The refusal of the jurors in the Thaw¹ trial to come to an agreement is certainly a somewhat amusing sequel to the frenzied² and even fantastic caution with which they were selected. Jurymen were set aside for reasons which seem to have only the very wildest relation to the case—reasons which we cannot conceive as giving any human being a real bias³. It may be questioned whether the exaggerated theory of impartiality⁴ in an arbiter⁶ or juryman may not be carried so far as to be more unjust than partiality itself. What people call impartiality may simply mean indifference⁷, and what people call partiality may simply mean mental activity. It is sometimes made an objection, for instance, to a juror that he has formed some primâ-facie opinion upon a case: if he can be forced under sharp questioning to admit that he has formed such an opinion, he is regarded as manifestly unfit to conduct the inquiry⁸. Surely this is unsound. If his bias is one of interest, of class, or creed⁹, or notorious propaganda, then that fact certainly proves that he is not an impartial⁵ arbiter. But the mere¹⁰ fact that he did form some temporary impression from the first facts as far as he knew them—this does not prove that he is not an impartial arbiter—it only proves that he is not a cold-blooded fool.

If we walk down the street, taking all the jurymen who have not formed opinions and leaving all the jurymen who have formed opinions, it seems highly probable that we shall only succeed in taking all the stupid jurymen and leaving all the thoughtful ones. Provided that the opinion formed is really of this airy and abstract kind, provided that it has no suggestion of settled

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