In the course of the argument which followed, I said something about the need of soon attacking Medina; for, with the rest of the British, I believed that the fall of Medina was a necessary preliminary to any further progress of the Arab Revolt. He took me up sharply, saying that it was in no wise proper for the Arabs to take Medina. In his view, the Arab Movement had attained5 its maximum utility by the mere6 rebellion in Mecca; and military operations against Turkey were better in the unaided hands of Great Britain and France. He wished to land Allied7 troops at Rabegh, because it would quench8 the ardour of the tribes by making the Sherif suspect in their eyes. The foreign troops would then be his main defence, and his preservation9 be our work and option, until at the end of the war, when Turkey was defeated, the victorious10 Powers could extract Medina by treaty from the Sultan, and confer it upon Hussein, with the legal sovereignty of Hejaz, as his rewards for faithful service.
I had not his light confidence in our being strong enough to dispense11 with small allies; so I said shortly that my opinions were opposed to his. I laid the greatest weight on the immediate12 conquest of Medina, and was advising Feisal to seize Wejh, in order to prolong his threat against the railway. In sum, to my mind, the Arab Movement would not justify13 its creation if the enthusiasm of it did not carry the Arabs into Damascus.
This was unwelcome to him; for the Sykes-Picot Treaty of 1916 between France and England had been drawn14 by Sykes for this very eventuality; and, to reward it, stipulated15 the establishment of independent Arab states in Damascus, Aleppo and Mosul, districts which would otherwise fall to the unrestricted control of France. Neither Sykes nor Picot had believed the thing really possible; but I knew that it was, and believed that after it the vigour16 of the Arab Movement would prevent the creation — by us or others — in Western Asia of unduly17 ‘colonial’ schemes of exploitation.
Bremond took refuge in his technical sphere, and assured me, on his honour as a staff-officer, that for Feisal to leave Yenbo and go to Wejh was military suicide; but I saw no force in the arguments which he threw at me volubly; and told him so. It was a curious interview, that, between an old soldier and a young man in fancy dress; and it left a bad taste in my mouth. The Colonel, like his countrymen, was a realist in love, and war. Even in situations of poetry the French remained incorrigible18 prose-writers, seeing by the directly-thrown light of reason and understanding, not through the half-closed eye, mistily19, by things’ essential radiance, in the manner of the imaginative British: so the two races worked ill together on a great undertaking20. However, I controlled myself enough not to tell any Arab of the conversation, but sent a full account of it to Colonel Wilson, who was shortly coming up to see Feisal for a discussion of the Wejh prospect21 in all its bearings.
Before Wilson arrived the centre of Turkish gravity changed abruptly22. Fakhri Pashi had seen the hopelessness of attacking Yenbo, or of driving after the intangible Juheina in Kheif Hussein. Also he was being violently bombed in Nakhl Mubarak itself by a pair of British seaplanes which did hardy23 flights over the desert and got well into the enemy on two occasions, despite their shrapnel.
Consequently he decided24 to fall back in a hurry on Bir Said, leaving a small force there to check the Juheina, and to move down the Sultani road towards Rabegh with the bulk of his men. These changes were no doubt partly impelled25 by the unusual vigour of Ali at Rabegh. As soon as Ali had heard of Zeid’s defeat he had sent him reinforcements and guns; and when Feisal himself collapsed26 he decided to move north with all his army, to attack the Turks in Wadi Safra and draw them off Yenbo. Ali had nearly seven thousand men; and Feisal felt that if the move was synchronized27 with one on his part, Fakhri’s force might be crushed between them in the hills. He telegraphed, suggesting this, asking for a delay of a few days till his shaken men were ready.
Ali was strung up and would not wait. Feisal therefore rushed Zeid out to Masahali in Wadi Yenbo to make preparations. When these were complete he sent Zeid on to occupy Bir Said, which was done successfully. He then ordered the Juheina forward in support. They demurred28; for ibn Beidawi was jealous of Feisal’s growing power among his tribes, and wanted to keep himself indispensable. Feisal rode unattended to Nakhl Mubarak, and in one night convinced the Juheina that he was their leader. Next morning they were all moving, while he went on to collect the northern Harb on the Tasha Pass to interrupt the Turkish retreat in Wadi Safra. He had nearly six thousand men; and if Ali took the southern bank of the valley the weak Turks would be between two fires.
Unfortunately it did not happen. When actually on the move he heard from Ali that, after a peaceful recovery of Bir ibn Hassani, his men had been shaken by false reports of disloyalty among the Subh, and had fallen back in rapid disorder29 to Babegh.
In this ominous30 pause Colonel Wilson came up to Yenbo to persuade us of the necessity of an immediate operation against Wejh. An amended31 plan had been drawn up whereby Feisal would take the whole force of the Juheina, and his permanent battalions33, against Wejh with the maximum of naval34 help. This strength would make success reasonably sure, but it left Yenbo empty and defenceless. For the moment Feisal dreaded35 incurring36 such a risk. He pointed37 out, not unreasonably38, that the Turks in his neighbourhood were still mobile; that Ali’s force had proved hollow, unlikely to defend even Babegh against serious attack; and that, as Babegh was the bulwark39 of Mecca, sooner than see it lost he must throw away Yenbo and ferry himself and men thither40 to die fighting on its beach.
To reassure41 him, Wilson painted the Babegh force in warm colours. Feisal checked his sincerity42 by asking for his personal word that the Babegh garrison43, with British naval help, would resist enemy attack till Wejh fell. Wilson looked for support round the silent deck of the Dufferin (on which we were conferring), and nobly gave the required assurance: a wise gamble, since without it Feisal would not move; and this diversion against Wejh, the only offensive in the Arabs’ power, was their last chance not so much of securing a convincing siege of Medina, as of preventing the Turkish capture of Mecca. A few days later he strengthened himself by sending Feisal direct orders from his father, the Sherif, to proceed to Wejh at once, with all his available troops.
Meanwhile the Babegh situation grew worse. The enemy in Wadi Safra and the Sultani road were estimated at nearly five thousand men. The Harb of the north were suppliant44 to them for preservation of their palm-groves. The Harb of the south, those of Hussein Mabeirig, notoriously waited their advance to attack the Sherifians in the rear. At a conference of Wilson, Bremond, Joyce, Boss and others, held in Babegh on Christmas Eve, it was decided to lay out on the beach by the aerodrome a small position, capable of being held under the ship’s guns by the Egyptians, the Flying Corps45 and a seamen’s landing party from the Minerva, for the few hours needed to embark46 or destroy the stores. The Turks were advancing step by step; and the place was not in condition to resist one well-handled battalion32 supported by field artillery47.
However, Fakhri was too slow. He did not pass Bir el Sheikh in any force till near the end of the first week in January, and seven days later was still not ready to attack Khoreiba, where Ali had an outpost of a few hundred men. The patrols were in touch; and an assault was daily expected, but as regularly delayed.
In truth the Turks were meeting with unguessed difficulties. Their headquarters were faced by a heavy sick rate among the men, and a growing weakness of the animals: both symptoms of overwork and lack of decent food. Always the activity of the tribesmen behind their back hampered48 them. Clans49 might sometimes fall away from the Arab cause, but did not therefore become trustworthy adherents50 of the Turks, who soon found themselves in ubiquitously hostile country. The tribal51 raids in the first fortnight of January caused them average daily losses of forty camels and some twenty men killed and wounded, with corresponding expense in stores.
These raids might occur at any point from ten miles seaward of Medina itself for the next seventy miles through the hills. They illustrated52 the obstacles in the way of the new Turkish Army with its half-Germanized complexity53 of equipment, when, from a distant railhead with no made roads, it tried to advance through extremely rugged54 and hostile country. The administrative55 developments of scientific war had clogged56 its mobility57 and destroyed its dash; and troubles grew in geometrical rather than arithmetical progression for each new mile its commanding officers put between themselves and Medina, their ill-found, insecure and inconvenient58 base.
The situation was so unpromising for the Turks that Fakhri was probably half glad when the forthcoming sudden moves of Abdulla and Feisal in the last days of 1916 altered the strategic conception of the Hejaz war, and hurried the Mecca expedition (after January the eighteenth 1917) back from the Sultani and the Fara and the Gaha roads, back from Wadi Safra, to hold a passive defence of trenches59 within sight of the walls of Medina: a static position which endured till the Armistice60 ended the war and involved Turkey in the dismal61 surrender of the Holy City and its helpless garrison.
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1
demonstration
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n.表明,示范,论证,示威 | |
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2
withdrawals
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n.收回,取回,撤回( withdrawal的名词复数 );撤退,撤走;收回[取回,撤回,撤退,撤走]的实例;推出(组织),提走(存款),戒除毒瘾,对说过的话收回,孤僻 | |
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3
dispersed
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adj. 被驱散的, 被分散的, 散布的 | |
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promising
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adj.有希望的,有前途的 | |
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5
attained
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(通常经过努力)实现( attain的过去式和过去分词 ); 达到; 获得; 达到(某年龄、水平、状况) | |
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6
mere
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adj.纯粹的;仅仅,只不过 | |
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7
allied
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adj.协约国的;同盟国的 | |
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8
quench
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vt.熄灭,扑灭;压制 | |
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9
preservation
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n.保护,维护,保存,保留,保持 | |
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10
victorious
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adj.胜利的,得胜的 | |
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11
dispense
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vt.分配,分发;配(药),发(药);实施 | |
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12
immediate
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adj.立即的;直接的,最接近的;紧靠的 | |
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13
justify
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vt.证明…正当(或有理),为…辩护 | |
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14
drawn
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v.拖,拉,拔出;adj.憔悴的,紧张的 | |
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15
stipulated
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vt.& vi.规定;约定adj.[法]合同规定的 | |
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16
vigour
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(=vigor)n.智力,体力,精力 | |
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17
unduly
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adv.过度地,不适当地 | |
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18
incorrigible
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adj.难以纠正的,屡教不改的 | |
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19
mistily
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adv.有雾地,朦胧地,不清楚地 | |
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20
undertaking
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n.保证,许诺,事业 | |
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21
prospect
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n.前景,前途;景色,视野 | |
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22
abruptly
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adv.突然地,出其不意地 | |
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23
hardy
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adj.勇敢的,果断的,吃苦的;耐寒的 | |
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24
decided
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adj.决定了的,坚决的;明显的,明确的 | |
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25
impelled
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v.推动、推进或敦促某人做某事( impel的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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26
collapsed
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adj.倒塌的 | |
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27
synchronized
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同步的 | |
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28
demurred
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v.表示异议,反对( demur的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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29
disorder
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n.紊乱,混乱;骚动,骚乱;疾病,失调 | |
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30
ominous
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adj.不祥的,不吉的,预兆的,预示的 | |
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31
Amended
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adj. 修正的 动词amend的过去式和过去分词 | |
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32
battalion
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n.营;部队;大队(的人) | |
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33
battalions
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n.(陆军的)一营(大约有一千兵士)( battalion的名词复数 );协同作战的部队;军队;(组织在一起工作的)队伍 | |
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34
naval
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adj.海军的,军舰的,船的 | |
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35
dreaded
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adj.令人畏惧的;害怕的v.害怕,恐惧,担心( dread的过去式和过去分词) | |
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36
incurring
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遭受,招致,引起( incur的现在分词 ) | |
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37
pointed
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adj.尖的,直截了当的 | |
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38
unreasonably
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adv. 不合理地 | |
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39
bulwark
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n.堡垒,保障,防御 | |
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40
thither
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adv.向那里;adj.在那边的,对岸的 | |
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41
reassure
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v.使放心,使消除疑虑 | |
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42
sincerity
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n.真诚,诚意;真实 | |
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43
garrison
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n.卫戍部队;驻地,卫戍区;vt.派(兵)驻防 | |
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44
suppliant
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adj.哀恳的;n.恳求者,哀求者 | |
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45
corps
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n.(通信等兵种的)部队;(同类作的)一组 | |
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46
embark
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vi.乘船,着手,从事,上飞机 | |
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47
artillery
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n.(军)火炮,大炮;炮兵(部队) | |
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48
hampered
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妨碍,束缚,限制( hamper的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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49
clans
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宗族( clan的名词复数 ); 氏族; 庞大的家族; 宗派 | |
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50
adherents
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n.支持者,拥护者( adherent的名词复数 );党羽;徒子徒孙 | |
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51
tribal
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adj.部族的,种族的 | |
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52
illustrated
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adj. 有插图的,列举的 动词illustrate的过去式和过去分词 | |
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53
complexity
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n.复杂(性),复杂的事物 | |
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54
rugged
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adj.高低不平的,粗糙的,粗壮的,强健的 | |
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55
administrative
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adj.行政的,管理的 | |
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56
clogged
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(使)阻碍( clog的过去式和过去分词 ); 淤滞 | |
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57
mobility
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n.可动性,变动性,情感不定 | |
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58
inconvenient
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adj.不方便的,令人感到麻烦的 | |
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59
trenches
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深沟,地沟( trench的名词复数 ); 战壕 | |
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60
armistice
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n.休战,停战协定 | |
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61
dismal
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adj.阴沉的,凄凉的,令人忧郁的,差劲的 | |
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