Lee's army was cleverly withdrawn4 from Hooker's front and was carried through western Maryland into Pennsylvania by the old line of the Shenandoah Valley and across the Potomac at Falling Waters. Hooker reports to Lincoln under date of June 4th that the army or an army is still in his front on the line of the Rappahannock, Lincoln writes to Hooker under date of June 5th, "We have report that Lee's army is moving westward5 and that a large portion of it is already to the west of the Blue Ridge6. The 'bull' [Lee's army] is across the fence and it surely ought to be possible to worry him." On June 14th, Lincoln writes again, reporting to Hooker that Lee with the body of his troops is approaching the Potomac at a point forty miles away from the line of the entrenchments on the Rappahannock. "The animal [Lee's army] is extended over a line of forty miles. It must be very slim somewhere. Can you not cut it?" The phrases are not in military form but they give evidence of sound military judgment7. Hooker was unable to grasp the opportunity, and realising this himself, he asked to be relieved. The troublesome and anxious honour of the command of the army now falls upon General Meade. He takes over the responsibility at a time when Lee's army is already safely across the Potomac and advancing northward8, apparently9 towards Philadelphia. His troops are more or less scattered10 and no definite plan of campaign appears to have been formulated11. The events of the next three weeks constitute possibly the best known portion of the War. Meade shows good energy in breaking up his encampment along the Rappahannock and getting his column on to the road northward. Fortunately, the army of the Potomac for once has the advantage of the interior line so that Meade is able to place his army in a position that protects at once Washington on the south-west, Baltimore on the east, and Philadelphia on the north-east. We can, however, picture to ourselves the anxiety that must have rested upon the Commander-in-chief in Washington during the weeks of the campaign and during the three days of the great battle which was fought on Northern soil and miles to the north of the Northern capital. If, on that critical third day of July, the Federal lines had been broken and the army disorganised, there was nothing that could prevent the national capital from coming into the control of Lee's army. The surrender of Washington meant the intervention of France and England, meant the failure of the attempt to preserve the nation's existence, meant that Abraham Lincoln would go down to history as the last President of the United States, the President under whose leadership the national history had come to a close. But the Federal lines were not broken. The third day of Gettysburg made clear that with equality of position and with substantial equality in numbers there was no better fighting material in the army of the grey than in the army of the blue. The advance of Pickett's division to the crest13 of Cemetery14 Ridge marked the high tide of the Confederate cause. Longstreet's men were not able to prevail against the sturdy defence of Hancock's second corps15 and when, on the Fourth of July, Lee's army took up its line of retreat to the Potomac, leaving behind it thousands of dead and wounded, the calm judgment of Lee and his associates must have made clear to them that the cause of the Confederacy was lost. The army of Northern Virginia had shattered itself against the defences of the North, and there was for Lee no reserve line. For a long series of months to come, Lee, magnificent engineer officer that he was, and with a sturdy persistency16 which withstood all disaster, was able to maintain defensive lines in the Wilderness17, at Cold Harbor, and in front of Petersburg, but as his brigades crumbled18 away under the persistent19 and unceasing attacks of the army of the Potomac, he must have realised long before the day of Appomattox that his task was impossible. What Gettysburg decided20 in the East was confirmed with equal emphasis by the fall of Vicksburg in the West. On the Fourth of July, 1863, the day on which Lee, defeated and discouraged, was taking his shattered army out of Pennsylvania, General Grant was placing the Stars and Stripes over the earthworks of Vicksburg. The Mississippi was now under the control of the Federalists from its source to the mouth, and that portion of the Confederacy lying to the west of the river was cut off so that from this territory no further co-operation of importance could be rendered to the armies either of Johnston or of Lee.
Lincoln writes to Grant after the fall of Vicksburg giving, with his word of congratulation, the admission that he (Lincoln) had doubted the wisdom or the practicability of Grant's movement to the south of Vicksburg and inland to Jackson. "You were right," said Lincoln, "and I was wrong."
On the 19th of November, 1863, comes the Gettysburg address, so eloquent21 in its simplicity22. It is probable that no speaker in recorded history ever succeeded in putting into so few words so much feeling, such suggestive thought, and such high idealism. The speech is one that children can understand and that the greatest minds must admire.
FACSIMILE OF GETTYSBURG ADDRESS.
Address delivered at the dedication23 of the cemetery at Gettysburg.
Four score and seven years ago our fathers brought forth24 on this continent a new nation, conceived in liberty, and dedicated25 to the proposition that all men are created equal.
Now we are engaged in a great civil war, testing whether that nation, or any nation, so conceived and so dedicated, can long endure. We are met on a great battlefield of that war. We have come to dedicate a portion of that field, as a final resting place for those who here gave their lives that their nation might live. It is altogether fitting and proper that we should this.
But in a larger sense, we cannot dedicate, we cannot consecrate26, we cannot hallow this ground. The brave men, living and dead who struggled here have consecrated27 it far above our poor power to add or detract. The world will little note nor long remember what we say here, but it can never forget what they did here. It is for us the living rather to be dedicated here to the unfinished work which they who fought here have thus far so nobly advanced. It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us—that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion—that we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain, that this nation under God shall have a new birth of freedom, and that government of the people, by the people, for the people shall not perish from the earth.
Abraham Lincoln
November 19, 1863
There was disappointment that Meade had not shown more energy after Gettysburg in the pursuit of Lee's army and that some attempt, at least, had not been made to interfere28 with the retreat across the Potomac. Military critics have in fact pointed29 out that Meade had laid himself open to criticism in the management of the battle itself. At the time of the repulse30 of Pickett's charge, Meade had available at the left and in rear of his centre the sixth corps which had hardly been engaged on the previous two days, and which included some of the best fighting material in the army. It has been pointed out more than once that if that corps had been thrown in at once with a countercharge upon the heels of the retreating divisions of Longstreet, Lee's right must have been curled up and overwhelmed. If this had happened, Lee's army would have been so seriously shattered that its power for future service would have been inconsiderable. Meade was accepted as a good working general but the occasion demanded something more forcible in the way of leadership and, early in 1864, Lincoln sends for the man who by his success in the West had won the hopeful confidence of the President and the people.
Before this appointment of General-in-chief was given to General Grant, and he came to the East to take charge of the armies in Virginia, he had brought to a successful conclusion a dramatic campaign, of which Chattanooga was the centre. In September, 1863, General Rosecrans, who had occupied Chattanooga, was defeated some twenty miles to the south on the field of Chickamauga, a defeat which was the result of too much confidence on the part of the Federal commander, who in pressing his advance had unwisely separated the great divisions of his army, and of excellent skill and enterprise on the part of the Confederate commander, General Bragg. If the troops of Rosecrans had not been veterans, and if the right wing had not been under the immediate31 command of so sturdy and unconquered a veteran as General Thomas, the defeat might have become a rout32. As it was, the army retreated with some discouragement but in good fighting force, to the lines of Chattanooga. By skilful33 disposition34 of his forces across the lines of connection between Chattanooga and the base of supplies, General Bragg brought the Federals almost to the point of starvation, and there was grave risk that through the necessary falling back of the army to secure supplies, the whole advantage of the previous year's campaign might be lost. Grant was placed in charge of the forces in Chattanooga, and by a good management of the resources available, he succeeded in reopening the river and what became known as "the cracker35 line," and in November, 1863, in the dramatic battles of Lookout36 Mountain, fought more immediately by General Hooker, and of Missionary37 Ridge, the troops of which were under the direct command of General Sherman, overwhelmed the lines of Bragg, and pressed his forces back into a more or less disorderly retreat. An important factor in the defeat of Bragg was the detaching from his army of the corps under Longstreet which had been sent to Knoxville in a futile38 attempt to crush Burnside and to reconquer East Tennessee for the Confederacy. This plan, chiefly political in purpose, was said to have originated with President Davis. The armies of the West were now placed under the command of General Sherman, and early in 1864, Grant was brought to Virginia to take up the perplexing problem of overcoming the sturdy veterans of General Lee.
The first action of Grant as commander of all the armies in the field was to concentrate all the available forces against the two chief armies of the Confederacy. The old policy of occupying outlying territory for the sake of making a show of political authority was given up. If Johnston in the West and Lee in the East could be crushed, the national authority would be restored in due season, and that was the only way in which it could be restored. Troops were gathered in from Missouri and Arkansas and Louisiana and were placed under the command of Sherman for use in the final effort of breaking through the centre of the Confederacy, while in the East nothing was neglected on the part of the new administration to secure for the direction of the new commander all resources available of men and of supplies.
Grant now finds himself pitted against the first soldier of the continent, the leader who is to go down to history as probably the greatest soldier that America has ever produced. Lee's military career is a wonderful example of a combination of brilliancy, daring ingenuity39 of plan, promptness of action, and patient persistence40 under all kinds of discouragement, but it was not only through these qualities that it was possible for him to retain control, through three years of heavy fighting, of the territory of Virginia, which came to be the chief bulwark41 of the Confederacy. Lee's high character, sweetness of nature, and unselfish integrity of purpose had impressed themselves not only upon the Confederate administration which had given him the command but upon every soldier in that command. For the army of Northern Virginia Lee was the man behind the guns just as Lincoln came to be for all the men in blue. There never was a more devoted42 army and there probably never was a better handled army than that with which Lee defended for three years the lines across Northern Virginia and the remnants of which were finally surrendered at Appomattox.
Grant might well have felt concerned with such an opponent in front of him. He had on his hands (as had been the almost uniform condition for the army of the Potomac) the disadvantage of position. His advance must be made from exterior43 lines and nearly every attack was to be against well entrenched44 positions that had been first selected years back and had been strengthened from season to season. On the other hand, Grant was able to depend upon the loyal support of the administration through which came to his army the full advantage of the great resources of the North. His ranks as depleted45 were filled up, his commissary trains need never be long unsupplied, his ammunition46 waggons47 were always equipped. For Lee, during the years following the Gettysburg battle, the problem was unending and increasing: How should the troops be fed and whence should they secure the fresh supplies of ammunition?
Between Grant and Lincoln there came to be perfect sympathy of thought and action. The men had in their nature (though not in their mental equipment) much in common. Grant carries his army through the spring of 1864, across the much fought over territory, marching and fighting from day to day towards the south-west. The effort is always to outflank Lee's right, getting in between him and his base at Richmond, but after each fight, Lee's army always bars the way. Marching out of the Wilderness after seven days' fierce struggle, Grant still finds the line of grey blocking his path to Richmond. The army of the Potomac had been marching and fighting without break for weeks. There had been but little sleep, and the food in the trains was often far out of the reach of the men in the fighting line. Men and officers were alike exhausted48. While advantages had been gained at one point or another along the line, and while it was certain that the opposing army had also suffered severely49, there had been no conclusive50 successes to inspirit the troops with the feeling that they were to seize victory out of the campaign.
In emerging from the Wilderness, the head of the column reached the cross-roads the left fork of which led back to the Potomac and the right fork to Richmond or to Petersburg. In the previous campaigns, the army of the Potomac, after doing its share of plucky51 fighting and taking more than its share of discouragement, had at such a point been withdrawn for rest and recuperation. It was not an unnatural52 expectation that this course would be taken in the present campaign. The road to the right meant further fatigue53 and further continuous fighting for men who were already exhausted. In the leading brigade it was only the brigade commander and the adjutant who had knowledge of the instructions for the line of march. When, with a wave of the hand of the adjutant, the guidon flag of the brigade was carried to the right and the head of the column was set towards Richmond, a shout went up from the men marching behind the guidon. It was an utterance54 not of discouragement but of enthusiasm. Exhausting as the campaign had been, the men in the ranks preferred to fight it out then and to get through with it. Old soldiers as they were, they were able to understand the actual issue of the contest. Their plucky opponents were as exhausted as themselves and possibly even more exhausted. It was only through the hammering of Lee's diminishing army out of existence that the War could be brought to a close. The enthusiastic shout of satisfaction rolled through the long column reaching twenty miles back, as the news passed from brigade to brigade that the army was not to be withdrawn but was, as Grant's report to Lincoln was worded, "to fight it out on this line if it took all summer." When this report reached Lincoln, he felt that the selection of Grant as Lieutenant55-General had been justified56. He said: "We need this man. He fights."
In July, 1864, Washington is once more within reach if not of the invader57 at least of the raider. The Federal forces had been concentrated in Grant's lines along the James, and General Jubal Early, one of the most energetic fighters of the Southern army, tempted58 by the apparently unprotected condition of the capital, dashed across the Potomac on a raid that became famous. It is probable that in this undertaking59, as in some of the other movements that have been referred to on the part of the Southern leaders, the purpose was as much political as military. Early's force of from fifteen to sixteen thousand men was, of course, in no way strong enough to be an army of invasion. The best success for which he could hope would be, in breaking through the defences of Washington, to hold the capital for a day or even a few hours. The capture of Washington in 1864, as in 1863 or in 1862, would in all probability have brought about the long-hoped-for intervention of France and England. General Lew Wallace, whose name became known in the years after the War through some noteworthy romances, Ben Hur and The Fair God, and who was in command of a division of troops stationed west of Washington, and composed in part of loyal Marylanders and in part of convalescents who were about to be returned to the front, fell back before Early's advance to Monocacy Creek60. He disposed his thin line cleverly in the thickets61 on the east side of the creek in such fashion as to give the impression of a force of some size with an advance line of skirmishers. Early's advance was checked for some hours before he realised that there was nothing of importance in front of him; when Wallace's division was promptly62 overwhelmed and scattered. The few hours that had thus been saved were, however, of first importance for the safety of Washington. Early reached the outer lines of the fortifications of the capital some time after sunset. His immediate problem was to discover whether the troops which were, as he knew, being hurried up from the army of the James, had reached Washington or whether the capital was still under the protection only of its so-called home-guard of veteran reserves. These reserves were made up of men more or less crippled and unfit for work in the field but who were still able to do service on fortifications. They comprised in all about six thousand men and were under the command of Colonel Wisewell. The force was strengthened somewhat that night by the addition of all of the male nurses from the hospitals (themselves convalescents) who were able to bear arms. That night the women nurses, who had already been in attendance during the hours of the day, had to render double service. Lincoln had himself in the afternoon stood on the works watching the dust of the Confederate advance. Once more there came to the President who had in his hands the responsibility for the direction of the War the bitterness of the feeling, if not of possible failure, at least of immediate mortification63. He knew that within twenty-four or thirty-six hours Washington could depend upon receiving the troops that were being hurried up from Grant's army, but he also realised what enormous mischief64 might be brought about by even a momentary65 occupation of the national capital by Confederate troops. I had some personal interest in this side campaign. The 19th army corps, to which my own regiment66 belonged, had been brought from Louisiana to Virginia and had been landed on the James River to strengthen the ranks of General Butler. There had not been time to assign to us posts in the trenches67 and we had, in fact, not even been placed in position. We were more nearly in marching order than any other troops available and it was therefore the divisions of the 19th army corps that were selected to be hurried up to Washington. To these were added two divisions of the 6th corps.
Colonel Wisewell, commanding the defences of the city, realised the nature of his problem. He had got to hold the lines of Washington, cost what it might, until the arrival of the troops from Grant. He took the bold step of placing on the picket12 line that night every man within reach, or at least every loyal man within reach (for plenty of the men in Washington were looking and hoping for the success of the South). The instructions usually given to pickets68 were in this instance reversed. The men were ordered, in place of keeping their positions hidden and of maintaining absolute quiet, to move from post to post along the whole line, and they were also ordered, without any reference to the saving of ammunition, to shoot off their carbines on the least possible pretext69 and without pretext. The armories70 were then beginning to send to the front Sharp's repeating carbines. The invention of breech-loading rifles came too late to be of service to the infantry71 on either side, but during the last year of the War, certain brigades of cavalry72 were armed with Sharp's breech-loaders. The infantry weapon used through the War by the armies of the North as by those of the South was the muzzle-loading rifle which bore the name on our side of the Springfield and on the Confederate side of the Enfield. The larger portion of the Northern rifles were manufactured in Springfield, Massachusetts, while the Southern rifles, in great part imported from England, took their name from the English factory. It was of convenience for both sides that the two rifles were practically identical so that captured pieces and captured ammunition could be interchanged without difficulty.
Early's skirmish line was instructed early in the night to "feel" the Federal pickets, an instruction which resulted in a perfect blaze of carbine fire from Wisewell's men. The report that went to Early was that the picket line must be about six thousand strong. The conclusion on the part of the old Confederate commander was that the troops from the army of the Potomac must have reached the city. If that were true, there was, of course, no chance that on the following day he could break through the entrenchments, while there was considerable risk that his retreat to the Shenandoah might be cut off. Early the next morning, therefore, the disappointed Early led his men back to Falling Waters.
I happened during the following winter, when in prison in Danville, to meet a Confederate lieutenant who had been on Early's staff and who had lost an arm in this little campaign. He reported that when Early, on recrossing the Potomac, learned that he had had Washington in his grasp and that the divisions marching to its relief did not arrive and could not have arrived for another twenty-four hours, he was about the maddest Early that the lieutenant had ever seen. "And," added the lieutenant, "when Early was angry, the atmosphere became blue."
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1
inevitable
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| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
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defensive
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| adj.防御的；防卫的；防守的 | |
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intervention
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| n.介入，干涉，干预 | |
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withdrawn
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| vt.收回；使退出；vi.撤退，退出 | |
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westward
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| n.西方，西部；adj.西方的，向西的；adv.向西 | |
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ridge
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| n.山脊；鼻梁；分水岭 | |
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judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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northward
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| adv.向北；n.北方的地区 | |
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apparently
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| adv.显然地；表面上，似乎 | |
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scattered
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| adj.分散的，稀疏的；散步的；疏疏落落的 | |
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formulated
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| v.构想出( formulate的过去式和过去分词 )；规划；确切地阐述；用公式表示 | |
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picket
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| n.纠察队；警戒哨；v.设置纠察线；布置警卫 | |
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crest
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| n.顶点；饰章；羽冠；vt.达到顶点；vi.形成浪尖 | |
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cemetery
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| n.坟墓，墓地，坟场 | |
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corps
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| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
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persistency
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| n. 坚持(余辉, 时间常数) | |
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wilderness
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| n.杳无人烟的一片陆地、水等，荒漠 | |
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crumbled
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| （把…）弄碎， （使）碎成细屑( crumble的过去式和过去分词 )； 衰落； 坍塌； 损坏 | |
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persistent
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| adj.坚持不懈的，执意的；持续的 | |
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decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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eloquent
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| adj.雄辩的，口才流利的；明白显示出的 | |
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simplicity
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| n.简单，简易；朴素；直率，单纯 | |
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dedication
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| n.奉献，献身，致力，题献，献辞 | |
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forth
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dedicated
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| adj.一心一意的；献身的；热诚的 | |
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consecrate
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| v.使圣化，奉…为神圣；尊崇；奉献 | |
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consecrated
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| adj.神圣的，被视为神圣的v.把…奉为神圣，给…祝圣( consecrate的过去式和过去分词 )；奉献 | |
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interfere
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| v.(in)干涉，干预；(with)妨碍，打扰 | |
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pointed
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| adj.尖的，直截了当的 | |
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repulse
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| n.击退，拒绝；vt.逐退，击退，拒绝 | |
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immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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rout
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| n.溃退，溃败；v.击溃，打垮 | |
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skilful
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| (=skillful)adj.灵巧的，熟练的 | |
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disposition
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| n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署 | |
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cracker
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| n.（无甜味的）薄脆饼干 | |
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lookout
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| n.注意，前途，瞭望台 | |
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missionary
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| adj.教会的，传教(士)的；n.传教士 | |
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futile
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| adj.无效的，无用的，无希望的 | |
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ingenuity
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| n.别出心裁；善于发明创造 | |
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persistence
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| n.坚持，持续，存留 | |
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bulwark
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| n.堡垒，保障，防御 | |
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devoted
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| adj.忠诚的，忠实的，热心的，献身于...的 | |
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exterior
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| adj.外部的，外在的；表面的 | |
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entrenched
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| adj.确立的，不容易改的(风俗习惯) | |
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depleted
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| adj. 枯竭的, 废弃的 动词deplete的过去式和过去分词 | |
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ammunition
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| n.军火，弹药 | |
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waggons
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| 四轮的运货马车( waggon的名词复数 )； 铁路货车； 小手推车 | |
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exhausted
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| adj.极其疲惫的，精疲力尽的 | |
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severely
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| adv.严格地；严厉地；非常恶劣地 | |
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conclusive
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| adj.最后的，结论的；确凿的，消除怀疑的 | |
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51
plucky
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| adj.勇敢的 | |
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unnatural
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| adj.不自然的；反常的 | |
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fatigue
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| n.疲劳，劳累 | |
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54
utterance
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| n.用言语表达，话语，言语 | |
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lieutenant
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| n.陆军中尉，海军上尉；代理官员，副职官员 | |
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justified
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| a.正当的，有理的 | |
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invader
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| n.侵略者，侵犯者，入侵者 | |
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58
tempted
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| v.怂恿（某人）干不正当的事；冒…的险（tempt的过去分词） | |
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undertaking
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| n.保证，许诺，事业 | |
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60
creek
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| n.小溪，小河，小湾 | |
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61
thickets
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| n.灌木丛( thicket的名词复数 )；丛状物 | |
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promptly
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| adv.及时地，敏捷地 | |
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mortification
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| n.耻辱，屈辱 | |
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mischief
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| n.损害，伤害，危害；恶作剧，捣蛋，胡闹 | |
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momentary
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| adj.片刻的，瞬息的；短暂的 | |
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66
regiment
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| n.团，多数，管理；v.组织，编成团，统制 | |
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trenches
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| 深沟，地沟( trench的名词复数 )； 战壕 | |
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pickets
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| 罢工纠察员( picket的名词复数 ) | |
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pretext
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| n.借口，托词 | |
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armories
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| n.纹章( armory的名词复数 )；纹章学；兵工厂；军械库 | |
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71
infantry
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| n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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cavalry
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| n.骑兵；轻装甲部队 | |
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