moist and dry, light and heavy? The true conclusion is, that the original Source of all things is entirely indifferent to all these principles; and has no more regard to good above ill, than to heat above cold, or to drought above moisture, or to light above heavy.
There may four hypotheses be framed concerning the first causes of the universe: that they are endowed with perfect goodness; that they have perfect malice105; that they are opposite, and have both goodness and malice; that they have neither goodness nor malice. Mixed phenomena can never prove the two former unmixed principles; and the uniformity and steadiness of general laws seem to oppose the third. The fourth, therefore, seems by far the most probable.
What I have said concerning natural evil will apply to moral, with little or no variation; and we have no more reason to infer, that the rectitude of the Supreme Being resembles human rectitude, than that his benevolence resembles the human. Nay106, it will be thought, that we have still greater cause to exclude from him moral sentiments, such as we feel them; since moral evil, in the opinion of many, is much more predominant above moral good than natural evil above natural good.
But even though this should not be allowed, and though the virtue107 which is in mankind should be acknowledged much superior to the vice, yet so long as there is any vice at all in the universe, it will very much puzzle you Anthropomorphites, how to account for it. You must assign a cause for it, without having recourse to the first cause. But as every effect must have a cause, and that cause another, you must either carry on the progression in infinitum, or rest on that original principle, who is the ultimate cause of all things . . .
Hold! hold! cried DEMEA: Whither does your imagination hurry you? I joined in alliance with you, in order to prove the incomprehensible nature of the Divine Being, and refute the principles of CLEANTHES, who would measure every thing by human rule and standard. But I now find you running into all the topics of the greatest libertines108 and infidels, and betraying that holy cause which you seemingly espoused109. Are you secretly, then, a more dangerous enemy than CLEANTHES himself?
And are you so late in perceiving it? replied CLEANTHES. Believe me, DEMEA, your friend PHILO, from the beginning, has been amusing himself at both our expense; and it must be confessed, that the injudicious reasoning of our vulgar theology has given him but too just a handle of ridicule110. The total infirmity of human reason, the absolute incomprehensibility of the Divine Nature, the great and universal misery, and still greater wickedness of men; these are strange topics, surely, to be so fondly cherished by orthodox divines and doctors. In ages of stupidity and ignorance, indeed, these principles may safely be espoused; and perhaps no views of things are more proper to promote superstition111, than such as encourage the blind amazement112, the diffidence, and melancholy113 of mankind. But at present . . .
Blame not so much, interposed PHILO, the ignorance of these reverend gentlemen. They know how to change their style with the times. Formerly114 it was a most popular theological topic to maintain, that human life was vanity and misery, and to exaggerate all the ills and pains which are incident to men. But of late years, divines, we find, begin to retract this position; and maintain, though still with some hesitation115, that there are more goods than evils, more pleasures than pains, even in this life. When religion stood entirely upon temper and education, it was thought proper to encourage melancholy; as indeed mankind never have recourse to superior powers so readily as in that disposition45. But as men have now learned to form principles, and to draw consequences, it is necessary to change the batteries, and to make use of such arguments as will endure at least some scrutiny116 and examination. This variation is the same (and from the same causes) with that which I formerly remarked with regard to Scepticism.
Thus PHILO continued to the last his spirit of opposition, and his censure117 of established opinions. But I could observe that DEMEA did not at all relish118 the latter part of the discourse119; and he took occasion soon after, on some pretence120 or other, to leave the company.
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scruple
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| n./v.顾忌，迟疑 | |
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panegyric
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| n.颂词，颂扬 | |
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contented
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| adj.满意的，安心的，知足的 | |
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sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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absurdities
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| n.极端无理性( absurdity的名词复数 )；荒谬；谬论；荒谬的行为 | |
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adoration
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| n.爱慕，崇拜 | |
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untoward
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| adj.不利的，不幸的，困难重重的 | |
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benevolence
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| n.慈悲，捐助 | |
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utterly
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| adv.完全地，绝对地 | |
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conjectures
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| 推测，猜想( conjecture的名词复数 ) | |
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conjecture
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| n./v.推测，猜测 | |
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mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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vice
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| n.坏事；恶习；[pl.]台钳，老虎钳；adj.副的 | |
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misery
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| n.痛苦，苦恼，苦难；悲惨的境遇，贫苦 | |
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disorder
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| n.紊乱，混乱；骚动，骚乱；疾病，失调 | |
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sublime
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| adj.崇高的，伟大的；极度的，不顾后果的 | |
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benevolent
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| adj.仁慈的，乐善好施的 | |
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retract
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| vt.缩回，撤回收回，取消 | |
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phenomena
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| n.现象 | |
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supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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faculties
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| n.能力( faculty的名词复数 )；全体教职员；技巧；院 | |
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fatigue
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| n.疲劳，劳累 | |
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subtlety
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| n.微妙，敏锐，精巧；微妙之处，细微的区别 | |
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strictly
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| adv.严厉地，严格地；严密地 | |
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alteration
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| n.变更，改变；蚀变 | |
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augment
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| vt.(使)增大，增加，增长，扩张 | |
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condemn
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| vt.谴责，指责；宣判(罪犯)，判刑 | |
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deity
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| n.神，神性；被奉若神明的人(或物) | |
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infinity
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| n.无限，无穷，大量 | |
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molest
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| vt.骚扰，干扰，调戏 | |
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plausible
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| adj.似真实的，似乎有理的，似乎可信的 | |
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license
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| n.执照，许可证，特许；v.许可，特许 | |
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vigilant
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| adj.警觉的，警戒的，警惕的 | |
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preservation
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| n.保护，维护，保存，保留，保持 | |
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enjoyment
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| n.乐趣；享有；享用 | |
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diminution
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| n.减少；变小 | |
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susceptible
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| adj.过敏的，敏感的；易动感情的，易受感动的 | |
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exempt
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| adj.免除的；v.使免除；n.免税者，被免除义务者 | |
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exemption
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| n.豁免，免税额，免除 | |
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exterminate
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| v.扑灭，消灭，根绝 | |
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virtuous
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| adj.有品德的，善良的，贞洁的，有效力的 | |
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dispositions
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| 安排( disposition的名词复数 )； 倾向； （财产、金钱的）处置； 气质 | |
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disposition
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| n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署 | |
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infancy
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| n.婴儿期；幼年期；初期 | |
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47
providence
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| n.深谋远虑，天道，天意；远见；节约；上帝 | |
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48
concurrence
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| n.同意；并发 | |
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49
opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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50
frugality
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| n.节约，节俭 | |
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51
requisite
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| adj.需要的，必不可少的；n.必需品 | |
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52
bestow
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| v.把…赠与，把…授予；花费 | |
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53
bestowed
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| 赠给，授予( bestow的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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54
scrupulous
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| adj.审慎的，小心翼翼的，完全的，纯粹的 | |
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abatement
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| n.减(免)税，打折扣，冲销 | |
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defective
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| adj.有毛病的，有问题的，有瑕疵的 | |
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57
craving
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| n.渴望,热望 | |
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deficient
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| adj.不足的，不充份的，有缺陷的 | |
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59
lodging
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| n.寄宿，住所；(大学生的)校外宿舍 | |
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60
rigid
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| adj.严格的，死板的；刚硬的，僵硬的 | |
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61
precipices
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| n.悬崖，峭壁( precipice的名词复数 ) | |
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esteemed
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| adj.受人尊敬的v.尊敬( esteem的过去式和过去分词 )；敬重；认为；以为 | |
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prudent
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| adj.谨慎的，有远见的，精打细算的 | |
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64
rhinoceros
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| n.犀牛 | |
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65
faculty
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| n.才能；学院，系；(学院或系的)全体教学人员 | |
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propensity
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| n.倾向；习性 | |
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67
bent
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| n.爱好，癖好；adj.弯的；决心的，一心的 | |
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68
attain
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| vt.达到，获得，完成 | |
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allay
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| v.消除，减轻(恐惧、怀疑等) | |
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immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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cultivation
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| n.耕作，培养，栽培（法），养成 | |
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attained
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| （通常经过努力）实现( attain的过去式和过去分词 )； 达到； 获得； 达到（某年龄、水平、状况） | |
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determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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maxims
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| n.格言，座右铭( maxim的名词复数 ) | |
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severely
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| adv.严格地；严厉地；非常恶劣地 | |
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attainments
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| 成就，造诣； 获得( attainment的名词复数 )； 达到； 造诣； 成就 | |
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contrived
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| adj.不自然的，做作的；虚构的 | |
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bereave
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| v.使痛失(亲人等)，剥夺，使丧失 | |
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humble
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| adj.谦卑的，恭顺的；地位低下的；v.降低，贬低 | |
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penetration
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| n.穿透，穿人，渗透 | |
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exalt
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| v.赞扬，歌颂，晋升，提升 | |
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foe
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| n.敌人，仇敌 | |
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inaccurate
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| adj.错误的，不正确的，不准确的 | |
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accurately
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| adv.准确地，精确地 | |
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precisely
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| adv.恰好，正好，精确地，细致地 | |
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maker
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| n.制造者，制造商 | |
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87
secretion
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| n.分泌 | |
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88
advantageous
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| adj.有利的；有帮助的 | |
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89
incapable
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| adj.无能力的，不能做某事的 | |
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90
temperament
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| n.气质，性格，性情 | |
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presumptuous
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| adj.胆大妄为的，放肆的，冒昧的，冒失的 | |
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subvert
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| v.推翻；暗中破坏；搅乱 | |
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profusion
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| n.挥霍；丰富 | |
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animated
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| adj.生气勃勃的，活跃的，愉快的 | |
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prodigious
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| adj.惊人的，奇妙的；异常的；巨大的；庞大的 | |
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96
fecundity
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| n.生产力；丰富 | |
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97
insufficient
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| adj.(for，of)不足的，不够的 | |
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98
contemptible
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| adj.可鄙的，可轻视的，卑劣的 | |
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99
odious
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| adj.可憎的，讨厌的 | |
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100
forth
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| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
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101
parental
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| adj.父母的；父的；母的 | |
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102
abortive
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| adj.不成功的，发育不全的 | |
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103
specious
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| adj.似是而非的；adv.似是而非地 | |
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104
malevolent
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| adj.有恶意的，恶毒的 | |
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105
malice
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| n.恶意，怨恨，蓄意；[律]预谋 | |
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106
nay
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| adv.不；n.反对票，投反对票者 | |
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107
virtue
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| n.德行，美德；贞操；优点；功效，效力 | |
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108
libertines
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| n.放荡不羁的人，淫荡的人( libertine的名词复数 ) | |
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109
espoused
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| v.（决定）支持，拥护（目标、主张等）( espouse的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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110
ridicule
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| v.讥讽，挖苦；n.嘲弄 | |
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111
superstition
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| n.迷信，迷信行为 | |
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112
amazement
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| n.惊奇，惊讶 | |
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113
melancholy
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| n.忧郁，愁思；adj.令人感伤（沮丧）的，忧郁的 | |
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114
formerly
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| adv.从前，以前 | |
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115
hesitation
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| n.犹豫，踌躇 | |
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116
scrutiny
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| n.详细检查，仔细观察 | |
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117
censure
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| v./n.责备；非难；责难 | |
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118
relish
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| n.滋味，享受，爱好，调味品；vt.加调味料，享受，品味；vi.有滋味 | |
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119
discourse
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| n.论文，演说；谈话；话语；vi.讲述，著述 | |
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120
pretence
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| n.假装，作假；借口，口实；虚伪；虚饰 | |
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