Assume, to fix our ideas, a universe composed of two things only: imperial Caesar dead and turned to clay, and me, saying ‘Caesar really existed.’ Most persons would naively4 deem truth to be thereby5 uttered, and say that by a sort of actio in distans my statement had taken direct hold of the other fact.
But have my words so certainly denoted THAT Caesar? — or so certainly connoted HIS individual attributes? To fill out the complete measure of what the epithet6 ‘true’ may ideally mean, my thought ought to bear a fully7 determinate and unambiguous ‘one-to-one-relation’ to its own particular object. In the ultrasimple universe imagined the reference is uncertified. Were there two Caesars we shouldn’t know which was meant. The conditions of truth thus seem incomplete in this universe of discourse8 so that it must be enlarged.
Transcendentalists enlarge it by invoking an absolute mind which, as it owns all the facts, can sovereignly correlate them. If it intends that my statement SHALL refer to that identical Caesar, and that the attributes I have in mind SHALL mean his attributes, that intention suffices to make the statement true.
I, in turn, enlarge the universe by admitting finite intermediaries between the two original facts. Caesar HAD, and my statement HAS, effects; and if these effects in any way run together, a concrete medium and bottom is provided for the determinate cognitive9 relation, which, as a pure ACTIO IN DISTANS, seemed to float too vaguely10 and unintelligibly11.
The real Caesar, for example, wrote a manuscript of which I see a real reprint, and say ‘the Caesar I mean is the author of THAT.’ The workings of my thought thus determine both its denotative and its connotative significance more fully. It now defines itself as neither irrelevant12 to the real Caesar, nor false in what it suggests of him. The absolute mind, seeing me thus working towards Caesar through the cosmic intermediaries, might well say: ‘Such workings only specify13 in detail what I meant myself by the statement being true. I decree the cognitive relation between the two original facts to mean that just that kind of concrete chain of intermediaries exists or can exist.’
But the chain involves facts prior to the statement the logical conditions of whose truth we are defining, and facts subsequent to it; and this circumstance, coupled with the vulgar employment of the terms truth and fact as synonyms14, has laid my account open to misapprehension. ‘How,’ it is confusedly asked, ‘can Caesar’s existence, a truth already 2000 years old, depend for its truth on anything about to happen now? How can my acknowledgment of it be made true by the acknowledgment’s own effects? The effects may indeed confirm my belief, but the belief was made true already by the fact that Caesar really did exist.’
Well, be it so, for if there were no Caesar, there could, of course, be no positive truth about him — but then distinguish between ‘true’ as being positively16 and completely so established, and ‘true’ as being so only ‘practically,’ elliptically, and by courtesy, in the sense of not being positively irrelevant or UNtrue. Remember also that Caesar’s having existed in fact may make a present statement false or irrelevant as well as it may make it true, and that in neither case does it itself have to alter. It being given, whether truth, untruth, or irrelevancy17 shall be also given depends on something coming from the statement itself. What pragmatism contends for is that you cannot adequately DEFINE the something if you leave the notion of the statement’s functional18 workings out of your account. Truth meaning agreement with reality, the mode of the agreeing is a practical problem which the subjective19 term of the relation alone can solve.
NOTE. This paper was originally followed by a couple of paragraphs meant to conciliate the intellectualist opposition20. Since you love the word ‘true’ so, and since you despise so the concrete working of our ideas, I said, keep the word ‘truth’ for the saltatory and incomprehensible relation you care so much for, and I will say of thoughts that know their objects in an intelligible21 sense that they are ‘truthful.’
Like most offerings, this one has been spurned22, so I revoke23 it, repenting24 of my generosity25. Professor Pratt, in his recent book, calls any objective state of FACTS ‘a truth,’ and uses the word ‘trueness’ in the sense of ‘truth’ as proposed by me. Mr. Hawtrey (see below, page 281) uses ‘correctness’ in the same sense. Apart from the general evil of ambiguous vocabularies, we may really forsake26 all hope, if the term ‘truth’ is officially to lose its status as a property of our beliefs and opinions, and become recognized as a technical synonym15 for ‘fact.’
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1 purely | |
adv.纯粹地,完全地 | |
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2 applied | |
adj.应用的;v.应用,适用 | |
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3 invoking | |
v.援引( invoke的现在分词 );行使(权利等);祈求救助;恳求 | |
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4 naively | |
adv. 天真地 | |
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5 thereby | |
adv.因此,从而 | |
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6 epithet | |
n.(用于褒贬人物等的)表述形容词,修饰语 | |
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7 fully | |
adv.完全地,全部地,彻底地;充分地 | |
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8 discourse | |
n.论文,演说;谈话;话语;vi.讲述,著述 | |
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9 cognitive | |
adj.认知的,认识的,有感知的 | |
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10 vaguely | |
adv.含糊地,暖昧地 | |
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11 unintelligibly | |
难以理解地 | |
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12 irrelevant | |
adj.不恰当的,无关系的,不相干的 | |
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13 specify | |
vt.指定,详细说明 | |
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14 synonyms | |
同义词( synonym的名词复数 ) | |
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15 synonym | |
n.同义词,换喻词 | |
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16 positively | |
adv.明确地,断然,坚决地;实在,确实 | |
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17 irrelevancy | |
n.不恰当,离题,不相干的事物 | |
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18 functional | |
adj.为实用而设计的,具备功能的,起作用的 | |
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19 subjective | |
a.主观(上)的,个人的 | |
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20 opposition | |
n.反对,敌对 | |
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21 intelligible | |
adj.可理解的,明白易懂的,清楚的 | |
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22 spurned | |
v.一脚踢开,拒绝接受( spurn的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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23 revoke | |
v.废除,取消,撤回 | |
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24 repenting | |
对(自己的所为)感到懊悔或忏悔( repent的现在分词 ) | |
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25 generosity | |
n.大度,慷慨,慷慨的行为 | |
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26 forsake | |
vt.遗弃,抛弃;舍弃,放弃 | |
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