This notion of a reality independent of either of us, taken from ordinary social experience, lies at the base of the pragmatist definition of truth. With some such reality any statement, in order to be counted true, must agree. Pragmatism defines ‘agreeing’ to mean certain ways of ‘working,’ be they actual or potential. Thus, for my statement ‘the desk exists’ to be true of a desk recognized as real by you, it must be able to lead me to shake your desk, to explain myself by words that suggest that desk to your mind, to make a drawing that is like the desk you see, etc. Only in such ways as this is there sense in saying it agrees with THAT reality, only thus does it gain for me the satisfaction of hearing you corroborate4 me. Reference then to something determinate, and some sort of adaptation to it worthy5 of the name of agreement, are thus constituent6 elements in the definition of any statement of mine as ‘true’.
You cannot get at either the reference or the adaptation without using the notion of the workings. THAT the thing is, WHAT it is, and WHICH it is (of all the possible things with that what) are points determinable only by the pragmatic method. The ‘which’ means a possibility of pointing, or of otherwise singling out the special object; the ‘what’ means choice on our part of an essential aspect to conceive it by (and this is always relative to what Dewey calls our own ‘situation’); and the ‘that’ means our assumption of the attitude of belief, the reality-recognizing attitude. Surely for understanding what the word ‘true’ means as applied7 to a statement, the mention of such workings is indispensable. Surely if we leave them out the subject and the object of the cognitive8 relation float-in the same universe, ’tis true — but vaguely9 and ignorantly and without mutual10 contact or mediation11.
Our critics nevertheless call the workings inessential. No functional12 possibilities ‘make’ our beliefs true, they say; they are true inherently, true positively13, born ‘true’ as the Count of Chambord was born ‘Henri–Cinq.’ Pragmatism insists, on the contrary, that statements and beliefs are thus inertly14 and statically true only by courtesy: they practically pass for true; but you CANNOT DEFINE WHAT YOU MEAN by calling them true without referring to their functional possibilities. These give its whole LOGICAL CONTENT to that relation to reality on a belief’s part to which the name ‘truth’ is applied, a relation which otherwise remains15 one of mere16 coexistence or bare withness.
The foregoing statements reproduce the essential content of the lecture on Truth in my book PRAGMATISM. Schiller’s doctrine17 of ‘humanism,’ Dewey’s ‘Studies in logical theory,’ and my own ‘radical empiricism,’ all involve this general notion of truth as ‘working,’ either actual or conceivable. But they envelop18 it as only one detail in the midst of much wider theories that aim eventually at determining the notion of what ‘reality’ at large is in its ultimate nature and constitution.
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1 determined | |
adj.坚定的;有决心的 | |
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2 irrelevant | |
adj.不恰当的,无关系的,不相干的 | |
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3 bail | |
v.舀(水),保释;n.保证金,保释,保释人 | |
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4 corroborate | |
v.支持,证实,确定 | |
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5 worthy | |
adj.(of)值得的,配得上的;有价值的 | |
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6 constituent | |
n.选民;成分,组分;adj.组成的,构成的 | |
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7 applied | |
adj.应用的;v.应用,适用 | |
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8 cognitive | |
adj.认知的,认识的,有感知的 | |
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9 vaguely | |
adv.含糊地,暖昧地 | |
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10 mutual | |
adj.相互的,彼此的;共同的,共有的 | |
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11 mediation | |
n.调解 | |
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12 functional | |
adj.为实用而设计的,具备功能的,起作用的 | |
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13 positively | |
adv.明确地,断然,坚决地;实在,确实 | |
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14 inertly | |
adv.不活泼地,无生气地 | |
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15 remains | |
n.剩余物,残留物;遗体,遗迹 | |
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16 mere | |
adj.纯粹的;仅仅,只不过 | |
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17 doctrine | |
n.教义;主义;学说 | |
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18 envelop | |
vt.包,封,遮盖;包围 | |
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