The old Ottoman Governments regarded this clan5 of manticratic peers with a mixture of reverence6 and distrust. Since they were too strong to be destroyed, the Sultan salved his dignity by solemnly confirming their Emir in place. This empty approval acquired dignity by lapse7 of time, until the new holder8 began to feel that it added a final seal to his election. At last the Turks found that they needed the Hejaz under their unquestioned sway as part of the stage furniture for their new pan-Islamic notion. The fortuitous opening of the Suez Canal enabled them to garrison9 the Holy Cities. They projected the Hejaz Railway, and increased Turkish influence among the tribes by money, intrigue10, and armed expeditions.
As the Sultan grew stronger there he ventured to assert himself more and more alongside the Sherif, even in Mecca itself, and upon occasion ventured to depose11 a Sherif too magnificent for his views, and to appoint a successor from a rival family of the clan in hopes of winning the usual advantages from dissension. Finally, Abdul Hamid took away some of the family to Constantinople into honourable12 captivity13. Amongst these was Hussein ibn Ali, the future ruler, who was held a prisoner for nearly eighteen years. He took the opportunity to provide his sons — Ali, Abdulla, Feisal, and Zeid — with the modern education and experience which afterwards enabled them to lead the Arab armies to success.
When Abdul Hamid fell, the less wily Young Turks reversed his policy and sent back Sherif Hussein to Mecca as Emir. He at once set to work unobtrusively to restore the power of the Emirate, and strengthened himself on the old basis, keeping the while close and friendly touch with Constantinople through his sons Abdulla, vice-chairman of the Turkish House, and Feisal, member for Jidda. They kept him informed of political opinion in the capital until war broke out, when they returned in haste to Mecca.
The outbreak of war made trouble in the Hejaz. The pilgrimage ceased, and with it the revenues and business of the Holy Cities. There was reason to fear that the Indian food-ships would cease to come (since the Sherif became technically15 an enemy subject); and as the province produced almost no food of its own, it would be precariously16 dependent on the goodwill17 of the Turks, who might starve it by closing the Hejaz Railway. Hussein had never been entirely18 at the Turks’ mercy before; and at this unhappy moment they particularly needed his adherence19 to their ‘Jehad’, the Holy War of all Moslems against Christianity.
To become popularly effective this must be endorsed22 by Mecca; and if endorsed it might plunge23 the East in blood. Hussein was honourable, shrewd, obstinate24 and deeply pious25. He felt that the Holy War was doctrinally incompatible26 with an aggressive war, and absurd with a Christian21 ally: Germany. So he refused the Turkish demand, and made at the same time a dignified27 appeal to the Allies not to starve his province for what was in no way his people’s fault. The Turks in reply at once instituted a partial blockade of the Hejaz by controlling the traffic on the pilgrim railway. The British left his coast open to specially-regulated food vessels28.
The Turkish demand was, however, not the only one which the Sherif received. In January 1915, Yisin, head of the Mesopotamian officers, Ali Riza, head of the Damascus officers, and Abd el Ghani el Areisi, for the Syrian civilians29, sent down to him a concrete proposal for a military mutiny in Syria against the Turks. The oppressed people of Mesopotamia and Syria, the committees of the Ahad and the Fetah, were calling out to him as the Father of the Arabs, the Moslem20 of Moslems, their greatest prince, their oldest notable, to save them from the sinister30 designs of Talaat and Jemal.
Hussein, as politician, as prince, as moslem, as modernist, and as nationalist, was forced to listen to their appeal. He sent Feisal, his third son, to Damascus, to discuss their projects as his representative, and to make a report. He sent Ali, his eldest31 son, to Medina, with orders to raise quietly, on any excuse he pleased, troops from villagers and tribesmen of the Hejaz, and to hold them ready for action if Feisal called. Abdulla, his politic14 second son, was to sound the British by letter, to learn what would be their attitude towards a possible Arab revolt against Turkey.
Feisal reported in January 1915, that local conditions were good, but that the general war was not going well for their hopes. In Damascus were three divisions of Arab troops ready for rebellion. In Aleppo two other divisions, riddled32 with Arab nationalism, were sure to join in if the others began. There was only one Turkish division this side of the Taurus, so that it was certain that the rebels would get possession of Syria at the first effort. On the other hand, public opinion was less ready for extreme measures, and the military class quite sure that Germany would win the war and win it soon. If, however, the Allies landed their Australian Expedition (preparing in Egypt) at Alexandretta, and so covered the Syrian flank, then it would be wise and safe to risk a final German victory and the need to make a previous separate peace with the Turks.
Delay followed, as the Allies went to the Dardanelles, and not to Alexandretta. Feisal went after them to get first-hand knowledge of Gallipoli conditions, since a breakdown33 of Turkey would be the Arab signal. Then followed stagnation34 through the months of the Dardanelles campaign. In that slaughter-house the remaining Ottoman first-line army was destroyed. The disaster to Turkey of the accumulated losses was so great that Feisal came back to Syria, judging it a possible moment in which to strike, but found that meanwhile the local situation had become unfavourable.
His Syrian supporters were under arrest or in hiding, and their friends being hanged in scores on political charges. He found the well-disposed Arab divisions either exiled to distant fronts, or broken up in drafts and distributed among Turkish units. The Arab peasantry were in the grip of Turkish military service, and Syria prostrate35 before the merciless Jemal Pasha. His assets had disappeared. He wrote to his father counselling further delay, till England should be ready and Turkey in extremities36. Unfortunately, England was in a deplorable condition. Her forces were falling back shattered from the Dardanelles. The slow-drawn agony of Kut was in its last stage; and the Senussi rising, coincident with the entry of Bulgaria, threatened her on new flanks.
Feisal’s position was hazardous37 in the extreme. He was at the mercy of the members of the secret society, whose president he had been before the war. He had to live as the guest of Jemal Pasha, in Damascus, rubbing up his military knowledge; for his brother Ali was raising the troops in Hejaz on the pretext38 that he and Feisal would lead them against the Suez Canal to help the Turks. So Feisal, as a good Ottoman and officer in the Turkish service, had to live at headquarters, and endure acquiescingly the insults and indignities39 heaped upon his race by the bully40 Jemal in his cups.
Jemal would send for Feisal and take him to the hanging of his Syrian friends. These victims of justice dared not show that they knew Feisal’s real hopes, any more than he dared show his mind by word or look, since disclosure would have condemned41 his family and perhaps their race to the same fate. Only once did he burst out that these executions would cost Jemal all that he was trying to avoid; and it took the intercessions of his Constantinople friends, chief men in Turkey, to save him from the price of these rash words.
Feisal’s correspondence with his father was an adventure in itself. They communicated by means of old retainers of the family, men above suspicion, who went up and down the Hejaz Railway, carrying letters in sword-hilts, in cakes, sewn between the soles of sandals, or in invisible writings on the wrappers of harmless packages. In all of them Feisal reported unfavourable things, and begged his father to postpone42 action till a wiser time.
Hussein, however, was not a whit43 cast down by Emir Feisal’s discouragements. The Young Turks in his eyes were so many godless transgressors of their creed44 and their human duty — traitors45 to the spirit of the time, and to the higher interests of Islam. Though an old man of sixty-five, he was cheerfully determined46 to wage war against them, relying upon justice to cover the cost. Hussein trusted so much in God that he let his military sense lie fallow, and thought Hejaz able to fight it out with Turkey on a fair field. So he sent Abd el Kader el Abdu to Feisal with a letter that all was now ready for inspection47 by him in Medina before the troops started for the front Feisal informed Jemal, and asked leave to go down, but, to his dismay, Jemal replied that Enver Pasha, the Generalissimo, was on his way to the province, and that they would visit Medina together and inspect them. Feisal had planned to raise his father’s crimson48 banner as soon as he arrived in Medina, and so to take the Turks unawares; and here he was going to be saddled with two uninvited guests to whom, by the Arab law of hospitality, he could do no harm, and who would probably delay his action so long that the whole secret of the revolt would be in jeopardy49!
In the end matters passed off well, though the irony50 of the review was terrible. Enver, Jemal and Feisal watched the troops wheeling and turning in the dusty plain outside the city gate, rushing up and down in mimic51 camel-battle, or spurring their horses in the javelin52 game after immemorial Arab fashion. ‘And are all these volunteers for the Holy War?’ asked Enver at last, turning to Feisal. ‘Yes,’ said Feisal. Willing to fight to the death against the enemies of the faithful?’ Yes,’ said Feisal again; and then the Arab chiefs came up to be presented, and Sherif Ali ibn el Hussein, of Modhig, drew him aside whispering, ‘My Lord, shall we kill them now?’ and Feisal said, ‘No, they are our guests.’
The sheikhs protested further; for they believed that so they could finish off the war in two blows. They were determined to force Feisal’s hand; and he had to go among them, just out of earshot but in full view, and plead for the lives of the Turkish dictators, who had murdered his best friends on the scaffold. In the end he had to make excuses, take the party back quickly to Medina, picket53 the banqueting hall with his own slaves, and escort Enver and Jemal back to Damascus to save them from death on the way. He explained this laboured courtesy by the plea that it was the Arab manner to devote everything to guests; but Enver and Jemal being deeply suspicious of what they had seen, imposed a strict blockade of the Hejaz, and ordered large Turkish reinforcements thither54. They wanted to detain Feisal in Damascus; but telegrams came from Medina claiming his immediate55 return to prevent disorder56, and, reluctantly, Jemal let him go on condition that his suite57 remained behind as hostages.
Feisal found Medina full of Turkish troops, with the staff and headquarters of the Twelfth Army Corps58 under Fakhri Pasha, the courageous59 old butcher who had bloodily60 ‘purified’ Zeitun and Urfa of Armenians. Clearly the Turks had taken warning, and Feisal’s hope of a surprise rush, winning success almost without a shot, had become impossible. However, it was too late for prudence61. From Damascus four days later his suite took horse and rode out east into the desert to take refuge with Nuri Shaalan, the Beduin chieftain; and the same day Feisal showed his hand. When he raised the Arab flag, the pan-Islamic supra-national State, for which Abdul Hamid had massacred and worked and died, and the German hope of the co-operation of Islam in the world-plans of the Kaiser, passed into the realm of dreams. By the mere62 fact of his rebellion the Sherif had closed these two fantastic chapters of history.
Rebellion was the gravest step which political men could take, and the success or failure of the Arab revolt was a gamble too hazardous for prophecy. Yet, for once, fortune favoured the bold player, and the Arab epic63 tossed up its stormy road from birth through weakness, pain and doubt, to red victory. It was the just end to an adventure which had dared so much, but after the victory there came a slow time of disillusion64, and then a night in which the fighting men found that all their hopes had failed them. Now, at last, may there have come to them the white peace of the end, in the knowledge that they achieved a deathless thing, a lucent inspiration to the children of their race.
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1 anomalous | |
adj.反常的;不规则的 | |
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2 authentic | |
a.真的,真正的;可靠的,可信的,有根据的 | |
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3 inscribed | |
v.写,刻( inscribe的过去式和过去分词 );内接 | |
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4 custody | |
n.监护,照看,羁押,拘留 | |
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5 clan | |
n.氏族,部落,宗族,家族,宗派 | |
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6 reverence | |
n.敬畏,尊敬,尊严;Reverence:对某些基督教神职人员的尊称;v.尊敬,敬畏,崇敬 | |
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7 lapse | |
n.过失,流逝,失效,抛弃信仰,间隔;vi.堕落,停止,失效,流逝;vt.使失效 | |
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8 holder | |
n.持有者,占有者;(台,架等)支持物 | |
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9 garrison | |
n.卫戍部队;驻地,卫戍区;vt.派(兵)驻防 | |
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10 intrigue | |
vt.激起兴趣,迷住;vi.耍阴谋;n.阴谋,密谋 | |
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11 depose | |
vt.免职;宣誓作证 | |
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12 honourable | |
adj.可敬的;荣誉的,光荣的 | |
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13 captivity | |
n.囚禁;被俘;束缚 | |
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14 politic | |
adj.有智虑的;精明的;v.从政 | |
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15 technically | |
adv.专门地,技术上地 | |
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16 precariously | |
adv.不安全地;危险地;碰机会地;不稳定地 | |
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17 goodwill | |
n.善意,亲善,信誉,声誉 | |
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18 entirely | |
ad.全部地,完整地;完全地,彻底地 | |
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19 adherence | |
n.信奉,依附,坚持,固着 | |
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20 Moslem | |
n.回教徒,穆罕默德信徒;adj.回教徒的,回教的 | |
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21 Christian | |
adj.基督教徒的;n.基督教徒 | |
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22 endorsed | |
vt.& vi.endorse的过去式或过去分词形式v.赞同( endorse的过去式和过去分词 );在(尤指支票的)背面签字;在(文件的)背面写评论;在广告上说本人使用并赞同某产品 | |
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23 plunge | |
v.跳入,(使)投入,(使)陷入;猛冲 | |
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24 obstinate | |
adj.顽固的,倔强的,不易屈服的,较难治愈的 | |
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25 pious | |
adj.虔诚的;道貌岸然的 | |
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26 incompatible | |
adj.不相容的,不协调的,不相配的 | |
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27 dignified | |
a.可敬的,高贵的 | |
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28 vessels | |
n.血管( vessel的名词复数 );船;容器;(具有特殊品质或接受特殊品质的)人 | |
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29 civilians | |
平民,百姓( civilian的名词复数 ); 老百姓 | |
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30 sinister | |
adj.不吉利的,凶恶的,左边的 | |
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31 eldest | |
adj.最年长的,最年老的 | |
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32 riddled | |
adj.布满的;充斥的;泛滥的v.解谜,出谜题(riddle的过去分词形式) | |
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33 breakdown | |
n.垮,衰竭;损坏,故障,倒塌 | |
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34 stagnation | |
n. 停滞 | |
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35 prostrate | |
v.拜倒,平卧,衰竭;adj.拜倒的,平卧的,衰竭的 | |
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36 extremities | |
n.端点( extremity的名词复数 );尽头;手和足;极窘迫的境地 | |
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37 hazardous | |
adj.(有)危险的,冒险的;碰运气的 | |
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38 pretext | |
n.借口,托词 | |
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39 indignities | |
n.侮辱,轻蔑( indignity的名词复数 ) | |
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40 bully | |
n.恃强欺弱者,小流氓;vt.威胁,欺侮 | |
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41 condemned | |
adj. 被责难的, 被宣告有罪的 动词condemn的过去式和过去分词 | |
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42 postpone | |
v.延期,推迟 | |
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43 whit | |
n.一点,丝毫 | |
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44 creed | |
n.信条;信念,纲领 | |
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45 traitors | |
卖国贼( traitor的名词复数 ); 叛徒; 背叛者; 背信弃义的人 | |
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46 determined | |
adj.坚定的;有决心的 | |
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47 inspection | |
n.检查,审查,检阅 | |
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48 crimson | |
n./adj.深(绯)红色(的);vi.脸变绯红色 | |
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49 jeopardy | |
n.危险;危难 | |
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50 irony | |
n.反语,冷嘲;具有讽刺意味的事,嘲弄 | |
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51 mimic | |
v.模仿,戏弄;n.模仿他人言行的人 | |
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52 javelin | |
n.标枪,投枪 | |
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53 picket | |
n.纠察队;警戒哨;v.设置纠察线;布置警卫 | |
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54 thither | |
adv.向那里;adj.在那边的,对岸的 | |
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55 immediate | |
adj.立即的;直接的,最接近的;紧靠的 | |
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56 disorder | |
n.紊乱,混乱;骚动,骚乱;疾病,失调 | |
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57 suite | |
n.一套(家具);套房;随从人员 | |
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58 corps | |
n.(通信等兵种的)部队;(同类作的)一组 | |
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59 courageous | |
adj.勇敢的,有胆量的 | |
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60 bloodily | |
adv.出血地;血淋淋地;残忍地;野蛮地 | |
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61 prudence | |
n.谨慎,精明,节俭 | |
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62 mere | |
adj.纯粹的;仅仅,只不过 | |
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63 epic | |
n.史诗,叙事诗;adj.史诗般的,壮丽的 | |
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64 disillusion | |
vt.使不再抱幻想,使理想破灭 | |
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