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Book 10 Chapter 19
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ON THE 24th was fought the battle before the redoubt of Shevardino; on the 25th not a shot was fired on either side; on the 26th was fought the battle of Borodino.

How and with what object were the battles of Shevardino and Borodino fought? Why was the battle of Borodino fought? There was not the slightest sense in it, either for the French or for the Russians. The immediate1 result of it was, and was bound to be, for the Russians, that we were brought nearer to the destruction of Moscow (the very thing we dreaded2 above everything in the world); and for the French, that they were brought nearer to the destruction of their army (which they, too, dreaded above everything in the world). That result was at the time perfectly3 obvious, and yet Napoleon offered battle, and Kutuzov accepted it.

If military leaders were guided by reasonable considerations only, it would seem that it must have been clear to Napoleon that in advancing two thousand versts into the heart of the country and giving battle, with the probable contingency4 of losing a quarter of his men, he was going to certain destruction; and that it must have been equally clear to Kutuzov that in accepting that battle and risking the loss of a fourth of his army, he would infallibly lose Moscow. For Kutuzov this was mathematically clear, as clear as it is at chess, that if I have one piece less than my adversary5 and I exchange pieces, I am certain to be a loser by it, and therefore must avoid exchanging pieces. When my adversary has sixteen pieces and I have fourteen, I am only one-eighth weaker than he; but when we have exchanged thirteen pieces, he is three times as strong as I am.

Up to the battle of Borodino our forces were approximately five-sixths of the French, but after that battle they were only one-half—that is, before the battle a hundred thousand against a hundred and twenty thousand, and after the battle fifty thousand against a hundred thousand. And yet the shrewd and experienced Kutuzov fought the battle. Napoleon, a military genius, as he is called, gave battle, losing a fourth of his army and drawing his line of communications out further than ever. If we are told that he expected the taking of Moscow to complete the campaign, as the taking of Vienna had done, we may say that there are many evidences to the contrary. Napoleon's historians themselves tell us that he wanted to halt as soon as he reached Smolensk; that he knew the danger of his extended line, and that he knew that the taking of Moscow would not be the end of the campaign, because from Smolensk he had learned in what condition the towns were left when abandoned to him, and he had not received a single reply to his reiterated6 expressions of a desire to open negotiations7.

In giving and accepting battle at Borodino, Kutuzov and Napoleon acted without design or rational plan. After the accomplished8 fact historians have brought forward cunningly devised evidences of the foresight9 and genius of the generals, who of all the involuntary instruments of the world's history were the most slavish and least independent agents.

The ancients have transmitted to us examples of epic10 poems in which the whole interest of history is concentrated in a few heroic figures; and under their influence we are still unable to accustom11 our minds to the idea that history of that kind is meaningless at our stage in the development of humanity.

In answer to the next question, how the battles of Borodino and Shevardino came to be fought, we have also a very definite, well-known, and utterly12 false account. All the historians describe the affair thus:

The Russian army, they say, in its retreat from Smolensk sought out the best position for a general engagement, and such a position they found in Borodino. The Russians, they say, fortified13 the position beforehand, to the left of the road (from Moscow to Smolensk) at right angles to it, from Borodino to Utitsa, at the very place where the battle was fought.

In front of this position, they tell us, a fortified earthwork was thrown up on the Shevardino redoubt as an outpost for observation of the enemy's movements.

On the 24th, we are told, Napoleon attacked this redoubt, and took it. On the 26th he attacked the whole Russian army, which had taken up its position on the plain of Borodino.

This is what we are told in the histories, and all that is perfectly incorrect, as any one may easily see who cares to go into the matter.

The Russians did not seek out the best position; on the contrary, on their retreat they had passed by many positions better than Borodino. They did not make a stand at one of these positions, because Kutuzov did not care to take up a position he had not himself selected, because the popular clamour for a battle had not yet been so strongly expressed, because Miloradovitch had not yet arrived with reinforcements of militia14, and for countless15 other reasons.

The fact remains16 that there were stronger positions on the road the Russian army had passed along, and that the plain of Borodino, on which the battle was fought, is in no respect a more suitable position than any other spot in the Russian empire to which one might point at hazard on the map.

Far from having fortified the position on the left at right angles to the road—that is the spot on which the battle was fought—the Russians never, till the 25th of August, 1812, dreamed of a battle being possible on that spot. The proof of this is, first, that there were no fortifications there before the 25th, and that the earthworks begun on that day were not completed by the 26th; and, secondly17, the Shevardino redoubt, owing to its situation in front of the position on which the battle was actually fought, was of no real value. With what object was that redoubt more strongly fortified than any of the other points? And with what object was every effort exhausted18 and six thousand men sacrificed to defend it till late at night on the 24th? A picket19 of Cossacks would have been enough to keep watch on the enemy's movements. And a third proof that the position of the battlefield was not foreseen, and that the redoubt of Shevardino was not the foremost point of that position, is to be found in the fact that Barclay de Tolly and Bagration were, till the 25th, under the impression that the Shevardino redoubt was the left flank of the position, and that Kutuzov himself, in the report written in hot haste after the battle, speaks of Shevardino as the left flank of the position. Only a good time later, when reports of the battle were written at leisure, the incorrect and strange statement was invented (probably to cover the blunders of the commander-in-chief, who had, of course, to appear infallible) that the Shevardino redoubt served as an advance post, though it was in reality simply the fortified point of the left flank, and that the battle of Borodino was fought by us on a fortified position selected beforehand for it, though it was in reality fought on a position quite unforeseen, and almost unfortified.

The affair obviously took place in this way. A position had been pitched upon on the stream Kolotcha, which intersects the high-road, not at a right angle, but at an acute angle, so that the left flank was at Shevardino, the right near the village of Novoe, and the centre at Borodino, near the confluence20 of the Kolotcha and the Voina. Any one looking at the plain of Borodino, and not considering how the battle actually was fought, would pick out this position, covered by the Kolotcha, as the obvious one for an army, whose object was to check the advance of an enemy marching along the Smolensk road towards Moscow.

Napoleon, riding up on the 24th to Valuev, did not (we are told in the histories) see the position of the Russians from Utitsa to Borodino (he could not have seen that position since it did not exist), and did not see the advance posts of the Russian army, but in the pursuit of the Russian rearguard stumbled upon the left flank of the Russian position at the redoubt of Shevardino, and, to the surprise of the Russians, his troops crossed the Kolotcha. And the Russians, since it was too late for a general engagement, withdrew their left wing from the position they had intended to occupy, and took up a new position, which had not been foreseen, and was not fortified. By crossing to the left bank of the Kolotcha, on the left of the road, Napoleon shifted the whole battle from right to left (looking from the Russian side), and transferred it to the plain between Utitsa, Semyonovskoye and Borodino—a plain which in itself was a no more favourable21 position than any other plain in Russia—and on that plain was fought the whole battle of the 26th.

Had Napoleon not reached the Kolotcha on the evening of the 24th, and had he not ordered the redoubt to be attacked at once that evening, had he begun the attack next morning, no one could have doubted that the Shevardino redoubt was the left flank of the Russian position; and the battle would have been fought as we expected. In that case we should probably have defended the Shevardino redoubt by our left flank even more obstinately22; we should have attacked Napoleon in the centre or on the right, and the general engagement would have been fought on the 24th on the position prepared and fortified for it. But as the attack was made on our left flank in the evening after the retreat of our rearguard, that is, immediately after the action at Gridnevo, and as the Russian generals would not, or could not, begin the general engagement on the evening of the 24th, the first and most important action of the battle of Borodino was lost on the 24th, and that loss led inevitably23 to the loss of the battle fought on the 26th.

After the loss of the Shevardino redoubt, we found ourselves on the morning of the 25th with our left flank driven from its position, and were forced to draw in the left wing of our position and hurriedly fortify24 it were we could.

So that on the 26th of August the Russian troops were only defended by weak, unfinished earthworks, and the disadvantage of that position was aggravated25 by the fact that the Russian generals, not fully26 recognising the facts of the position (the loss of the position on the left flank, and the shifting of the whole field of the coming battle from right to left), retained their extended formation from Novoe to Utitsa, and, consequently, had to transfer their troops from right to left during the battle. Consequently, we had during the whole battle to face the whole French army attacking our left wing, with our forces of half the strength.

(Poniatovsky's action facing Utitsa and Uvarov's action against the French right flank were quite independent of the general course of the battle.)

And so the battle of Borodino was fought, not at all as, in order to cover the blunders of our commanders, it is described by our historians, whose accounts, consequently, diminish the credit due to the Russian army and the Russian people. The battle of Borodino was not fought on a carefully picked and fortified position, with forces only slightly weaker on the Russian side. After the loss of the Shevardino redoubt, the Russians fought on an open, almost unfortified position, with forces half the strength of the French, that is, in conditions in which it was not merely senseless to fight for ten hours and gain a drawn27 battle, but incredibly difficult to keep the army for three hours together from absolute rout28 and flight.


八月二十四日,在舍瓦尔金诺多面堡打了一仗,二十五日,双方都没有开火,二十六日,波罗底诺战役爆发了。

舍瓦尔金诺和波罗底诺两次战役是为了什么呢?是怎样挑起、怎样应战的呢?为什么又打起波罗底诺战役呢?不论是对法国人还是对俄国人来说,这次战役都是毫无意义的。这次战役,对俄国人来说,最直接的结果曾是也必然是促进莫斯科的毁灭(这是我们最担心的),对法国人来说,则是促进他们的全军覆没(这也是他们怕得要命的)。这个结果甚至在当时也是非常明显的,然而拿破仑还是发动了这次战役,库图佐夫也奋起应了战。

如果两位统帅均以理智为指南,拿破仑似乎应当明白,深入俄国两千俄里,在很有可能损失四分之一军队的情况下发动一场大战,他必将趋于毁灭;库图佐夫也似乎同样应当明白,冒着损失四分之一军队的军队应战,他准会失掉莫斯科。这在库图佐夫就像做算术题一样明显,比如下跳棋,我方少一个子儿,而要跟对方对拼子儿,我方一定会输,因为不应当对拼。

当对方有十六个子儿,我方有十四个子儿的时候,我方只比对方弱八分之一;但是如果我方拼掉了十三个子儿,对方就比我方强三倍了。

在波罗底诺战役之前,我方兵力与法军相比,大致是五比六;战役之后,是一比二,也就是战役以前是十万比十二万,战役以后是五万比十万。然而聪明且富有经验的库图佐夫应战了。被人称为天才统帅的拿破仑发动了那次战役,损失了四分之一的兵力,更拉长了战线。如果说他认为占领莫斯科就像占领维也纳一样,可以结束战争,那么他错了,有许多证据证明并非如此。拿破仑的史学家们亲口说,他在占领了斯摩棱斯克之后就想停止前进,他知道拉长战线的危险,也知道占领莫斯科不会是战争的终结,因为在斯摩棱克他就看到,留给他的那些俄国城市是怎样的情景,他一再表示愿意进行谈判,但一次也没有得到答复。

拿破仑和库图佐夫发动和应接波罗底诺战役都是不由自主和毫无意义的。但是后来史学家们用这些既成事实强牵附会地证明两个统帅的预见和天才。其实,这些统帅不过是历史的工具,且是所有不由自主的历史工具中最不自由、最不由自主的活动家。

古人留给我们许多英雄史诗的典范,其中的英雄人物引起历史上的普遍注意,但是我们还不能习惯这样的事实,那就是这类历史对于我们人类的时代是没有意义的。

关于另外一个问题:波罗底诺战役以及在这之前的舍瓦尔金诺战役是怎样打起来的,也存在一个极为明显、众所周知、完全错误的概念。所有史学家都是这样描述的:俄国军队在从斯摩棱斯克撤退时,就为大会战寻找最有利的阵地,在波罗底诺找到了这样的阵地。

在莫斯科到斯摩棱斯克的大路左侧,与大路几乎成直角——从波罗底诺到乌季察,也就是作战的那个地方,俄国人事前在那儿修筑了防御工事。

在这个阵地的前方,在舍瓦尔金诺高地,设立了一个观察敌情的前哨。二十四日,拿破仑进攻这个前哨,占领了它;

二十六日,开始进攻已经进入波罗底诺战场的全部俄军。

史书上是这样记载的,而这是完全歪曲的,这一点,任何愿意深入研究事情真相的人,都能很容易弄清楚。

俄国人并没有寻找最好的阵地;恰恰相反,他们在退却中放过了许多比波罗底诺更好的阵地。他们没有据守这些阵地中的任何一个:因为库图佐夫不愿采纳不是他所选择的阵地;因为人们对大会战的要求还不够强烈;还因为带领后备军的米洛拉多维奇尚未赶到;还有其他无数的原因。事实上,以前所放过的阵地都比较强大,波罗底诺阵地(大会战的地点)不但不强大,与俄罗斯帝国任何一个地方相比较,哪怕随便用针在地图上插一个地方,它都更不像一个阵地。

在大路左侧与大路成直角的波罗底诺战场(就是大会战的地点),俄国人非但没有设防,而且在一八一二年八月二十五日前,从未想到在这个地点会打一场大仗。以下事实可以说明这一点:其一,不但二十五日以前那里没有战壕,而且二十五日开始挖的那些战壕,到二十六日也没有挖成;其二,舍瓦尔金诺多面堡的形势可资证明,那个在发生战斗的阵地前面的舍瓦尔金诺多面堡,是无任何意义的,为什么比别的据点更要加强那个多面堡呢?为什么要耗费一切力量,损失六千人,把它据守到二十四日深夜呢?要观测敌人,一个哥萨克侦察班就足够了;其三,作战的那个阵地不是事先料到的,而舍瓦尔金诺多面堡也不是那个阵地的前哨,因为直到二十五日,巴克莱·德·托利和巴格拉季翁还相信舍瓦尔金诺多面堡是阵地的·左·翼。而库图佐夫本人在那次战役之后,在一时盛怒之下写的报告中,也说舍瓦尔金诺多面堡是此阵地的·左·翼。只是在很久以后,可以自由地写波罗底诺战役的报告时,才捏造出那一套奇谈怪论(大概是为一个不会犯错误的总司令辩护),说舍瓦尔金诺多面堡是一个前哨(其实,它不过是左翼的一个设防点),说波罗底诺战役是在我们预先选定的、在修筑了工事的阵地上进行的。实际上,那次战斗是在一个完全意外的,几乎没有任何工事的地点爆发的。

事情显然是这样的:沿科洛恰河选定了一个阵地,这条河斜穿过大路,不是成直角,而是成锐角,因此左翼是在舍瓦尔金诺,右翼靠近诺沃耶村,中心在波罗底诺,也就是在科洛恰和沃伊纳两河汇流的地方。假如不去管仗是怎么打的。只要看一看波罗底诺战场,就一目了然,这个战地是以科洛恰河为掩护,以阻止沿斯摩棱斯克大路进犯莫斯科的敌军。

二十四日拿破仑骑马来到瓦卢耶瓦,他没有看见(正如史书上所说的)从乌季察到波罗底诺的俄国阵地(他不可能看见那个阵地,因为它并不存在),他也没有看见俄国的前哨,但在追击俄军后卫的时候,他碰到俄军阵地的左翼——舍瓦尔金诺多面堡,出乎俄国人意料之外,拿破仑把他的军队移过科洛恰河。这样一来,俄国人已经来不及迎接大会战了,只好撤掉他们本来要据守的左翼阵地,占领一个不曾料到的,没有修筑工事的新阵地。拿破仑转移到科洛恰河对岸,也就是大路的左侧,这样拿破仑就把即将打响的战斗从右侧移到左侧(从俄军方面看),移到乌季察、谢苗诺夫斯科耶和波罗底诺之间的平原上(作为一个阵地,这片平原并不比俄国任何一片平原更为有利),二十六日的大会战就在这片平原上打响了。预定的战斗和实际的战斗的草图见下页:

假如拿破仑不在二十四日傍晚到达科洛恰河;假如他当晚没有立刻下令攻打多面堡,而是在第二天早晨开始攻打的话,那么,就不会有人怀疑舍瓦尔金诺多面堡是我们的左翼了;而战斗也会像我们所预料的那样进行了。在那种情况下,我们大概会像我们所预料的那样进行了。在这种情况下,我们大概会顽强地守卫舍瓦尔金诺多面堡,与此同时,从中央或者从右面攻击拿破仑,而二十四日大会战就会在预定的修筑有工事的阵地上进行了。但是,因为对我们左翼进攻是在紧接着我们的后卫撤退的晚上,也就是在格里德涅瓦战役刚结束的晚上发生的,还因为俄国的军事将领不愿意或者来不及在二十四日晚上就开始大会战,以致波罗底诺战役的第一仗,也是主要的一仗,在二十四日就打输了,而且显然导致二十六日那一仗的失败。

在舍瓦尔金诺多面堡沦陷后,二十五日清晨我们已经没有左翼阵地了,于是不得不把左翼往后撤,随便选择一个地方仓促地构筑工事。

但是,只说俄军仅用薄弱的、未筑成的工事来防守还不够,更加不利的情况还在于,俄军将领不承认显而易见的既成事实(左翼已失守,当前的战场已经从右面向左面转移),仍停留在诺沃耶村至乌季察这一带拉长的阵地上,因此,在战斗开始后,不得不把军队从右方调到左方。这样一来,在整个战斗期间,俄国方面仅有对方一半的兵力用以抵抗法军对我军左翼的进攻(波尼亚托夫斯基对乌季察的进攻以及乌瓦罗夫从右翼攻击法军,只是大会成进程中的单独的军事行动)。

由此可见,波罗底诺战役完全不像人们描绘的那样(极力隐瞒我们军事将领们的错误,从而贬低俄国军队和人民的光荣)。波罗底诺战役并不是在一个选定的,设了防的阵地上进行的,也不是俄军的兵力仅仅稍弱于敌军,实际上俄国人由于失掉舍瓦尔金诺多面堡,不得不在一个开阔的,几乎没有防御工事的地带,兵力比法军少一半的情况下迎接波罗底诺战役,也就是说,在这样的条件下,不仅战斗十小时和打一场不分输赢的战役不可思议,就是坚持三小时而不使军队完全崩溃和逃遁也是不可思议的。


点击收听单词发音收听单词发音  

1 immediate aapxh     
adj.立即的;直接的,最接近的;紧靠的
参考例句:
  • His immediate neighbours felt it their duty to call.他的近邻认为他们有责任去拜访。
  • We declared ourselves for the immediate convocation of the meeting.我们主张立即召开这个会议。
2 dreaded XuNzI3     
adj.令人畏惧的;害怕的v.害怕,恐惧,担心( dread的过去式和过去分词)
参考例句:
  • The dreaded moment had finally arrived. 可怕的时刻终于来到了。
  • He dreaded having to spend Christmas in hospital. 他害怕非得在医院过圣诞节不可。 来自《用法词典》
3 perfectly 8Mzxb     
adv.完美地,无可非议地,彻底地
参考例句:
  • The witnesses were each perfectly certain of what they said.证人们个个对自己所说的话十分肯定。
  • Everything that we're doing is all perfectly above board.我们做的每件事情都是光明正大的。
4 contingency vaGyi     
n.意外事件,可能性
参考例句:
  • We should be prepared for any contingency.我们应该对任何应急情况有所准备。
  • A fire in our warehouse was a contingency that we had not expected.库房的一场大火是我们始料未及的。
5 adversary mxrzt     
adj.敌手,对手
参考例句:
  • He saw her as his main adversary within the company.他将她视为公司中主要的对手。
  • They will do anything to undermine their adversary's reputation.他们会不择手段地去损害对手的名誉。
6 reiterated d9580be532fe69f8451c32061126606b     
反复地说,重申( reiterate的过去式和过去分词 )
参考例句:
  • "Well, I want to know about it,'she reiterated. “嗯,我一定要知道你的休假日期,"她重复说。 来自英汉文学 - 嘉莉妹妹
  • Some twenty-two years later President Polk reiterated and elaborated upon these principles. 大约二十二年之后,波尔克总统重申这些原则并且刻意阐释一番。
7 negotiations af4b5f3e98e178dd3c4bac64b625ecd0     
协商( negotiation的名词复数 ); 谈判; 完成(难事); 通过
参考例句:
  • negotiations for a durable peace 为持久和平而进行的谈判
  • Negotiations have failed to establish any middle ground. 谈判未能达成任何妥协。
8 accomplished UzwztZ     
adj.有才艺的;有造诣的;达到了的
参考例句:
  • Thanks to your help,we accomplished the task ahead of schedule.亏得你们帮忙,我们才提前完成了任务。
  • Removal of excess heat is accomplished by means of a radiator.通过散热器完成多余热量的排出。
9 foresight Wi3xm     
n.先见之明,深谋远虑
参考例句:
  • The failure is the result of our lack of foresight.这次失败是由于我们缺乏远虑而造成的。
  • It required a statesman's foresight and sagacity to make the decision.作出这个决定需要政治家的远见卓识。
10 epic ui5zz     
n.史诗,叙事诗;adj.史诗般的,壮丽的
参考例句:
  • I gave up my epic and wrote this little tale instead.我放弃了写叙事诗,而写了这个小故事。
  • They held a banquet of epic proportions.他们举行了盛大的宴会。
11 accustom sJSyd     
vt.使适应,使习惯
参考例句:
  • It took him a while to accustom himself to the idea.他过了一段时间才习惯这个想法。
  • It'shouldn't take long to accustom your students to working in groups.你的学生应该很快就会习惯分组学习的。
12 utterly ZfpzM1     
adv.完全地,绝对地
参考例句:
  • Utterly devoted to the people,he gave his life in saving his patients.他忠于人民,把毕生精力用于挽救患者的生命。
  • I was utterly ravished by the way she smiled.她的微笑使我完全陶醉了。
13 fortified fortified     
adj. 加强的
参考例句:
  • He fortified himself against the cold with a hot drink. 他喝了一杯热饮御寒。
  • The enemy drew back into a few fortified points. 敌人收缩到几个据点里。
14 militia 375zN     
n.民兵,民兵组织
参考例句:
  • First came the PLA men,then the people's militia.人民解放军走在前面,其次是民兵。
  • There's a building guarded by the local militia at the corner of the street.街道拐角处有一幢由当地民兵团守卫的大楼。
15 countless 7vqz9L     
adj.无数的,多得不计其数的
参考例句:
  • In the war countless innocent people lost their lives.在这场战争中无数无辜的人丧失了性命。
  • I've told you countless times.我已经告诉你无数遍了。
16 remains 1kMzTy     
n.剩余物,残留物;遗体,遗迹
参考例句:
  • He ate the remains of food hungrily.他狼吞虎咽地吃剩余的食物。
  • The remains of the meal were fed to the dog.残羹剩饭喂狗了。
17 secondly cjazXx     
adv.第二,其次
参考例句:
  • Secondly,use your own head and present your point of view.第二,动脑筋提出自己的见解。
  • Secondly it is necessary to define the applied load.其次,需要确定所作用的载荷。
18 exhausted 7taz4r     
adj.极其疲惫的,精疲力尽的
参考例句:
  • It was a long haul home and we arrived exhausted.搬运回家的这段路程特别长,到家时我们已筋疲力尽。
  • Jenny was exhausted by the hustle of city life.珍妮被城市生活的忙乱弄得筋疲力尽。
19 picket B2kzl     
n.纠察队;警戒哨;v.设置纠察线;布置警卫
参考例句:
  • They marched to the factory and formed a picket.他们向工厂前进,并组成了纠察队。
  • Some of the union members did not want to picket.工会的一些会员不想担任罢工纠察员。
20 confluence PnbyL     
n.汇合,聚集
参考例句:
  • They built the city at the confluence of two rivers.他们建造了城市的汇合两条河流。
  • The whole DV movements actually was a confluence of several trends.整个当时的DV运动,实际上是几股潮流的同谋。
21 favourable favourable     
adj.赞成的,称赞的,有利的,良好的,顺利的
参考例句:
  • The company will lend you money on very favourable terms.这家公司将以非常优惠的条件借钱给你。
  • We found that most people are favourable to the idea.我们发现大多数人同意这个意见。
22 obstinately imVzvU     
ad.固执地,顽固地
参考例句:
  • He obstinately asserted that he had done the right thing. 他硬说他做得对。
  • Unemployment figures are remaining obstinately high. 失业数字仍然顽固地居高不下。
23 inevitably x7axc     
adv.不可避免地;必然发生地
参考例句:
  • In the way you go on,you are inevitably coming apart.照你们这样下去,毫无疑问是会散伙的。
  • Technological changes will inevitably lead to unemployment.技术变革必然会导致失业。
24 fortify sgezZ     
v.强化防御,为…设防;加强,强化
参考例句:
  • This country will fortify the coastal areas.该国将加强沿海地区的防御。
  • This treaty forbade the United States to fortify the canal.此条约禁止美国对运河设防。
25 aggravated d0aec1b8bb810b0e260cb2aa0ff9c2ed     
使恶化( aggravate的过去式和过去分词 ); 使更严重; 激怒; 使恼火
参考例句:
  • If he aggravated me any more I shall hit him. 假如他再激怒我,我就要揍他。
  • Far from relieving my cough, the medicine aggravated it. 这药非但不镇咳,反而使我咳嗽得更厉害。
26 fully Gfuzd     
adv.完全地,全部地,彻底地;充分地
参考例句:
  • The doctor asked me to breathe in,then to breathe out fully.医生让我先吸气,然后全部呼出。
  • They soon became fully integrated into the local community.他们很快就完全融入了当地人的圈子。
27 drawn MuXzIi     
v.拖,拉,拔出;adj.憔悴的,紧张的
参考例句:
  • All the characters in the story are drawn from life.故事中的所有人物都取材于生活。
  • Her gaze was drawn irresistibly to the scene outside.她的目光禁不住被外面的风景所吸引。
28 rout isUye     
n.溃退,溃败;v.击溃,打垮
参考例句:
  • The enemy was put to rout all along the line.敌人已全线崩溃。
  • The people's army put all to rout wherever they went.人民军队所向披靡。


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