He feared to make the Arab Army formidable — an argument one could understand — but the case of the British Government was incomprehensible. It was not ill-will, for they gave us all else we wanted; nor was it niggardliness4, for their total help to the Arabs, in materials and money, exceeded ten millions. I believe it was sheer stupidity. But it was maddening to be unequal to many enterprises and to fail in others, for the technical reason that we could not keep down the Turkish artillery5 because its guns outranged ours by three or four thousand yards. In the end, happily, Bremond over-reached himself, after keeping his batteries idle for a year at Suez. Major Cousse, his successor, ordered them down to us, and by their help we entered Damascus. During that idle year they had been, to each Arab officer who entered Suez, a silent incontrovertible proof of French malice6 towards the Arab movement.
We received a great reinforcement to our cause in Jaafar Pasha, a Bagdadi officer from the Turkish Army. After distinguished7 service in the German and Turkish armies, he had been chosen by Enver to organize the levies8 of the Sheikh el Senussi. He went there by submarine, made a decent force of the wild men, and showed tactical ability against the British in two battles. Then he was captured and lodged9 in the citadel10 at Cairo with the other officer prisoners of war. He escaped one night, slipping down a blanket-rope towards the moat; but the blankets failed under the strain, and in the fall he hurt his ankle, and was re-taken helpless. In hospital he gave his parole, and was enlarged after paying for the torn blanket. But one day he read in an Arabic newspaper of the Sherif s revolt, and of the execution by the Turks of prominent Arab Nationalists — his friends — and realized that he had been on the wrong side.
Feisal had heard of him, of course, and wanted him as commander-in-chief of his regular troops, whose improvement was now our main effort. We knew that Jaafar was one of the few men with enough of reputation and personality to weld their difficult and reciprocally disagreeable elements into an army. King Hussein, however, would not have it. He was old and narrow, and disliked Mesopotamians and Syrians: Mecca must deliver Damascus. He refused the services of Jaafar. Feisal had to accept him on his own responsibility.
In Cairo were Hogarth and George Lloyd, and Storrs and Deedes, and many old friends. Beyond them the circle of Arabian well-wishers was now strangely increased. In the army our shares rose as we showed profits. Lynden Bell stood firmly our friend and swore that method was coming out of the Arab madness. Sir Archibald Murray realized with a sudden shock that more Turkish troops were fighting the Arabs than were fighting him, and began to remember how he had always favoured the Arab revolt. Admiral Wemyss was as ready to help now as he had been in our hard days round Rabegh. Sir Reginald Wingate, High Commissioner11 in Egypt, was happy in the success of the work he had advocated for years. I grudged12 him this happiness; for McMahon, who took the actual risk of starting it, had been broken just before prosperity began. However, that was hardly Wingate’s fault.
In the midst of my touching13 the slender stops of all these quills14 there came a rude surprise. Colonel Bremond called to felicitate me on the capture of Wejh, saying that it confirmed his belief in my military talent and encouraged him to expect my help in an extension of our success. He wanted to occupy Akaba with an Anglo-French force and naval15 help. He pointed16 out the importance of Akaba, the only Turkish port left in the Red Sea, the nearest to the Suez Canal, the nearest to the Hejaz Railway, on the left flank of the Beersheba army; suggesting its occupation by a composite brigade, which should advance up Wadi Itm for a crushing blow at Maan. He began to enlarge on the nature of the ground.
I told him that I knew Akaba from before the war, and felt that his scheme was technically17 impossible. We could take the beach of the gulf18; but our forces there, as unfavourably placed as on a Gallipoli beach, would be under observation and gun-fire from the coastal19 hills: and these granite20 hills, thousands of feet high, were impracticable for heavy troops: the passes through them being formidable defiles21, very costly22 to assault or to cover. In my opinion, Akaba, whose importance was all and more than he said, would be best taken by Arab irregulars descending23 from the interior without naval help.
Bremond did not tell me (but I knew) that he wanted the landing at Akaba to head off the Arab movement, by getting a mixed force in front of them (as at Rabegh), so that they might be confined to Arabia, and compelled to waste their efforts against Medina. The Arabs still feared that the Sherif s alliance with us was based on a secret agreement to sell them at the end, and such a Christian24 invasion would have confirmed these fears and destroyed their cooperation. For my part, I did not tell Bremond (but he knew) that I meant to defeat his efforts and to take the Arabs soon into Damascus. It amused me, this childishly-conceived rivalry25 of vital aims, but he ended his talk ominously26 by saying that, anyhow, he was going down to put the scheme to Feisal in Wejh.
Now, I had not warned Feisal that Bremond was a politician. Newcombe was in Wejh, with his friendly desire to get moves on. We had not talked over the problem of Akaba. Feisal knew neither its terrain27 nor its tribes. Keenness and ignorance would lend an ear favourable28 to the proposal. It seemed best for me to hurry down there and put my side on its guard, so I left the same afternoon for Suez and sailed that night. Two days later, in Wejh, I explained myself; so that when Bremond came after ten days and opened his heart, or part of it, to Feisal, his tactics were returned to him with improvements.
The Frenchman began by presenting six Hotchkiss automatics complete with instructors29. This was a noble gift; but Feisal took the opportunity to ask him to increase his bounty30 by a battery of the quick-firing mountain guns at Suez, explaining that he had been sorry to leave the Yenbo area for Wejh, since Wejh was so much further from his objective — Medina — but it was really impossible for him to assault the Turks (who had French artillery) with rifles or with the old guns supplied him by the British Army. His men had not the technical excellence31 to make a bad tool prevail over a good one. He had to exploit his only advantages — numbers and mobility32 — and, unless his equipment could be improved, there was no saying where this protraction of his front might end!
Bremond tried to turn it off by belittling33 guns as useless for Hejaz warfare34 (quite right, this, practically). But it would end the war at once if Feisal made his men climb about the country like goats and tear up the railway. Feisal, angry at the metaphor35 (impolite in Arabic), looked at Bremond’s six feet of comfortable body, and asked if he had ever tried to ‘goat’ himself. Bremond referred gallantly36 to the question of Akaba, and the real danger to the Arabs in the Turks remaining there: insisting that the British, who had the means for an expedition thither37, should be pressed to undertake it. Feisal, in reply, gave him a geographical38 sketch39 of the land behind Akaba (I recognized the less dashing part of it myself) and explained the tribal40 difficulties and the food problem — all the points which made it a serious obstacle. He ended by saying that, after the cloud of orders, counter-orders and confusion over the allied troops for Rabegh, he really had not the face to approach Sir Archibald Murray so soon with another request for an excursion.
Bremond had to retire from the battle in good order, getting in a Parthian shot at me, where I sat spitefully smiling, by begging Feisal to insist that the British armoured cars in Suez be sent down to Wejh. But even this was a boomerang, since they had started! After he had gone, I returned to Cairo for a cheerful week, in which I gave my betters much good advice. Murray, who had growlingly41 earmarked Tullibardine’s brigade for Akaba, approved me still further when I declared against that side-show too. Then to Wejh.

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1
mules
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骡( mule的名词复数 ); 拖鞋; 顽固的人; 越境运毒者 | |
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2
torment
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n.折磨;令人痛苦的东西(人);vt.折磨;纠缠 | |
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3
allied
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adj.协约国的;同盟国的 | |
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niggardliness
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artillery
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n.(军)火炮,大炮;炮兵(部队) | |
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malice
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n.恶意,怨恨,蓄意;[律]预谋 | |
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7
distinguished
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adj.卓越的,杰出的,著名的 | |
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levies
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(部队)征兵( levy的名词复数 ); 募捐; 被征募的军队 | |
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9
lodged
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v.存放( lodge的过去式和过去分词 );暂住;埋入;(权利、权威等)归属 | |
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10
citadel
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n.城堡;堡垒;避难所 | |
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11
commissioner
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n.(政府厅、局、处等部门)专员,长官,委员 | |
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12
grudged
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怀恨(grudge的过去式与过去分词形式) | |
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13
touching
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adj.动人的,使人感伤的 | |
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quills
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n.(刺猬或豪猪的)刺( quill的名词复数 );羽毛管;翮;纡管 | |
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15
naval
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adj.海军的,军舰的,船的 | |
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pointed
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adj.尖的,直截了当的 | |
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technically
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adv.专门地,技术上地 | |
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18
gulf
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n.海湾;深渊,鸿沟;分歧,隔阂 | |
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19
coastal
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adj.海岸的,沿海的,沿岸的 | |
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20
granite
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adj.花岗岩,花岗石 | |
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21
defiles
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v.玷污( defile的第三人称单数 );污染;弄脏;纵列行进 | |
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22
costly
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adj.昂贵的,价值高的,豪华的 | |
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23
descending
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n. 下行 adj. 下降的 | |
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24
Christian
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adj.基督教徒的;n.基督教徒 | |
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25
rivalry
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n.竞争,竞赛,对抗 | |
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ominously
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adv.恶兆地,不吉利地;预示地 | |
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27
terrain
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n.地面,地形,地图 | |
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28
favourable
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adj.赞成的,称赞的,有利的,良好的,顺利的 | |
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instructors
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指导者,教师( instructor的名词复数 ) | |
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bounty
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n.慷慨的赠予物,奖金;慷慨,大方;施与 | |
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31
excellence
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n.优秀,杰出,(pl.)优点,美德 | |
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32
mobility
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n.可动性,变动性,情感不定 | |
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33
belittling
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使显得微小,轻视,贬低( belittle的现在分词 ) | |
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34
warfare
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n.战争(状态);斗争;冲突 | |
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35
metaphor
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n.隐喻,暗喻 | |
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36
gallantly
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adv. 漂亮地,勇敢地,献殷勤地 | |
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37
thither
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adv.向那里;adj.在那边的,对岸的 | |
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geographical
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adj.地理的;地区(性)的 | |
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39
sketch
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n.草图;梗概;素描;v.素描;概述 | |
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40
tribal
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adj.部族的,种族的 | |
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41
growlingly
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adv.怒吠,吼,咆哮 | |
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