It is necessary to consider separately these two hypotheses, each of which has a distinct branch of the argument corresponding to it. We can never be sure that the opinion we are endeavouring to stifle22 is a false opinion; and if we were sure, stifling23 it would be an evil still.
First: the opinion which it is attempted to suppress by authority may possibly be true. Those who desire to suppress it, of course deny its truth; but they are not infallible. They have no authority to decide the question for all mankind, and exclude every other person from the means of judging. To refuse a hearing to an opinion, because they are sure that it is false, is to assume that their certainty is the same thing as absolute certainty. All silencing of discussion is an assumption of infallibility. Its condemnation25 may be allowed to rest on this common argument, not the worse for being common.
Unfortunately for the good sense of mankind, the fact of their fallibility is far from carrying the weight in their practical judgment26, which is always allowed to it in theory; for while every one well knows himself to be fallible, few think it necessary to take any precautions against their own fallibility, or admit the supposition that any opinion of which they feel very certain, may be one of the examples of the error to which they acknowledge themselves to be liable. Absolute princes, or others who are accustomed to unlimited27 deference29, usually feel this complete confidence in their own opinions on nearly all subjects. People more happily situated30, who sometimes hear their opinions disputed, and are not wholly unused to be set right when they are wrong, place the same unbounded reliance only on such of their opinions as are shared by all who surround them, or to whom they habitually32 defer28: for in proportion to a man’s want of confidence in his own solitary33 judgment, does he usually repose34, with implicit35 trust, on the infallibility of “the world” in general. And the world, to each individual, means the part of it with which he comes in contact; his party, his sect36, his church, his class of society: the man may be called, by comparison, almost liberal and largeminded to whom it means anything so comprehensive as his own country or his own age. Nor is his faith in this collective authority at all shaken by his being aware that other ages, countries, sects37, churches, classes, and parties have thought, and even now think, the exact reverse. He devolves upon his own world the responsibility of being in the right against the dissentient worlds of other people; and it never troubles him that mere38 accident has decided39 which of these numerous worlds is the object of his reliance, and that the same causes which make him a Churchman in London, would have made him a Buddhist40 or a Confucian in Pekin. Yet it is as evident in itself as any amount of argument can make it, that ages are no more infallible than individuals; every age having held many opinions which subsequent ages have deemed not only false but absurd; and it is as certain that many opinions, now general, will be rejected by future ages, as it is that many, once general, are rejected by the present.
The objection likely to be made to this argument, would probably take some such form as the following. There is no greater assumption of infallibility in forbidding the propagation of error, than in any other thing which is done by public authority on its own judgment and responsibility. Judgment is given to men that they may use it. Because it may be used erroneously, are men to be told that they ought not to use it at all? To prohibit what they think pernicious, is not claiming exemption41 from error, but fulfilling the duty incumbent43 on them, although fallible, of acting44 on their conscientious45 conviction. If we were never to act on our opinions, because those opinions may be wrong, we should leave all our interests uncared for, and all our duties unperformed. An objection which applies to all conduct can be no valid46 objection to any conduct in particular.
It is the duty of governments, and of individuals, to form the truest opinions they can; to form them carefully, and never impose them upon others unless they are quite sure of being right. But when they are sure (such reasoners may say), it is not conscientiousness48 but cowardice49 to shrink from acting on their opinions, and allow doctrines which they honestly think dangerous to the welfare of mankind, either in this life or in another, to be scattered50 abroad without restraint, because other people, in less enlightened times, have persecuted51 opinions now believed to be true. Let us take care, it may be said, not to make the same mistake: but governments and nations have made mistakes in other things, which are not denied to be fit subjects for the exercise of authority: they have laid on bad taxes, made unjust wars. Ought we therefore to lay on no taxes, and, under whatever provocation53, make no wars? Men, and governments, must act to the best of their ability. There is no such thing as absolute certainty, but there is assurance sufficient for the purposes of human life. We may, and must, assume our opinion to be true for the guidance of our own conduct: and it is assuming no more when we forbid bad men to pervert54 society by the propagation of opinions which we regard as false and pernicious.
I answer, that it is assuming very much more. There is the greatest difference between presuming an opinion to be true, because, with every opportunity for contesting it, it has not been refuted, and assuming its truth for the purpose of not permitting its refutation. Complete liberty of contradicting and disproving our opinion, is the very condition which justifies55 us in assuming its truth for purposes of action; and on no other terms can a being with human faculties56 have any rational assurance of being right.
When we consider either the history of opinion, or the ordinary conduct of human life, to what is it to be ascribed that the one and the other are no worse than they are? Not certainly to the inherent force of the human understanding; for, on any matter not self-evident, there are ninety-nine persons totally incapable58 of judging of it, for one who is capable; and the capacity of the hundredth person is only comparative; for the majority of the eminent59 men of every past generation held many opinions now known to be erroneous, and did or approved numerous things which no one will now justify60. Why is it, then, that there is on the whole a preponderance among mankind of rational opinions and rational conduct? If there really is this preponderance — which there must be, unless human affairs are, and have always been, in an almost desperate state — it is owing to a quality of the human mind, the source of everything respectable in man, either as an intellectual or as a moral being, namely, that his errors are corrigible. He is capable of rectifying61 his mistakes by discussion and experience. Not by experience alone. There must be discussion, to show how experience is to be interpreted. Wrong opinions and practices gradually yield to fact and argument: but facts and arguments, to produce any effect on the mind, must be brought before it. Very few facts are able to tell their own story, without comments to bring out their meaning. The whole strength and value, then, of human judgment, depending on the one property, that it can be set right when it is wrong, reliance can be placed on it only when the means of setting it right are kept constantly at hand. In the case of any person whose judgment is really deserving of confidence, how has it become so? Because he has kept his mind open to criticism of his opinions and conduct. Because it has been his practice to listen to all that could be said against him; to profit by as much of it as was just, and expound62 to himself, and upon occasion to others, the fallacy of what was fallacious. Because he has felt, that the only way in which a human being can make some approach to knowing the whole of a subject, is by hearing what can be said about it by persons of every variety of opinion, and studying all modes in which it can be looked at by every character of mind. No wise man ever acquired his wisdom in any mode but this; nor is it in the nature of human intellect to become wise in any other manner. The steady habit of correcting and completing his own opinion by collating63 it with those of others, so far from causing doubt and hesitation64 in carrying it into practice, is the only stable foundation for a just reliance on it: for, being cognizant of all that can, at least obviously, be said against him, and having taken up his position against all gainsayers knowing that he has sought for objections and difficulties, instead of avoiding them, and has shut out no light which can be thrown upon the subject from any quarter — he has a right to think his judgment better than that of any person, or any multitude, who have not gone through a similar process.
It is not too much to require that what the wisest of mankind, those who are best entitled to trust their own judgment, find necessary to warrant their relying on it, should be submitted to by that miscellaneous collection of a few wise and many foolish individuals, called the public. The most intolerant of churches, the Roman Catholic Church, even at the canonization of a saint, admits, and listens patiently to, a “devil’s advocate.” The holiest of men, it appears, cannot be admitted to posthumous65 honors, until all that the devil could say against him is known and weighed. If even the Newtonian philosophy were not permitted to be questioned, mankind could not feel as complete assurance of its truth as they now do. The beliefs which we have most warrant for, have no safeguard to rest on, but a standing57 invitation to the whole world to prove them unfounded. If the challenge is not accepted, or is accepted and the attempt fails, we are far enough from certainty still; but we have done the best that the existing state of human reason admits of; we have neglected nothing that could give the truth a chance of reaching us: if the lists are kept open, we may hope that if there be a better truth, it will be found when the human mind is capable of receiving it; and in the meantime we may rely on having attained67 such approach to truth, as is possible in our own day. This is the amount of certainty attainable68 by a fallible being, and this the sole way of attaining69 it.
Strange it is, that men should admit the validity of the arguments for free discussion, but object to their being “pushed to an extreme;” not seeing that unless the reasons are good for an extreme case, they are not good for any case. Strange that they should imagine that they are not assuming infallibility when they acknowledge that there should be free discussion on all subjects which can possibly be doubtful, but think that some particular principle or doctrine4 should be forbidden to be questioned because it is so certain, that is, because they are certain that it is certain. To call any proposition certain, while there is any one who would deny its certainty if permitted, but who is not permitted, is to assume that we ourselves, and those who agree with us, are the judges of certainty, and judges without hearing the other side.
In the present age — which has been described as “destitute of faith, but terrified at scepticism,"— in which people feel sure, not so much that their opinions are true, as that they should not know what to do without them — the claims of an opinion to be protected from public attack are rested not so much on its truth, as on its importance to society. There are, it is alleged71, certain beliefs, so useful, not to say indispensable to well-being72, that it is as much the duty of governments to uphold those beliefs, as to protect any other of the interests of society. In a case of such necessity, and so directly in the line of their duty, something less than infallibility may, it is maintained, warrant, and even bind73, governments, to act on their own opinion, confirmed by the general opinion of mankind. It is also often argued, and still oftener thought, that none but bad men would desire to weaken these salutary beliefs; and there can be nothing wrong, it is thought, in restraining bad men, and prohibiting what only such men would wish to practise. This mode of thinking makes the justification74 of restraints on discussion not a question of the truth of doctrines, but of their usefulness; and flatters itself by that means to escape the responsibility of claiming to be an infallible judge of opinions. But those who thus satisfy themselves, do not perceive that the assumption of infallibility is merely shifted from one point to another. The usefulness of an opinion is itself matter of opinion: as disputable, as open to discussion and requiring discussion as much, as the opinion itself. There is the same need of an infallible judge of opinions to decide an opinion to be noxious, as to decide it to be false, unless the opinion condemned75 has full opportunity of defending itself. And it will not do to say that the heretic may be allowed to maintain the utility or harmlessness of his opinion, though forbidden to maintain its truth. The truth of an opinion is part of its utility. If we would know whether or not it is desirable that a proposition should be believed, is it possible to exclude the consideration of whether or not it is true? In the opinion, not of bad men, but of the best men, no belief which is contrary to truth can be really useful: and can you prevent such men from urging that plea, when they are charged with culpability76 for denying some doctrine which they are told is useful, but which they believe to be false? Those who are on the side of received opinions, never fail to take all possible advantage of this plea; you do not find them handling the question of utility as if it could be completely abstracted from that of truth: on the contrary, it is, above all, because their doctrine is “the truth,” that the knowledge or the belief of it is held to be so indispensable. There can be no fair discussion of the question of usefulness, when an argument so vital may be employed on one side, but not on the other. And in point of fact, when law or public feeling do not permit the truth of an opinion to be disputed, they are just as little tolerant of a denial of its usefulness. The utmost they allow is an extenuation77 of its absolute necessity or of the positive guilt78 of rejecting it.
In order more fully47 to illustrate79 the mischief80 of denying a hearing to opinions because we, in our own judgment, have condemned them, it will be desirable to fix down the discussion to a concrete case; and I choose, by preference, the cases which are least favourable81 to me — in which the argument against freedom of opinion, both on the score of truth and on that of utility, is considered the strongest. Let the opinions impugned82 be the belief in a God and in a future state, or any of the commonly received doctrines of morality. To fight the battle on such ground, gives a great advantage to an unfair antagonist83; since he will be sure to say (and many who have no desire to be unfair will say it internally), Are these the doctrines which you do not deem sufficiently84 certain to be taken under the protection of law? Is the belief in a God one of the opinions, to feel sure of which, you hold to be assuming infallibility? But I must be permitted to observe, that it is not the feeling sure of a doctrine (be it what it may) which I call an assumption of infallibility. It is the undertaking85 to decide that question for others, without allowing them to hear what can be said on the contrary side. And I denounce and reprobate86 this pretension87 not the less, if put forth88 on the side of my most solemn convictions. However positive any one’s persuasion89 may be, not only of the falsity, but of the pernicious consequences — not only of the pernicious consequences, but (to adopt expressions which I altogether condemn) the immorality91 and impiety92 of an opinion; yet if, in pursuance of that private judgment, though backed by the public judgment of his country or his cotemporaries, he prevents the opinion from being heard in its defence, he assumes infallibility. And so far from the assumption being less objectionable or less dangerous because the opinion is called immoral90 or impious, this is the case of all others in which it is most fatal. These are exactly the occasions on which the men of one generation commit those dreadful mistakes which excite the astonishment95 and horror of posterity. It is among such that we find the instances memorable96 in history, when the arm of the law has been employed to root out the best men and the noblest doctrines; with deplorable success as to the men, though some of the doctrines have survived to be (as if in mockery) invoked97, in defence of similar conduct towards those who dissent from them, or from their received interpretation98.
Mankind can hardly be too often reminded, that there was once a man named Socrates, between whom and the legal authorities and public opinion of his time, there took place a memorable collision. Born in an age and country abounding99 in individual greatness, this man has been handed down to us by those who best knew both him and the age, as the most virtuous100 man in it; while we know him as the head and prototype of all subsequent teachers of virtue101, the source equally of the lofty inspiration of Plato and the judicious102 utilitarianism of Aristotle, “i maestri di color che sanno,” the two headsprings of ethical103 as of all other philosophy. This acknowledged master of all the eminent thinkers who have since lived — whose fame, still growing after more than two thousand years, all but outweighs104 the whole remainder of the names which make his native city illustrious — was put to death by his countrymen, after a judicial106 conviction, for impiety and immorality. Impiety, in denying the gods recognized by the State; indeed his accuser asserted (see the “Apologia”) that he believed in no gods at all. Immorality, in being, by his doctrines and instructions, a “corrupter of youth.” Of these charges the tribunal, there is every ground for believing, honestly found him guilty, and condemned the man who probably of all then born had deserved best of mankind, to be put to death as a criminal.
To pass from this to the only other instance of judicial iniquity107, the mention of which, after the condemnation of Socrates, would not be an anti-climax: the event which took place on Calvary rather more than eighteen hundred years ago. The man who left on the memory of those who witnessed his life and conversation, such an impression of his moral grandeur108, that eighteen subsequent centuries have done homage109 to him as the Almighty110 in person, was ignominiously111 put to death, as what? As a blasphemer. Men did not merely mistake their benefactor112; they mistook him for the exact contrary of what he was, and treated him as that prodigy113 of impiety, which they themselves are now held to be, for their treatment of him. The feelings with which mankind now regard these lamentable114 transactions, especially the latter of the two, render them extremely unjust in their judgment of the unhappy actors. These were, to all appearance, not bad men — not worse than men most commonly are, but rather the contrary; men who possessed115 in a full, or somewhat more than a full measure, the religious, moral, and patriotic116 feelings of their time and people: the very kind of men who, in all times, our own included, have every chance of passing through life blameless and respected. The high-priest who rent his garments when the words were pronounced, which, according to all the ideas of his country, constituted the blackest guilt, was in all probability quite as sincere in his horror and indignation, as the generality of respectable and pious93 men now are in the religious and moral sentiments they profess117; and most of those who now shudder118 at his conduct, if they had lived in his time and been born Jews, would have acted precisely119 as he did. Orthodox Christians121 who are tempted24 to think that those who stoned to death the first martyrs122 must have been worse men than they themselves are, ought to remember that one of those persecutors was Saint Paul.
Let us add one more example, the most striking of all, if the impressiveness of an error is measured by the wisdom and virtue of him who falls into it. If ever any one, possessed of power, had grounds for thinking himself the best and most enlightened among his cotemporaries, it was the Emperor Marcus Aurelius. Absolute monarch123 of the whole civilized124 world, he preserved through life not only the most unblemished justice, but what was less to be expected from his Stoical breeding, the tenderest heart. The few failings which are attributed to him, were all on the side of indulgence: while his writings, the highest ethical product of the ancient mind, differ scarcely perceptibly, if they differ at all, from the most characteristic teachings of Christ. This man, a better Christian120 in all but the dogmatic sense of the word, than almost any of the ostensibly Christian sovereigns who have since reigned125, persecuted Christianity. Placed at the summit of all the previous attainments126 of humanity, with an open, unfettered intellect, and a character which led him of himself to embody127 in his moral writings the Christian ideal, he yet failed to see that Christianity was to be a good and not an evil to the world, with his duties to which he was so deeply penetrated128. Existing society he knew to be in a deplorable state. But such as it was, he saw or thought he saw, that it was held together and prevented from being worse, by belief and reverence130 of the received divinities. As a ruler of mankind, he deemed it his duty not to suffer society to fall in pieces; and saw not how, if its existing ties were removed, any others could be formed which could again knit it together. The new religion openly aimed at dissolving these ties: unless, therefore, it was his duty to adopt that religion, it seemed to be his duty to put it down. Inasmuch then as the theology of Christianity did not appear to him true or of divine origin; inasmuch as this strange history of a crucified God was not credible131 to him, and a system which purported132 to rest entirely upon a foundation to him so wholly unbelievable, could not be foreseen by him to be that renovating133 agency which, after all abatements, it has in fact proved to be; the gentlest and most amiable135 of philosophers and rulers, under a solemn sense of duty, authorized136 the persecution137 of Christianity. To my mind this is one of the most tragical138 facts in all history. It is a bitter thought, how different a thing the Christianity of the world might have been, if the Christian faith had been adopted as the religion of the empire under the auspices139 of Marcus Aurelius instead of those of Constantine. But it would be equally unjust to him and false to truth, to deny, that no one plea which can be urged for punishing anti-Christian teaching, was wanting to Marcus Aurelius for punishing, as he did, the propagation of Christianity. No Christian more firmly believes that Atheism140 is false, and tends to the dissolution of society, than Marcus Aurelius believed the same things of Christianity; he who, of all men then living, might have been thought the most capable of appreciating it. Unless any one who approves of punishment for the promulgation141 of opinions, flatters himself that he is a wiser and better man than Marcus Aurelius — more deeply versed142 in the wisdom of his time, more elevated in his intellect above it — more earnest in his search for truth, or more single-minded in his devotion to it when found — let him abstain143 from that assumption of the joint144 infallibility of himself and the multitude, which the great Antoninus made with so unfortunate a result.
Aware of the impossibility of defending the use of punishment for restraining irreligious opinions, by any argument which will not justify Marcus Antoninus, the enemies of religious freedom, when hard pressed, occasionally accept this consequence, and say, with Dr. Johnson, that the persecutors of Christianity were in the right; that persecution is an ordeal145 through which truth ought to pass, and always passes successfully, legal penalties being, in the end, powerless against truth, though sometimes beneficially effective against mischievous147 errors. This is a form of the argument for religious intolerance, sufficiently remarkable148 not to be passed without notice.
A theory which maintains that truth may justifiably149 be persecuted because persecution cannot possibly do it any harm, cannot be charged with being intentionally150 hostile to the reception of new truths; but we cannot commend the generosity151 of its dealing152 with the persons to whom mankind are indebted for them. To discover to the world something which deeply concerns it, and of which it was previously153 ignorant; to prove to it that it had been mistaken on some vital point of temporal or spiritual interest, is as important a service as a human being can render to his fellow-creatures, and in certain cases, as in those of the early Christians and of the Reformers, those who think with Dr. Johnson believe it to have been the most precious gift which could be bestowed154 on mankind. That the authors of such splendid benefits should be requited155 by martyrdom; that their reward should be to be dealt with as the vilest156 of criminals, is not, upon this theory, a deplorable error and misfortune, for which humanity should mourn in sackcloth and ashes, but the normal and justifiable157 state of things. The propounder158 of a new truth, according to this doctrine, should stand, as stood, in the legislation of the Locrians, the proposer of a new law, with a halter round his neck, to be instantly tightened159 if the public assembly did not, on hearing his reasons, then and there adopt his proposition. People who defend this mode of treating benefactors160, can not be supposed to set much value on the benefit; and I believe this view of the subject is mostly confined to the sort of persons who think that new truths may have been desirable once, but that we have had enough of them now.
But, indeed, the dictum that truth always triumphs over persecution, is one of those pleasant falsehoods which men repeat after one another till they pass into commonplaces, but which all experience refutes. History teems161 with instances of truth put down by persecution. If not suppressed forever, it may be thrown back for centuries. To speak only of religious opinions: the Reformation broke out at least twenty times before Luther, and was put down. Arnold of Brescia was put down. Fra Dolcino was put down. Savonarola was put down. The Albigeois were put down. The Vaudois were put down. The Lollards were put down. The Hussites were put down. Even after the era of Luther, wherever persecution was persisted in, it was successful. In Spain, Italy, Flanders, the Austrian empire, Protestantism was rooted out; and, most likely, would have been so in England, had Queen Mary lived, or Queen Elizabeth died. Persecution has always succeeded, save where the heretics were too strong a party to be effectually persecuted. No reasonable person can doubt that Christianity might have been extirpated163 in the Roman empire. It spread, and became predominant, because the persecutions were only occasional, lasting164 but a short time, and separated by long intervals165 of almost undisturbed propagandism. It is a piece of idle sentimentality that truth, merely as truth, has any inherent power denied to error, of prevailing166 against the dungeon167 and the stake. Men are not more zealous168 for truth than they often are for error, and a sufficient application of legal or even of social penalties will generally succeed in stopping the propagation of either. The real advantage which truth has, consists in this, that when an opinion is true, it may be extinguished once, twice, or many times, but in the course of ages there will generally be found persons to rediscover it, until some one of its reappearances falls on a time when from favourable circumstances it escapes persecution until it has made such head as to withstand all subsequent attempts to suppress it.
It will be said, that we do not now put to death the introducers of new opinions: we are not like our fathers who slew170 the prophets, we even build sepulchres to them. It is true we no longer put heretics to death; and the amount of penal146 infliction171 which modern feeling would probably tolerate, even against the most obnoxious172 opinions, is not sufficient to extirpate162 them. But let us not flatter ourselves that we are yet free from the stain even of legal persecution. Penalties for opinion, or at least for its expression, still exist by law; and their enforcement is not, even in these times, so unexampled as to make it at all incredible that they may some day be revived in full force. In the year 1857, at the summer assizes of the county of Cornwall, an unfortunate man,2 said to be of unexceptionable conduct in all relations of life, was sentenced to twenty-one months imprisonment173, for uttering, and writing on a gate, some offensive words concerning Christianity. Within a month of the same time, at the Old Bailey, two persons, on two separate occasions,3 were rejected as jurymen, and one of them grossly insulted by the judge and one of the counsel, because they honestly declared that they had no theological belief; and a third, a foreigner,4 for the same reason, was denied justice against a thief. This refusal of redress175 took place in virtue of the legal doctrine, that no person can be allowed to give evidence in a court of justice, who does not profess belief in a God (any god is sufficient) and in a future state; which is equivalent to declaring such persons to be outlaws176, excluded from the protection of the tribunals; who may not only be robbed or assaulted with impunity177, if no one but themselves, or persons of similar opinions, be present, but any one else may be robbed or assaulted with impunity, if the proof of the fact depends on their evidence. The assumption on which this is grounded, is that the oath is worthless, of a person who does not believe in a future state; a proposition which betokens178 much ignorance of history in those who assent179 to it (since it is historically true that a large proportion of infidels in all ages have been persons of distinguished180 integrity and honor); and would be maintained by no one who had the smallest conception how many of the persons in greatest repute with the world, both for virtues181 and for attainments, are well known, at least to their intimates, to be unbelievers. The rule, besides, is suicidal, and cuts away its own foundation. Under pretence182 that atheists must be liars183, it admits the testimony184 of all atheists who are willing to lie, and rejects only those who brave the obloquy185 of publicly confessing a detested186 creed187 rather than affirm a falsehood. A rule thus self-convicted of absurdity188 so far as regards its professed189 purpose, can be kept in force only as a badge of hatred190, a relic191 of persecution; a persecution, too, having the peculiarity192 that the qualification for undergoing it is the being clearly proved not to deserve it. The rule, and the theory it implies, are hardly less insulting to believers than to infidels. For if he who does not believe in a future state necessarily lies, it follows that they who do believe are only prevented from lying, if prevented they are, by the fear of hell. We will not do the authors and abettors of the rule the injury of supposing, that the conception which they have formed of Christian virtue is drawn193 from their own consciousness.
These, indeed, are but rags and remnants of persecution, and may be thought to be not so much an indication of the wish to persecute52, as an example of that very frequent infirmity of English minds, which makes them take a preposterous194 pleasure in the assertion of a bad principle, when they are no longer bad enough to desire to carry it really into practice. But unhappily there is no security in the state of the public mind, that the suspension of worse forms of legal persecution, which has lasted for about the space of a generation, will continue. In this age the quiet surface of routine is as often ruffled195 by attempts to resuscitate196 past evils, as to introduce new benefits. What is boasted of at the present time as the revival197 of religion, is always, in narrow and uncultivated minds, at least as much the revival of bigotry198; and where there is the strongest permanent leaven199 of intolerance in the feelings of a people, which at all times abides200 in the middle classes of this country, it needs but little to provoke them into actively201 persecuting202 those whom they have never ceased to think proper objects of persecution.5 For it is this — it is the opinions men entertain, and the feelings they cherish, respecting those who disown the beliefs they deem important, which makes this country not a place of mental freedom. For a long time past, the chief mischief of the legal penalties is that they strengthen the social stigma203. It is that stigma which is really effective, and so effective is it, that the profession of opinions which are under the ban of society is much less common in England, than is, in many other countries, the avowal204 of those which incur205 risk of judicial punishment. In respect to all persons but those whose pecuniary206 circumstances make them independent of the good will of other people, opinion, on this subject, is as efficacious as law; men might as well be imprisoned207, as excluded from the means of earning their bread. Those whose bread is already secured, and who desire no favors from men in power, or from bodies of men, or from the public, have nothing to fear from the open avowal of any opinions, but to be ill-thought of and illspoken of, and this it ought not to require a very heroic mould to enable them to bear. There is no room for any appeal ad misericordiam in behalf of such persons. But though we do not now inflict18 so much evil on those who think differently from us, as it was formerly208 our custom to do, it may be that we do ourselves as much evil as ever by our treatment of them. Socrates was put to death, but the Socratic philosophy rose like the sun in heaven, and spread its illumination over the whole intellectual firmament209. Christians were cast to the lions, but the Christian Church grew up a stately and spreading tree, overtopping the older and less vigorous growths, and stifling them by its shade. Our merely social intolerance, kills no one, roots out no opinions, but induces men to disguise them, or to abstain from any active effort for their diffusion210. With us, heretical opinions do not perceptibly gain or even lose, ground in each decade or generation; they never blaze out far and wide, but continue to smoulder in the narrow circles of thinking and studious persons among whom they originate, without ever lighting211 up the general affairs of mankind with either a true or a deceptive212 light. And thus is kept up a state of things very satisfactory to some minds, because, without the unpleasant process of fining or imprisoning213 anybody, it maintains all prevailing opinions outwardly undisturbed, while it does not absolutely interdict214 the exercise of reason by dissentients afflicted215 with the malady216 of thought. A convenient plan for having peace in the intellectual world, and keeping all things going on therein very much as they do already. But the price paid for this sort of intellectual pacification217, is the sacrifice of the entire moral courage of the human mind. A state of things in which a large portion of the most active and inquiring intellects find it advisable to keep the genuine principles and grounds of their convictions within their own breasts, and attempt, in what they address to the public, to fit as much as they can of their own conclusions to premises218 which they have internally renounced219, cannot send forth the open, fearless characters, and logical, consistent intellects who once adorned220 the thinking world. The sort of men who can be looked for under it, are either mere conformers to commonplace, or time-servers for truth whose arguments on all great subjects are meant for their hearers, and are not those which have convinced themselves. Those who avoid this alternative, do so by narrowing their thoughts and interests to things which can be spoken of without venturing within the region of principles, that is, to small practical matters, which would come right of themselves, if but the minds of mankind were strengthened and enlarged, and which will never be made effectually right until then; while that which would strengthen and enlarge men’s minds, free and daring speculation221 on the highest subjects, is abandoned.
Those in whose eyes this reticence222 on the part of heretics is no evil, should consider in the first place, that in consequence of it there is never any fair and thorough discussion of heretical opinions; and that such of them as could not stand such a discussion, though they may be prevented from spreading, do not disappear. But it is not the minds of heretics that are deteriorated223 most, by the ban placed on all inquiry224 which does not end in the orthodox conclusions. The greatest harm done is to those who are not heretics, and whose whole mental development is cramped225, and their reason cowed, by the fear of heresy227. Who can compute228 what the world loses in the multitude of promising229 intellects combined with timid characters, who dare not follow out any bold, vigorous, independent train of thought, lest it should land them in something which would admit of being considered irreligious or immoral? Among them we may occasionally see some man of deep conscientiousness, and subtile and refined understanding, who spends a life in sophisticating with an intellect which he cannot silence, and exhausts the resources of ingenuity230 in attempting to reconcile the promptings of his conscience and reason with orthodoxy, which yet he does not, perhaps, to the end succeed in doing. No one can be a great thinker who does not recognize, that as a thinker it is his first duty to follow his intellect to whatever conclusions it may lead. Truth gains more even by the errors of one who, with due study and preparation, thinks for himself, than by the true opinions of those who only hold them because they do not suffer themselves to think. Not that it is solely231, or chiefly, to form great thinkers, that freedom of thinking is required. On the contrary, it is as much, and even more indispensable, to enable average human beings to attain66 the mental stature232 which they are capable of. There have been, and may again be, great individual thinkers, in a general atmosphere of mental slavery. But there never has been, nor ever will be, in that atmosphere, an intellectually active people. Where any people has made a temporary approach to such a character, it has been because the dread94 of heterodox speculation was for a time suspended. Where there is a tacit convention that principles are not to be disputed; where the discussion of the greatest questions which can occupy humanity is considered to be closed, we cannot hope to find that generally high scale of mental activity which has made some periods of history so remarkable. Never when controversy233 avoided the subjects which are large and important enough to kindle234 enthusiasm, was the mind of a people stirred up from its foundations, and the impulse given which raised even persons of the most ordinary intellect to something of the dignity of thinking beings. Of such we have had an example in the condition of Europe during the times immediately following the Reformation; another, though limited to the Continent and to a more cultivated class, in the speculative235 movement of the latter half of the eighteenth century; and a third, of still briefer duration, in the intellectual fermentation of Germany during the Goethian and Fichtean period. These periods differed widely in the particular opinions which they developed; but were alike in this, that during all three the yoke236 of authority was broken. In each, an old mental despotism had been thrown off, and no new one had yet taken its place. The impulse given at these three periods has made Europe what it now is. Every single improvement which has taken place either in the human mind or in institutions, may be traced distinctly to one or other of them. Appearances have for some time indicated that all three impulses are well-nigh spent; and we can expect no fresh start, until we again assert our mental freedom.
Let us now pass to the second division of the argument, and dismissing the Supposition that any of the received opinions may be false, let us assume them to be true, and examine into the worth of the manner in which they are likely to be held, when their truth is not freely and openly canvassed237. However unwillingly238 a person who has a strong opinion may admit the possibility that his opinion may be false, he ought to be moved by the consideration that however true it may be, if it is not fully, frequently, and fearlessly discussed, it will be held as a dead dogma, not a living truth.
There is a class of persons (happily not quite so numerous as formerly) who think it enough if a person assents239 undoubtingly to what they think true, though he has no knowledge whatever of the grounds of the opinion, and could not make a tenable defence of it against the most superficial objections. Such persons, if they can once get their creed taught from authority, naturally think that no good, and some harm, comes of its being allowed to be questioned. Where their influence prevails, they make it nearly impossible for the received opinion to be rejected wisely and considerately, though it may still be rejected rashly and ignorantly; for to shut out discussion entirely is seldom possible, and when it once gets in, beliefs not grounded on conviction are apt to give way before the slightest semblance240 of an argument. Waiving241, however, this possibility — assuming that the true opinion abides in the mind, but abides as a prejudice, a belief independent of, and proof against, argument — this is not the way in which truth ought to be held by a rational being. This is not knowing the truth. Truth, thus held, is but one superstition242 the more, accidentally clinging to the words which enunciate243 a truth.
If the intellect and judgment of mankind ought to be cultivated, a thing which Protestants at least do not deny, on what can these faculties be more appropriately exercised by any one, than on the things which concern him so much that it is considered necessary for him to hold opinions on them? If the cultivation244 of the understanding consists in one thing more than in another, it is surely in learning the grounds of one’s own opinions. Whatever people believe, on subjects on which it is of the first importance to believe rightly, they ought to be able to defend against at least the common objections. But, some one may say, “Let them be taught the grounds of their opinions. It does not follow that opinions must be merely parroted because they are never heard controverted245. Persons who learn geometry do not simply commit the theorems to memory, but understand and learn likewise the demonstrations246; and it would be absurd to say that they remain ignorant of the grounds of geometrical truths, because they never hear any one deny, and attempt to disprove them.” Undoubtedly247: and such teaching suffices on a subject like mathematics, where there is nothing at all to be said on the wrong side of the question. The peculiarity of the evidence of mathematical truths is, that all the argument is on one side. There are no objections, and no answers to objections. But on every subject on which difference of opinion is possible, the truth depends on a balance to be struck between two sets of conflicting reasons. Even in natural philosophy, there is always some other explanation possible of the same facts; some geocentric theory instead of heliocentric, some phlogiston instead of oxygen; and it has to be shown why that other theory cannot be the true one: and until this is shown and until we know how it is shown, we do not understand the grounds of our opinion. But when we turn to subjects infinitely248 more complicated, to morals, religion, politics, social relations, and the business of life, three-fourths of the arguments for every disputed opinion consist in dispelling249 the appearances which favor some opinion different from it. The greatest orator250, save one, of antiquity251, has left it on record that he always studied his adversary’s case with as great, if not with still greater, intensity252 than even his own. What Cicero practised as the means of forensic253 success, requires to be imitated by all who study any subject in order to arrive at the truth. He who knows only his own side of the case, knows little of that. His reasons may be good, and no one may have been able to refute them. But if he is equally unable to refute the reasons on the opposite side; if he does not so much as know what they are, he has no ground for preferring either opinion. The rational position for him would be suspension of judgment, and unless he contents himself with that, he is either led by authority, or adopts, like the generality of the world, the side to which he feels most inclination254. Nor is it enough that he should hear the arguments of adversaries255 from his own teachers, presented as they state them, and accompanied by what they offer as refutations. This is not the way to do justice to the arguments, or bring them into real contact with his own mind. He must be able to hear them from persons who actually believe them; who defend them in earnest, and do their very utmost for them. He must know them in their most plausible256 and persuasive257 form; he must feel the whole force of the difficulty which the true view of the subject has to encounter and dispose of, else he will never really possess himself of the portion of truth which meets and removes that difficulty. Ninety-nine in a hundred of what are called educated men are in this condition, even of those who can argue fluently for their opinions. Their conclusion may be true, but it might be false for anything they know: they have never thrown themselves into the mental position of those who think differently from them, and considered what such persons may have to say; and consequently they do not, in any proper sense of the word, know the doctrine which they themselves profess. They do not know those parts of it which explain and justify the remainder; the considerations which show that a fact which seemingly conflicts with another is reconcilable with it, or that, of two apparently258 strong reasons, one and not the other ought to be preferred. All that part of the truth which turns the scale, and decides the judgment of a completely informed mind, they are strangers to; nor is it ever really known, but to those who have attended equally and impartially260 to both sides, and endeavored to see the reasons of both in the strongest light. So essential is this discipline to a real understanding of moral and human subjects, that if opponents of all important truths do not exist, it is indispensable to imagine them and supply them with the strongest arguments which the most skilful262 devil’s advocate can conjure263 up.
To abate134 the force of these considerations, an enemy of free discussion may be supposed to say, that there is no necessity for mankind in general to know and understand all that can be said against or for their opinions by philosophers and theologians. That it is not needful for common men to be able to expose all the misstatements or fallacies of an ingenious opponent. That it is enough if there is always somebody capable of answering them, so that nothing likely to mislead uninstructed persons remains264 unrefuted. That simple minds, having been taught the obvious grounds of the truths inculcated on them, may trust to authority for the rest, and being aware that they have neither knowledge nor talent to resolve every difficulty which can be raised, may repose in the assurance that all those which have been raised have been or can be answered, by those who are specially trained to the task.
Conceding to this view of the subject the utmost that can be claimed for it by those most easily satisfied with the amount of understanding of truth which ought to accompany the belief of it; even so, the argument for free discussion is no way weakened. For even this doctrine acknowledges that mankind ought to have a rational assurance that all objections have been satisfactorily answered; and how are they to be answered if that which requires to be answered is not spoken? or how can the answer be known to be satisfactory, if the objectors have no opportunity of showing that it is unsatisfactory? If not the public, at least the philosophers and theologians who are to resolve the difficulties, must make themselves familiar with those difficulties in their most puzzling form; and this cannot be accomplished265 unless they are freely stated, and placed in the most advantageous266 light which they admit of. The Catholic Church has its own way of dealing with this embarrassing problem. It makes a broad separation between those who can be permitted to receive its doctrines on conviction, and those who must accept them on trust. Neither, indeed, are allowed any choice as to what they will accept; but the clergy267, such at least as can be fully confided268 in, may admissibly and meritoriously269 make themselves acquainted with the arguments of opponents, in order to answer them, and may, therefore, read heretical books; the laity270, not unless by special permission, hard to be obtained. This discipline recognizes a knowledge of the enemy’s case as beneficial to the teachers, but finds means, consistent with this, of denying it to the rest of the world: thus giving to the elite271 more mental culture, though not more mental freedom, than it allows to the mass. By this device it succeeds in obtaining the kind of mental superiority which its purposes require; for though culture without freedom never made a large and liberal mind, it can make a clever nisi prius advocate of a cause. But in countries professing272 Protestantism, this resource is denied; since Protestants hold, at least in theory, that the responsibility for the choice of a religion must be borne by each for himself, and cannot be thrown off upon teachers. Besides, in the present state of the world, it is practically impossible that writings which are read by the instructed can be kept from the uninstructed. If the teachers of mankind are to be cognizant of all that they ought to know, everything must be free to be written and published without restraint.
If, however, the mischievous operation of the absence of free discussion, when the received opinions are true, were confined to leaving men ignorant of the grounds of those opinions, it might be thought that this, if an intellectual, is no moral evil, and does not affect the worth of the opinions, regarded in their influence on the character. The fact, however, is, that not only the grounds of the opinion are forgotten in the absence of discussion, but too often the meaning of the opinion itself. The words which convey it, cease to suggest ideas, or suggest only a small portion of those they were originally employed to communicate. Instead of a vivid conception and a living belief, there remain only a few phrases retained by rote70; or, if any part, the shell and husk only of the meaning is retained, the finer essence being lost. The great chapter in human history which this fact occupies and fills, cannot be too earnestly studied and meditated273 on.
It is illustrated274 in the experience of almost all ethical doctrines and religious creeds275. They are all full of meaning and vitality276 to those who originate them, and to the direct disciples277 of the originators. Their meaning continues to be felt in undiminished strength, and is perhaps brought out into even fuller consciousness, so long as the struggle lasts to give the doctrine or creed an ascendency over other creeds. At last it either prevails, and becomes the general opinion, or its progress stops; it keeps possession of the ground it has gained, but ceases to spread further. When either of these results has become apparent, controversy on the subject flags, and gradually dies away. The doctrine has taken its place, if not as a received opinion, as one of the admitted sects or divisions of opinion: those who hold it have generally inherited, not adopted it; and conversion278 from one of these doctrines to another, being now an exceptional fact, occupies little place in the thoughts of their professors. Instead of being, as at first, constantly on the alert either to defend themselves against the world, or to bring the world over to them, they have subsided279 into acquiescence280, and neither listen, when they can help it, to arguments against their creed, nor trouble dissentients (if there be such) with arguments in its favor. From this time may usually be dated the decline in the living power of the doctrine. We often hear the teachers of all creeds lamenting281 the difficulty of keeping up in the minds of believers a lively apprehension282 of the truth which they nominally283 recognize, so that it may penetrate129 the feelings, and acquire a real mastery over the conduct. No such difficulty is complained of while the creed is still fighting for its existence: even the weaker combatants then know and feel what they are fighting for, and the difference between it and other doctrines; and in that period of every creed’s existence, not a few persons may be found, who have realized its fundamental principles in all the forms of thought, have weighed and considered them in all their important bearings, and have experienced the full effect on the character, which belief in that creed ought to produce in a mind thoroughly284 imbued285 with it. But when it has come to be an hereditary286 creed, and to be received passively, not actively — when the mind is no longer compelled, in the same degree as at first, to exercise its vital powers on the questions which its belief presents to it, there is a progressive tendency to forget all of the belief except the formularies, or to give it a dull and torpid287 assent, as if accepting it on trust dispensed288 with the necessity of realizing it in consciousness, or testing it by personal experience; until it almost ceases to connect itself at all with the inner life of the human being. Then are seen the cases, so frequent in this age of the world as almost to form the majority, in which the creed remains as it were outside the mind, encrusting and petrifying289 it against all other influences addressed to the higher parts of our nature; manifesting its power by not suffering any fresh and living conviction to get in, but itself doing nothing for the mind or heart, except standing sentinel over them to keep them vacant.
To what an extent doctrines intrinsically fitted to make the deepest impression upon the mind may remain in it as dead beliefs, without being ever realized in the imagination, the feelings, or the understanding, is exemplified by the manner in which the majority of believers hold the doctrines of Christianity. By Christianity I here mean what is accounted such by all churches and sects — the maxims291 and precepts292 contained in the New Testament293. These are considered sacred, and accepted as laws, by all professing Christians. Yet it is scarcely too much to say that not one Christian in a thousand guides or tests his individual conduct by reference to those laws. The standard to which he does refer it, is the custom of his nation, his class, or his religious profession. He has thus, on the one hand, a collection of ethical maxims, which he believes to have been vouchsafed294 to him by infallible wisdom as rules for his government; and on the other, a set of every-day judgments295 and practices, which go a certain length with some of those maxims, not so great a length with others, stand in direct opposition to some, and are, on the whole, a compromise between the Christian creed and the interests and suggestions of worldly life. To the first of these standards he gives his homage; to the other his real allegiance. All Christians believe that the blessed are the poor and humble296, and those who are illused by the world; that it is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of heaven; that they should judge not, lest they be judged; that they should swear not at all; that they should love their neighbor as themselves; that if one take their cloak, they should give him their coat also; that they should take no thought for the morrow; that if they would be perfect, they should sell all that they have and give it to the poor. They are not insincere when they say that they believe these things. They do believe them, as people believe what they have always heard lauded297 and never discussed. But in the sense of that living belief which regulates conduct, they believe these doctrines just up to the point to which it is usual to act upon them. The doctrines in their integrity are serviceable to pelt298 adversaries with; and it is understood that they are to be put forward (when possible) as the reasons for whatever people do that they think laudable. But any one who reminded them that the maxims require an infinity299 of things which they never even think of doing would gain nothing but to be classed among those very unpopular characters who affect to be better than other people. The doctrines have no hold on ordinary believers — are not a power in their minds. They have an habitual31 respect for the sound of them, but no feeling which spreads from the words to the things signified, and forces the mind to take them in, and make them conform to the formula. Whenever conduct is concerned, they look round for Mr. A and B to direct them how far to go in obeying Christ.
Now we may be well assured that the case was not thus, but far otherwise, with the early Christians. Had it been thus, Christianity never would have expanded from an obscure sect of the despised Hebrews into the religion of the Roman empire. When their enemies said, “See how these Christians love one another” (a remark not likely to be made by anybody now), they assuredly had a much livelier feeling of the meaning of their creed than they have ever had since. And to this cause, probably, it is chiefly owing that Christianity now makes so little progress in extending its domain300, and after eighteen centuries, is still nearly confined to Europeans and the descendants of Europeans. Even with the strictly301 religious, who are much in earnest about their doctrines, and attach a greater amount of meaning to many of them than people in general, it commonly happens that the part which is thus comparatively active in their minds is that which was made by Calvin, or Knox, or some such person much nearer in character to themselves. The sayings of Christ coexist passively in their minds, producing hardly any effect beyond what is caused by mere listening to words so amiable and bland302. There are many reasons, doubtless, why doctrines which are the badge of a sect retain more of their vitality than those common to all recognized sects, and why more pains are taken by teachers to keep their meaning alive; but one reason certainly is, that the peculiar doctrines are more questioned, and have to be oftener defended against open gainsayers. Both teachers and learners go to sleep at their post, as soon as there is no enemy in the field.
The same thing holds true, generally speaking, of all traditional doctrines — those of prudence303 and knowledge of life, as well as of morals or religion. All languages and literatures are full of general observations on life, both as to what it is, and how to conduct oneself in it; observations which everybody knows, which everybody repeats, or hears with acquiescence, which are received as truisms, yet of which most people first truly learn the meaning, when experience, generally of a painful kind, has made it a reality to them. How often, when smarting under some unforeseen misfortune or disappointment, does a person call to mind some proverb or common saying familiar to him all his life, the meaning of which, if he had ever before felt it as he does now, would have saved him from the calamity304. There are indeed reasons for this, other than the absence of discussion: there are many truths of which the full meaning cannot be realized, until personal experience has brought it home. But much more of the meaning even of these would have been understood, and what was understood would have been far more deeply impressed on the mind, if the man had been accustomed to hear it argued pro7 and con8 by people who did understand it. The fatal tendency of mankind to leave off thinking about a thing when it is no longer doubtful, is the cause of half their errors. A contemporary author has well spoken of “the deep slumber305 of a decided opinion.”
But what! (it may be asked) Is the absence of unanimity306 an indispensable condition of true knowledge? Is it necessary that some part of mankind should persist in error, to enable any to realize the truth? Does a belief cease to be real and vital as soon as it is generally received — and is a proposition never thoroughly understood and felt unless some doubt of it remains? As soon as mankind have unanimously accepted a truth, does the truth perish within them? The highest aim and best result of improved intelligence, it has hitherto been thought, is to unite mankind more and more in the acknowledgment of all important truths: and does the intelligence only last as long as it has not achieved its object? Do the fruits of conquest perish by the very completeness of the victory?
I affirm no such thing. As mankind improve, the number of doctrines which are no longer disputed or doubted will be constantly on the increase: and the well-being of mankind may almost be measured by the number and gravity of the truths which have reached the point of being uncontested. The cessation, on one question after another, of serious controversy, is one of the necessary incidents of the consolidation307 of opinion; a consolidation as salutary in the case of true opinions, as it is dangerous and noxious when the opinions are erroneous. But though this gradual narrowing of the bounds of diversity of opinion is necessary in both senses of the term, being at once inevitable308 and indispensable, we are not therefore obliged to conclude that all its consequences must be beneficial. The loss of so important an aid to the intelligent and living apprehension of a truth, as is afforded by the necessity of explaining it to, or defending it against, opponents, though not sufficient to outweigh105, is no trifling309 drawback from, the benefit of its universal recognition. Where this advantage can no longer be had, I confess I should like to see the teachers of mankind endeavoring to provide a substitute for it; some contrivance for making the difficulties of the question as present to the learner’s consciousness, as if they were pressed upon him by a dissentient champion, eager for his conversion.
But instead of seeking contrivances for this purpose, they have lost those they formerly had. The Socratic dialectics, so magnificently exemplified in the dialogues of Plato, were a contrivance of this description. They were essentially311 a negative discussion of the great questions of philosophy and life, directed with consummate312 skill to the purpose of convincing any one who had merely adopted the commonplaces of received opinion, that he did not understand the subject — that he as yet attached no definite meaning to the doctrines he professed; in order that, becoming aware of his ignorance, he might be put in the way to attain a stable belief, resting on a clear apprehension both of the meaning of doctrines and of their evidence. The school disputations of the Middle Ages had a somewhat similar object. They were intended to make sure that the pupil understood his own opinion, and (by necessary correlation) the opinion opposed to it, and could enforce the grounds of the one and confute those of the other. These last-mentioned contests had indeed the incurable313 defect, that the premises appealed to were taken from authority, not from reason; and, as a discipline to the mind, they were in every respect inferior to the powerful dialectics which formed the intellects of the “Socratici viri:” but the modern mind owes far more to both than it is generally willing to admit, and the present modes of education contain nothing which in the smallest degree supplies the place either of the one or of the other. A person who derives314 all his instruction from teachers or books, even if he escape the besetting315 temptation of contenting himself with cram226, is under no compulsion to hear both sides; accordingly it is far from a frequent accomplishment316, even among thinkers, to know both sides; and the weakest part of what everybody says in defence of his opinion, is what he intends as a reply to antagonists317. It is the fashion of the present time to disparage318 negative logic174 — that which points out weaknesses in theory or errors in practice, without establishing positive truths. Such negative criticism would indeed be poor enough as an ultimate result; but as a means to attaining any positive knowledge or conviction worthy319 the name, it cannot be valued too highly; and until people are again systematically320 trained to it, there will be few great thinkers, and a low general average of intellect, in any but the mathematical and physical departments of speculation. On any other subject no one’s opinions deserve the name of knowledge, except so far as he has either had forced upon him by others, or gone through of himself, the same mental process which would have been required of him in carrying on an active controversy with opponents. That, therefore, which when absent, it is so indispensable, but so difficult, to create, how worse than absurd is it to forego, when spontaneously offering itself! If there are any persons who contest a received opinion, or who will do so if law or opinion will let them, let us thank them for it, open our minds to listen to them, and rejoice that there is some one to do for us what we otherwise ought, if we have any regard for either the certainty or the vitality of our convictions, to do with much greater labor321 for ourselves.
It still remains to speak of one of the principal causes which make diversity of opinion advantageous, and will continue to do so until mankind shall have entered a stage of intellectual advancement322 which at present seems at an incalculable distance. We have hitherto considered only two possibilities: that the received opinion may be false, and some other opinion, consequently, true; or that, the received opinion being true, a conflict with the opposite error is essential to a clear apprehension and deep feeling of its truth. But there is a commoner case than either of these; when the conflicting doctrines, instead of being one true and the other false, share the truth between them; and the nonconforming opinion is needed to supply the remainder of the truth, of which the received doctrine embodies323 only a part. Popular opinions, on subjects not palpable to sense, are often true, but seldom or never the whole truth. They are a part of the truth; sometimes a greater, sometimes a smaller part, but exaggerated, distorted, and disjoined from the truths by which they ought to be accompanied and limited. Heretical opinions, on the other hand, are generally some of these suppressed and neglected truths, bursting the bonds which kept them down, and either seeking reconciliation324 with the truth contained in the common opinion, or fronting it as enemies, and setting themselves up, with similar exclusiveness, as the whole truth. The latter case is hitherto the most frequent, as, in the human mind, one-sidedness has always been the rule, and many-sidedness the exception. Hence, even in revolutions of opinion, one part of the truth usually sets while another rises. Even progress, which ought to superadd, for the most part only substitutes one partial and incomplete truth for another; improvement consisting chiefly in this, that the new fragment of truth is more wanted, more adapted to the needs of the time, than that which it displaces. Such being the partial character of prevailing opinions, even when resting on a true foundation; every opinion which embodies somewhat of the portion of truth which the common opinion omits, ought to be considered precious, with whatever amount of error and confusion that truth may be blended. No sober judge of human affairs will feel bound to be indignant because those who force on our notice truths which we should otherwise have overlooked, overlook some of those which we see. Rather, he will think that so long as popular truth is one-sided, it is more desirable than otherwise that unpopular truth should have one-sided asserters too; such being usually the most energetic, and the most likely to compel reluctant attention to the fragment of wisdom which they proclaim as if it were the whole.
Thus, in the eighteenth century, when nearly all the instructed, and all those of the uninstructed who were led by them, were lost in admiration325 of what is called civilization, and of the marvels326 of modern science, literature, and philosophy, and while greatly overrating the amount of unlikeness between the men of modern and those of ancient times, indulged the belief that the whole of the difference was in their own favor; with what a salutary shock did the paradoxes327 of Rousseau explode like bombshells in the midst, dislocating the compact mass of one-sided opinion, and forcing its elements to recombine in a better form and with additional ingredients. Not that the current opinions were on the whole farther from the truth than Rousseau’s were; on the contrary, they were nearer to it; they contained more of positive truth, and very much less of error. Nevertheless there lay in Rousseau’s doctrine, and has floated down the stream of opinion along with it, a considerable amount of exactly those truths which the popular opinion wanted; and these are the deposit which was left behind when the flood subsided. The superior worth of simplicity328 of life, the enervating329 and demoralizing effect of the trammels and hypocrisies330 of artificial society, are ideas which have never been entirely absent from cultivated minds since Rousseau wrote; and they will in time produce their due effect, though at present needing to be asserted as much as ever, and to be asserted by deeds, for words, on this subject, have nearly exhausted331 their power.
In politics, again, it is almost a commonplace, that a party of order or stability, and a party of progress or reform, are both necessary elements of a healthy state of political life; until the one or the other shall have so enlarged its mental grasp as to be a party equally of order and of progress, knowing and distinguishing what is fit to be preserved from what ought to be swept away. Each of these modes of thinking derives its utility from the deficiencies of the other; but it is in a great measure the opposition of the other that keeps each within the limits of reason and sanity332. Unless opinions favorable to democracy and to aristocracy, to property and to equality, to co-operation and to competition, to luxury and to abstinence, to sociality and individuality, to liberty and discipline, and all the other standing antagonisms333 of practical life, are expressed with equal freedom, and enforced and defended with equal talent and energy, there is no chance of both elements obtaining their due; one scale is sure to go up, and the other down. Truth, in the great practical concerns of life, is so much a question of the reconciling and combining of opposites, that very few have minds sufficiently capacious and impartial259 to make the adjustment with an approach to correctness, and it has to be made by the rough process of a struggle between combatants fighting under hostile banners. On any of the great open questions just enumerated334, if either of the two opinions has a better claim than the other, not merely to be tolerated, but to be encouraged and countenanced335, it is the one which happens at the particular time and place to be in a minority. That is the opinion which, for the time being, represents the neglected interests, the side of human well-being which is in danger of obtaining less than its share. I am aware that there is not, in this country, any intolerance of differences of opinion on most of these topics. They are adduced to show, by admitted and multiplied examples, the universality of the fact, that only through diversity of opinion is there, in the existing state of human intellect, a chance of fair play to all sides of the truth. When there are persons to be found, who form an exception to the apparent unanimity of the world on any subject, even if the world is in the right, it is always probable that dissentients have something worth hearing to say for themselves, and that truth would lose something by their silence.
It may be objected, “But some received principles, especially on the highest and most vital subjects, are more than half-truths. The Christian morality, for instance, is the whole truth on that subject and if any one teaches a morality which varies from it, he is wholly in error.” As this is of all cases the most important in practice, none can be fitter to test the general maxim290. But before pronouncing what Christian morality is or is not, it would be desirable to decide what is meant by Christian morality. If it means the morality of the New Testament, I wonder that any one who derives his knowledge of this from the book itself, can suppose that it was announced, or intended, as a complete doctrine of morals. The Gospel always refers to a preexisting morality, and confines its precepts to the particulars in which that morality was to be corrected, or superseded336 by a wider and higher; expressing itself, moreover, in terms most general, often impossible to be interpreted literally337, and possessing rather the impressiveness of poetry or eloquence338 than the precision of legislation. To extract from it a body of ethical doctrine, has never been possible without eking310 it out from the Old Testament, that is, from a system elaborate indeed, but in many respects barbarous, and intended only for a barbarous people. St. Paul, a declared enemy to this Judaical mode of interpreting the doctrine and filling up the scheme of his Master, equally assumes a preexisting morality, namely, that of the Greeks and Romans; and his advice to Christians is in a great measure a system of accommodation to that; even to the extent of giving an apparent sanction to slavery. What is called Christian, but should rather be termed theological, morality, was not the work of Christ or the Apostles, but is of much later origin, having been gradually built up by the Catholic Church of the first five centuries, and though not implicitly339 adopted by moderns and Protestants, has been much less modified by them than might have been expected. For the most part, indeed, they have contented340 themselves with cutting off the additions which had been made to it in the Middle Ages, each sect supplying the place by fresh additions, adapted to its own character and tendencies. That mankind owe a great debt to this morality, and to its early teachers, I should be the last person to deny; but I do not scruple341 to say of it, that it is, in many important points, incomplete and one-sided, and that unless ideas and feelings, not sanctioned by it, had contributed to the formation of European life and character, human affairs would have been in a worse condition than they now are. Christian morality (so called) has all the characters of a reaction; it is, in great part, a protest against Paganism. Its ideal is negative rather than positive; passive rather than active; Innocence342 rather than Nobleness; Abstinence from Evil, rather than energetic Pursuit of Good: in its precepts (as has been well said) “thou shalt not” predominates unduly343 over “thou shalt.” In its horror of sensuality, it made an idol344 of asceticism345, which has been gradually compromised away into one of legality. It holds out the hope of heaven and the threat of hell, as the appointed and appropriate motives346 to a virtuous life: in this falling far below the best of the ancients, and doing what lies in it to give to human morality an essentially selfish character, by disconnecting each man’s feelings of duty from the interests of his fellow-creatures, except so far as a self-interested inducement is offered to him for consulting them. It is essentially a doctrine of passive obedience347; it inculcates submission348 to all authorities found established; who indeed are not to be actively obeyed when they command what religion forbids, but who are not to be resisted, far less rebelled against, for any amount of wrong to ourselves. And while, in the morality of the best Pagan nations, duty to the State holds even a disproportionate place, infringing349 on the just liberty of the individual; in purely350 Christian ethics351 that grand department of duty is scarcely noticed or acknowledged. It is in the Koran, not the New Testament, that we read the maxim —“A ruler who appoints any man to an office, when there is in his dominions352 another man better qualified353 for it, sins against God and against the State.” What little recognition the idea of obligation to the public obtains in modern morality, is derived354 from Greek and Roman sources, not from Christian; as, even in the morality of private life, whatever exists of magnanimity, high-mindedness, personal dignity, even the sense of honor, is derived from the purely human, not the religious part of our education, and never could have grown out of a standard of ethics in which the only worth, professedly recognized, is that of obedience.
I am as far as any one from pretending that these defects are necessarily inherent in the Christian ethics, in every manner in which it can be conceived, or that the many requisites355 of a complete moral doctrine which it does not contain, do not admit of being reconciled with it. Far less would I insinuate356 this of the doctrines and precepts of Christ himself. I believe that the sayings of Christ are all, that I can see any evidence of their having been intended to be; that they are irreconcilable357 with nothing which a comprehensive morality requires; that everything which is excellent in ethics may be brought within them, with no greater violence to their language than has been done to it by all who have attempted to deduce from them any practical system of conduct whatever. But it is quite consistent with this, to believe that they contain and were meant to contain, only a part of the truth; that many essential elements of the highest morality are among the things which are not provided for, nor intended to be provided for, in the recorded deliverances of the Founder358 of Christianity, and which have been entirely thrown aside in the system of ethics erected359 on the basis of those deliverances by the Christian Church. And this being so, I think it a great error to persist in attempting to find in the Christian doctrine that complete rule for our guidance, which its author intended it to sanction and enforce, but only partially261 to provide. I believe, too, that this narrow theory is becoming a grave practical evil, detracting greatly from the value of the moral training and instruction, which so many wellmeaning persons are now at length exerting themselves to promote. I much fear that by attempting to form the mind and feelings on an exclusively religious type, and discarding those secular360 standards (as for want of a better name they may be called) which heretofore coexisted with and supplemented the Christian ethics, receiving some of its spirit, and infusing into it some of theirs, there will result, and is even now resulting, a low, abject361, servile type of character, which, submit itself as it may to what it deems the Supreme362 Will, is incapable of rising to or sympathizing in the conception of Supreme Goodness. I believe that other ethics than any one which can be evolved from exclusively Christian sources, must exist side by side with Christian ethics to produce the moral regeneration of mankind; and that the Christian system is no exception to the rule that in an imperfect state of the human mind, the interests of truth require a diversity of opinions. It is not necessary that in ceasing to ignore the moral truths not contained in Christianity, men should ignore any of those which it does contain. Such prejudice, or oversight363, when it occurs, is altogether an evil; but it is one from which we cannot hope to be always exempt42, and must be regarded as the price paid for an inestimable good. The exclusive pretension made by a part of the truth to be the whole, must and ought to be protested against, and if a reactionary364 impulse should make the protestors unjust in their turn, this one-sidedness, like the other, may be lamented365, but must be tolerated. If Christians would teach infidels to be just to Christianity, they should themselves be just to infidelity. It can do truth no service to blink the fact, known to all who have the most ordinary acquaintance with literary history, that a large portion of the noblest and most valuable moral teaching has been the work, not only of men who did not know, but of men who knew and rejected, the Christian faith.
I do not pretend that the most unlimited use of the freedom of enunciating all possible opinions would put an end to the evils of religious or philosophical366 sectarianism. Every truth which men of narrow capacity are in earnest about, is sure to be asserted, inculcated, and in many ways even acted on, as if no other truth existed in the world, or at all events none that could limit or qualify the first. I acknowledge that the tendency of all opinions to become sectarian is not cured by the freest discussion, but is often heightened and exacerbated367 thereby368; the truth which ought to have been, but was not, seen, being rejected all the more violently because proclaimed by persons regarded as opponents. But it is not on the impassioned partisan369, it is on the calmer and more disinterested370 bystander, that this collision of opinions works its salutary effect. Not the violent conflict between parts of the truth, but the quiet suppression of half of it, is the formidable evil: there is always hope when people are forced to listen to both sides; it is when they attend only to one that errors harden into prejudices, and truth itself ceases to have the effect of truth, by being exaggerated into falsehood. And since there are few mental attributes more rare than that judicial faculty371 which can sit in intelligent judgment between two sides of a question, of which only one is represented by an advocate before it, truth has no chance but in proportion as every side of it, every opinion which embodies any fraction of the truth, not only finds advocates, but is so advocated as to be listened to.
We have now recognized the necessity to the mental wellbeing of mankind (on which all their other well-being depends) of freedom of opinion, and freedom of the expression of opinion, on four distinct grounds; which we will now briefly372 recapitulate373.
First, if any opinion is compelled to silence, that opinion may, for aught we can certainly know, be true. To deny this is to assume our own infallibility.
Secondly374, though the silenced opinion be an error, it may, and very commonly does, contain a portion of truth; and since the general or prevailing opinion on any object is rarely or never the whole truth, it is only by the collision of adverse375 opinions that the remainder of the truth has any chance of being supplied.
Thirdly, even if the received opinion be not only true, but the whole truth; unless it is suffered to be, and actually is, vigorously and earnestly contested, it will, by most of those who receive it, be held in the manner of a prejudice, with little comprehension or feeling of its rational grounds. And not only this, but, fourthly, the meaning of the doctrine itself will be in danger of being lost, or enfeebled, and deprived of its vital effect on the character and conduct: the dogma becoming a mere formal profession, inefficacious for good, but cumbering the ground, and preventing the growth of any real and heartfelt conviction, from reason or personal experience.
Before quitting the subject of freedom of opinion, it is fit to take notice of those who say, that the free expression of all opinions should be permitted, on condition that the manner be temperate376, and do not pass the bounds of fair discussion. Much might be said on the impossibility of fixing where these supposed bounds are to be placed; for if the test be offence to those whose opinion is attacked, I think experience testifies that this offence is given whenever the attack is telling and powerful, and that every opponent who pushes them hard, and whom they find it difficult to answer, appears to them, if he shows any strong feeling on the subject, an intemperate377 opponent. But this, though an important consideration in a practical point of view, merges378 in a more fundamental objection. Undoubtedly the manner of asserting an opinion, even though it be a true one, may be very objectionable, and may justly incur severe censure379. But the principal offences of the kind are such as it is mostly impossible, unless by accidental self-betrayal, to bring home to conviction. The gravest of them is, to argue sophistically, to suppress facts or arguments, to misstate the elements of the case, or misrepresent the opposite opinion. But all this, even to the most aggravated380 degree, is so continually done in perfect good faith, by persons who are not considered, and in many other respects may not deserve to be considered, ignorant or incompetent381, that it is rarely possible on adequate grounds conscientiously382 to stamp the misrepresentation as morally culpable383; and still less could law presume to interfere384 with this kind of controversial misconduct. With regard to what is commonly meant by intemperate discussion, namely, invective385, sarcasm386, personality, and the like, the denunciation of these weapons would deserve more sympathy if it were ever proposed to interdict them equally to both sides; but it is only desired to restrain the employment of them against the prevailing opinion: against the unprevailing they may not only be used without general disapproval387, but will be likely to obtain for him who uses them the praise of honest zeal169 and righteous indignation. Yet whatever mischief arises from their use, is greatest when they are employed against the comparatively defenceless; and whatever unfair advantage can be derived by any opinion from this mode of asserting it, accrues388 almost exclusively to received opinions. The worst offence of this kind which can be committed by a polemic389, is to stigmatize390 those who hold the contrary opinion as bad and immoral men. To calumny391 of this sort, those who hold any unpopular opinion are peculiarly exposed, because they are in general few and uninfluential, and nobody but themselves feels much interest in seeing justice done them; but this weapon is, from the nature of the case, denied to those who attack a prevailing opinion: they can neither use it with safety to themselves, nor if they could, would it do anything but recoil392 on their own cause. In general, opinions contrary to those commonly received can only obtain a hearing by studied moderation of language, and the most cautious avoidance of unnecessary offence, from which they hardly ever deviate393 even in a slight degree without losing ground: while unmeasured vituperation employed on the side of the prevailing opinion, really does deter2 people from professing contrary opinions, and from listening to those who profess them. For the interest, therefore, of truth and justice, it is far more important to restrain this employment of vituperative394 language than the other; and, for example, if it were necessary to choose, there would be much more need to discourage offensive attacks on infidelity, than on religion. It is, however, obvious that law and authority have no business with restraining either, while opinion ought, in every instance, to determine its verdict by the circumstances of the individual case; condemning395 every one, on whichever side of the argument he places himself, in whose mode of advocacy either want of candor396, or malignity397, bigotry or intolerance of feeling manifest themselves, but not inferring these vices398 from the side which a person takes, though it be the contrary side of the question to our own; and giving merited honor to every one, whatever opinion he may hold, who has calmness to see and honesty to state what his opponents and their opinions really are, exaggerating nothing to their discredit399, keeping nothing back which tells, or can be supposed to tell, in their favor. This is the real morality of public discussion; and if often violated, I am happy to think that there are many controversialists who to a great extent observe it, and a still greater number who conscientiously strive towards it.
点击收听单词发音
1 corrupt | |
v.贿赂,收买;adj.腐败的,贪污的 | |
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2 deter | |
vt.阻止,使不敢,吓住 | |
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3 doctrines | |
n.教条( doctrine的名词复数 );教义;学说;(政府政策的)正式声明 | |
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4 doctrine | |
n.教义;主义;学说 | |
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5 triumphantly | |
ad.得意洋洋地;得胜地;成功地 | |
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6 specially | |
adv.特定地;特殊地;明确地 | |
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7 pro | |
n.赞成,赞成的意见,赞成者 | |
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8 con | |
n.反对的观点,反对者,反对票,肺病;vt.精读,学习,默记;adv.反对地,从反面;adj.欺诈的 | |
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9 apprehended | |
逮捕,拘押( apprehend的过去式和过去分词 ); 理解 | |
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10 entirely | |
ad.全部地,完整地;完全地,彻底地 | |
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11 coercion | |
n.强制,高压统治 | |
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12 noxious | |
adj.有害的,有毒的;使道德败坏的,讨厌的 | |
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13 opposition | |
n.反对,敌对 | |
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14 justified | |
a.正当的,有理的 | |
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15 obstructed | |
阻塞( obstruct的过去式和过去分词 ); 堵塞; 阻碍; 阻止 | |
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16 enjoyment | |
n.乐趣;享有;享用 | |
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17 inflicted | |
把…强加给,使承受,遭受( inflict的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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18 inflict | |
vt.(on)把…强加给,使遭受,使承担 | |
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19 peculiar | |
adj.古怪的,异常的;特殊的,特有的 | |
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20 posterity | |
n.后裔,子孙,后代 | |
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21 dissent | |
n./v.不同意,持异议 | |
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22 stifle | |
vt.使窒息;闷死;扼杀;抑止,阻止 | |
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23 stifling | |
a.令人窒息的 | |
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24 tempted | |
v.怂恿(某人)干不正当的事;冒…的险(tempt的过去分词) | |
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25 condemnation | |
n.谴责; 定罪 | |
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26 judgment | |
n.审判;判断力,识别力,看法,意见 | |
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27 unlimited | |
adj.无限的,不受控制的,无条件的 | |
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28 defer | |
vt.推迟,拖延;vi.(to)遵从,听从,服从 | |
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29 deference | |
n.尊重,顺从;敬意 | |
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30 situated | |
adj.坐落在...的,处于某种境地的 | |
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31 habitual | |
adj.习惯性的;通常的,惯常的 | |
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32 habitually | |
ad.习惯地,通常地 | |
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33 solitary | |
adj.孤独的,独立的,荒凉的;n.隐士 | |
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34 repose | |
v.(使)休息;n.安息 | |
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35 implicit | |
a.暗示的,含蓄的,不明晰的,绝对的 | |
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36 sect | |
n.派别,宗教,学派,派系 | |
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37 sects | |
n.宗派,教派( sect的名词复数 ) | |
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38 mere | |
adj.纯粹的;仅仅,只不过 | |
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39 decided | |
adj.决定了的,坚决的;明显的,明确的 | |
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40 Buddhist | |
adj./n.佛教的,佛教徒 | |
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41 exemption | |
n.豁免,免税额,免除 | |
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42 exempt | |
adj.免除的;v.使免除;n.免税者,被免除义务者 | |
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43 incumbent | |
adj.成为责任的,有义务的;现任的,在职的 | |
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44 acting | |
n.演戏,行为,假装;adj.代理的,临时的,演出用的 | |
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45 conscientious | |
adj.审慎正直的,认真的,本着良心的 | |
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46 valid | |
adj.有确实根据的;有效的;正当的,合法的 | |
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47 fully | |
adv.完全地,全部地,彻底地;充分地 | |
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48 conscientiousness | |
责任心 | |
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49 cowardice | |
n.胆小,怯懦 | |
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50 scattered | |
adj.分散的,稀疏的;散步的;疏疏落落的 | |
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51 persecuted | |
(尤指宗教或政治信仰的)迫害(~sb. for sth.)( persecute的过去式和过去分词 ); 烦扰,困扰或骚扰某人 | |
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52 persecute | |
vt.迫害,虐待;纠缠,骚扰 | |
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53 provocation | |
n.激怒,刺激,挑拨,挑衅的事物,激怒的原因 | |
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54 pervert | |
n.堕落者,反常者;vt.误用,滥用;使人堕落,使入邪路 | |
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55 justifies | |
证明…有理( justify的第三人称单数 ); 为…辩护; 对…作出解释; 为…辩解(或辩护) | |
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56 faculties | |
n.能力( faculty的名词复数 );全体教职员;技巧;院 | |
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57 standing | |
n.持续,地位;adj.永久的,不动的,直立的,不流动的 | |
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58 incapable | |
adj.无能力的,不能做某事的 | |
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59 eminent | |
adj.显赫的,杰出的,有名的,优良的 | |
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60 justify | |
vt.证明…正当(或有理),为…辩护 | |
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61 rectifying | |
改正,矫正( rectify的现在分词 ); 精馏; 蒸流; 整流 | |
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62 expound | |
v.详述;解释;阐述 | |
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63 collating | |
v.校对( collate的现在分词 );整理;核对;整理(文件或书等) | |
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64 hesitation | |
n.犹豫,踌躇 | |
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65 posthumous | |
adj.遗腹的;父亡后出生的;死后的,身后的 | |
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66 attain | |
vt.达到,获得,完成 | |
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67 attained | |
(通常经过努力)实现( attain的过去式和过去分词 ); 达到; 获得; 达到(某年龄、水平、状况) | |
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68 attainable | |
a.可达到的,可获得的 | |
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69 attaining | |
(通常经过努力)实现( attain的现在分词 ); 达到; 获得; 达到(某年龄、水平、状况) | |
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70 rote | |
n.死记硬背,生搬硬套 | |
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71 alleged | |
a.被指控的,嫌疑的 | |
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72 well-being | |
n.安康,安乐,幸福 | |
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73 bind | |
vt.捆,包扎;装订;约束;使凝固;vi.变硬 | |
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74 justification | |
n.正当的理由;辩解的理由 | |
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75 condemned | |
adj. 被责难的, 被宣告有罪的 动词condemn的过去式和过去分词 | |
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76 culpability | |
n.苛责,有罪 | |
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77 extenuation | |
n.减轻罪孽的借口;酌情减轻;细 | |
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78 guilt | |
n.犯罪;内疚;过失,罪责 | |
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79 illustrate | |
v.举例说明,阐明;图解,加插图 | |
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80 mischief | |
n.损害,伤害,危害;恶作剧,捣蛋,胡闹 | |
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81 favourable | |
adj.赞成的,称赞的,有利的,良好的,顺利的 | |
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82 impugned | |
v.非难,指谪( impugn的过去式和过去分词 );对…有怀疑 | |
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83 antagonist | |
n.敌人,对抗者,对手 | |
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84 sufficiently | |
adv.足够地,充分地 | |
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85 undertaking | |
n.保证,许诺,事业 | |
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86 reprobate | |
n.无赖汉;堕落的人 | |
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87 pretension | |
n.要求;自命,自称;自负 | |
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88 forth | |
adv.向前;向外,往外 | |
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89 persuasion | |
n.劝说;说服;持有某种信仰的宗派 | |
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90 immoral | |
adj.不道德的,淫荡的,荒淫的,有伤风化的 | |
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91 immorality | |
n. 不道德, 无道义 | |
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92 impiety | |
n.不敬;不孝 | |
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93 pious | |
adj.虔诚的;道貌岸然的 | |
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94 dread | |
vt.担忧,忧虑;惧怕,不敢;n.担忧,畏惧 | |
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95 astonishment | |
n.惊奇,惊异 | |
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96 memorable | |
adj.值得回忆的,难忘的,特别的,显著的 | |
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97 invoked | |
v.援引( invoke的过去式和过去分词 );行使(权利等);祈求救助;恳求 | |
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98 interpretation | |
n.解释,说明,描述;艺术处理 | |
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99 abounding | |
adj.丰富的,大量的v.大量存在,充满,富于( abound的现在分词 ) | |
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100 virtuous | |
adj.有品德的,善良的,贞洁的,有效力的 | |
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101 virtue | |
n.德行,美德;贞操;优点;功效,效力 | |
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102 judicious | |
adj.明智的,明断的,能作出明智决定的 | |
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103 ethical | |
adj.伦理的,道德的,合乎道德的 | |
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104 outweighs | |
v.在重量上超过( outweigh的第三人称单数 );在重要性或价值方面超过 | |
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105 outweigh | |
vt.比...更重,...更重要 | |
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106 judicial | |
adj.司法的,法庭的,审判的,明断的,公正的 | |
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107 iniquity | |
n.邪恶;不公正 | |
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108 grandeur | |
n.伟大,崇高,宏伟,庄严,豪华 | |
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109 homage | |
n.尊敬,敬意,崇敬 | |
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110 almighty | |
adj.全能的,万能的;很大的,很强的 | |
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111 ignominiously | |
adv.耻辱地,屈辱地,丢脸地 | |
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112 benefactor | |
n. 恩人,行善的人,捐助人 | |
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113 prodigy | |
n.惊人的事物,奇迹,神童,天才,预兆 | |
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114 lamentable | |
adj.令人惋惜的,悔恨的 | |
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115 possessed | |
adj.疯狂的;拥有的,占有的 | |
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116 patriotic | |
adj.爱国的,有爱国心的 | |
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117 profess | |
v.声称,冒称,以...为业,正式接受入教,表明信仰 | |
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118 shudder | |
v.战粟,震动,剧烈地摇晃;n.战粟,抖动 | |
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119 precisely | |
adv.恰好,正好,精确地,细致地 | |
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120 Christian | |
adj.基督教徒的;n.基督教徒 | |
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121 Christians | |
n.基督教徒( Christian的名词复数 ) | |
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122 martyrs | |
n.martyr的复数形式;烈士( martyr的名词复数 );殉道者;殉教者;乞怜者(向人诉苦以博取同情) | |
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123 monarch | |
n.帝王,君主,最高统治者 | |
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124 civilized | |
a.有教养的,文雅的 | |
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125 reigned | |
vi.当政,统治(reign的过去式形式) | |
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126 attainments | |
成就,造诣; 获得( attainment的名词复数 ); 达到; 造诣; 成就 | |
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127 embody | |
vt.具体表达,使具体化;包含,收录 | |
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128 penetrated | |
adj. 击穿的,鞭辟入里的 动词penetrate的过去式和过去分词形式 | |
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129 penetrate | |
v.透(渗)入;刺入,刺穿;洞察,了解 | |
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130 reverence | |
n.敬畏,尊敬,尊严;Reverence:对某些基督教神职人员的尊称;v.尊敬,敬畏,崇敬 | |
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131 credible | |
adj.可信任的,可靠的 | |
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132 purported | |
adj.传说的,谣传的v.声称是…,(装得)像是…的样子( purport的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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133 renovating | |
翻新,修复,整修( renovate的现在分词 ) | |
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134 abate | |
vi.(风势,疼痛等)减弱,减轻,减退 | |
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135 amiable | |
adj.和蔼可亲的,友善的,亲切的 | |
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136 authorized | |
a.委任的,许可的 | |
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137 persecution | |
n. 迫害,烦扰 | |
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138 tragical | |
adj. 悲剧的, 悲剧性的 | |
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139 auspices | |
n.资助,赞助 | |
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140 atheism | |
n.无神论,不信神 | |
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141 promulgation | |
n.颁布 | |
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142 versed | |
adj. 精通,熟练 | |
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143 abstain | |
v.自制,戒绝,弃权,避免 | |
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144 joint | |
adj.联合的,共同的;n.关节,接合处;v.连接,贴合 | |
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145 ordeal | |
n.苦难经历,(尤指对品格、耐力的)严峻考验 | |
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146 penal | |
adj.刑罚的;刑法上的 | |
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147 mischievous | |
adj.调皮的,恶作剧的,有害的,伤人的 | |
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148 remarkable | |
adj.显著的,异常的,非凡的,值得注意的 | |
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149 justifiably | |
adv.无可非议地 | |
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150 intentionally | |
ad.故意地,有意地 | |
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151 generosity | |
n.大度,慷慨,慷慨的行为 | |
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152 dealing | |
n.经商方法,待人态度 | |
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153 previously | |
adv.以前,先前(地) | |
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154 bestowed | |
赠给,授予( bestow的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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155 requited | |
v.报答( requite的过去式和过去分词 );酬谢;回报;报复 | |
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156 vilest | |
adj.卑鄙的( vile的最高级 );可耻的;极坏的;非常讨厌的 | |
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157 justifiable | |
adj.有理由的,无可非议的 | |
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158 propounder | |
n.提议者,建议者,[法] 提出遗嘱者 | |
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159 tightened | |
收紧( tighten的过去式和过去分词 ); (使)变紧; (使)绷紧; 加紧 | |
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160 benefactors | |
n.捐助者,施主( benefactor的名词复数 );恩人 | |
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161 teems | |
v.充满( teem的第三人称单数 );到处都是;(指水、雨等)暴降;倾注 | |
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162 extirpate | |
v.除尽,灭绝 | |
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163 extirpated | |
v.消灭,灭绝( extirpate的过去式和过去分词 );根除 | |
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164 lasting | |
adj.永久的,永恒的;vbl.持续,维持 | |
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165 intervals | |
n.[军事]间隔( interval的名词复数 );间隔时间;[数学]区间;(戏剧、电影或音乐会的)幕间休息 | |
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166 prevailing | |
adj.盛行的;占优势的;主要的 | |
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167 dungeon | |
n.地牢,土牢 | |
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168 zealous | |
adj.狂热的,热心的 | |
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169 zeal | |
n.热心,热情,热忱 | |
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170 slew | |
v.(使)旋转;n.大量,许多 | |
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171 infliction | |
n.(强加于人身的)痛苦,刑罚 | |
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172 obnoxious | |
adj.极恼人的,讨人厌的,可憎的 | |
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173 imprisonment | |
n.关押,监禁,坐牢 | |
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174 logic | |
n.逻辑(学);逻辑性 | |
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175 redress | |
n.赔偿,救济,矫正;v.纠正,匡正,革除 | |
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176 outlaws | |
歹徒,亡命之徒( outlaw的名词复数 ); 逃犯 | |
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177 impunity | |
n.(惩罚、损失、伤害等的)免除 | |
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178 betokens | |
v.预示,表示( betoken的第三人称单数 ) | |
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179 assent | |
v.批准,认可;n.批准,认可 | |
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180 distinguished | |
adj.卓越的,杰出的,著名的 | |
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181 virtues | |
美德( virtue的名词复数 ); 德行; 优点; 长处 | |
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182 pretence | |
n.假装,作假;借口,口实;虚伪;虚饰 | |
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183 liars | |
说谎者( liar的名词复数 ) | |
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184 testimony | |
n.证词;见证,证明 | |
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185 obloquy | |
n.斥责,大骂 | |
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186 detested | |
v.憎恶,嫌恶,痛恨( detest的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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187 creed | |
n.信条;信念,纲领 | |
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188 absurdity | |
n.荒谬,愚蠢;谬论 | |
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189 professed | |
公开声称的,伪称的,已立誓信教的 | |
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190 hatred | |
n.憎恶,憎恨,仇恨 | |
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191 relic | |
n.神圣的遗物,遗迹,纪念物 | |
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192 peculiarity | |
n.独特性,特色;特殊的东西;怪癖 | |
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193 drawn | |
v.拖,拉,拔出;adj.憔悴的,紧张的 | |
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194 preposterous | |
adj.荒谬的,可笑的 | |
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195 ruffled | |
adj. 有褶饰边的, 起皱的 动词ruffle的过去式和过去分词 | |
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196 resuscitate | |
v.使复活,使苏醒 | |
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197 revival | |
n.复兴,复苏,(精力、活力等的)重振 | |
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198 bigotry | |
n.偏见,偏执,持偏见的行为[态度]等 | |
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199 leaven | |
v.使发酵;n.酵母;影响 | |
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200 abides | |
容忍( abide的第三人称单数 ); 等候; 逗留; 停留 | |
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201 actively | |
adv.积极地,勤奋地 | |
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202 persecuting | |
(尤指宗教或政治信仰的)迫害(~sb. for sth.)( persecute的现在分词 ); 烦扰,困扰或骚扰某人 | |
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203 stigma | |
n.耻辱,污名;(花的)柱头 | |
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204 avowal | |
n.公开宣称,坦白承认 | |
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205 incur | |
vt.招致,蒙受,遭遇 | |
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206 pecuniary | |
adj.金钱的;金钱上的 | |
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207 imprisoned | |
下狱,监禁( imprison的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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208 formerly | |
adv.从前,以前 | |
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209 firmament | |
n.苍穹;最高层 | |
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210 diffusion | |
n.流布;普及;散漫 | |
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211 lighting | |
n.照明,光线的明暗,舞台灯光 | |
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212 deceptive | |
adj.骗人的,造成假象的,靠不住的 | |
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213 imprisoning | |
v.下狱,监禁( imprison的现在分词 ) | |
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214 interdict | |
v.限制;禁止;n.正式禁止;禁令 | |
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215 afflicted | |
使受痛苦,折磨( afflict的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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216 malady | |
n.病,疾病(通常做比喻) | |
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217 pacification | |
n. 讲和,绥靖,平定 | |
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218 premises | |
n.建筑物,房屋 | |
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219 renounced | |
v.声明放弃( renounce的过去式和过去分词 );宣布放弃;宣布与…决裂;宣布摒弃 | |
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220 adorned | |
[计]被修饰的 | |
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221 speculation | |
n.思索,沉思;猜测;投机 | |
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222 reticence | |
n.沉默,含蓄 | |
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223 deteriorated | |
恶化,变坏( deteriorate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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224 inquiry | |
n.打听,询问,调查,查问 | |
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225 cramped | |
a.狭窄的 | |
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226 cram | |
v.填塞,塞满,临时抱佛脚,为考试而学习 | |
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227 heresy | |
n.异端邪说;异教 | |
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228 compute | |
v./n.计算,估计 | |
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229 promising | |
adj.有希望的,有前途的 | |
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230 ingenuity | |
n.别出心裁;善于发明创造 | |
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231 solely | |
adv.仅仅,唯一地 | |
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232 stature | |
n.(高度)水平,(高度)境界,身高,身材 | |
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233 controversy | |
n.争论,辩论,争吵 | |
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234 kindle | |
v.点燃,着火 | |
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235 speculative | |
adj.思索性的,暝想性的,推理的 | |
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236 yoke | |
n.轭;支配;v.给...上轭,连接,使成配偶 | |
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237 canvassed | |
v.(在政治方面)游说( canvass的过去式和过去分词 );调查(如选举前选民的)意见;为讨论而提出(意见等);详细检查 | |
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238 unwillingly | |
adv.不情愿地 | |
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239 assents | |
同意,赞同( assent的名词复数 ) | |
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240 semblance | |
n.外貌,外表 | |
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241 waiving | |
v.宣布放弃( waive的现在分词 );搁置;推迟;放弃(权利、要求等) | |
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242 superstition | |
n.迷信,迷信行为 | |
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243 enunciate | |
v.发音;(清楚地)表达 | |
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244 cultivation | |
n.耕作,培养,栽培(法),养成 | |
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245 controverted | |
v.争论,反驳,否定( controvert的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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246 demonstrations | |
证明( demonstration的名词复数 ); 表明; 表达; 游行示威 | |
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247 undoubtedly | |
adv.确实地,无疑地 | |
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248 infinitely | |
adv.无限地,无穷地 | |
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249 dispelling | |
v.驱散,赶跑( dispel的现在分词 ) | |
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250 orator | |
n.演说者,演讲者,雄辩家 | |
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251 antiquity | |
n.古老;高龄;古物,古迹 | |
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252 intensity | |
n.强烈,剧烈;强度;烈度 | |
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253 forensic | |
adj.法庭的,雄辩的 | |
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254 inclination | |
n.倾斜;点头;弯腰;斜坡;倾度;倾向;爱好 | |
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255 adversaries | |
n.对手,敌手( adversary的名词复数 ) | |
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256 plausible | |
adj.似真实的,似乎有理的,似乎可信的 | |
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257 persuasive | |
adj.有说服力的,能说得使人相信的 | |
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258 apparently | |
adv.显然地;表面上,似乎 | |
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259 impartial | |
adj.(in,to)公正的,无偏见的 | |
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260 impartially | |
adv.公平地,无私地 | |
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261 partially | |
adv.部分地,从某些方面讲 | |
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262 skilful | |
(=skillful)adj.灵巧的,熟练的 | |
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263 conjure | |
v.恳求,祈求;变魔术,变戏法 | |
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264 remains | |
n.剩余物,残留物;遗体,遗迹 | |
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265 accomplished | |
adj.有才艺的;有造诣的;达到了的 | |
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266 advantageous | |
adj.有利的;有帮助的 | |
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267 clergy | |
n.[总称]牧师,神职人员 | |
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268 confided | |
v.吐露(秘密,心事等)( confide的过去式和过去分词 );(向某人)吐露(隐私、秘密等) | |
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269 meritoriously | |
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270 laity | |
n.俗人;门外汉 | |
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271 elite | |
n.精英阶层;实力集团;adj.杰出的,卓越的 | |
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272 professing | |
声称( profess的现在分词 ); 宣称; 公开表明; 信奉 | |
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273 meditated | |
深思,沉思,冥想( meditate的过去式和过去分词 ); 内心策划,考虑 | |
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274 illustrated | |
adj. 有插图的,列举的 动词illustrate的过去式和过去分词 | |
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275 creeds | |
(尤指宗教)信条,教条( creed的名词复数 ) | |
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276 vitality | |
n.活力,生命力,效力 | |
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277 disciples | |
n.信徒( disciple的名词复数 );门徒;耶稣的信徒;(尤指)耶稣十二门徒之一 | |
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278 conversion | |
n.转化,转换,转变 | |
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279 subsided | |
v.(土地)下陷(因在地下采矿)( subside的过去式和过去分词 );减弱;下降至较低或正常水平;一下子坐在椅子等上 | |
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280 acquiescence | |
n.默许;顺从 | |
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281 lamenting | |
adj.悲伤的,悲哀的v.(为…)哀悼,痛哭,悲伤( lament的现在分词 ) | |
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282 apprehension | |
n.理解,领悟;逮捕,拘捕;忧虑 | |
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283 nominally | |
在名义上,表面地; 应名儿 | |
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284 thoroughly | |
adv.完全地,彻底地,十足地 | |
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285 imbued | |
v.使(某人/某事)充满或激起(感情等)( imbue的过去式和过去分词 );使充满;灌输;激发(强烈感情或品质等) | |
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286 hereditary | |
adj.遗传的,遗传性的,可继承的,世袭的 | |
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287 torpid | |
adj.麻痹的,麻木的,迟钝的 | |
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288 dispensed | |
v.分配( dispense的过去式和过去分词 );施与;配(药) | |
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289 petrifying | |
v.吓呆,使麻木( petrify的现在分词 );使吓呆,使惊呆;僵化 | |
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290 maxim | |
n.格言,箴言 | |
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291 maxims | |
n.格言,座右铭( maxim的名词复数 ) | |
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292 precepts | |
n.规诫,戒律,箴言( precept的名词复数 ) | |
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293 testament | |
n.遗嘱;证明 | |
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294 vouchsafed | |
v.给予,赐予( vouchsafe的过去式和过去分词 );允诺 | |
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295 judgments | |
判断( judgment的名词复数 ); 鉴定; 评价; 审判 | |
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296 humble | |
adj.谦卑的,恭顺的;地位低下的;v.降低,贬低 | |
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297 lauded | |
v.称赞,赞美( laud的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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298 pelt | |
v.投掷,剥皮,抨击,开火 | |
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299 infinity | |
n.无限,无穷,大量 | |
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300 domain | |
n.(活动等)领域,范围;领地,势力范围 | |
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301 strictly | |
adv.严厉地,严格地;严密地 | |
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302 bland | |
adj.淡而无味的,温和的,无刺激性的 | |
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303 prudence | |
n.谨慎,精明,节俭 | |
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304 calamity | |
n.灾害,祸患,不幸事件 | |
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305 slumber | |
n.睡眠,沉睡状态 | |
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306 unanimity | |
n.全体一致,一致同意 | |
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307 consolidation | |
n.合并,巩固 | |
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308 inevitable | |
adj.不可避免的,必然发生的 | |
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309 trifling | |
adj.微不足道的;没什么价值的 | |
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310 eking | |
v.(靠节省用量)使…的供应持久( eke的现在分词 );节约使用;竭力维持生计;勉强度日 | |
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311 essentially | |
adv.本质上,实质上,基本上 | |
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312 consummate | |
adj.完美的;v.成婚;使完美 [反]baffle | |
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313 incurable | |
adj.不能医治的,不能矫正的,无救的;n.不治的病人,无救的人 | |
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314 derives | |
v.得到( derive的第三人称单数 );(从…中)得到获得;源于;(从…中)提取 | |
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315 besetting | |
adj.不断攻击的v.困扰( beset的现在分词 );不断围攻;镶;嵌 | |
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316 accomplishment | |
n.完成,成就,(pl.)造诣,技能 | |
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317 antagonists | |
对立[对抗] 者,对手,敌手( antagonist的名词复数 ); 对抗肌; 对抗药 | |
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318 disparage | |
v.贬抑,轻蔑 | |
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319 worthy | |
adj.(of)值得的,配得上的;有价值的 | |
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320 systematically | |
adv.有系统地 | |
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321 labor | |
n.劳动,努力,工作,劳工;分娩;vi.劳动,努力,苦干;vt.详细分析;麻烦 | |
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322 advancement | |
n.前进,促进,提升 | |
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323 embodies | |
v.表现( embody的第三人称单数 );象征;包括;包含 | |
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324 reconciliation | |
n.和解,和谐,一致 | |
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325 admiration | |
n.钦佩,赞美,羡慕 | |
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326 marvels | |
n.奇迹( marvel的名词复数 );令人惊奇的事物(或事例);不平凡的成果;成就v.惊奇,对…感到惊奇( marvel的第三人称单数 ) | |
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327 paradoxes | |
n.似非而是的隽语,看似矛盾而实际却可能正确的说法( paradox的名词复数 );用于语言文学中的上述隽语;有矛盾特点的人[事物,情况] | |
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328 simplicity | |
n.简单,简易;朴素;直率,单纯 | |
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329 enervating | |
v.使衰弱,使失去活力( enervate的现在分词 ) | |
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330 hypocrisies | |
n.伪善,虚伪( hypocrisy的名词复数 ) | |
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331 exhausted | |
adj.极其疲惫的,精疲力尽的 | |
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332 sanity | |
n.心智健全,神智正常,判断正确 | |
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333 antagonisms | |
对抗,敌对( antagonism的名词复数 ) | |
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334 enumerated | |
v.列举,枚举,数( enumerate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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335 countenanced | |
v.支持,赞同,批准( countenance的过去式 ) | |
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336 superseded | |
[医]被代替的,废弃的 | |
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337 literally | |
adv.照字面意义,逐字地;确实 | |
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338 eloquence | |
n.雄辩;口才,修辞 | |
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339 implicitly | |
adv. 含蓄地, 暗中地, 毫不保留地 | |
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340 contented | |
adj.满意的,安心的,知足的 | |
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341 scruple | |
n./v.顾忌,迟疑 | |
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342 innocence | |
n.无罪;天真;无害 | |
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343 unduly | |
adv.过度地,不适当地 | |
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344 idol | |
n.偶像,红人,宠儿 | |
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345 asceticism | |
n.禁欲主义 | |
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346 motives | |
n.动机,目的( motive的名词复数 ) | |
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347 obedience | |
n.服从,顺从 | |
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348 submission | |
n.服从,投降;温顺,谦虚;提出 | |
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349 infringing | |
v.违反(规章等)( infringe的现在分词 );侵犯(某人的权利);侵害(某人的自由、权益等) | |
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350 purely | |
adv.纯粹地,完全地 | |
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351 ethics | |
n.伦理学;伦理观,道德标准 | |
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352 dominions | |
统治权( dominion的名词复数 ); 领土; 疆土; 版图 | |
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353 qualified | |
adj.合格的,有资格的,胜任的,有限制的 | |
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354 derived | |
vi.起源;由来;衍生;导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 );(从…中)得到获得;源于;(从…中)提取 | |
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355 requisites | |
n.必要的事物( requisite的名词复数 ) | |
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356 insinuate | |
vt.含沙射影地说,暗示 | |
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357 irreconcilable | |
adj.(指人)难和解的,势不两立的 | |
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358 Founder | |
n.创始者,缔造者 | |
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359 ERECTED | |
adj. 直立的,竖立的,笔直的 vt. 使 ... 直立,建立 | |
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360 secular | |
n.牧师,凡人;adj.世俗的,现世的,不朽的 | |
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361 abject | |
adj.极可怜的,卑屈的 | |
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362 supreme | |
adj.极度的,最重要的;至高的,最高的 | |
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363 oversight | |
n.勘漏,失察,疏忽 | |
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364 reactionary | |
n.反动者,反动主义者;adj.反动的,反动主义的,反对改革的 | |
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365 lamented | |
adj.被哀悼的,令人遗憾的v.(为…)哀悼,痛哭,悲伤( lament的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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366 philosophical | |
adj.哲学家的,哲学上的,达观的 | |
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367 exacerbated | |
v.使恶化,使加重( exacerbate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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368 thereby | |
adv.因此,从而 | |
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369 partisan | |
adj.党派性的;游击队的;n.游击队员;党徒 | |
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370 disinterested | |
adj.不关心的,不感兴趣的 | |
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371 faculty | |
n.才能;学院,系;(学院或系的)全体教学人员 | |
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372 briefly | |
adv.简单地,简短地 | |
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373 recapitulate | |
v.节述要旨,择要说明 | |
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374 secondly | |
adv.第二,其次 | |
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375 adverse | |
adj.不利的;有害的;敌对的,不友好的 | |
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376 temperate | |
adj.温和的,温带的,自我克制的,不过分的 | |
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377 intemperate | |
adj.无节制的,放纵的 | |
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378 merges | |
(使)混合( merge的第三人称单数 ); 相融; 融入; 渐渐消失在某物中 | |
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379 censure | |
v./n.责备;非难;责难 | |
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380 aggravated | |
使恶化( aggravate的过去式和过去分词 ); 使更严重; 激怒; 使恼火 | |
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381 incompetent | |
adj.无能力的,不能胜任的 | |
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382 conscientiously | |
adv.凭良心地;认真地,负责尽职地;老老实实 | |
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383 culpable | |
adj.有罪的,该受谴责的 | |
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384 interfere | |
v.(in)干涉,干预;(with)妨碍,打扰 | |
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385 invective | |
n.痛骂,恶意抨击 | |
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386 sarcasm | |
n.讥讽,讽刺,嘲弄,反话 (adj.sarcastic) | |
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387 disapproval | |
n.反对,不赞成 | |
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388 accrues | |
v.增加( accrue的第三人称单数 );(通过自然增长)产生;获得;(使钱款、债务)积累 | |
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389 polemic | |
n.争论,论战 | |
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390 stigmatize | |
v.污蔑,玷污 | |
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391 calumny | |
n.诽谤,污蔑,中伤 | |
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392 recoil | |
vi.退却,退缩,畏缩 | |
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393 deviate | |
v.(from)背离,偏离 | |
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394 vituperative | |
adj.谩骂的;斥责的 | |
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395 condemning | |
v.(通常因道义上的原因而)谴责( condemn的现在分词 );宣判;宣布…不能使用;迫使…陷于不幸的境地 | |
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396 candor | |
n.坦白,率真 | |
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397 malignity | |
n.极度的恶意,恶毒;(病的)恶性 | |
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398 vices | |
缺陷( vice的名词复数 ); 恶习; 不道德行为; 台钳 | |
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399 discredit | |
vt.使不可置信;n.丧失信义;不信,怀疑 | |
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