T here were three positive developments in foreign affairs in July: I normalized relations with Vietnam, with the strong support of most Vietnam veterans in Congress, including John McCain, Bob Kerrey, John Kerry, Chuck Robb, and Pete Peterson; Saddam Hussein released two Americans who had been held prisoner since March, after a strong plea from Congressman1 Bill Richardson; and South Korean President Kim Young-Sam, in Washington for the dedication2 of the Korean War Memorial, strongly endorsed3 the agreement we had made with North Korea to end its nuclear program. Because Jesse Helms and others had criticized the deal, Kims support was helpful, especially since he had been a political prisoner and advocate for democracy when South Korea was still an authoritarian4 state.
Unfortunately, the good news was dwarfed5 by what was happening in Bosnia. After being reasonably quiet for most of 1994, things had begun to go wrong at the end of November, when Serb warplanes attacked Croatian Muslims in western Bosnia. The attack was a violation6 of the no-fly zone, and in retaliation7 NATO bombed the Serb airfield8, but didnt destroy it or all the planes that had flown.
In March, when the cease-fire President Carter had announced began to unravel9, Dick Holbrooke, who had left his post as ambassador to Germany to become assistant secretary of state for European and Canadian affairs, sent our special envoy10 to the former Yugoslavia, Bob Frasure, to see Milosevic in the futile11 hope of ending the Bosnian Serb aggression12 and securing at least limited recognition for Bosnia in return for lifting the UN sanctions on Serbia.
By July, the fighting was in full swing again, with the Bosnian government forces making some gains in the middle of the country. Instead of trying to regain14 the lost territory, General Mladic decided15 to attack three isolated16 Muslim towns in eastern Bosnia, Srebrenica, Zepa, and Gorazde. The towns were filled with Muslim refugees from nearby areas, and though they had been declared UN safe areas, they were protected by only a small number of UN troops. Mladic wanted to take the three towns so that all of eastern Bosnia would be controlled by the Serbs, and he was convinced that, as long as he held UN peacekeepers hostage, the UN would not allow NATO to bomb in retaliation. He was right, and the consequences were devastating17.
On July 10, the Serbs took Srebrenica. By the end of the month they had also taken Zepa, and refugees who escaped from Srebrenica had begun to tell the world of the horrifying19 slaughter20 of Muslims there by Mladics troops. Thousands of men and boys were gathered in a soccer field and murdered en masse. Thousands more were trying to escape through the heavily wooded hills.
After Srebrenica was overrun, I pressured the UN to authorize21 the rapid reaction force we had discussed at the G-7 meeting in Canada a few weeks earlier. Meanwhile, Bob Dole22 was pushing to lift the arms embargo23. I asked him to postpone24 the vote and he agreed. I was still trying to find a way to save Bosnia that restored the effectiveness of the UN and NATO, but by the third week of July, Bosnian Serbs had made a mockery of the UN and, by extension, of the commitments of NATO and the United States. The safe areas were far from safe, and NATO action was severely25 limited because of the vulnerability of European troops who couldnt defend themselves, much less the Muslims. The Bosnian Serb practice of UN hostage-taking had exposed the fundamental flaw of the UNs strategy. Its arms embargo had kept the Bosnian government from achieving military parity26 with the Serbs. The peacekeepers could protect the Bosnian Muslims and Croatians only as long as the Serbs believed NATO would punish their aggression. Now the hostage-taking had erased27 that fear and given the Serbs a free hand in eastern Bosnia. The situation was slightly better in central and western Bosnia, because the Croatians and Muslims had been able to obtain some arms despite the UN embargo.
In an almost desperate attempt to regain the initiative, the foreign and defense28 ministers of NATO met in London. Warren Christopher, Bill Perry, and General Shalikashvili went to the conference determined29 to reverse the building momentum30 for a withdrawal31 of UN forces from Bosnia and, instead, to increase NATOs commitment and authority to act against the Serbs. Both the loss of Srebrenica and Zepa and the move in Congress to lift the arms embargo had strengthened our ability to push for more aggressive action. At the meeting, the ministers eventually accepted a proposal developed by Warren Christopher and his team to draw a line in the sand around Gorazde and to remove the dual32 key decision making that had given the UN veto authority over NATO action. The London conference was a turning point; from then on, NATO would be much more assertive33. Not long afterward34, the NATO commander, General George Joulwan, and our NATO ambassador, Robert Hunter, succeeded in extending the Gorazde rules to the Sarajevo safe area.
In August, the situation took a dramatic turn. The Croatians launched an offensive to retake the Krajina, a part of Croatia that the local Serbs had proclaimed their territory. European and some American military and intelligence officials had recommended against the action in the belief that Milosevic would intervene to save the Krajina Serbs, but I was rooting for the Croatians. So was Helmut Kohl, who knew, as I did, that diplomacy35 could not succeed until the Serbs had sustained some serious losses on the ground.
Because we knew Bosnias survival was at stake, we had not tightly enforced the arms embargo. As a result, both the Croatians and the Bosnians were able to get some arms, which helped them survive. We had also authorized36 a private company to use retired37 U.S. military personnel to improve and train the Croatian army.
As it turned out, Milosevic didnt come to the aid of the Krajina Serbs, and Croatian forces took Krajina with little resistance. It was the first defeat for the Serbs in four years, and it changed both the balance of power on the ground and the psychology38 of all the parties. One Western diplomat39 in Croatia was quoted as saying, There was almost a signal of support from Washington. The Americans have been spoiling for a chance to hit the Serbs, and they are using Croatia as their proxy40 to do the deed for them. On August 4, in a visit with veteran ABC News correspondent Sam Donaldson at the National Institutes of Health, where he was recovering from cancer surgery, I acknowledged that the Croatian offensive could prove helpful in resolving the conflict. Ever the good journalist, Donaldson filed a report on my comments from his hospital bed.
In an effort to capitalize on the shift in momentum, I sent Tony Lake and Undersecretary of State Peter Tarnoff to Europe (including Russia) to present a framework for peace that Lake had developed and to have Dick Holbrooke lead a team to begin a last-ditch effort to negotiate an end to the conflict with the Bosnians and Milosevic, who claimed not to control the Bosnian Serbs, though everyone knew they could not prevail without his support. Just before we launched the diplomatic mission, the Senate followed the House in voting to lift the arms embargo and I vetoed the bill to give our effort a chance. Lake and Tarnoff immediately took off to make the case for our plan, then met with Holbrooke on August 14 to report that the allies and Russians were supportive, and that Holbrooke could begin his mission at once.
On August 15, after a briefing from Tony Lake on Bosnia, Hillary, Chelsea, and I left for a vacation in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, where we had been invited to spend a few days at the home of Senator Jay and Sharon Rockefeller. We all needed the time off, and I was really looking forward to the prospect41 of hiking and horseback riding in the Grand Tetons; rafting the Snake River; visiting Yellowstone National Park to see Old Faithful, the buffalo42 and moose, and the wolves we had brought back to the wild; and playing golf at the high altitude, where the ball goes a lot farther. Hillary was working on a book about families and children, and she was looking forward to making headway on it at the Rockefellers spacious43, light-filled ranch44 house. We did all those things and more, but the enduring memory of our vacation was about Bosnia, and heartbreak.
On the day my family went to Wyoming, Dick Holbrooke left for Bosnia with an impressive team, including Bob Frasure; Joe Kruzel; Air Force Colonel Nelson Drew; and Lieutenant45 General Wesley Clark, director of strategic policy for the Joint46 Chiefs and a fellow Arkansan I had first met at Georgetown in 1965.
Holbrooke and his team landed in the Croatian coastal47 city of Split, where they briefed the Bosnian foreign minister, Muhamed Sacirbey, on our plans. Sacirbey was the eloquent48 public face of Bosnia on American television, a handsome, fit man who, as a student in the United States, had been a starting football player at Tulane University. He had long sought greater American involvement in his beleaguered49 nation and was glad the hour had finally come.
After Split, the U.S. team went to Zagreb, Croatias capital, to see President Tudjman, then flew to Belgrade to meet with Slobodan Milosevic. This inconclusive meeting was remarkable50 only for the fact that Milosevic refused to guarantee the safety of our teams plane from Bosnian Serb artillery51 if they flew from Belgrade into the airport at Sarajevo, their next stop. That meant they had to fly back to Split, from which they would helicopter to a landing spot, then take off for a two-hour drive to Sarajevo over the Mount Igman road, a narrow, unpaved route with no guardrails at the edges of its steep slopes and great vulnerability to nearby Serb machine gunners who regularly shot at UN vehicles. The EU negotiator, Carl Bildt, had been shot at when he traveled the road a few weeks earlier, and there were many wrecked52 vehicles in the ravines between Spilt and Sarajevo, some of which had simply slid off the road.
On August 19, my forty-ninth birthday, I started the day by playing golf with Vernon Jordan, Erskine Bowles, and Jim Wolfensohn, the president of the World Bank. It was a perfect morning until I heard about what had happened on the Mount Igman road. First from a news report, and later in an emotional phone call with Dick Holbrooke and Wes Clark, I learned that our team had set out for Sarajevo with Holbrooke and Clark riding in a U.S. Army Humvee, and Frasure, Kruzel, and Drew following behind in a French armored personnel carrier (APC) painted UN white. About an hour into the trip, at the top of a steep incline, the road gave way on the APC, and it somersaulted down the mountain and exploded into flames. Besides the three members of our team, there were two other Americans and four French soldiers in the vehicle. The APC had caught fire when the live ammunition53 it was carrying exploded. In a brave attempt to help, Wes Clark rappelled down the mountain with a rope tied to a tree trunk and tried to get into the burning vehicle to rescue the men still trapped inside, but it was too damaged and scalding hot.
It was also too late. Bob Frasure and Nelson Drew had been killed in the tumbling fall down the mountain. The others all got out, but Joe Kruzel soon died of his injuries, and one French soldier also perished. Frasure was fifty-three, Kruzel fifty, Drew forty-seven; all were patriotic54 public servants and good family men who died too young trying to save the lives of innocent people a long way from home.
The next week, after the Bosnian Serbs lobbed a mortar55 shell into the heart of Sarajevo, killing56 thirty-eight people, NATO began three days of air strikes on Serb positions. On September 1, Holbrooke announced that all the parties would meet in Geneva for talks. When the Bosnian Serbs did not comply with all of NATOs conditions, the air strikes resumed and continued until the fourteenth, when Holbrooke succeeded in getting an agreement signed by Kradzic and Mladic to end the siege of Sarajevo. Soon the final peace talks would begin in Dayton, Ohio. Ultimately they would bring an end to the bloody57 Bosnian war. When they did, their success would be in no small measure a tribute to three quiet American heroes who did not live to see the fruits of their labors58.
While the August news was dominated by Bosnia, I continued to argue with the Republicans on the budget; noted59 that a million Americans had lost their health insurance in the year since the failure of health-care reform; and took executive action to limit the advertising60, promotion61, distribution, and marketing62 of cigarettes to teenagers. The Food and Drug Administration had just completed a fourteen-month study confirming that cigarettes were addictive63, harmful, and aggressively marketed to teenagers, whose smoking rates were on the rise.
The teen smoking problem was a tough nut to crack. Tobacco is Americas legal addictive drug; it kills people and adds untold64 billions to the cost of health care. But the tobacco companies are politically influential65, and the farmers who raise the tobacco crop are an important part of the economic, political, and cultural life of Kentucky and North Carolina. The farmers were the sympathetic face of the tobacco companies effort to increase their profits by hooking younger and younger people on cigarettes. I thought we had to do something to push them back. So did Al Gore66, who had lost his beloved sister, Nancy, to lung cancer.
On August 8, we got a break in our efforts to eliminate the vestiges67 of Iraqs weapons of mass destruction program when two of Saddam Husseins daughters and their husbands defected to Jordan and were given asylum68 by King Hussein. One of the men, Hussein Kamel Hassan al-Majid, had headed Saddams secret effort to develop weapons of mass destruction and would supply valuable information on Iraqs remaining WMD stocks, the size and significance of which contradicted what the UN inspectors69 had been told by Iraqi officials. When confronted with the evidence, the Iraqis simply acknowledged that Saddams son-in-law was telling the truth and took the inspectors to the sites he had identified. After six months in exile, Saddams relatives were induced to return to Iraq. Within a couple of days, both sons-in-law were killed. Their brief journey to freedom had provided the UN inspectors with so much information that more chemical and biological stocks and laboratory equipment were destroyed during the inspections70 process than during the Gulf71 War.
August was also a big month in Whitewater World. Kenneth Starr indicted72 Jim and Susan McDougal and Governor Jim Guy Tucker on charges unrelated to Whitewater, and the Senate and House Republicans held hearings all month. In the Senate, Al DAmato was still trying to prove there was something more to Vince Fosters death than a depression-induced suicide. He hauled Hillarys staff and friends before the committee for bullying73 questioning and ad hominem attacks. DAmato was especially unpleasant to Maggie Williams and his fellow New Yorker Susan Thomases. Senator Lauch Faircloth was even worse, scoffing74 at the notion that Williams and Thomases could have had so many phone conversations about Vince Foster just to share their grief. At the time, I thought that if Faircloth really didnt understand their feelings, his own life must have been lived in an emotional wilderness75. The fact that Maggie had passed two lie detector76 tests about her actions in the aftermath of Vinces death didnt temper DAmatos and Faircloths accusatory questioning.
In the House Banking77 Committee, Chairman Jim Leach78 was behaving much like DAmato. From the beginning, he trumpeted79 every bogus charge against Hillary and me, alleging80 that we had made, not lost, money on Whitewater, had used Madison Guaranty funds for personal and political expenses, and had engineered David Hales SBA fraud. He kept promising81 blockbuster revelations, but they never materialized.
In August, Leach held a hearing starring L. Jean Lewis, the Resolution Trust Corporation investigator83 who had named Hillary and me as witnesses in a criminal referral shortly before the 1992 election. At the time, the Bush Justice Department inquired about Lewiss referral and the Republican U.S. attorney in Arkansas, Charles Banks, told them that there was no case against us, that it was an attempt to influence the election, and that to launch an investigation84 at that time would amount to prosecutorial85 misconduct.
Nevertheless, Leach referred to Lewis as a heroic public servant whose investigation had been thwarted86 after my election. Before the hearings began, documents were released that supported our position, including Bankss letter refusing to pursue Lewiss allegations because of lack of evidence, and internal FBI cables and Justice Department evaluations87 saying that no facts can be identified to support the designation of Hillary and me as material witnesses. Although there was almost no press coverage88 of the documents refuting Lewis, the hearings fizzled.
By the time of the August hearings and Starrs latest round of indictments89, I had settled into a routine of handling press questions about Whitewater with as little public comment as possible. I had learned from the press coverage over the gays-in-the-military issue that if I gave a meaty answer to a question on whatever the press was obsessing90 about, it would be on the evening news, blocking out whatever else I was doing in the public interest that day, and the American people would think I was spending all my time defending myself instead of working for them, when in fact Whitewater took up very little of my own time. On a scale of 1 to 10, a 7 answer on the economy was better than a 10 answer on Whitewater. So, with the help of constant reminders92 from my staff, I held my tongue on most days, but it was hard. I had always hated abuse of power, and as false charges flew, evidence of our innocence93 was ignored, and more blameless people were hounded by Starr, I was seething94 inside. No one can be as angry as I was without doing himself harm. It took me too long to figure that out.
September began with a memorable95 trip to Hawaii to commemorate96 the fiftieth anniversary of the end of World War II, followed by Hillarys trip to Beijing to address the United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women. Hillary gave one of the most important speeches delivered by anyone in our administration during our entire eight years, asserting that human rights are womens rights and condemning97 their all-too-frequent violation by those who sold women into prostitution, burned them when their marriage dowries were deemed too small, raped98 them in wartime, beat them in their homes, or subjected them to genital mutilation, forced abortions99, or sterilization100 on them. Her speech got a standing101 ovation102 and struck a responsive chord with women all over the world, who knew now, beyond a doubt, that America was pulling for them. Once again, despite the abuse she had been taking on Whitewater, Hillary had come through for a cause she deeply believed in, and for our country. I was so proud of her; the unfair hard knocks she had endured had done nothing to dull the idealism that I had fallen in love with so long ago.
By the middle of the month, Dick Holbrooke had persuaded the foreign ministers of Bosnia, Croatia, and Yugoslavia to agree on a set of basic principles as a framework to settle the Bosnian conflict. Meanwhile, NATO air strikes and cruise missile attacks continued to pound Bosnian Serb positions, and Bosnian and Croatian military gains reduced the percentage of Bosnia controlled by the Serbs from 70 to 50 percent, close to what a negotiated settlement would likely require.
September 28 capped off a good month in foreign policy, as Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat came to the White House for the next big step in the peace process, the signing of the West Bank accord, which turned over a substantial portion of land to Palestinian control.
The most significant event occurred away from the cameras. The signing ceremony was scheduled to occur at noon, but first Rabin and Arafat met in the Cabinet Room to initial the annex103 to the agreement, three copies that included twenty-six different maps, each reflecting literally104 thousands of decisions the parties had reached on roads, crossings, settlements, and holy sites. I was also asked to initial the pages as the official witness. About midway through the process, when I had stepped outside to take a call, Rabin came out and said, We have a problem. On one of the maps, Arafat had spotted105 a stretch of road that was marked as under Israeli control but that he was convinced the parties had agreed to turn over to the Palestinians. Rabin and Arafat wanted me to help resolve the dispute. I took them into my private dining room and they began to talk, with Rabin saying he wanted to be a good neighbor and Arafat replying that, as descendants of Abraham, they were really more like cousins. The interplay between the old adversaries106 was fascinating. Without saying a word, I turned and walked out of the room, leaving them alone together for the first time. Sooner or later, they had to develop a direct relationship, and today seemed the right moment to begin.
Within twenty minutes they had reached an agreement that the disputed crossing should go to the Palestinians. Because the world was waiting for the ceremony and we were already late, there was no time to change the map. Instead, Rabin and Arafat agreed to its modification107 with a handshake, then signed the maps before them, legally binding108 themselves to the incorrect designation of the disputed road.
It was an act of personal trust that would have been unthinkable not long before. And it was risky109 for Rabin. Several days later, with Israelis evenly divided on the West Bank accord, Rabin survived a no-confidence vote in the Knesset by only one vote. We were still walking a tightrope110, but I was optimistic. I knew the handover would proceed according to the handshake, and it did. It was the handshake even more than the official signing that convinced me that Rabin and Arafat would find a way to finish the job of making peace.
The fiscal111 year ended on September 30, and we still didnt have a budget. When I wasnt working on Bosnia and the Middle East, I had spent the entire month traveling the country campaigning against the Republicans proposed cuts in Medicare and Medicaid, food stamps, the direct student-loan program, AmeriCorps, environmental enforcement, and the initiative to put 100,000 new police officers on the street. They were even proposing to cut back the Earned Income Tax Credit, thus raising taxes on lower-income working families at the same time they were trying to cut taxes for the wealthiest Americans. At virtually every stop, I pointed112 out that our fight was not about whether to balance the budget and reduce the burden of unnecessary government, but how to do it. The big dispute involved what responsibilities the federal government should assume for the common good.
In response to my attacks, Newt Gingrich threatened to refuse to raise the debt limit and thus put America in default if I vetoed their budget bills. Raising the debt limit was merely a technical act that recognized the inevitable113: as long as America continued to run deficits114, the annual debt would increase, and the government would be required to sell more bonds to finance it. Increasing the debt limit simply gave the Treasury115 Department authority to do that. As long as Democrats116 were in the majority, Republicans could cast symbolic117 votes against raising the debt limit and pretend that they hadnt contributed to the necessity to do it. Many Republicans in the House had never voted to raise the debt limit and didnt relish118 doing so now, so I had to take Gingrichs threat seriously.
If America defaulted on its debt, the consequences could be severe. In more than two hundred years, the United States had never failed to pay its debts. Default would shake investor119 confidence in our reliability120. As we headed into the final showdown, I couldnt deny that Newt had a bargaining chip, but I was determined not to be blackmailed121. If he followed through on his threat, he would be hurt, too. Default ran the risk of increasing interest rates, and even a small increase would add hundreds of billions of dollars to home mortgage payments. Ten million Americans had variable-rate mortgages tied to federal interest rates. If Congress didnt raise the debt limit, people could pay what Al Gore called a Gingrich surcharge on their monthly mortgage payments. The Republicans would have to think twice before letting America go into default.
In the first week of October, the pope came to America again, and Hillary and I went to meet him at Newarks magnificent Gothic cathedral. As we had in Denver and at the Vatican, His Holiness and I met alone and mostly talked about Bosnia. The pope encouraged our efforts for peace, with an observation that stuck with me: he said the twentieth century had begun with a war in Sarajevo, and I must not allow the century to end with a war in Sarajevo.
When our meeting concluded, the pope gave me a lesson in politics. First, he left the cathedral for a spot a couple of miles away so that he could drive back in his popemobile, with its roof of clear, bulletproof glass, waving to the people who had crowded the streets. By the time he reached the church, the congregation was seated. Hillary and I were in the front pew with local and state officials and prominent New Jersey122 Catholics. The massive oak doors opened, revealing the pontiff in his resplendent white cassock and cape18, and the crowd stood and began to clap. As the pope began to walk down the aisle123 with his arms spread out to touch hands with people on either side of the aisle, the applause turned into cheers and roars. I noticed a group of nuns124 standing on their pews and screaming like teenagers at a rock concert. When I asked a man near me about it, he explained that they were Carmelites, members of an order that lived a cloistered125 existence completely apart from society. The pope had given them a dispensation to come to the cathedral. He sure knew how to build a crowd. I just shook my head and said, Id hate to have to run against that man.
On the day after I met with the pope, we made progress on Bosnia, as I announced that all the parties had agreed to a cease-fire. A week later Bill Perry stated that a peace agreement would require NATO to send troops to Bosnia to enforce it. Moreover, since our responsibility to participate in NATO missions was clear, he did not believe we were required to seek advance approval from Congress. I thought Dole and Gingrich might be relieved not to have a vote on the Bosnia mission; they were both internationalists who knew what we had to do, but there were many Republicans in both chambers126 who strongly disagreed.
On October 15, I reinforced my determination to end the Bosnian war and hold those who had perpetrated war crimes accountable when I went to the University of Connecticut with my friend Senator Chris Dodd to inaugurate the research center named for his father. Before going to the Senate, Tom Dodd had been the executive trial counsel at the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal. In my remarks, I strongly endorsed the existing war crimes tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, to which we were contributing money and personnel, and supported the establishment of a permanent tribunal to deal with war crimes and other atrocities127 that violated human rights. Eventually, the idea would take root in the International Criminal Court.
While I was dealing128 with Bosnia at home, Hillary was off on another trip, this time to Latin America. In the postCold War world, with America the worlds only military, economic, and political superpower, every nation wanted our attention, and it was usually in our interest to give it. But I couldnt go everywhere, especially during the budget struggles with Congress. As a result, both Al Gore and Hillary made an unusually large number of important foreign trips. Wherever they went, people knew they spoke129 for the United States, and for me, and on every trip, without fail, they strengthened Americas standing in the world.
On October 22, I flew to New York to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations, using the occasion to call for greater international cooperation in the fight against terrorism, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, organized crime, and narco-trafficking. Earlier in the month, Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman and nine others had been found guilty in the first World Trade Center bombing case, and not long before, Colombia had arrested several leaders of the infamous130 Cali drug cartel. In my address I outlined an agenda to build on those successes, including universal adherence131 to antimoney laundering132 practices; freezing the assets of terrorists and narco-traffickers, as I had just done with respect to Colombian cartels; a no-sanctuary pledge for members of terrorist or organized crime groups; shutting down the gray markets that provided arms and false identification papers to terrorists and narco-traffickers; intensified133 efforts to destroy drug crops and decrease demand for drugs; an international network to train police officers and provide them with the latest technology; ratification134 of the Chemical Weapons Convention; and strengthening of the Biological Weapons Convention.
The next day I returned to Hyde Park for my ninth meeting with Boris Yeltsin. Yeltsin had been ill and was under a lot of pressure at home from the ultra-nationalists over NATO expansion and the aggressive role the United States was playing in Bosnia at the expense of the Bosnian Serbs. He had given a tough speech the day before at the UN, which was mostly for domestic consumption, and I could tell he was stressed out.
To put him more at ease, I flew him to Hyde Park in my helicopter so that he could see the beautiful foliage135 along the Hudson River on an unseasonably warm fall day. When we arrived, I took him out to the front yard of the old house with its sweeping136 view of the river, and we talked awhile, sitting in the same chairs Roosevelt and Churchill had used when the prime minister visited there during World War II. Then I brought him into the house to show him a bust82 of Roosevelt sculpted137 by a Russian artist, a painting of the Presidents indomitable mother done by the sculptors138 brother, and the handwritten note FDR had sent to Stalin informing him that the date for D-day had been set.
Boris and I spent the morning talking about his precarious139 political situation. I reminded him that I had done everything I could to support him, and though we disagreed on NATO expansion, I would try to help him work through it.
After lunch we retuned to the house to talk about Bosnia. The parties were about to come to the United States to negotiate what we all hoped would be a final pact140, the success of which depended on both a multinational141 NATO-led force and the participation142 of Russian troops, to reassure143 the Bosnian Serbs that they too would be treated fairly. Finally, Boris agreed to send troops, but said they could not serve under NATO commanders, though he would be glad to have them serve under an American general. I assented144, as long as it was understood that his troops would not in any way interfere145 with NATOs command and control.
I regretted that Yeltsin was in so much trouble back home. Yes, he had made his share of mistakes, but against enormous odds146 he had also kept Russia going in the right direction. I still thought he would come out ahead in the election.
At the press conference after our meeting, I said that we had made progress on Bosnia and that we would both push for the ratification of START II and work together to conclude a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty in 1996. It was a good announcement, but Yeltsin stole the show. He told the press that he was leaving our meeting with more optimism than he had brought to it, because of all the press reports saying that our summit was going to be a disaster. Well, now, for the first time, I can tell you that youre a disaster. I almost fell over laughing, and the press laughed too. All I could say to them in response was Be sure you get the right attribution there. Yeltsin could get away with saying the darnedest things. Theres no telling how he would have answered all the Whitewater questions.
October was relatively147 quiet on the home front, as the budget pot slowly simmered toward a boil. Early in the month, Newt Gingrich decided not to bring the lobbying-reform legislation to a vote and I vetoed the legislative148 appropriations149 bill. The lobbying bill required lobbyists to disclose their activities and prohibited them from giving lawmakers gifts, travel, and meals beyond a modest limit. The Republicans were raising a lot of money from lobbyists by writing legislation that gave tax breaks, subsidies150, and relief from environmental regulations to a wide array of interest groups. Gingrich saw no reason to disturb a beneficial situation. I vetoed the legislative appropriations bill because, apart from the appropriations act for military construction, it was the only budget bill Congress had passed as the new fiscal year started, and I didnt think Congress should be taking care of itself first. I didnt want to veto the bill and had asked the Republican leaders just to hold it until we had finished a few other budget bills, but they sent it to me anyway.
While the budget battle continued, Energy Secretary Hazel OLeary and I received a report from my Advisory151 Committee on Human Radiation Experiments detailing thousands of experiments done on humans at universities, hospitals, and military bases during the Cold War. Most of them were ethical152, but a few were not: in one experiment scientists injected plutonium into eighteen patients without their knowledge; in another, doctors exposed indigent153 cancer patients to excessive radiation, knowing they would not benefit from it. I ordered a review of all current experimentation154 procedures and pledged to seek compensation in all appropriate cases. The release of this formerly155 classified information was part of a wider disclosure policy I followed throughout my tenure156. We had already declassified157 thousands of documents from World War II, the Cold War, and President Kennedys assassination158.
At the end of the first week of October, Hillary and I took a weekend off to fly to Marthas Vineyard for the wedding of our good friend Mary Steenburgen to Ted13 Danson. We had been friends since 1980; our children had played together since they were young, and Mary had worked her heart out for me all over the country in 1992. I was thrilled when she and Ted met and fell in love, and their wedding was a welcome relief from the strains of Bosnia, Whitewater, and the budget battle.
At the end of the month, Hillary and I celebrated159 our twentieth wedding anniversary. I got her a pretty diamond ring to mark a milestone160 in our lives and to make up for the fact that when she agreed to marry me, I didnt have enough money to buy her an engagement ring. Hillary loved the little diamonds across the thin band, and wore the ring as a reminder91 that, through all our ups and downs, we were still very much engaged.
1 Congressman | |
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2 dedication | |
n.奉献,献身,致力,题献,献辞 | |
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3 endorsed | |
vt.& vi.endorse的过去式或过去分词形式v.赞同( endorse的过去式和过去分词 );在(尤指支票的)背面签字;在(文件的)背面写评论;在广告上说本人使用并赞同某产品 | |
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4 authoritarian | |
n./adj.专制(的),专制主义者,独裁主义者 | |
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5 dwarfed | |
vt.(使)显得矮小(dwarf的过去式与过去分词形式) | |
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6 violation | |
n.违反(行为),违背(行为),侵犯 | |
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7 retaliation | |
n.报复,反击 | |
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8 airfield | |
n.飞机场 | |
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9 unravel | |
v.弄清楚(秘密);拆开,解开,松开 | |
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10 envoy | |
n.使节,使者,代表,公使 | |
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11 futile | |
adj.无效的,无用的,无希望的 | |
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12 aggression | |
n.进攻,侵略,侵犯,侵害 | |
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13 ted | |
vt.翻晒,撒,撒开 | |
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14 regain | |
vt.重新获得,收复,恢复 | |
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15 decided | |
adj.决定了的,坚决的;明显的,明确的 | |
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16 isolated | |
adj.与世隔绝的 | |
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17 devastating | |
adj.毁灭性的,令人震惊的,强有力的 | |
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18 cape | |
n.海角,岬;披肩,短披风 | |
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19 horrifying | |
a.令人震惊的,使人毛骨悚然的 | |
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20 slaughter | |
n.屠杀,屠宰;vt.屠杀,宰杀 | |
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21 authorize | |
v.授权,委任;批准,认可 | |
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22 dole | |
n.救济,(失业)救济金;vt.(out)发放,发给 | |
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23 embargo | |
n.禁运(令);vt.对...实行禁运,禁止(通商) | |
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24 postpone | |
v.延期,推迟 | |
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25 severely | |
adv.严格地;严厉地;非常恶劣地 | |
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26 parity | |
n.平价,等价,比价,对等 | |
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27 erased | |
v.擦掉( erase的过去式和过去分词 );抹去;清除 | |
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28 defense | |
n.防御,保卫;[pl.]防务工事;辩护,答辩 | |
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29 determined | |
adj.坚定的;有决心的 | |
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30 momentum | |
n.动力,冲力,势头;动量 | |
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31 withdrawal | |
n.取回,提款;撤退,撤军;收回,撤销 | |
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32 dual | |
adj.双的;二重的,二元的 | |
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33 assertive | |
adj.果断的,自信的,有冲劲的 | |
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34 afterward | |
adv.后来;以后 | |
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35 diplomacy | |
n.外交;外交手腕,交际手腕 | |
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36 authorized | |
a.委任的,许可的 | |
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37 retired | |
adj.隐退的,退休的,退役的 | |
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38 psychology | |
n.心理,心理学,心理状态 | |
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39 diplomat | |
n.外交官,外交家;能交际的人,圆滑的人 | |
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40 proxy | |
n.代理权,代表权;(对代理人的)委托书;代理人 | |
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41 prospect | |
n.前景,前途;景色,视野 | |
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42 buffalo | |
n.(北美)野牛;(亚洲)水牛 | |
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43 spacious | |
adj.广阔的,宽敞的 | |
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44 ranch | |
n.大牧场,大农场 | |
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45 lieutenant | |
n.陆军中尉,海军上尉;代理官员,副职官员 | |
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46 joint | |
adj.联合的,共同的;n.关节,接合处;v.连接,贴合 | |
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47 coastal | |
adj.海岸的,沿海的,沿岸的 | |
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48 eloquent | |
adj.雄辩的,口才流利的;明白显示出的 | |
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49 beleaguered | |
adj.受到围困[围攻]的;包围的v.围攻( beleaguer的过去式和过去分词);困扰;骚扰 | |
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50 remarkable | |
adj.显著的,异常的,非凡的,值得注意的 | |
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51 artillery | |
n.(军)火炮,大炮;炮兵(部队) | |
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52 wrecked | |
adj.失事的,遇难的 | |
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53 ammunition | |
n.军火,弹药 | |
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54 patriotic | |
adj.爱国的,有爱国心的 | |
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55 mortar | |
n.灰浆,灰泥;迫击炮;v.把…用灰浆涂接合 | |
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56 killing | |
n.巨额利润;突然赚大钱,发大财 | |
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57 bloody | |
adj.非常的的;流血的;残忍的;adv.很;vt.血染 | |
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58 labors | |
v.努力争取(for)( labor的第三人称单数 );苦干;详细分析;(指引擎)缓慢而困难地运转 | |
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59 noted | |
adj.著名的,知名的 | |
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60 advertising | |
n.广告业;广告活动 a.广告的;广告业务的 | |
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61 promotion | |
n.提升,晋级;促销,宣传 | |
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62 marketing | |
n.行销,在市场的买卖,买东西 | |
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63 addictive | |
adj.(吸毒等)使成瘾的,成为习惯的 | |
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64 untold | |
adj.数不清的,无数的 | |
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65 influential | |
adj.有影响的,有权势的 | |
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66 gore | |
n.凝血,血污;v.(动物)用角撞伤,用牙刺破;缝以补裆;顶 | |
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67 vestiges | |
残余部分( vestige的名词复数 ); 遗迹; 痕迹; 毫不 | |
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68 asylum | |
n.避难所,庇护所,避难 | |
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69 inspectors | |
n.检查员( inspector的名词复数 );(英国公共汽车或火车上的)查票员;(警察)巡官;检阅官 | |
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70 inspections | |
n.检查( inspection的名词复数 );检验;视察;检阅 | |
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71 gulf | |
n.海湾;深渊,鸿沟;分歧,隔阂 | |
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72 indicted | |
控告,起诉( indict的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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73 bullying | |
v.恐吓,威逼( bully的现在分词 );豪;跋扈 | |
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74 scoffing | |
n. 嘲笑, 笑柄, 愚弄 v. 嘲笑, 嘲弄, 愚弄, 狼吞虎咽 | |
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75 wilderness | |
n.杳无人烟的一片陆地、水等,荒漠 | |
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76 detector | |
n.发觉者,探测器 | |
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77 banking | |
n.银行业,银行学,金融业 | |
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78 leach | |
v.分离,过滤掉;n.过滤;过滤器 | |
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79 trumpeted | |
大声说出或宣告(trumpet的过去式与过去分词形式) | |
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80 alleging | |
断言,宣称,辩解( allege的现在分词 ) | |
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81 promising | |
adj.有希望的,有前途的 | |
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82 bust | |
vt.打破;vi.爆裂;n.半身像;胸部 | |
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83 investigator | |
n.研究者,调查者,审查者 | |
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84 investigation | |
n.调查,调查研究 | |
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85 prosecutorial | |
公诉人的,原告的; 起诉的 | |
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86 thwarted | |
阻挠( thwart的过去式和过去分词 ); 使受挫折; 挫败; 横过 | |
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87 evaluations | |
估价( evaluation的名词复数 ); 赋值; 估计价值; [医学]诊断 | |
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88 coverage | |
n.报导,保险范围,保险额,范围,覆盖 | |
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89 indictments | |
n.(制度、社会等的)衰败迹象( indictment的名词复数 );刑事起诉书;公诉书;控告 | |
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90 obsessing | |
v.时刻困扰( obsess的现在分词 );缠住;使痴迷;使迷恋 | |
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91 reminder | |
n.提醒物,纪念品;暗示,提示 | |
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92 reminders | |
n.令人回忆起…的东西( reminder的名词复数 );提醒…的东西;(告知该做某事的)通知单;提示信 | |
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93 innocence | |
n.无罪;天真;无害 | |
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94 seething | |
沸腾的,火热的 | |
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95 memorable | |
adj.值得回忆的,难忘的,特别的,显著的 | |
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96 commemorate | |
vt.纪念,庆祝 | |
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97 condemning | |
v.(通常因道义上的原因而)谴责( condemn的现在分词 );宣判;宣布…不能使用;迫使…陷于不幸的境地 | |
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98 raped | |
v.以暴力夺取,强夺( rape的过去式和过去分词 );强奸 | |
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99 abortions | |
n.小产( abortion的名词复数 );小产胎儿;(计划)等中止或夭折;败育 | |
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100 sterilization | |
n.杀菌,绝育;灭菌 | |
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101 standing | |
n.持续,地位;adj.永久的,不动的,直立的,不流动的 | |
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102 ovation | |
n.欢呼,热烈欢迎,热烈鼓掌 | |
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103 annex | |
vt.兼并,吞并;n.附属建筑物 | |
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104 literally | |
adv.照字面意义,逐字地;确实 | |
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105 spotted | |
adj.有斑点的,斑纹的,弄污了的 | |
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106 adversaries | |
n.对手,敌手( adversary的名词复数 ) | |
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107 modification | |
n.修改,改进,缓和,减轻 | |
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108 binding | |
有约束力的,有效的,应遵守的 | |
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109 risky | |
adj.有风险的,冒险的 | |
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110 tightrope | |
n.绷紧的绳索或钢丝 | |
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111 fiscal | |
adj.财政的,会计的,国库的,国库岁入的 | |
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112 pointed | |
adj.尖的,直截了当的 | |
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113 inevitable | |
adj.不可避免的,必然发生的 | |
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114 deficits | |
n.不足额( deficit的名词复数 );赤字;亏空;亏损 | |
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115 treasury | |
n.宝库;国库,金库;文库 | |
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116 democrats | |
n.民主主义者,民主人士( democrat的名词复数 ) | |
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117 symbolic | |
adj.象征性的,符号的,象征主义的 | |
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118 relish | |
n.滋味,享受,爱好,调味品;vt.加调味料,享受,品味;vi.有滋味 | |
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119 investor | |
n.投资者,投资人 | |
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120 reliability | |
n.可靠性,确实性 | |
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121 blackmailed | |
胁迫,尤指以透露他人不体面行为相威胁以勒索钱财( blackmail的过去式 ) | |
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122 jersey | |
n.运动衫 | |
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123 aisle | |
n.(教堂、教室、戏院等里的)过道,通道 | |
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124 nuns | |
n.(通常指基督教的)修女, (佛教的)尼姑( nun的名词复数 ) | |
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125 cloistered | |
adj.隐居的,躲开尘世纷争的v.隐退,使与世隔绝( cloister的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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126 chambers | |
n.房间( chamber的名词复数 );(议会的)议院;卧室;会议厅 | |
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127 atrocities | |
n.邪恶,暴行( atrocity的名词复数 );滔天大罪 | |
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128 dealing | |
n.经商方法,待人态度 | |
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129 spoke | |
n.(车轮的)辐条;轮辐;破坏某人的计划;阻挠某人的行动 v.讲,谈(speak的过去式);说;演说;从某种观点来说 | |
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130 infamous | |
adj.声名狼藉的,臭名昭著的,邪恶的 | |
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131 adherence | |
n.信奉,依附,坚持,固着 | |
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132 laundering | |
n.洗涤(衣等),洗烫(衣等);洗(钱)v.洗(衣服等),洗烫(衣服等)( launder的现在分词 );洗(黑钱)(把非法收入改头换面,变为貌似合法的收入) | |
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133 intensified | |
v.(使)增强, (使)加剧( intensify的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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134 ratification | |
n.批准,认可 | |
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135 foliage | |
n.叶子,树叶,簇叶 | |
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136 sweeping | |
adj.范围广大的,一扫无遗的 | |
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137 sculpted | |
adj.经雕塑的 | |
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138 sculptors | |
雕刻家,雕塑家( sculptor的名词复数 ); [天]玉夫座 | |
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139 precarious | |
adj.不安定的,靠不住的;根据不足的 | |
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140 pact | |
n.合同,条约,公约,协定 | |
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141 multinational | |
adj.多国的,多种国籍的;n.多国籍公司,跨国公司 | |
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142 participation | |
n.参与,参加,分享 | |
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143 reassure | |
v.使放心,使消除疑虑 | |
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144 assented | |
同意,赞成( assent的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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145 interfere | |
v.(in)干涉,干预;(with)妨碍,打扰 | |
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146 odds | |
n.让步,机率,可能性,比率;胜败优劣之别 | |
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147 relatively | |
adv.比较...地,相对地 | |
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148 legislative | |
n.立法机构,立法权;adj.立法的,有立法权的 | |
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149 appropriations | |
n.挪用(appropriation的复数形式) | |
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150 subsidies | |
n.补贴,津贴,补助金( subsidy的名词复数 ) | |
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151 advisory | |
adj.劝告的,忠告的,顾问的,提供咨询 | |
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152 ethical | |
adj.伦理的,道德的,合乎道德的 | |
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153 indigent | |
adj.贫穷的,贫困的 | |
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154 experimentation | |
n.实验,试验,实验法 | |
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155 formerly | |
adv.从前,以前 | |
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156 tenure | |
n.终身职位;任期;(土地)保有权,保有期 | |
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157 declassified | |
adj.解密的v.对(机密文件等)销密( declassify的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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158 assassination | |
n.暗杀;暗杀事件 | |
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159 celebrated | |
adj.有名的,声誉卓著的 | |
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160 milestone | |
n.里程碑;划时代的事件 | |
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